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Abstract
The thesis examines the processes of coalition formation and maintenance involving the 
SPD and Green party at the sub-national level in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The theoretical component builds upon formal models of coalition formation to posit a 
New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance which balances office-seeking 
and policy-oriented Payoffs as a determinant of coalition behaviour. To this end, it uses 
the 'policy network1 idiom of public policy analysis (with an emphasis on 
environmental policy) as a secondary theoretical framework. The theoretical 
framework is used in tandem with empirical data on institutional processes, policy 
outputs and outcomes, party political behaviour and value-orientation within the 
electorate.
The empirical component centres around the research question: to what extent have the 
Greens assumed a 'normal 1 role within the German party system? Such a 'normal 1 role' 
means that the Greens' strategic behaviour can be interpreted as the rational pursuit of a 
specific bundle of (office-seeking and policy-oriented) preferences. The thesis argues 
that this is indeed the case and that these preferences - and the Greens strategic 
behaviour in pursuit of them - are consistent and predictable. The thesis concludes that 
the Greens have become increasingly pragmatic over time in pursuit of their 
preferences, although their strategic options (and those of the SPD) are constrained by 
the ability of the party's parliamentarians to mobilise the Basis in support of their 
strategic goals.
Part I: Theory
(I) CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW & A 
NEW MODEL OF COALITION FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW
1.1. Arguments and Research Design
1.1.1. Preamble
The thesis examines the processes of coalition formation and maintenance involving the 
social-democratic SPD and the Green party at the sub-national level in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Such coalition arrangements have generally taken place between the 
SPD and the Greens alone ('Red-Green' coalitions), but have also been formed with the 
liberal FDP as a third party ('Traffic-Light' coalitions). The research utilises political 
science theories of (I) coalition formation and maintenance and (II) 'networks' of policy 
actors (particularly in the field of environmental policy) in order to explain Red-Green 
coalitions within the context of the wider processes of political change taking place in the 
Federal Republic.
1.1.2. The Research Question
The Research Question asks to what extent the Greens have assumed a 'normal' political 
role within the party system? Such a 'normal' role would mean that their strategic 
behaviour can be predicted as a function of the rational pursuit of a bundle of group-related 
preferences. These preferences are either instrumental (office-seeking) or ideological 
(related to policy processes and outcomes). However, it is hard to demonstrate significant 
differences in policy outcomes between different German Lander, regardless of political
'colour', because they are hard to establish empirically and involve counter-factual 
argument (too many 'what if?' questions). Therefore, the thesis assumes that policy- 
related payoffs will be as much a function of the process of policy-making as of its 
content. As a subsidiary question, the thesis examines the extent to which the Greens 
have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own client groups and break down 
established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework. The thesis will 
concentrate on a number of cases at the Lander level.
1.1.3. The Analytical Framework
The thesis will utilise and build upon a number of formal hypothetico-deductive models of 
coalition behaviour in order to posit a new model of coalition formation. A more 
comprehensive literature review follows later in the chapter.
The theoretical 'idiom' of analysis - to use Albert Weale's [1992] terminology - can be 
broadly categorised as being within the rational choice tradition. This means that the focus 
will fall primarily upon the individual agent or, as is the case when one is studying one or 
more political parties, a group or groups of agents and the strategies they employ in order 
to pursue their preferences. However, in its purest theoretical form, rational choice 
models take no account of the nature of preference acquisition and the institutional norms 
that shape this process. Therefore, if one was to embark upon an essentially theoretical 
analysis of coalition behaviour, one would be required to ignore a great deal of contextual 
data in order to achieve some degree of empirical Tit'. Within what is intended to be an 
extended body of research into a specific sub-set of the German party system, this would 
be very much a case of'the tail wagging the dog'.
Therefore, those formal models of coalition behaviour that are to be used will be of a more 
heuristic nature. They will impose form and structure upon the research and provide some 
common criteria with which to evaluate phenomena across time and space. It remains the 
intention of the thesis to retain a coherent and predictive model of coalition behaviour 
across multiple cases. However, it must be stressed that there will be a trade-off between 
a model's assumptions and the empirical reality under study. This means that the specific 
institutional precedents, norms and processes that have shaped the German party system 
(and continue to do so) will be taken into account. Thus, not only will the formal models 
be used to impose order upon the empirical component of my thesis, but will in turn be 
'tested' by the research itself.
A large and heterogeneous literature exists relating to coalition behaviour. The field is 
conceptually diverse and many of the more important models within the genre are to some 
extent contradictory. Moreover, theorists have often taken different aspects of coalition 
behaviour as their starting point. For instance, the bulk of the early literature was 
primarily concerned with the process of coalition formation and paid little attention to the 
degree to which such coalitions were successfully maintained. One reason for this was 
that not only did much of the early modelling rely upon a strictly game-theoretical 
approach, within which the concept of the formation of a given coalition as a 'single-play" 
game provided considerable theoretical elegance and simplicity, but also that the majority 
of such models took an 'office-seeking' perspective which either ignored or down-graded 
the policy dimension as a formation criteria. However, once one questions why some 
coalitions are more successful than others in maintaining themselves over time, the idea 
that office-seeking motives are the only decisive criteria within the bargaining process 
becomes very hard to sustain. For instance, if we assume that office-seeking is the only 
decisive criteria within the process, it would be reasonable to ask why coalitions break 
down at all, given that some degree of equilibrium has been established within which all
agents in the coalition have achieved office. Why would such a coalition not go on in 
perpetuity rather than break down and allow a rival coalition of agents to gain office? One 
reply to this would be to point out that agents within the coalition are acting rationally and 
may actually be maximising their office-seeking utility over the long run. For instance, in 
terms of legislative mathematics, they may actually be a member of any rival coalition that 
forms. Alternatively, they may calculate that the rival coalition will not last long and that 
they have a good chance of returning to office in an enhanced position: either with regard 
to the rival potential coalition or within the encumbent coalition itself. In both cases, it 
could be argued that office-seeking is still the dominant criteria.
Nevertheless, such questions highlight the dialectic between office-seeking and ideology 
within the coalition equation. Although ideology has declined in importance over recent 
years, historically it has had a relatively important role in European party systems, at 
least compared with the limited role of ideological conflict in the United States (where the 
most important theoretical work has been carried out). Thus, it is essential to include a 
'policy dimension' within both the bargaining process and in the subsequent process of 
coalition maintenance. This thesis develops a model that both conceptualises the policy 
dimension as a form of 'weighting' within the coalition process and defines a common set 
of criteria in order to assess a given coalition's record of policy implementation. The 
criteria will apply both across cases and in relation to the record of policy implementation 
under previous administrations in the same Land. The thesis will use environmental 
policy as its main example of policy implementation. There are two reasons for this. 
First, it is the policy area most closely identified with the Greens (indeed, it is at the core 
of their own self-identity and external perceptions of them). Second, it is an area of 
governance which is of academic interest in its own right, particularly in the Federal 
Republic, which has established itself as a innovator and world-leader in the field (see 
Chapter Three).
The requirement for such a set of criteria raises a number of questions. For instance, how 
is one to establish that one case was 'successful' in terms of policy implementation whilst 
another 'failed' without resorting to the opacity of judgmental opinion? Clearly, a 
transparent set of criteria, based on both qualitative and quantitative data, is needed. 
Moreover, I would argue that these criteria should not only be applicable to the outputs 
and outcomes of the policy process, but also to the policy- making structure and process.
This last point becomes more apparent when one considers the ideological and discursive 
distance between the parties involved in the coalition process. For instance, given that the 
agenda of the (German) Greens stretches well beyond 'deep' Green issues and has 
encompassed a fundamental critique of the entire structure and discourse of the modern 
capitalist state, it can be argued that changing the process of policy implementation is as 
important to them as the actual outputs of that process. If this is so, one could envisage 
certain elements within a locally governing Green party being content to make a short-term 
trade-off between the optimal implementation of concrete environmental policy initiatives 
in return for a partial dissolution of the established hierarchies within the German policy- 
making process.
In order to establish if this is indeed the case, the analysis will contain two distinct 
elements. First, a comparative analysis of the ideological and discursive profiles of the 
SPD and Greens, with emphasis upon the role of the 'new polities'. Data will be sourced 
from manifestos, interviews and official documents. This will be of both a qualitative and 
quantitative nature (see section on Methods at the end of this chapter).
Second, a clear, descriptive analysis of the actual policy process with some degree of 
global/comparative applicability. The thesis will use the 'policy networks' idiom as 
secondary theoretical tool (in order to examine the degree of Green penetration of the
policy-making process). This idiom is particularly attractive, both because much of its 
inductive base derives from the German experience (see Katzenstein, 1987. for instance) 
and because its ontological assumptions (a focus upon the actors involved in each sector 
rather than some over-arching super-system) are compatible with the general approach 
(see 1.2. Literature Review).
The use of coalition theory as the primary theoretical framework driving the thesis 
forward, with the policy networks idiom as a secondary structure, is reflected in the fact 
that the research is divided into two empirical strands. One is a 'party-polities' focus, 
which relates intra- and inter-party politics to the preconditions and assumptions of the 
model(s). The other looks in greater depth at the structure, process, outputs and 
outcomes of policy-making, as part of an assessment of the process of coalition 
maintenance. This is particularly germane to the New Model of Coalition Formation and 
Maintenance which predicates the success of a given coalition (and its chances of future 
success) upon the perceptions of the parties as to the degree to which they have been able 
to fulfil their preferences. A longer discussion of these points is developed later in the 
chapter (see sections on literature review, choice of models and fieldwork methods).
1.1.4. The Choice Of Cases
The empirical element within the thesis will focus on two case studies. An explanation of 
why the thesis uses case studies is given in 1.4. (Methods). The two cases were chosen 
with three criteria in mind: First, that they are geographically well dispersed within the 
Federal Republic and not limited to one particular region and/or political culture. Second, 
that as a group they span the period before and after German unification and thus 
encompass the changes that have taken place within the party system as a whole during 
the last ten years. Third, that they should have been in place for a long enough time for
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their record to be objectively assessed by the researcher, thus ruling out recent coalitions 
(such as in North-Rhine Westphalia). The cases are as follows:
Berlin. The Red-Green coalition of 1989-1990 in West Berlin was relatively short-lived 
but was in place during the period running up to and including the unification of Germany. 
Thus, a coalition that formed in what was in many ways a political backwater - and where 
some degree of political risk-taking was possible - ended in the full glare of national (and 
even international) publicity as Berlin took centre-stage in world events. Moreover, a 
coalition that was elected to govern a relatively prosperous West German city of just over 
two million inhabitants soon became responsible for a socially- and economically-divided 
city of almost double that number. As a result, the issues that had previously bound the 
coalition (such as the environment, nuclear and conventional disarmament and other 
'quality of life' issues) were superseded by more urgent themes (such as unification, 
nationalism and the collapse of the economy in eastern Germany). The differing responses 
of the Berlin Alternative Liste (as the local Greens were then called) and the SPD to these 
themes was to ultimately undermine the coalition. The case has been the subject of 
relatively little research.
Lower Saxony. The 1990-1994 Red-Green coalition in the state was widely regarded as 
successful and would probably have been renewed if the electoral arithmetic had demanded 
following the elections in March of 1994. There is no comparison between the official 
positions enjoyed by the SPD's Gerhard Schroder - as Minister President of Lower 
Saxony - and that of Joschka Fischer in Hesse in the 1980's. Schroder's position was far 
more secure and well-resourced in political terms, in that he was leader of the largest 
coalition partner and enjoyed the formal institutional power and prestige associated with 
the post of Minister President. By contrast, Fischer's position had been far more 
contingent upon factors over which he had little influence (such as internal SPD politicking
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and the ongoing 'war of the mullahs' within his own party). Nevertheless, the two men 
-and to a lesser extent the leader of the Lower Saxony Greens Jiirgen Trittin - have come to 
be regarded as 'Red-Green flag-wavers', who would wield considerable influence in any 
such coalition in Bonn. Therefore, the Lower Saxony coalition has added significance in 
terms of providing pointers of the shape and tone of a possible Red-Green coalition at the 
national level. Moreover, like Berlin, the Lower Saxony coalition has been the subject of 
little research.
1.1.5. Thesis Structure
This thesis will follow the logic of the preliminary arguments above and will be structured 
along the same lines. In order to reconcile the general with the particular, the thesis 
contains an original theoretical and an empirical component. The intention is that the 
theoretical component will enhance our understanding of events and structure our 
investigation of them.
The thesis has four sections. Part I (Theory) consists of this chapter only. The rest of 
this chapter will review those areas of the literature relevant to this thesis and make a 
choice of both theoretical models to be used and cases to be studied. The intention is to 
ground my research within the wider literature. The rest of this chapter will be structured 
as follows:
1.2.: Literature Review: Coalition Theory and Policy Networks Analysis.
1.3.: A New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance.
14.: Theoretical Framework and Fieldwork Methods.
The new model of coalition formation and maintenance builds upon the existing literature 
and represents original theoretical work.
Part II consists of two Chapters and is designed to establish the institutional context 
within which the research has been carried out. Chapter Two (The Party System and 
Policy Environment in the Federal Republic) describes the institutional context - mainly 
from the perspective of the national level - within which coalition behaviour takes place. 
The chapter looks at the party system(s) and the electorate, the parties themselves (the 
SPD and the Greens) and the policy-making framework (in general terms and specifically 
with regard to environmental policy). Chapter Three (A Short History of Red-Green 
Coalitions in the Federal Republic) looks at the wider political phenomena of Red-Green 
coalitions and identifies the recurring themes (inter- and intra-party conflict, staffing of 
ministries and outside actors such as producer groups) that impact upon them. There is 
some original research in this chapter, although the material from the two case studies is 
deliberately omitted at this point, in order to avoid repetition in the subsequent chapters.
Part III consists of the two case studies and comprises the bulk of the original empirical 
research within the thesis. It is made up of four chapters. Chapters Four and Five 
(Politics in Berlin; Politics in Lower Saxony) look at the political records of the Berlin and 
Lower Saxony coalitions, including an overview of the bargaining process leading up to 
their formation. Chapters Six and Seven (Programmatic and Institutional Innovation in 
Berlin; Programmatic and Institutional Innovation in Lower Saxony) will look at a selection 
of such innovations carried out by the two coalitions in their respective states. As already 
noted, the thesis concentrates upon innovation within the field of environmental policy.
Part IV consists of three chapters. Chapter Eight compares the processes of coalition 
formation whilst Chapter Nine takes an in-depth look at the two coalitions' respective 
records of coalition maintenance over time. In terms of coalition formation, the empirical 
component under study will be previous distributions of party weights within the relevant 
legislatures, previous bargaining processes and outcomes, party manifestos (past and
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present), the campaigns leading up to the coalitions under study, the election outcome 
(party weightings within the legislature) and the bargaining process and outcome. In terms 
of coalition maintenance, the empirical component will comprise internal coalition issues 
(distribution of portfolios and policy processes over time) and external constraints 
(pressure groups, opinion polls and grass-roots opinion) and the interaction between them. 
Finally Chapter Ten will pull together the various strands of the thesis and will examine 
the nature of pay-offs and the balance between office-seeking and policy-based criteria in 
predicting coalition behaviour. This will comprise a comparative analysis of the 
conclusions derived from the previous chapters, a review the results of the research and an 
assessment the degree to which its theoretical and empirical components have answered 
the research question and furthered academic knowledge of the field.
1.2. Literature Review
1.2.1. Why And What Theory?
As Taylor points out, 'conceptual structures' or 'theoretical frameworks', such as those 
within what is broadly called coalition theory, 'claim to delimit the area in which scientific 
enquiry will be fruitful' [Ryan, (ed.), 1973: 144]. In other words, one's choice of theoretical 
model will determine which variables will be considered significant and where one's 
investigation will be focused.
This is not to advocate methodological anarchy. It is merely an acceptance that certain 
models, in effect, 'suggest themselves' for different modes and areas of inquiry. Nor would 
one argue that the choice of one's framework precludes all other approaches to the subject. 
For instance, an historical account of the events in question would yield its own
1 1
considerable benefits: particularly in a wealth of contextual detail. However, one could 
argue that such an account would have limited explanatory value and very little predictive 
power.
As Weale observes, one's choice of model - or 'idiom of analysis' as he calls them - is down 
to the individual analyst in as much as he or she judges it to 'provide a way of talking 
about, and therefore understanding, political processes'. Weale goes on to stress that, not 
only are such idioms not mutually exclusive but that their internal components are often 
only loosely related to each other. As a result, Weale suggests that the analyst may have 
to draw upon a quite heterogeneous literature, given that 'there sometimes is no canonical 
source to which one can go' [1992: 38].
1.2.2. Coalition Theory
Such caveats are particularly germane to the broad sweep of literature related to coalition 
theory. As Laver and Schofield observe, there have traditionally been two distinct and 
divergent 'traditions' within coalition theory which 'are by now so far apart that they have 
almost nothing to contribute to one another'. These traditions can be broadly classified as 
the 'game-theoretical' (or formal-deductive) and 'European polities' (primarily inductive) 
schools [1990: 10-11]. In recent years, scholars such as Laver and Schofield [1990] and 
Budge and Keman [1990] have attempted to bridge this gulf and incorporate empirical and 
contextual variables into their theoretical modelling. It is this dialectic between the rigidity 
of formal deductive modelling and the social scientist's desire to achieve a good empirical 
'fit' with the exogenous universe that is at the heart of the development of coalition theory 
over the last 40 years.
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(I). Office-Seeking Models of Electoral Competition and Coalition Formation 
Although not a coalition theory in itself, the early models of coalition formation were to a 
large degree ontologically predicated upon Anthony Downs' Economic Theory of 
Democracy [1957]. Downs build upon the game-theoretical work of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern [1947] and Savage [1954] and constructed a formal theory of politics. 
Central to Down's theory was the a priori assumption that office-seeking is the ultimate 
goal of political strategy, in that 'parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather 
than win elections in order to formulate policies' [1957: 28]. Thus, although Downs 
acknowledged the existence of a policy dimension to political competition, he saw it as 
contingent upon the parties' main preoccupation with maximising votes in order to win 
elections and acquire office. In order to do this office-seeking parties compete for the 
median voter: representing the social choice of the electorate [see Appendix One].
The debt that early coalition theorists owed to Downs' theory is acknowledged by William 
H. Riker in his seminal Theory of Political Coalitions, in which he states that Downs' book 
is 'one of the half-dozen outstanding works of political theory in this century' [1962: 33]. 
Riker builds upon Downs' work to construct a predictive model of coalition formation in 
which office-seeking is central. The focus of Riker's model lies with the strategies adopted 
by the parties, who are assumed to be rational actors, as they attempt to gain admission to 
any coalition that may form. This process takes place within a game-theoretical 
environment that is both 'constant sum' (limited in size and scope) and 'zero-sum' (one 
player's gain diminishes the potential utility of all other players). Each player is assigned 
a 'weight' within the bargaining process and which serves to differentiate between the 
possible coalitions that may form. These weights are determined by the resources that the 
players bring to any potential coalition. Given that office-seeking rather than policy is 
assumed to be the central formation criteria, these resources take the form of votes. 
parliamentary seats or power. Within this environment, Riker predicts that players will
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try to create coalitions that are only as large as they believe will ensure winning. In its 
pure theoretical form, such a 'minimal winning' coalition would be so small as to maximise 
the payoffs (which are assumed to be a function of each player's weight) to each coalition 
member. Thus, with repeated 'plays' of the bargaining game (through which irrelevant 
alternatives are discarded) there would be a tendency towards the smallest sub-set of 
potential minimal winning coalitions (in other words, towards a 'minimum winning' 
coalition of 50% plus one vote). This is Riker's 'size principle' [see Appendix One].
It must be remembered that Riker's model assumes that these payoffs are associated with 
the acquisition of office rather than the chance to formulate or implement policy 1. Such 
assumptions are also central to the related work of William A. Gamson [1961b] and 
Michael A, Leiserson [1968]. In an article for the American Sociological Review, Gamson 
argues that:
When a player must choose among alternative coalition strategies where the 
total payoff to a -winning coalition is constant, he will maximise his payoff by 
maximising his share. The theory states that he will do this by maximising 
the ratio of his resources to the total resources of the coalition. Since his 
resources will be the same regardless of which coalition he joins, the lower 
the total resources, the greater will be his share. Thus, where the total 
payoff is held constant, he will favour the 'cheapest winning' coalition. 
[1961b: 376]
In terms of practical politics, Gamson's 'cheapest winning coalition' model assumes that 
each party would prefer to be a big fish in a small (and relatively under-resourced) pond
Ijhis is consistent with Downs' assumption, dealt with earlier, that parties formulate policies in order to 
win elections rather than the other way round.
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than be party to a more equitable distribution of payoffs (even if in reality this meant an 
identical size of payoff) [see Appendix One].
Leiserson's model is explicitly game-theoretical in nature and is centred around the concept 
of dominance in 'payoff vectors' (that is, the players' payoff for inclusion in any given 
coalition). Thus, if all players have perfect information as to the payoff value from each 
potential coalition and all members of a potential winning coalition are aware that such a 
coalition will maximise the payoff vector of each member, then that coalition is predicted 
to form. Leiserson's model assumes that if the coalition game is 'constant sum' and 'simple' 
(that is, a universally accepted decision rule exists by which any given coalition is either 
winning or losing), minimal winning coalitions will be decisive. In Leiserson's terminology, 
only such a minimal winning coalition would comprise the 'solution set 1 . Moreover, 
Leiserson attempts to limit the range of possible outcomes through the introduction of two 
supplementary propositions: a 'maintenance proposition' and a 'bargaining proposition'. 
The maintenance proposition allows for surplus-majority coalitions to form under 
conditions where institutional norms restrict the formation of new bargaining sets. For 
example, if a parliament had a fixed term, the strategic needs of each player may dictate 
that an interdecision period may be characterised by temporary coalitions, that are larger 
than numerically necessary, in order to allow parties to be best placed for when the 
specified time for the formation of a new bargaining set arrives^. The bargaining 
proposition seeks to delineate between minimal winning coalitions with many members 
and those with a very small number [see Appendix One]. Leiserson states: 'as the number 
of actors increases, there is a tendency to form.... with as few actors as possible' 
[1968:775].
2Although less common than the minimal winning thesis, it is not unknown for formal theories of 
coalition formation to posit the rationality of surplus majority coalitions under certain circumstances. See. 
for instance, Colomer and Martinez 1995.
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The formal nature of Riker, Gamson and Leiserson's three models have attracted much 
criticism on epistemological grounds. The most commonly cited criticism is that the 
centrality of office-seeking as the main formation criteria makes these models effectively 
'policy blind [Laver and Schofield 1990: 90] and therefore unrealistic^. One possible 
riposte to this accusation would be along the lines of Milton Friedman's [1953] argument 
(with regard to formal - and especially neo-classical - theories used in economics) that it is 
not the realism of a model's assumptions that are important when judging the adequacy of 
a theory but rather the degree of concordance between the logical consequences of a given 
theory and the actual phenomena under study. In other words, Friedman argues that it is 
the theory's logical consequences and predictive power that is at least as important as 
simply describing empirical phenomena . A similar argument is made by Riker and 
Ordeshook, who defend positivism in political science in general by asserting that it is 'just 
as important to generate and test out new theories as to investigate obvious 
phenomena''[1973: xi].
Even if one accepts this premise, the three minimal winning models have a modest record 
in predicting real outcomes to processes of coalition bargaining. For instance, Eric C. 
Browne tested all three models against data drawn from thirteen parliamentary 
democracies covering the period 1945-1970. Browne's test found that both Riker's and 
Gamson's models correctly predicted only 8% of the overall actual outcomes of coalition 
bargaining during this period. Moreover, the two models fail to correctly predict any of
is not to say that policy considerations did not exist at all with regard to these early models. 
Building upon Downs' work, there is an implicit assumption that the electorate are motivated by policy 
considerations and that the parties will -as political entrepreneurs- adjust their policy profile accordingly. A 
more recent model has been formulated by Austen-Smith and Banks [1988]. They assume that, as voters 
are motivated by the desire to influence policy outcomes, political parties are concerned about policy to the 
extent that they need to retain credibility with voters in order to secure their utility-flows over the long-run. 
Austen-Smith and banks also assume that the process of coalition building conforms to a normative!) - 
imposed sequence where the largest party has the first opportunity to try and form a coalition, and then the 
second largest and so on. The prediction or any distribution of party weights is a coalition involving the 
largest and smallest parties in the bargaining set.
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the outcomes in Austria, Denmark and Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy and Luxembourg. 
Leiserson's 'solution set' model faired somewhat better: correctly predicting 50.4% of 
actual outcomes across the entire data, including all nine outcomes from the Austrian sub­ 
set, twelve out of fourteen for Belgium and ten out of eleven for Luxembourg. The overall 
prediction rate fell to 37.6% after Leiserson's 'bargaining proposition' (which was designed 
to add constraints in order to limit the amount of predictions made) was applied, but still 
remains better than the Riker or Gamson models. Browne counters this evidence by 
pointing out that, although the three models are only partially predictive in terms of actual 
outcomes, other tests have supported their underlying assumptions [1973: 17-31].
Laver and Schofield also defend the predictive power of the minimal winning hypothesis, 
especially Riker's model. With reference to data drawn from European democracies 
between 1945-1987, they point out that although only 35% of actual outcomes were 
correctly predicted the number of potential coalition formations that might have arisen in 
such multi-party legislatures is exponentially higher. Under such circumstances, to 
correctly predict the actual outcome once in every three trials is, the authors argue, a quite 
respectable achievement [1990: 70-93]4.
Laver and Schofleld's observation is a reminder that, when testing the predictive power of 
the three theories against empirical data that has already been gathered, one must remember 
that in reality these are not predictions at all but rather what Lawrence Dodd has called 
'postdictions' [1976: 21]. In any given specific case, one possesses knowledge of both 
previous bargaining outcomes and the actual outcome under study. In such circumstances, 
and by process of inductive reasoning, a given outcome may appear fairly self-evident.
4 In his Coalitions In Parliamentary Government, Lawrence C. Dodd [1976] also found evidence that 
minimal-winning governments lasted longer than others. Opinion (and the evidence of data) is obviously 
divided and inconclusive on this point.
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However, if one reasons deductively -and therefore discounts any institutionally-specific 
information- any process of coalition formation in a multi-party environment is simply an 
/7-person game (involving more than two players) which generates exponential outcomes as 
players are added. Martin Schubik's (1967) general formulation for such games vividly 
demonstrated how unwieldy they can become as additional players are added.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the pure office-seeking accounts of coalition formation put 
forward by Riker, Gamson and Leiserson have enjoyed only partial success as predictors 
of actual outcomes. This has been cited by scholars such as Bogdanor [1983], von Bey me 
[1984] and Pridham [1986] as evidence that the use of such formal models is misguided, at 
least as far as their applicability to European party systems is concerned. The gist of their 
arguments is that not only are pure office-seeking accounts conceptually flawed in their 
neglect of the policy dimension but such explanatory shortcomings are not made up for by 
their predictive power. Pure office-seeking models of coalition formation retain their 
adherents, but the ontological assumptions that underpin them - in particular the neglect of 
the policy dimension - are essentially contested. It is no surprise that subsequent models 
of coalition formation attempted to bring in policy as a formation criterion.
(II). The 'Policy Dimension' As A Secondary Formation Criterion
The difficulties apparent in providing a satisfactory empirical Tit' with pure office-seeking 
theories of coalition formation was not only noted by scholars who were uncomfortable 
with the notion of formal a priori theorising within the social sciences. It also prompted 
those who remained convinced of the need for the creation and testing of such theories to 
attempt to factor in policy considerations into the bargaining process.
Robert Axelrod's Conflict of Interest [1970] is one of the most often cited early examples 
of this approach. Axelrod assumes that, whilst office-seeking remains the central strategic
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goal of all players, the members of the successful coalition will ideally be adjacent to one 
another along a single Downsian Left-Right ideological dimension. Such 'minimal 
connected winning' coalitions are assumed to be as large as necessary to secure a majority 
in the legislature, and as adjacent as possible to minimise the potential for conflicts of 
interest within the coalition (see Appendix One).
There are three main objections to the assumptions inherent in Axelrod's model. First, as 
Laver and Schofield point out, although minimal connected winning predictions did better 
than minimal winning predictions with regard to actual outcomes of cabinet formation in 
post-war Europe, its success rate was only 20%. This compares badly with the 12% 
success rate that is achieved by chance [1990: 98]. Second, the underlying assumption 
that minimal connected winning coalitions have lower levels of conflicts of interest has 
been empirically challenged by Browne, Gleiber and Mashoba [1984], although they do 
not question the model's predictive power. Finally, although Axelrod's model assumes 
ideological adjacency, it has no conception of the ideological distance between parties. 
This raises questions of institutional norms within a given party system that are central to 
this thesis. For instance, assume such a distribution of party weights in a Right-leaning 
legislature (in which party Y is a conservative party, party X is a bourgeois/centrist party, 
yet parties U and T are respectively eco-socialist and Maoist in their ideological profile 
with a profound hostility to private enterprise). Assume that the minimal connected 
winning coalition is X, U, T. It is hard to credit a scenario in which the bourgeois/centrist 
party would go into coalition with parties U and T, purely in order to ensure the optimal 
distribution of payoffs. Moreover, Axelrod's central assumption that such a coalition 
would minimise conflicts of interest is hard to credit under such circumstances. In short. 
one needs to be able to conceptualise and take into account spatial information about 
ideological distance between parties and across the legislature as a whole.
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In Coalition Theories And Cabinet Formation [1973], Abram de Swaan elaborated upon 
Axelrod's work in order to construct what he called the 'closed minimum range' of cabinet 
formation. De Swaan's theory predicts that the winning set will comprise the minimal 
connected winning coalition with the smallest ideological range. The policy dimension 
remains a single Downsian Left-Right axis, running ordinally from progressivism to 
conservatism. All parties are assumed to have preference orderings of all potential 
coalitions, based upon their relative proximities to the median or 'Mparty' (of both a given 
coalition and within the legislature as a whole). De Swaan asserts that:
An actor prefers those coalitions in which the Mparty(k) [median party] 
lies closer to him to those in which it lies farther away. Among those 
coalitions that have the same Mparty, an actor prefers those in which the 
coalition median lies closer to him, that is, where U(k) [total seats of the 
median party to the Left of the coalition median] or V(k) [total seats of the 
median party to the Right of the coalition median] is smallest depending on 
whether is Left or Right of the Mparry(kj respectively.. ..[1973: 443]
De Swaan's theory is often referred to as the 'median legislator' (or 'median party') model 
because it is predicated upon the assumption that the party that controls the median 
legislator in any potential coalition is decisive because it blocks the axis along which any 
connected winning coalition must form. If a party is the Mparty (median within the 
legislature) and Mparty(k) (controlling the median legislator within a potential coalition) in 
all cases, then it is dictator within the bargaining set. Theoretically, any such party must 
be included in the winning set.
Not only do the assumptions that underpin de Swaan's model seem reasonable, but its 
predictive power is also better than pure office-seeking accounts of coalition formation. 
For instance, whereas the Riker and Gamson models correctly predicted 8% of actual
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outcomes and Leiserson's model correctly predicted 50.4% of actual outcomes, de Swaan's 
own tests yielded a 69% prediction rate of actual outcomes from data on European 
coalition processes [cited Browne 1973: 76]. This would appear to represent significant 
progress towards a formal deductive model of coalition formation that is both explanatory 
and possesses considerable predictive power. However, using the example of the Right- 
leaning legislature, the same argument applies to de Swaan's model as to that of Axelrod. 
To what extent would a bourgeois/centrist party X choose to maintain a minimum 
connected winning coalition with what they would consider extremist partners rather than 
form a surplus majority coalition with conservative party Y? Conversely, could one 
envisage party Y forming a blocking majority with eco-socialist party U and Maoist party 
T, rather than tolerating a minority government of party Yl As long as the size principle is 
retained one is confronted with the trade-off between coalition size and ideological range. 
De Swaan allows us to conceptualise ideological distance (albeit in a one-dimensional 
form), but makes no assumption as to the institutional/ideological norms that skew the 
process of coalition formation and act as a variable upon coalition maintenance. In order to 
conceptualise these norms, one requires a theoretical model that is policy-driven.
(III). Policy-Driven Models Of Coalition Formation And Maintenance 
Although they offer plausible explanations for the coalition bargaining process, office- 
seeking models of coalition formation fail to address the question of how coalitions are 
maintained and why they break down. The appeal of policy-driven theories of coalition 
behaviour is that they offer the possibility of explaining the processes of coalition 
maintenance as well as coalition formation. Moreover, policy-driven accounts can be both 
rigorously deductive in nature or allow for a more inductive or historical-institutional 
approach.
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Formal deductive policy-driven models of coalition behaviour are generally spatial in their 
conceptualisation. Moreover, most spatial theories have moved beyond the single 
Downsian Left-Right dimension and posit the idea of a multi-dimensional policy space. 
Just as Schubik's formula demonstrates the exponential growth of outcomes in a simple n- 
person game when players are added, so the imposition of one (or even two) additional 
dimensions exponentially increases the potential outcomes in a given set. The potential 
for chaos for voting games in a multi-player set is obvious (see Appendix One).
Given this potential for disequilibrium, formal policy-driven models of coalition behaviour 
have focused upon conceptualising the processes that impose order upon voting games. 
More often than not, this has involved some variation upon the game-theoretical concept 
of the 'core' or 'barycenter' [Hanson, 1972; Hanson and Rice, 1972]. In his Coalition 
Theories: A Logical And Empirical Critique, Eric Browne [1973] suggests that core theory 
could be used to augment De Swaan's 'median legislator' model of coalition formation. 
Browne considers the process of calculating the mean of points in multi-dimensional space 
to be analogous to De Swaan's measurement of the distance of potential coalition partners 
from the median of that potential coalition. A weight is assigned to each party according 
to their position within a given policy space (as well as the number of seats they hold in 
the legislature) and the 'barycenter' (as Browne calls it) calculated as the mean of these 
positions. The predicted coalition will be that which is winning and minimises the policy 
distance of members from the core.
Core theory is generally highly mathematical in nature and has been more popular with 
political theorists than empiricists. Nevertheless, Keith Krehbiel's [1988] review of the 
field in Legislative Studies Quarterly (3) provides a good introduction to its application to 
practical politics. In essence, core theory assumes that a point exists in ^-dimensional 
Euclidean space that minimises the preference disagreement of a specific set of players and
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thus dominates the utility allocation of all other possible outcomes. Each potential 
coalition's utility allocation is based upon its members' calculation of the potential damage 
all players outside the coalition could do to it. Such an allocation is called the coalition's 
'security level'. As the core consists of that set of preferences that are not dominated by 
any other, it is assumed to also be Pareto optimal (in other words, there is no other way of 
making a particular coalition member better off than they are without making another 
worse off). A core allocation may even imply a grand coalition of all the players involved, 
although the payoff allocated to individual members will depend on their ability to form a 
smaller alternative coalition which could block (but not dominate) the Pareto set. The 
location of the core is plotted by calculating the mean of a collection of points 
(representing the policy positions of the parties that comprise the bargaining set) within 
political space (see Appendix One). The core is bound to exist in one-dimensional space, 
and finds an analogue in the 'median voter' of Black and Downs or De Swaan's 'median 
legislator. However, as Krehbiel points out, 'simply expanding the choice space from one 
to two has profoundly disequilibriating consequences' [1988: 259-319]. Thus, although the 
core may exist in two-dimensional space, it will not exist (or will be empty) in a multi­ 
dimensional political space because there will always be an alternative coalition package 
that can block (if not dominate) any potential winning set [Bacharach, 1976:128].
Core theory has proved attractive to political scientists because it has the potential to 
allow for the (varying degrees of) stability that are characteristic of democracy. However, 
it is dogged by the potential for permanent disequilibrium when the policy space is 
expanded beyond the single Downsian Left-Right dimension. Although the phenomenon 
of constantly shifting coalitions and allegiances is not unknown in practical politics 
(consider post-war Italy for instance), it is at odds with the experience of most western 
democracies, which are characterised by coalitions which manage to maintain themselves
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over time. In other words, how does one explain the persistence of such stable 
institutions?
In an article in the American Journal of Political Science Kenneth Shepsle [1979] attempts 
to factor in the institutional context whilst retaining a formal deductive approach to the 
problem. Shepsle concentrates upon the role of committees (in particular the US 
Congressional committee system) and their ability to deliver stability to an otherwise 
chaotic legislative environment. Shepsle asserts that committees facilitate a 'structure 
imposed equilibrium' through both control of the legislative agenda and the tendency 
towards specialisation. Committees control agendas by the selective emphasis of certain 
topics, through either reporting and making recommendations to the legislature or 
conversely 'sitting upon1 on issues. Moreover, specialisation endows a powerful gate- 
keeping function upon committees, in that modifications to a bill can only deal with 
matters that are 'germane' to the committee^. Shepsle argues that the committee system 
effectively re-imposes a one-dimensional policy environment upon the legislative game. 
Key decisions are taken on one dimension at a time and dimensions cannot be linked to one 
another through trade-offs. Crucially, this also means that the overall package of policies 
agreed by the legislature will be the aggregate of the policy position of the median legislator 
on each separate dimension.
Shepsle's model is of enormous significance because it allows the political theorist to both 
posit a formal deductive model of coalition formation and allow for the institutional 
specifics of a given case. Subsequently, other political scientists such as Denzau and 
Mackay (1987) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) have looked at the effects on legislative 
outcomes of other decision rules, such as the amendment procedure. The logic behind all
5And, one might add, the committees' final recommendations carry inordinate normative weight.
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these works is that, whilst theorists may posit the existence of general laws of legislative 
choice, these are contingent upon the constellation of facilitators and constraints in each 
legislature. The existence of institutionally-specific decision rules shape actual outcomes, 
and the winners of the coalition game over time are those that most successfully 
manipulate the dimensions of such institutions. This latter point is succinctly put in the 
article for the American Political Science Review on the 'Implications from the 
disequelibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions' by William Riker :
In the long run, outcomes are the consequences not only of institutions and 
tastes, but also of the political skills and artistry of those who manipulate 
agenda, formulate and reformulate questions, generate 'false issues' etc., in 
order to exploit the disequilibrium of tastes to their own advantage. And 
just what combination of institutions, tastes and artistry will appear in any 
given political system is, it seems to me, as unpredictable as poetry. But 
given the short-term structural and cultural restraints (my emphasis), there 
is some stability, some predictability of outcomes, and the function of the 
science of politics is to identify these 'unstable constants'. [1980: 445].
Although he is arriving at this argument from the opposite direction to this review, Riker is 
making the point that an effective explanation of any aspect of political behaviour must 
encapsulate both the universally-applicable dynamics of the event (the 'unstable constant') 
and the institutional context within which the event takes place. However. Riker is not 
advocating an historical-institutional account. He argues that, given the existence of the 
'unstable constants' of institutionally-specific decision rules, legislative outcomes are 
predictable in that there are certain universal laws, applicable to voting games, that 
political scientists can model.
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The appeal of Shepsle's model is that it has enabled theorists to factor in the institutional 
context (as a decision rule), as well as simplifying the concept of policy space. The policy 
dialectic for a given decision game is seen as one dimensional. This space is not restricted 
to the classic Downsian Left-Right continuum and can be any form of political dichotomy. 
The decision space may be between materialist and post-materialist values, between 
authoritarianism and libertarianism, or between nationalism and internationalism and so on. 
The appeal of such an approach is that it not only imposes equilibrium on the model, but 
that it is consistent with empirical evidence.
The reconciliation of deductive reasoning and the institutional context has raised hopes 
that formal modelling may be more easily applied to the European context, thus bridging 
the perceived gap between the - on the whole North American - game-theoretical tradition 
and the more inductive European approach. As mentioned earlier, two of the most 
important attempts at this have been in work by Laver and Schofield [1990] and Budge 
and Keman[ 1990].
Michael Laver and Norman Schofield's Multiparty Government: The Politics Of Coalition 
In Europe [1990] builds upon the Trotocoalition' model of Bernard Grofman [1982] and 
Laver's earlier empirical work. With regard to coalition formation, Laver and Schofield 
suggest that parties initially attempt to form a 'protocoalition1 with the party nearest them 
ideologically. Protocoalitions are assumed to then try and grow sufficiently to ensure a 
winning position within the legislature. This 'bargaining approach', as Laver and Schofield 
call it, conceptualises the process of growth as being either hierarchical (as Grofman 
originally posited), or manifesting itself in a more rapacious and non-hierarchical manner 
(as Laver suggests), whereby proto-coalitions form and break up only to be replaced by 
another, until the winning post is reached (see Appendix One). Cabinet stability and
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maintenance is assumed by Laver and Schofield to be the function of 'regime attributes'6 , 
'coalition attributes' 7 , the 'bargaining environment'8 in which coalitions occur and (in the 
spirit of Harold Macmillan) what the authors call 'events'9 .
lan Budge and Hans Keman's Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and 
Government Functioning In Twenty States [1993] aspires to a more deductive approach 
whilst attempting to factor in institutional contexts. The end result is that the distinction 
between deductive and inductive modelling is blurred, which creates its own
identify seven regime attributes. First, the gross number of parties in the party system. Second, the 
net, or 'effective number' of parties in the party system (considered to be more important than the gross 
number). Third, the presence of anti-system parties. Fourth, the extent of ideological polarisation within 
the system. Fifth, the level of policy influence open to the opposition through committee scrutiny etc. 
Sixth, the degree to which elections are salient to coalition formation and, finally, the presence (and nature) 
of a formal investiture requirement. The authors cite work by Kaare Strom [1989], that indicates that, 
whilst the operation of such variables as party system size are contingent upon specific institutional factors, 
only the salience of elections and, to a lesser extent, the presence of a formal investiture requirement are 
independently related to cabinet stability.
'Laver and Schofield identify three coalition attributes: its majority status, its minimal winning status and 
its minimal connected winning status. They produce data to show that these act as independent variables 
upon cabinet duration, with single-party majority cabinets and minimum-winning cabinets being more 
durable. Whilst they quote work by David Sanders and Valentine Herman [1977] and Paul Warwick [1988] 
that fail to identify ideology as a strong independent variable, they conclude that ideologically compact 
coalitions do appear to last longer.
^Turning their attention to the bargaining environment, Laver and Schofield identify three main categories: 
'multipolar', 'unipolar' and 'bipolar' systems. Multipolar systems (such as Belgium, Denmark and Italy) are 
characterised by a complex distribution of party weights and policy positions. As a result, cabinets are 
susceptible to even small changes in such a distribution and are less stable than in other systems. Unipolar 
systems are either centred (with the dominant party in the political centre) or off-centre (with the dominant 
party on either the Left or Right of the political middle ground). Such systems are prone to change. 
although less so than multipolar systems. Bipolar systems are described as 'simple, clear cut and 
unchanging' [1993: 156 ], in which dramatic shifts in the distribution of party weights or policy profiles are 
needed to change the underlying bargaining logic of the system (in which almost any two-party coalition is 
viable). It follows from this that cabinets are relatively stable because there are few incentives to break up 
one coalition and form another**. This is of special relevance to the thesis, as the Federal Republic has 
traditionally been regarded as a bipolar system. The question remains whether the German party- system 
will become more akin to the multipolar model (with both the Greens and FDP acting as potential junior 
coalition partners) or remain bipolar (with the Greens assuming the role of third party at the FDP's expense). 
9With regard to events, Laver and Schofield argue that there is a powerful correlation between the predicted 
stability of regimes (in terms of attributes and the bargaining environment) and their actual ability to 
withstand the impact of unforeseen and adverse events. They go on to advocate a model that combines both 
the 'attributes' and 'events' approach, observing:
While some coalitions are more durable than others, all coalitions, even the most durable, are subject to 
the potential impact of random events. Those that are more durable, however, are better able than others 
to withstand the impact of such events and will therefore tend to last longer than those others. Even a 
very 'durable' government, however, can in practice have quite a short 'duration' if a particularly 
important event happens to bring down the government early in its potential life. [1993; 162]
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epistemological problems. For instance, Budge and Keman describe their book's 
underlying theory as being 'a priori, semi-deductive' in nature [1990: 3]. This is a 
somewhat ambivalent description and could be construed as an elaborate way of saying 
that the theory is so contextualised as to be essentially inductive^. These caveats aside, 
the appeal of Budge and Keman's model of coalition formation and maintenance is that it is 
predicated on a small set of assumptions l ' that can be empirically tested.
Budge and Keman's four central assumptions are essentially a set of common-sense rules 
of thumb that would seem reasonable to most observers. Assumption Three is of 
particular interest to the thesis, as it neatly encapsulates the salient issues within the SPD- 
Green coalition debate. For instance, if democratic parties' first priority is to counter 
threats to the democratic system, then the perception of the Greens as koalitionsfdhig has 
been contingent upon their attitude to the political norms of the Bonn republic. As long as 
this was ambiguous, the Greens were considered at best an unreliable political partner and, 
more often, beyond the pale. However, once it was accepted that such a threat no longer 
existed - and the Greens were perceived as a democratic party - residual 'socialist- 
bourgeois' differences (as the authors call them) become more important. Although this 
cleavage has become less important in the Federal Republic, it still serves as the primary 
means of differentiation between the two Volksparteien. Therefore, to the extent that the
'Ojn a review of Budge and Keman's book, Laver took the authors to task over this description, stating that 
'// is just not possible, on most people's understanding of the words, for an argument to be 'semi- 
deductive', just as it is not possible for somebody to be semi-pregnant. An argument is either rigorously 
deductive or it is not'. [Party Politics Vol. 1 No. .2: 290]
1 ! 1 In parliamentary democracies the party or combination of parties which can win a legislative vote of 
confidence forms the government.
2 Parties seek to form that government capable of surviving legislative votes of confidence which will 
effectively carry through their declared policy preferences under existing conditions.
3 (a) The chief preference of all democratic parties is to counter threats to the..... democratic system;
(b) Where no such threats exist, but socialist-bourgeois differences are ..... important, the preference of all 
parties is to carry through policies related to..... these differences;
(c) where neither of the preceding conditions holds, parties pursue their own ..... group-related
preferences.
4 Within parties, and subject to overall policy agreements and disciplinary and procedural constraints, 
factions seek to transform their own policy preferences into government policy most effectively. [1993: 34]
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Greens are a Left-libertarian party, it would follow that political co-operation between 
them and the SPD would be facilitated along this cleavage. Nevertheless, as the third 
condition of Assumption Three makes clear, neither the SPD or the Greens are locked into 
co-operation with the other party for, to the extent that neither of the preceding conditions 
holds very strongly, both parties are able to pursue their own group-related preferences.
However, it must be remembered that all three conditions are contingent upon the 
perceived conformity to a system of norms, rather than a transparent set of criteria. The 
concept of a 'democratic' party may apply across cases, but how it is evaluated as a 
criteria is dependent upon norms that not only vary across space (between different states 
or regions) but also time (as local conditions change and the political middle-ground shifts). 
Budge and Keman make the mistake of using what are essentially value-judgements as 
would-be predictors of outcomes, with the inevitable consequences. For instance, they 
confidently predict the persistence of the pentapartito in Italy until the end of the 1990's, 
the continued participation in office of the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal and. in the 
Republic of Ireland, the alternation in office of the 'predominant party' (Fiana Fail) ruling 
alone and coalitions of the other significant parties [1993: 190]. By 1995 all three of these 
predictions had been falsified.
No doubt Budge and Keman were unfortunate to make these predictions at the beginning 
of a period of quite substantial political change in Europe. Nevertheless, the falsification 
of their predictions does demonstrate the need for political scientists to be circumspect, 
even when they aspire to be predictive. Theory is necessary if one is to enhance one's 
understanding of party systems and political behaviour. However, one cannot ignore the 
specific institutional context or regard the 'political culture' of a given case as static and 
unchanging. To conclude, the political scientist must remain aware that even the most 
elegant model can - and probably will - find itself falsified by the dynamics of practical
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politics. Given that this is the case, the choice of models of coalition formation and 
maintenance for the thesis has been made primarily for their heuristic value and with the 
institutional context of the Federal Republic in mind.
1.2.3. The 'Policy Networks' Literature
There is no doubt that the 'policy networks' idiom has, in the last ten to 15 years, proved 
highly popular within political science. Indeed, just from the evidence of a simple 
literature trawl for one recent year, it is evident that researchers have found it useful in 
explaining subjects as diverse as Aids and HIV-related policy [Altenstetter, 1994]; state- 
farmer relations in Northern Ireland [Greer, 1994]; the decolonisation of Indonesia 
[Fennema, 1994] and EU environmental policy in Scotland [Bomberg, 1994].
Given the popularity of the idiom, it is good to remember that, in objective terms, policy 
networks do not exist. The idiom of a policy 'network' (or 'community') is a subjective 
classification, used to describe - and ascribe meaning to - the pattern of relations between a 
group (or groups) of (either individual or collective) agents, linked together by some type 
of resource dependency (based upon expertise, money or some other source of power). It 
is best used as a meso-level concept, to describe government - interest group relations 
[Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 1], constituting 'a cluster or complex of organisations 
connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or 
complexes by breaks in the structures of resource dependencies' [Benson 1982: 148].
This description is only one of many definitions and uses of the term 'policy network'. 
However, as the word 'network' suggests, they all emphasise a certain continuity in 
relations between government and interest groups.
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Although not associated with policy networks literature per se, in his book The Political 
Process, the American political scientist Freeman defined this continuity in terms of the 
idea of a sub-system which is 'found in an immediate setting formed by an executive bureau 
and congressional committees, with special interests groups intimately attached [1955: 11]. 
It is the degree of continuity that defines the nature of the network.
The plethora of committees attached to government departments described by Freeman is 
a phenomenon of modern governance which is not just restricted to the United States. For 
instance, almost forty years ago an advisory committee on Political and Economic Planning 
to the United Kingdom Government counted 484 committees attached to central 
government departments, a quarter of which worked to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade alone [PEP, 1960: 193-217].
In the Federal Republic, steeped in the norms of 'co-operative federalism', the growth of 
such sub-systems is, if anything, even more advanced. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
much of the work on policy networks has looked at the Federal Republic. For instance, 
Peter Katzenstein clearly identifies a policy network ideal-type, conceptualised as three 
'nodes'. These nodes consist of (i) Political parties, (ii) multi-level governance between the 
Federal, Ldnder and, to a lesser extent, Kommune levels and (iii) the para-public 
institutions or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, Katzenstein regards 
this tightly-knit policy network as a block to innovation to the extent that he is 
pessimistic about the chances of new agents entering the network, as the existing 
structures constitute 'such a tightly integrated policy network that major changes in policy 
stand little chance of success' [1987: 35]. Katzenstein's conclusions do not bode well for 
the Greens and their client groups as examined in this thesis.
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In his study of the German chemical industry, Volker Schneider comes to similar 
conclusions. Schneider identifies the 'Intermediary Organisations' (NGOs) as the most 
important element within the network, as they perform the task of mediation between 
government and the individual whose interests are subordinated to - and represented by - 
the organisation. According to Schneider, power within the network is asymmetrical, 
based upon the exchange of resources (des 'ungleichen Tausches'). Within this 
environment, the relative power of an organisation depends upon what it brings to the 
exchange (Tauschpotentiale) [1988: 44]. The actions of individuals are significant only in 
as far as they are the representatives of organisations. Again, at first sight, this appears to 
be a relatively constrained set of relations, informed by a corporatist world-view which is 
antithetical to both the structure and goals of the Green milieus.
The work of Pappi [1993] also stresses the idea of networks being the interaction of 
individuals as agents of organisations, rather than actors in their own right. However, 
Pappi goes beyond the work of Katzenstein or Schneider, in expanding the use of the term 
'network'. Thus, whilst Pappi acknowledges that 'the traditional strength of network 
analysis as a method is to describe structures', he regards the idiom as having the potential 
for 'yielding convincing results in those areas where social relations are constrained 
[1993: 86-87]. Thus, for Pappi, the type of network can range from a constrained 
(eingeschrankte} network to fully-structured (Vollstrukturen) arrangements, in which all 
participants enjoy bilateral relations (the polar opposite of Schneider's 'ungleichen 
Tausches'). Pappi goes on to differentiate between the system to be analysed and the 
means by which its structure is described. For the former, Pappi opts for the term 'policy 
domain', defined as 'a social system with a structure that can be described as a nehvork' 
[1993: 85]. Thus, the term 'network' only applies to the interaction between agents within 
a given policy domain.
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Pappi's distinction between the policy domain and the policy network itself is a useful 
innovation, in that it makes a clear distinction between what is being described and how it 
is being described. However, its two-tier structure, like Katzenstein's 'three nodes' of the 
policy network, is relatively modest by the standards of the policy networks literature. 
For, if there is one clear tendency within the literature, it is that of disaggregation. Thus, 
rather than conceptualising government as a monolithic structure, stress is placed upon the 
many divisions within it. For instance, Richardson and Jordan state that 'the policy- 
making map is in reality a series of vertical compartments or segments - each segment 
inhabited by a different set of organised groups and generally impenetrable by 
'unrecognised groups' or the general public' [1979: 74]. However, the stress upon 
individuals as agents of organisations is relaxed and within these compartments, informal 
interpersonal relations are just as, if not more, important as structurally-contingent 
relationships.
This theme is echoed in the work of probably the most influential British writer on policy 
networks, R.A.W. Rhodes. The 'Rhodes model', which stresses power dependency 
between the various agents within the network, arose out of the examination of relations 
between central and local government through the idiom of 'intergovernmentalism'. 
Rhodes' research led to his developing five propositions.
• That any organisation is dependent upon other organisations for resources
• That, in order to achieve their goals, organisations have to exchange resources
• That within constraints of resource dependency, there is a dominant coalition which 
influences the perceived interests of the entire network
• That the dominant coalition regulates the process of exchange, within the rules of the 
game
  That agents have varying degrees of discretion, based upon their resources, the rules of 
the game, the process of exchange and the overall goals
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Thus, the policy network is a game, in which each agent (in Rhodes' original work, it is a 
central-local government dichotomy) deploys their resources. These resources may be of a 
constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, political, or informational nature [Rhodes. 
1981:98].
How useful one finds the Rhodes model depends to a large degree on one's own research 
interests. For instance, if one wants to clearly define at which level of analysis (micro- . 
meso-, or macro-) one's interests are located, the original Rhodes model (which draws upon 
corporatist theory) is inadequate. As Marsh points out, the problem with corporatist 
theory is that many authors make no distinction between corporatism as government 
-interest group relations and corporatism as a theory of the state [1983: 1 ].
Up to a point, therefore, the tendency towards disaggregation is useful. Building upon the 
work reviewed so far, one is able to focuses one's research upon a certain policy domain, 
the networks within the domains, the degree of constraint acting upon the agents within 
these networks and the importance of informal relationships. This degree of dis­ 
aggregation is useful and complements the ontological base of the models of coalition 
formation and maintenance used in this thesis, which, broadly-defined, is agent-based (but 
with allowances for structure).
However, as the idiom is debated and refined, there is a tendency within the literature to 
take this process of disaggregation to a point where it has limited explanatory value. From 
the point of view of the thesis, this process can lead to over-categorisation, in which what 
had been a heuristic model de-generates into a set of lists which, rather than clarify one's 
understanding of the world, merely add to the clutter.
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A good example of this is the work of Jordan and Schubert [1992]. Jordan and Schubert 
decline to ground their work in either a corporatist or pluralist framework but, rather, use 
the term 'network1 in its most generic sense. Thus, 'policy network' is a descriptive, rather 
than prescriptive, term that reflects empirical reality rather than any ideal type. The 
problem with this approach, at least as far as the thesis is concerned, is that - in extremis - 
there is a tendency to have as many different classifications as there are empirically- 
observable permutations of policy network. For instance, Jordan and Schubert classify 
government-interest group relations according to three criteria:
• The level of institutionalism (i.e. the stability of the network, ranging from 'Iron 
Triangles' to 'Issue Networks')
• The focus of the network
• The number of participants [1992: 12-13]
Having established this three dimensional space, they locate within it eleven terms drawn 
from the literature. These are:
1. 'Pressure Pluralism'. Government policy informed by competing interest groups.
2. 'State Corporatism'. Based upon state discretion and compulsory participation.
3. 'Societal Corporatism'. Based upon voluntary participation.





8. 'Meso-Corporatism'. Sectoral, between single interest group and the state.
9. 'Issue Networks'.
10. 'Policy Communities'. Limited access.
11. 'Negotiated Economy1 . Ad hoc, unstable [1992: 25].
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This tendency to list is also evident in the work of Franz van Waarden [1992]. Van 
Waarden follows the same line of thinking as Jordan and Schubert and uses the term policy 
network in its widest generic sense. For van Waarden, networks are 'proto-organisations. 
which exist as 'an intermediate form between .....contract ('market') and formal 
organisations'. Moreover, they 'do not necessarily have a power centre, and hence co- 
ordination is not by hierarchic authority... but by horizontal bargaining' [1992: 31]. 
Having defined policy networks as just about any form of public-private relationship 
short of a formal organisation, van Waarden classifies them within seven dimensions of 
policy network:
• Actors (the number and nature of)
• Function
• Structure
• The degree of institutionalism
• Conventions of interaction
• Power relations
• Actor Strategies [ 1992: 40]
After establishing these seven dimensions, van Waarden locates 11 policy network
classifications within them. They are:
1. 'Statism1 . No relations between the state and organised interests.






8. 'Sponsored Pluralism'. With a large number of interest groups participating in the 
implementation of public policy.
36
9. 'Parentala Relations'. Access through party links.
10. 'Iron Triangles'.
11. 'Issue Networks' [1992: 45-49].
Obviously, there are instances when the degree of classification in Jordan and Schubert's or 
Van Waarden's work is necessary. However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is not 
essential to discuss whether the relationship between the Greens, their client groups and 
the policy network constitutes 'clientilism', 'sectoral corporatism1 or even some form of 
'parentala relations'. The thesis requires something simpler.
At the same time, Marsh's criticisms of the original Rhodes model remain valid. It is 
necessary to define the level at which the network is located. Rhodes himself appears to 
have recognised this and consequently revised his model in the light of the debate [ 1986a; 
1986b]. Whilst retaining Benson's concept of'resource dependency'. Rhodes sites five 
types of network along a continuum from highly integrated 'policy communities' to loosely 
integrated 'issue networks'. These networks are then distinguished according to the type 
of membership and the distribution of resources within the network. The five categories 
are:
• 'Policy Communities'. Example: Education. Features: Stability of relationships, 
continuity of highly restricted membership, high vertical interdependence (share 
service/policy delivery responsibilities), limited horizontal articulation, insulation from 
other networks and the wider polity and a high degree of integration. Normally based 
upon functional interests or territorial interests (then better described as a 'territorial 
community').
• 'Professional Networks'. Example: The National Health Service. Features: one type 
of participant, the professions. High degree of vertical interdependence.
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• 'Intergovernmental Networks'. Example: Representative organisations of local 
authorities. Features: Topocratic membership (exclusion of public sector unions), 
extensive inclusion of interests, limited vertical interdependence (no service delivery 
responsibilities), extensive horizontal articulation and penetration of other networks.
• 'Producer Networks'. Example: Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA). 
Features: Prominent role of economic interests (private and public sector), fluctuating 
membership, dependence of the centre on industrial organisations for service delivery. 
limited interdependence.
• 'Issue Networks'. Example: the 'Environmental movement1 . Features: Large number of 
participants, limited degree of interdependence, low stability, low continuity, atomised 
structure [1986a, Ch.. 2].
Rhodes' five categories provide a robust analytical 'tool kit1 for the researcher. From the 
point of view of the thesis, this tool kit is an ideal way operationalising the subsidiary 
research question (as to the extent to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up1 the 
policy network to their own client groups and break down established hierarchies within 
the German regulatory framework). In this respect, four questions arising from these 
categories immediately suggest themselves. First, what were the nature of the Greens own 
networks prior to the Red-Green coalition? In other words, were they an issue network 
or, bearing in mind that some members of the Greens' client groups had moved beyond 
advocacy and were commercial practitioners (for example, with regard to solar energy), did 
they constitute a producer network? Second, what was the nature of the established 
network prior to the Red-Green coalition? Third, to what extent had the Greens' client 
groups already penetrated the network prior to the Red-Green coalition? Finally, did the 
Greens' client groups succeed in (i) breaking down the established networks per se or just 
(ii) gaining access to heretofore closed networks without actually changing the privileged 
position of the network?
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These questions will be briefly returned to in section 1.4 of this chapter and in Chapters 
Four to Nine. Chapter Ten (sections 10.3 and 10.4 on games and payoffs) will examine 
the whole issue more comprehensively in the light of the empirical evidence. However, 
what is clear is that Rhodes' revised model is a good starting point for the use of the policy 
networks idiom as a secondary theoretical framework within the thesis.
1.3. A New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance
1.3.1. Introduction
However, the primary theoretical structure that drives the thesis forward is that of 
coalition theory. The thesis will use a selection of models - in an amended form - drawn 
from the literature of coalition formation and maintenance. These will be built upon and 
integrated into a single set of assumptions that is intended to be used as a single model. 
The purpose of the model is both to direct and structure the research and to predict the 
outcome of attempts at coalition formation and maintenance between the SPD and the 
Greens.
The model is divided into three sections. First, it sets out a set of global preconditions to 
participation in coalition bargaining. Second, it sets out a number of global assumptions 
about the process of coalition formation. Finally, it sets out a number of global 
assumptions about the processes of coalition maintenance. With regard to the thesis, it is 
the assumptions regarding coalition maintenance - and in particular Assumption 3(/) - that 
are of particular importance to the two case studies. This will be explained in greater detail 
in section 1.3.3 (Notes).
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I.3.2. The Model
/. Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining.
(a) The bargaining set is self-selecting and excludes all parties that are perceived 
not to be normatively-defensible, according to accepted democratic criteria.
(b) All parties possess bundles of preferences, based on a combination of office- 
seeking and policy-driven criteria.
(c) The policy preferences of all parties are a function of one or more ideological 
dimensions, such as the Downsian Left-Right and/or the 'materialist/post- 
materialist1 policy dimension^ 2.
(d) Where policy differences are not salient, office-seeking is normally assumed to 
be paramount.
(e) Where (d) is not the case, it is assumed that office-seeking has been 
subordinated to another group-related preference.
(f) All parties within the bargaining set pursue their preferences in a rational and 
instrumental manner.
II. Assumptions about Coalition Formation.
(a) All parties want to be a member of the potential coalition that is closest to 
them in policy terms. Such a coalition is assumed to be ideologically 'connected' 
along one or more policy-dimension.
(b) Parties calculate policy-distance in terms of their relative positions with regard 
to policy sectors along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post-materialist 
dimensions. The two dimensions have different relative weights for each party, 
depending upon their respective ideological profiles.
12The domain of foreign policy is of such a high degree of salience within the Federal Republic that it 
could almost be counted as an additional dimension around which parties formulate their policy preferences. 
However, most political science literature would not consider it a discreet ideological dimension in itself. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, foreign policy is regarded as a function of the materialist post- 
materialist value -orientation; given that this is the best indicator of a party's foreign policy stance.
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(c) The party or parties to which a party X is most in agreement, across the 
(weighted) aggregate of policy sectors, is considered by party X to be the closest to 
them in policy terms.
(d) If conditions (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied, parties will choose to be a member of 
the coalition that will maximise office-seeking payoffs. It follows this will be the 
minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least partners.
(e) If all other conditions are satisfied, it follows that the party that controls the 
median legislator within the most policy sectors is decisive, as no minimal 
connected winning coalition can be formed without it. Such a decisive party could 
be assumed to gain a disproportionate share of the payoffs.
///. Assumptions about Coalition Maintenance.
(a) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range.
(b) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative 
majority.
(c) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of partners within the 
coalition.
(d) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of alternative 
coalitions available to members.
(e) Codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture procedure, are more 
stable.
(f) All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a 
coalition on the basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and 
their actual and anticipated payoffs.
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1.3.3. Notes
The Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining are reasonably straightforward. As touched 
upon earlier, the degree to which the Greens could be considered koalitionsfcihig is 
contingent upon their perceived stance towards the democratic order of the Bonn republic. 
Whilst this was in serious doubt, the Greens were considered by many to be beyond the 
pale. This fact is acknowledged in condition l(o), which builds upon condition 3(a) of the 
Budge-Keman criteria. Now that the Greens have by-and-large reconciled themselves to 
what they had previously considered to be a bourgeois democracy, this condition is 
fulfilled: at least at the local level, where any remaining doubts - such as the Greens' 
attitude to NATO - are not so relevant as they would be at national level. Conditions 
1(6), (c] (d) and (e) acknowledge that parties are motivated by a combination of policy- 
driven and office-seeking motivations and that, where policy considerations do not exist or 
have been satisfied, office seeking will normally be paramount. Moreover, within the 
policy domain, all parties have their own specific preference bundles which are a function 
of both the Downsian Left-Right and/or 'materialist/post-materialist' policy dimension. 
The model does not assume that 'socialist-bourgeois' differences alone are predominant 
and, thus, makes no assumption as to the predisposition of the SPD and Greens to co­ 
operation. Where neither policy considerations nor office-seeking appear to be the 
motivation for a party's actions, the model assumes that some other group-related 
preference - such as an internal power struggle or the need to retain party unity - has been 
the motivating force!3. Condition !(/) is a formality that allows all events to be 
interpreted consistently in terms of the other conditions.
13Of course, policy considerations or office-seeking may - and quite probably will - be embedded in these 
other group-related preferences. However, for the purpose of brevity, no assumptions will normally be made 
in this respect.
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The model's Assumptions about Coalition Formation follow on from its preconditions. 
Given that all parties possess policy-related preferences, and that all preferences are 
pursued in a rational and instrumental manner, it is logical that they will desire to be a 
member of the coalition that is closest to them in policy terms. Ideally, such a coalition 
will be connected (2(a)) and will have the least ideological range, within which the party 
will be in the median position along the relevant policy dimension. Parties calculate policy 
distance by their relative positions along the Downsian Left-Right and 'materialist/post- 
materialist' dimensions of the policy domain. These positions are the aggregate of each 
policy sector taken separately (2(6) and (c)). In other words, the model does not assume a 
multi-dimensional policy space (as in 'barycentre' or core theory), but rather multiple one- 
dimensional policy sectors. This is in the tradition of Kenneth Shepsle's concept of a 
'structure induced equilibrium', except that the gate-keeper for each policy sector is the 
ministry, rather than the congressional committee. Condition 2(d) is assumed to be self- 
evident under normal conditions, whilst 2(e) follows logically from the previous 
conditions. As 2(a) implies, all parties want to be in the median position along a policy 
dimension in order to minimise the ideological range of the coalition in relation to its 
preferences. 2(e) demonstrates the additional strategic payoffs for the party that achieves 
this goal.
The Assumptions about Coalition Maintenance follow on from the Preconditions and 
Assumptions about Coalition Formation. In addition, they have been augmented by the 
empirically-based assumptions of Laver and Schofield. 3(a) assumes that the larger a 
coalition's ideological range, the more potential for disagreement over policy. 3(6) is 
supported by empirical evidence that large majorities tend to be more unstable than 
minimal-winning ones. One assumes that this is because either there is a sub-optimal 
distribution of payoffs or there is insufficient fear of legislative defeat. Either way. this 
could lead to insufficient use of the 'carrot 1 or 'stick' in coalition management, which
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implies instability. 3(c) is based on Axelrod's common-sense proposition that the more 
partners there are in a coalition, the more potential exists for conflicts of interest. 3(</) and 
(e) deals with instrumental and normative factors that determine cabinet stability. The 
former assumes that a coalition partner is more likely to leave a coalition if viable 
alternatives exist. The latter assumes that a coalition partner is less likely to leave a 
coalition within which they have been involved in a formal investiture procedure. On one 
level, 3(/) - like !(/) - is a formality to ensure that all coalition behaviour is an ongoing and 
dynamic activity rather that a static arrangement. In other words, parties remain in 
coalitions to pursue their preferences and not out of a sense of altruism.
In fact, Assumption 3(f) is the key to the whole thesis, as it begs the question: what were 
the parties' preferences and were they successfully pursued? The other preconditions and 
assumptions are either self-evident, a logical consequence or a counter factual argument to 
a previous precondition or assumption, or relatively easy to demonstrate through 
quantitative means (such as counting the number of cabinet portfolios a party won in a 
given bargaining round). However, when one raises the issues relating to the pursuit of 
preferences over time (and the nature of the related payoffs), one is moving in game- 
theoretical terms, from a single-play game to a multiple-play game. It is much harder to 
model multiple plays of a game over time and, having done so, to operationalise the 'game' 
in terms of the empirical research.
As already discussed earlier in this chapter, the thesis works from the assumption that, for 
the Greens, it was just as important to change the structure and process of policy-making 
as it was to affect the outputs and outcomes. Thus, their 'bundle' of preferences is a 
composite of these aspirations (regarding structure, process, outputs and outcomes). It 
would also follow that the Greens continued participation in a given coalition was 
contingent upon enough of these preferences being fulfilled.
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In assessing the extent to which they were fulfilled, the thesis works from the general to 
the particular. Part II (the Institutional Context) examines structure and process in its 
most general sense and touches on their effect upon outputs and outcomes. In Part III. 
Chapters Four and Five (looking at the Politics of the two coalitions) looks at the whole 
'bundle' across all of the most salient policy areas whilst Chapters Six and Seven 
(Programmatic and Institutional Innovation) focuses explicitly on a selection of such 
innovations from within the environmental policy area. The conclusion (Chapter Ten) will 
review the results of the research and assess the nature of payoffs, what they indicate 
about the parties' preferences, and the extent to which they were achieved.
However, in order to do so, one must first assemble one's theoretical 'tool kit'. This is the 
purpose of the rest of the chapter.
1.4. Theoretical Framework and Fieldwork Methods
1.4.1. Notes on the Nature of Theory and its Use
Why Model Coalition Behaviour?
The thesis is predicated upon the a priori assumption that within the generic term 
'coalition theory', there is a model (or set of models) that provides both a predictive and 
explanatory account of coalition behaviour. With regard to coalition formation, the thesis 
will use three established models from the literature. These are:
• Riker's (1962) Minimum/Minimal- Winning Theory
• Axelrod's (1970) Minimal Connected Winning Theory
• de Swaan's (1973) Median Legislator Model
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The models are used to problematise the trade-off between, first, predictive and 
explanatory modelling and, second, between office-seeking and policy-driven accounts of 
coalition formation. Then, the thesis will use the empirical data to test:
The New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance (set out above in section 
1.3.2)
Why use Policy Networks Analysis?
Similarly, the thesis assumes that the 'policy networks' idiom will provide a useful 
secondary theoretical shorthand with which to describe and explain the nature of the 
policy-making community and the degree to which the Greens and their client groups 
succeeded in penetrating it. The thesis uses the policy network description in its loosest 
and most heuristic manner, based upon Rhodes' idea of resource dependency. Because the 
thesis is as interested in the perception as in the reality of the success of the Greens' client 
groups in opening up the policy network, the breaks in such resource dependencies are 
defined by the agents themselves. In other words, unless otherwise stated, the bounds of a 
given policy network will be set by the formal institutional structure in which it sited. For 
example, the thesis assumes that the Energy policy network in Berlin is confined to the 
formal structures (such as the Energiebeirat and the Energieleitstelle) set up by the 
Environment Ministry to mediate the policy area (see Chapter Six) or 'domain' [after 
Budge, 1987; Pappi, 1993].
Obviously, if the thesis was looking exclusively at the structure and content of policy- 
making in Berlin, for example, more discussion would be given to the exact nature and 
boundaries of the policy network. However, the thesis uses the concept in a limited sense. 
in order to examine the perceived payoffs of the coalition partners and their client groups.
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In Chapters Four to Nine, the thesis will build upon Katzenstein's [1987] concept of three 
'nodes' of the policy network and concentrate upon three sets of agents:
• Political parties
• Tiers of multi-level governance (the Bund, Lander and Kommuneri)
• NGOs
Chapter Ten (Conclusion) reviews the research and assesses the nature of the coalition 
'game'. In sections 10.3. and 10.4., the thesis will build upon the heuristic idea of the 
coalition game having six distinct elements, defined by six questions. These are:
• Who are the players?
• What strategies are available to them?
• To what extent are players able to form coalitions?
• What are the payoffs to the players?
• How much information do the players have about the game?
• How much information within the game can be considered to be 'common knowledge'
(i.e. an accepted institutional rule or norm understood by all)? 
[Hargreaves Heap et al, 1992: 95-97]
Having established the parameters of the coalition game, section 10.4 of the thesis will 
look in more detail at the game's fourth element, that of payoffs. In doing so it will assess 
the degree to which such payoffs are policy-oriented in nature. As has already been 
discussed, this is defined by the thesis as being determined as much by the process of 
policy-making as by its content (in other words, for the purposes of the thesis, the degree 
to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own client 
groups and break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework is 
as important as the actual policy record of the coalition). The assessment of such policy 
processes will draw upon the work of Rhodes [1981, 1986a, 1986b] and ask:
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• What was/were the configuration of the groups associated with the Greens prior to the 
Red-Green coalition? i.e. did they constitute any of the Policy Communities. 
Professional Networks, Intergovenmental Networks, Producer Networks or Issue 
Networks ideal-types?
• What was/were the nature of the established network(s) prior to the Red-Green 
coalition? (as above)
• To what extent had the Greens' client groups already penetrated the network(s) prior 
to the Red-Green coalition?
• Did the Greens' client groups succeed in (i) breaking down the established network(s) 
per se and make them more open and democratic, or (ii) were they just co-opted into 
what remained a relatively closed and privileged policy elite?
Is the Theoretical Framework Predictive, Realistic and Explanatory? 
The thesis does not intend to 're-invent the wheel' in these respects. As already noted in 
the literature review, the choice of theoretical model will help determine the focus of one's 
research, which variables will be considered significant and where one's investigation will 
be focused., in that certain models 'suggest themselves' for different modes and areas of 
inquiry., as 'a way of talking about, and therefore understanding, political processes' 
[Weale, 1992: 38]. Such models are often defended on the grounds that, although not fully 
explanatory, they have predictive power. In other words, it is not the realism of 
assumptions that is the salient point, so much as the logical consequences of a model's 
assumptions are in concord with the explanandum [Friedman, 1963: 211-219. cited Ryan. 
1973: 130].
The main criticism of this focus upon predictive power is that it neglects the fact that a 
model's assumptions may be unrealistic. Thus, although the researcher may be predicting 
a great deal of the what is actually happening, he or she is doing this with what i
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essentially the wrong set of methodological tools. If this is the case, the model is not 
explanatory.
But what is meant by 'unrealistic'? Moreover, when is a model not 'explanatory'? Taking 
the first question, Ernest Nagel identifies three main senses in which an assumption max 
be 'unrealistic'. First, if they are selective and not exhaustive. However, Nagel himself 
points out that this is an overly restrictive point, stating that 'no finitely long statement can 
possibly formulate the totality of traits embodied in any concretely existing thing'. Second, if 
they are either false or improbable on the available evidence. Although there are occasions 
when this discrepancy is blindingly obvious, such a process of falsification normally only 
occurs after deducing the logical consequences of an assumption and then comparing it 
against the available empirical evidence. Third, if they rely too much on 'pure cases' or 
ideal types [ibid: 133-135].
With regard to the question of'explanation', as Saunders puts it:
An explanation is a causal account of the occurrence of some phenomenon 
or set of phenomena. An explanation of a particular (class of) event (s) 
consists in the specification of the minimum non-tautological set of 
antecedent(s) necessary and sufficient conditions required for its (their) 
occurrence [1995: 60].
Or, in short, an explanation must yield an intellectually satisfying answer to a 'why'? 
question (or its equivalent). The amount of intellectual satisfaction derived will depend 
upon the degree to which the 'event' being explained is sufficiently described and classified, 
its causes accounted for in a non-tautological manner and its possible re-occurrence 
predicted on the basis of a set of conditions that hold across time and space.
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Taken together, the reader is entitled to ask if the theoretical framework fulfils the 
following criteria:
• Does the model (or models) correctly predict coalition behaviour in the case studies?
• Are its assumptions realistic?
• Does it yield intellectually satisfactory answers to 'why' questions?
The answers to these questions will be determined by testing the models against the two 
case studies. However, the whole debate reflects the often ambiguous nature of Political 
Science, torn as it is between a desire to achieve the empiricism of the natural sciences, yet 
wishing to retain the values of empathy and context inherent in the idea of 
'Geisteswissenschaften' [Ryan, 1973: 7].
In the research question, the thesis asks to what extent the Greens have assumed a 'normal' 
political role within the party system, where such a role would mean that their strategic 
behaviour can be predicted as a function of the rational pursuit of a bundle of group-related 
preferences. The thesis also argues that a pluralistic approach - between the empiricism of 
the natural sciences and the idea of'Geisteswissenschaften' - is feasible within Political 
Science. If one accepts this premise then the use of deductive models based upon rational 
action can be defended, even when applied to such an ideologically charged topic as Red- 
Green coalitions. Indeed, this is the central theoretical challenge of the thesis.
Such models are already well defended. For instance, Roemer states that 'in seeking to 
provide micro-foundations for behaviour....... the tools par excellence are rational choice
models' [1986: 192], whilst Dunleavy goes as far as to declare that 'I could not pursue my 
research without using them' [1991: xi]. They are indispensable to the thesis and are 
complemented, as a secondary framework, by the policy networks idiom.
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1.4.2. The use of Case Studies
The thesis is built upon a comparison of two case studies, both informed by and testing a 
theoretical framework. This is intuitively a relatively straightforward idea. However, 
although the use of case studies would appear to uncontentious, some scholars are keen to 
point out their limitations, in semantic terms at least. For instance, Sartori somewhat 
obscurely makes the distinction between case studies as a comparative method per se and 
as a method with some merit within the context of a wider comparative analysis [1994: 
23]. Although one must agree with Mackie and Marsh's [1995: 177] opinion that Sartori 
is indulging in pedantry , one can sympathise with the implicit point that Sartori is 
making, that case studies alone are a somewhat flimsy method of comparison if not 
informed by a well-defined and operational theoretical framework. This is echoed by 
Rose's assertion that it is the presence of such a operational framework - capable of 
application across cases - that makes a study comparative [1991: 449].
Lijphart divides case studies up into five ideal types. First, interpretative case studies 
using existing theory. Second, hypothesis-generating case studies. Third, case studies 
used to interrogate or test a theory. Fourth, those used to confirm a theory. Fifth, deviant 
studies [1971:691-3].
This typology generates a number of further points for discussion, much of which is 
beyond the remit of this thesis. Nevertheless, three points are worth mentioning. First, as 
Mackie and Marsh [1995] observe, the first of Lijphart's category of case study is not 
strictly comparative anyway. However, this is not to deny that such case studies do not 
have their own worth. For instance, Daniel Little's [1989] Understanding Peasant China 
uses case studies to illustrate a number of debates within the social sciences (the 'Moral 
Economy' debate, the 'Macroregions' debate, the 'Breakthrough' debate and so on) and to 
demonstrate the use of a selection of idioms of analysis (rational choice theory, Marxism
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and historical materialism) in addressing them. The uses of case studies in Little's book 
provides a solid and consistent focus with which to demonstrate a plurality of idioms. 
Thus it is essentially the empirical object of study that remains constant, rather than the 
theoretical framework.
The second point for discussion is that, as Mackie and Marsh point out, the other four of 
Lijphart's ideal types are not necessarily comparative either and can only be considered so 
if:
.....they use and assess the utility of concepts developed elsewhere (by 
elsewhere here we mean in another country, or in relation to a 
different jurisdiction in the same country or in the same country, 
during a different time period); test some general theory or 
hypothesis; or generate concepts to be of use elsewhere [1995: 177]
Third, being ideal types, Lijphart's categories are often not so neatly replicated within the 
field of comparative research. For instance, the use of case studies in this thesis covers 
four out of five of the categories (excluding deviant studies). Thus the use of existing 
models of coalition formation can be regarded as being primarily interpretative rather than 
comparative, in keeping with Lijpharts first classification. Moreover, the use of the case 
studies to test the new model of coalition formation and maintenance conforms to both the 
third ('theory informing') and fourth ('theory confirming') ideal types. The degree to which 
the case studies conform to the second category - that of 'hypothesis-generating' case 
studies - will be demonstrated in Chapter 10 (sections 10.3 and 10.4 on games and 
payoffs).
What is clear is that the use of case studies in this thesis does conform to Mackie and 
Marsh's criteria of comparability. For instance, in the thesis' examination of policy
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outputs and outcomes within the context of multi-level government, the case studies 'use 
and assess the utility of concepts developed elsewhere', whilst the use of existing coalition 
models and the New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance means that the thesis 
does 'test some general theory or hypothesis'. Moreover, it aims to generate concepts to 
be of use elsewhere.
Finally, the constraints of time, resources, thesis length and subject matter suggested that 
the focus of the case studies should fall within the formal institutional structure of two 
German Ldnder. Obviously, one could argue that these parameters are artificial, given that 
the political and policy-oriented phenomena under examination - for instance post- 
materialism or environmental policy - are not so neatly constrained by them. 
Nevertheless, the individual Land provides a framework for analysis, given the ease with 
which functional equivalents (Land legislatures, executives and party organisations for 
instance) can be identified across the cases. It remains for the reader to judge how 
successfully the thesis achieves this.
1.4.3. Fieldwork Methods
Apart from some secondary data sourced in Hesse, the bulk of the fieldwork was carried 
out between April and September 1996 in Berlin and Lower Saxony.
The main data is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. The quantitative data consists 
of opinion poll data (both academic and commercial), election data and Land-level official 
statistics. Apart from some degree of interpretation, the data is used in the form in which 
it was accessed by the author. No further data processing - such as regression analysis or 
cross-tabulation - has been undertaken.
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The qualitative data has been sourced from official documents (parliamentary protocols, 
internal policy briefings, minutes and official reports, official publicity material etc.), press 
archives, party press offices and public libraries, as well as from extensive elite interviews 
(with local politicians - including ex-ministers - civil servants, and members of NGOs and 
Land government-appointed advisory councils). Although the author has over twenty 
hours of such material on tape, most of it is not directly attributed to individuals. There 
are two reasons for this. First, with the exception of a limited number of direct quotes 
from individuals in Chapter Ten (section 10.4 on payoffs), the material was used as 
background information, designed to test, confirm and complement data found elsewhere. 
Second, much of the interview data was obtained in the understanding that it was 
essentially "off the record'. This was especially true of civil servants, in the Berlin and 
Lower Saxony Environment Ministries and elsewhere, who were astonishingly willing to 
give me access to material and air opinions that were not for public consumption. Having 
earned their trust, this material has been used discreetly 14 . All interviews were of an 
'open' rather than structured nature, allowing the informants to elaborate upon what they 
considered to be the most salient points of a given issue.
14The tapes are available to examiners, if they wish to verify the interview material.
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Part II: The Institutional Context
(I) CHAPTER TWO: THE PARTY SYSTEM AND POLICY 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
(II) CHAPTER THREE: A SHORT HISTORY OF RED-GREEN 
COALITIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PARTY SYSTEM AND POLICY 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
2.1. Preamble
The purpose of this chapter is to embed the research within its institutional context. 
Drawing upon secondary literature, it establishes a perspective (mainly from the national 
level) with which it will be easier to examine and explain the strategic actions of the agents 
(parties, bureaucracies, NGOs, politicians, civil servants, activists) and their impact upon 
coalition behaviour in the two case studies. As discussed in Chapter One, in keeping with 
the empirical research itself, this chapter has two strands: one looking at party politics and 
the other at policy making.
The chapter has four main sections. First, section 2.2. looks at the party system and the 
electorate in the Federal Republic and, using the established literature, assesses the degree 
to which the post-war West German polity has been characterised by continuity or 
change. It then goes on to examine the impact of unification, in particular the introduction 
of a significant new electorate displaying quite different patters of voting behaviour to 
those found in the 'old' Lander. The section assesses the impact of these developments in 
the formation of a 'New' German party system.
Section 2.3. examines the institutional histories of the SPD and the Greens, in order to 
establish an understanding of some of the historical and ideological dimensions that inform 
the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Although stress is placed upon their recent
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history, the origins of both parties is also looked at, in order to demonstrate that both 
parties have undergone similar processes of ideological schism between Left and Right, 
fundis and realos. The intention is posit the idea that, despite their distinct identities, 
both the Greens and the SPD have to grapple with similar intra-party debates over the 
whole issue of Red-Green political co-operation.
Section 2.4 looks at the historical background and institutional norms of the German 
administrative state, as well as its present structure. Stress is placed upon how German 
administrative culture has been steeped in the traditions of Roman law, with an emphasis 
upon the impartial and (crucially to this thesis) expert administrator as the embodiment of 
a public power. The chapter examines the degree to which public administration in the 
Federal Republic is characterised by a duality between the two ethoses of the 
contemporary party-driven Parteienstaat and the residual administrator-led Beamtenstaat. 
In terms of the structure of German public administration, the chapter examines the 
concept of the 'sectorisation' [Bulmer, 1983: 350] of German public policy . Emphasis is 
placed upon both vertical (between multiple levels of governance) and horizontal (between 
competing ministries) sectorisation. In keeping with the idea of a 'bundle' of preferences 
(see Chapter One), the section differentiates between the structure, process, outputs and 
outcomes of policy-making.
Finally, the chapter applies these ideas to the specific field of environmental policy in the 
Federal Republic in section 2.5. It assesses the degree to which it is the unique structure 
of German administration, rather than any cultural factors, that is responsible for 
Germany's innovative strength within the field of environmental administration. The 
chapter examines the historical background and institutional norms of German 
environmental policy making, the structure of German environmental administration and
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makes a preliminary assessment of the impact of the Greens upon the policy-making 
process.
2.2 The Federal Republic's Party Svstem(s)
Like all but one election in the Federal Republic's history, the 1994 Federal election 
returned the CDU-CSU to the Bundestag as its biggest political grouping. As a result, one 
could be forgiven for assuming that the German electorate is, in essence, as stable and 
conservative as this fact suggests. Yet, when one 'unpacks' the available data, a far more 
complex picture emerges. This was partly due to the unprecedented nature of the first all- 
German elections themselves, in which, as Veen observes, the act of Unification was 
'democratically legitimated ex post facto by the entire German nation' [1993: 47]. 
However, it was also because the addition of 10 million new voters - from a quite different 
socio-economic system - served to further complicate an electoral landscape that had 
displayed signs of instability and change from at least the late 1970's. That this change has 
been of such interest is primarily due to the fact that the Federal Republic had been for so 
long the musterknabe of electoral participation and stability.
2.2.1 The Party System in the 'Old' Federal Republic
The first thirty years of the Federal Republic was characterised by a concentration of the 
party system that in many ways reflected the ongoing integration of the electorate into a 
stable, pragmatic and democratic political system. As Dalton points out, even as recently 
as the late 1970's, the Federal Republic was 'noted for its growing stability and cohesion' 
[1992: 53]. The party system was dominated by the two large Volksparteien. competing
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with one another in an attempt to appeal across society to the maximum number of voters. 
Despite this 'catch-all 1 strategy, both the CDU-CSU and the SPD mobilised their core 
support around the dominant cleavages in German society, those of social class and 
religion. Indeed, one characteristic of the West German polity was the persistence of some 
degree of group-based voting behaviour; albeit supplemented by psychological ties 
between the individual voter and his/her party of choice [Padgett, 1993: 41 ]. As a result. 
the voter profiles of the two Volksparteien are significantly skewed towards specific class 
and confessional loci, despite the erosion of these traditional social networks.
The CDU-CSU's core support came from the predominantly rural and/or Catholic areas of 
the Federal Republic, such as Baden-Wurttemberg, Rhineland-Platinate, Lower Saxony and 
Bavaria. This support was supplemented by that of the 'old1 middle-class, the self- 
employed and the older generational cohorts (especially women). The SPD's support 
came from the more urban, and/or Protestant areas: such as North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Hamburg, Bremen and West Berlin. This support was also supplemented by the majority 
of manual workers (especially those who were members of trade unions), a significant 
proportion of the 'new' middle class of white-collar workers and the younger generational 
cohorts within the electorate [see Cerny, (ed.) 1990; Smith and Paterson, (eds.) 1992; 
Padgett, (ed.) 1993.]. Yet, despite the persistence of these cleavages and their stabilising 
effect upon voting behaviour, it has been clear for some time that their influence has been 
declining: especially as a way of mobilising the Volksparteien vote. As Klingemann 
observes, 'the group-anchored character of the voting behaviour of these strata is 
becoming less and less a guarantee for the continuity of stable social group polities' [Crewe 
and Denver, 1985: 252. Cited Padgett, 1993: 26]. Indeed, from the 1970's onwards, it has 
become clear that the certainties of the first three decades of the Federal Republic are being 
eroded. This happened first at the margins then, increasingly, at the core of electorate.
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The first manifestation of the erosion of party identity amongst the German electorate was 
the growth in 'split-ticket' voting. Split-ticket voting involves the division of party choice 
between the Erststimme and Zweitstimme on the ballot papers and the Federal Republic's 
two-ballot electoral system, first used in 1953, is ideally suited for this type of behaviour. 
Nevertheless, it was not until the 1960's that such voting behaviour became significant, at 
around 10% of votes cast [Dalton, 1992: 54] This was especially common amongst the 
emergent 'new' middle class and could be interpreted as reflecting their ambiguous social 
position in relation to the class cleavage [Padgett, 1993: 39]. The main beneficiary of this 
practice was the FDP, who are reliant upon second votes for their Liste in order to 
maintain their representation in the Bundestag. However, in the 1980's, split-ticket voting 
grew substantially: reaching 14 % in 1987 and 16 % in 1990 [Dalton, 1992: 54]. 
Interestingly, there is no evidence that this was translated into higher FDP support who. 
despite the party's excellent performance in the 1990 elections, have since gone into what 
appears to be terminal decline. This would suggest that much of this voter ambivalence is 
being diffused across the party system.
One obvious example of growing voter ambivalence has been the decline in the total vote 
for the Volksparteien. There appears to be two main reasons for this decline. First 
reduced partisan identification, either as a result of the erosion of distinct socio-economic 
loci and/or because of a loosening of psychological ties between the parties and their 
voters. Second, the decline in the total level of electoral participation from the high levels 
of the 1960's and 1970's. These two factors are themselves interlinked and have prompted 
much debate as to their underlying causes.
The total Volkspartei vote has been in decline for over a decade: falling from 82.7 % in 
1976, to 77.4 % in 1980 before stabilising at 77.6 % in the 1983 election. However, this 
would appear to have been a brief respite before resuming its fall to 68.5 % in 1987 and an
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unprecedented 62.9 % in 1990 [Padgett, 1993: 35. Table 1.2]. Given that it has been 
accepted that the CDU-CSU and the SPD constitute one of the stabilising factors within 
the political system, this 20-point decline in fourteen years raises questions as to its future 
stability. Moreover, this decline has affected both the government and opposition parties 
to some extent; with the SPD arguably the biggest loser. Whilst the CDU has seen some 
erosion of its support amongst its client groups, the SPD has suffered a severe loss of 
support amongst its electoral core of manual workers, especially Catholics, those in rural 
areas and those who are not members of a trade union. In 1983, this manifested itself at 
the margins of SPD support: such as in Baden-Wurttemberg. However, the 1987 and 1990 
elections continued the process; with the SPD losing support to both the FDP and CDU 
in areas such as Nordrhein-Westfalen and to the Far Right in Bremen. At the same time, 
the Greens have continued to challenge the SPD along the dimension of the 'New Polities'. 
Ironically, the party's attempts to counter this threat and integrate the 'New Left' agenda 
has further alienated the typical SPD Stammwahler. Thus, whilst the SPD's 'new' middle- 
class vote has held up in the 1980's, there has been a 19 % reduction in SPD alignment 
amongst the non-Catholic unionised working-class between 1983 and 1990 [Padgett, 1993: 
38]. Yet, despite remaining the biggest party in the Federal Republic, the CDU has not 
been able to fully exploit this decline in its opponent's fortunes. Indeed, during the early 
1990's, the party was itself prone to lose support to both the FDP.. the SPD and the Far 
Right. Moreover, it has never been able to win the allegiance of a majority of the 'ne\v' 
middle-class to the extent that, for example, the British Conservatives have done until 
recently.
As previously mentioned, one factor affecting the Volkspartei vote has been the decline in 
the socio-economic groups around which they have mobilised. For instance, in 1957. the 
SPD received 61 % of the working-class vote and only 24 % of the 'old' middle-class vote: 
a differential of 37 %. Despite the Bad Godesberg conference and, in the 1970's. a
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sustained period in office, this differential remained above 10 % throughout the decade and 
into the 1980's; with similar differentials along the dimensions of income and education 
[Dalton, 1992: 58]. Similarly, the CDU has also been embedded within a distinct social 
clientele. Yet, whilst the 'old' working-class and middle-class cleavage remains, these two 
groups' size as a proportion of the electorate has declined from approximately three- 
quarters of the electorate in the 1950's to little more than a half today. At the same time, 
the 'new' middle-class now constitutes around 46 % of the total electorate. Thus, although 
the old class cleavage is, arguably, as distinct as ever it is less salient politically, given its 
decline as a proportion of the electorate. More significant is the emergence of a 'new' class 
who no longer follow these cues in making their voting decisions [Dalton, 1992: 59]. This 
process is echoed in the slow decline in the importance of the confessional cleavage as a 
factor in voting choice. As we have seen, the SPD can no longer rely on the non-Catholic 
vote; even amongst the working-class. Equally, there has been some erosion of the CDU's 
traditional support amongst Catholic areas of the Federal Republic. In the 1987 election. 
CDU support in areas with over 60 % Catholic representation within the electorate fell by 
5.2 %, compared with an overall decline of-4.5 % [Padgett, 1993: 38]. However, this was 
to some extent reversed in 1990; although those sections of the Catholic population 
engaged in unionised manual occupations continued to show less support for the CDU. 
Nevertheless, as Padgett points out, this may not be of any great significance given that 
the CDU's 'sidvantage has been less pronounced and consistent where Catholicism is 
counteracted by trade union membership' [Padgett, 1993: 38].
Such social-structural changes are partly responsible for an erosion of the psychological 
attachment between the Volksparteien and their voters. This manifests itself in three 
ways. Firstly, as we have seen, the continuing decline in the Volkspartei vote. Secondly, 
in increased voter-exchange between the parties and, finally, in a significant increase in the
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proportion of non-voters. All the evidence suggests that there has been a real erosion of 
'the stable bedrock! of the German electorate [Padgett, 1993: 25].
Voter exchange is notoriously difficult to measure. The Pederson Index of net/aggregate 
change is reliable within narrow parameters, but is unable to account for self-cancelling 
voter exchange between the parties. However, measuring gross change is fraught with 
methodological problems because of its reliance on survey data, particularly in relation to 
individual recollections of previous voting choice. These caveats aside, it has been 
possible to demonstrate that, although net change has been reasonably stable in recent 
years, there has been an increase in gross change. In other words, whilst the respective 
shares of the Volkspartei vote have remained near previous levels, there has been greater 
volatility 'below the surface' as individual voters transfer allegiance between elections. 
Inter-election change (between Bundestag elections) has doubled since the 1960's- to 
around 20 %- whilst intra-election change (between Landtag and Bundestag elections or 
vice versa) has increased to an even greater extent. The 1990 Federal elections and 
subsequent Land elections have seen a continuation of this trend.
The third manifestation of growing voter alienation is the increase in non-voting; which has 
reached significantly high proportions in a society previously noted for high levels of 
electoral participation. As such high levels of electoral participation were based on the 
idea of voting being a civic responsibility, any significant decline has implications for the 
future legitimacy of the party system. Most of this growth has taken place amongst the 
younger generational cohorts and could be linked to feelings of impotence, dissatisfaction 
and the perceived lack of alternatives between the parties. However, such perceptions are 
not necessarily transitory and, if these cohorts are not integrated into the political system, 
the likelihood of future instability will increase.
63
Given this sea-change in the German electorate, much speculation has taken place as to the 
future shape of the German polity, to the extent that some analysts perceive a crisis in the 
system as a whole. But will such a crisis take place, or will the system return to stability 
once this period of turbulence has ended? The question hinges upon whether the German 
polity is undergoing a process of realignment or dealignment [Dalton et al. 1988. Ch. 15. 
Cited Dalton, 1992:56].
The argument for realignment centres upon the idea that parties are still fundamentally 
embedded within distinct social, economic and political loci. However, as technical change 
weakens the old milieus, new social forces and interest coalitions arise to make competing 
claims that the parties must address. Whilst this process takes place, there are decisive 
shifts in allegiance between parties and their clienteles. According to the logic of this 
argument, the 'realigning1 election of 1983 was such an event [Padgett, 1993: 27]. Thus, 
the rise of the 'new' middle-class, the decreasing degree of salience of the 'old' class- 
confessional cleavages and the 'New Polities' agenda - based around a 'post-materialist' 
discourse [Inglehart, 1990. cited Dalton, 1992: 56] - are all evidence of such a fundamental 
realignment.
However, it is clear that the German electorate shows no sign of returning to a stable 
voting pattern. Indeed, the 1980's appear to have been the precursor to 'an extended 
period of electoral change' [Padgett, 1993: 31 ]. Moreover, although more and more 
individuals no longer take their electoral cues from the 'old' class-confessional cleavages, 
their perceptions of the Volksparteien as being mobilised around class have actually 
increased since the 1950's [Dalton, 1992: 59]. It would appear that the Volksparteien have 
not undergone a qualitative change in their electoral appeal: but are still perceived to 
mobilise around the familiar class-confessional cleavages. One must conclude that it is the 
individual voter who has become distanced from the mobilisation process.
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Such a conclusion is consistent with the dealignment argument put forward by Dalton 
amongst others. The logic of this argument is that partisan identification has been eroded 
by both the increasing sophistication and alienation of the individual voter [Raschke, 1982; 
Dalton, 1988; cited Dalton, 1992: 56]. Voters are increasingly instrumental in their party 
choice and will favour one party over another depending on the issues of the day. 
Moreover, those interest coalitions that do arise will tend to be more fragmented than the 
monolithic socio-economic blocs that had previously shaped politics. Given this 
fragmentation, the signals given out by the electorate to the office-seeking party become 
increasingly confused. For example, the 1980's saw the emergence of a post-materialist 
electoral agenda; to which the SPD felt obliged to respond. Yet, in all three Federal 
elections, the environment never achieved the same issue-salience with the electorate as did 
the questions of unemployment or pension provision. Conversely, despite such 
materialist concerns, a period of unprecedented prosperity did not prevent Helmut Kohl 
and the CDU being profoundly unpopular in the first half of 1989. Indeed, in the Federal 
Republic there appears to no longer be a clear link between economic performance and 
party popularity [Kirchgassner, 1989; cited Padgett, 1993: 43]. Given such ambiguities, it 
is becoming harder for parties to identify and articulate the interests of the voters. In turn, 
this increases voter alienation and volatility. Ultimately, such a process has the potential 
to seriously undermine the legitimacy of the political system.
2.2.2. The Party System in the 'New' Lander
By the end of the 1980's, the German electorate was displaying signs of increased 
volatility and fragmentation. Thus, with the unification of the two Germanys. there 
seemed little possibility of a return to the stability of the 1950's and 1960's. As Dalton 
observes, 'Unification.... injected new uncertainty into this already fluid political 
environment'; giving the possibility of a new wave of partisan change' [Dalton, 1992: 55].
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Under any circumstances, the addition of 10 million new voters into the political landscape 
would impose a serious strain on an already brittle polity. However, decades of 'real 
existing socialism1 in the East had atomised any semblance of the civil society that had 
been the basis of party identification in the West. Indeed, survey data has indicated that 
only 4% of voters in the 'New' Lander admit to 'strong ties' to a particular party [Dalton, 
1992: 71]. Given the lack of such a deep-rooted party identification, there was some 
speculation as to how the individual voter would make his/her electoral choice. Initially, it 
was thought that, both the predominance of at least nominally Protestant voters and the 
large proportion of manual workers in the 'New' Lander would tip the scales in favour of 
the SPD. However, this has not been the case. Indeed, if one is to discern a clear pattern 
of voter choice, it is practically an inversion of that of the 'old' Lander. Thus, although 
social class classifications are somewhat tentative in eastern Germany, it would appear 
that the CDU enjoys disproportionate support amongst manual workers compared with 
its overall share of the vote; with 49.8% compared with 41.8 % overall (and 24.8% for the 
SPD). Moreover, not only is the CDU ahead of the SPD amongst the small Catholic 
section of the population; it also commands a majority of those voters who claim affinity 
to the Protestant church [Padgett, 1993: 39-41]. Indeed, it is only amongst those sections 
of the electorate who claim no religious affiliation that the SPD has made any headway. 
However, even here the SPD is by no means dominant and must compete with Bundnis 
90-Greens and the PDS.
As already noted, the Federal Republic's once stable electorate now appears to be 
increasingly fractious and unpredictable. This has been demonstrated by the falling 
Volkspartei vote, split-ticket voting, increased rates of voter exchange and falling levels of 
overall electoral participation, particularly amongst the young. Moreover, much of this 
volatility can be attributed to technical change: which has both eroded the social networks 
that provided many of the cues for voting behaviour and reduced the psychological
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attachment between the individual voter and the party of his/her choice. The results of the 
1990 election have demonstrated that these trends have continued. However, many voters 
are not only indifferent to the major parties but openly contemptuous of them. Such 
perceptions of Parteiverdrossenheit have been aggravated by a number of high-profile 
political scandals in recent years - such as the Flick and Barschel affairs - and by a wide­ 
spread perception that the political class is out of touch with the aspirations of the wider 
public.
However, there is no real evidence that the basis of the Federal Republic's political system 
is not still sound, despite the slow process of dealignment. Moreover, one must assume 
that the Volksparteien will still exercise a major stabilising role. As Gordon Smith asserts, 
'there are several reasons for supposing that they will continue to be the important 
mainstay of the German party system' [Mair and Smith, 1990: 159]; and that around a half 
of the total electorate will continue to vote for them. Nevertheless, they can no longer 
count on the electorate to the extent that they could even a decade ago and are more 
vulnerable to sudden shifts of allegiance over specific issues. To conclude, it is ironic that 
- even as individual voters appear to be increasingly alienated from the political process - 
understanding and responding to their aspirations and beliefs has become more and more 
vital to the parties.
It remains to be seen if this pattern of voter instability is now an established feature of the 
'New' German party system. However, it does force parties to consider, and even enter 
into, political alliances over the medium-term, in order to gain office. Moreover, these 




The SPD is the oldest political party in the Federal Republic and its origins have been well 
documented [see Mehring, 1897; Lipinski, 1927-1928; Berlau, 1949; Schorske, 1955: 
and Hunt, 1964]. Whilst its main competitor, the CDU, is inextricably linked with the 
post-war settlement and the establishment of the Federal Republic, the SPD's foundation 
is linked to the failed revolutionary fervour of 1848. Its roots are deeply embedded in the 
network of workers' clubs that spread throughout the more industrialised regions of 
Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The emergent party was polarised 
between two competing socialist groups, the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers. This 
polarisation manifested itself not only in their political outlook, but also in their formal 
organisation. The affect of this division between the two groups has persisted until the 
present. As Hunt observes, the two groups 'left a strange dual heritage to the later party, 
which helps to explain some of its paradoxes' [1964: 2].
The SPD has always had an authoritarian streak, dating back to one of its precursors the 
German General Workers Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeitervereien or ADA), 
founded in the mid-19th Century by Lassalle, who declared in a letter to Bismarck 'that the 
working classes are instinctively inclined to dictatorship, if they can be justly convinced that 
this dictatorship is exercised in their interests' [1964: 4]. As Hunt observes: 
'from its outset the German labour movement has a dual heritage in 
organisational as well as in political matters.... two sharply 
contrasting models of organisation: the one authoritarian, rigidly 
centralised, efficient, and disciplined; the other ultra-democratic, 
loosely federalist in structure, and lax in discipline. In the 
subsequent history of the Social Democratic Party, one can follow
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the interplay of these two clashing concepts of organisation' [1964: 
6-7].
The story of the modern SPD begins with the defeat of Hitler in 1945. At first, the SPD 
was able to remobilise under the aegis of all the occupying powers. However, following 
the Z-wangsvereinigung in the Russian zone, from the spring of 1946, the SPD's activities 
were restricted to the three Western zones of occupation.
Nevertheless, the SPD at this time remained in many respects a Marxist-inspired party of 
the non-Communist Left. It took a long time to come to terms with the post-war 
settlement, the division of Germany and the 'social market economy' model being 
developed by Adenauer and Erhard, with the encouragement of the Americans. The post­ 
war SPD's early policy pronouncements continued to promise to 'socialise' the production 
of coal, iron and steel, energy, chemicals, basic building materials, large banks and insurance 
companies. Such a stance set the SPD against the political tide in the western zones, as 
demonstrated by its rapidly falling membership in the late 1940s and early 1950s 15 . The 
death of Kurt Schumacher in 1952 only served to further demoralise the SPD during this 
period.
The electoral unpopularity of its stance was increasingly recognised within the SPD itself 
and, slowly, the party began to modernise all aspects of its activities. With the added 
impetus of election defeats in 1953 and 1957, the process of adapting to the new political 
realities of the Federal Republic culminated in the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959. 
where the party adopted a new raft of policies. The 'Bad Godesberg Programme'
15 SPD memebrship fell from almost 900,000 in 1946 to under 600,000 by the mid- 1950s [Merkl 
(ed.),1980: 37].
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disavowed Marxism and attempted to embed the SPD's core principles of democratic 
socialism within the wider context of Christian ethics, classical philosophy and the 
tradition of humanism. The programme endorsed the liberal pluralist settlement in the 
Federal Republic and the centrality of the 'social market' economy to it.
Underlying this change was the need to appeal across class-loyalties in order to enhance 
the SPD's support. This logic predated Kirchheimer's (1966) model of the Volkspartei, 
which explicitly de-emphasises ideology and class-allegiance as a means of political 
mobilisation. This, combined with a new professional team led by the charismatic Willy 
Brandt, led to a ten point rise in SPD support over the period 1957 to 1969. Finally, in 
1972, the SPD reached the peak of their popularity: polling 45.8% of the vote and 
becoming the biggest party in the Bundestag [Padgett, 1993: 28].
The SPD's rising support and Salonfahigkeit inevitably led to participation in national 
government, first as junior partner in the Grand Coalition (1966-1969) and then as senior 
partner in the Social-Liberal Coalition (1969-1982). However, ever since its peak of 
popularity in 1972, the SPD has been in both an electoral and ideological decline. This 
decline accelerated in the 1980's, following the collapse of the Social-Liberal coalition.
Once in opposition, the SPD has had to respond to four fundamental threats to its 
position. First, the decline in the overall Volkspartei vote, which has effected both the 
SPD and CDU and has prompted some observers to forecast growing instability within 
the Federal Republic's party system. Second, the extraordinary personal appeal and 
political acumen of Helmut Kohl, who has managed to keep the SPD on the back foot in 
the fight for the political centre-ground. Third, the growth of the Greens, which has served 
to put pressure on the SPD along the post-materialist or 'New Polities' dimension. 
Finally, after 1989, the persistence of the PDS in the new Lander. which has contributed
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to the SPD's weakness in the east and (with the additional weakness of the Greens and 
FDP) has severely restricted their coalition options.
The SPD's response took shape at the 1984 Party Conference in Essen. The Executive 
(Parteivorstand) appointed a Programme Commission, chaired by the talismanic Brandt. 
to work on the principles of a new programme. It produced its first draft in 1986. 
However, by this point, the internal politics of the SPD began to hamper the development 
of the new programme: with Hans-Jochen Vogel taking over as Chair of the Programme 
Commission and the younger and highly ambitious Oskar Lafontaine being appointed on 
to it.
The new Basic Programme of the SPD was approved in 1989 and is widely accepted to be 
an uninspired mish-mash, representing an uneasy compromise between the underlying core 
values of the SPD, as set out at Bad Godesberg, and the 'New Left' and/or post-materialist 
agenda around which the SPD's Left-wing (only partly in response to the Greens) had 
mobilised in the 1980's [Miiller, 1990: 63-4; von Winter, 1990: 350 -358; Padgett and 
Paterson, 1991: 58; Potthoff, 1991: 355; Miiller-Rommel and Poguntke, 1992: 338; 
Padgett (ed.), 1993: 174-176]. Moreover, it was a response to the problems of the 1980s 
and, with unification of Germany, was largely irrelevant to the new political landscape. 
Once again, the SPD appeared to be swimming against the tide.
Nevertheless, at the Lander level, the SPD has continued to thrive as a party of 
government. Here, the Greens are a party that the SPD can deal with, as demonstrated by 
the majority 'Red-Green' coalitions ( SPD and Greens) in, for example, Hesse (1985-7. 
1991-1995 and 1995-), West Berlin (1989-90), Lower Saxony (1990-1994) and North- 
Rhine Westphalia (1995-) as well as a minority coalition ('tolerated' by the PDS) in 
Saxony-Anhalt since 1994. In addition there have been Traffic-Light' coalitions in
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Brandenburg (1990-1994 with Biindnis 90 and the FDP) and Bremen (1991-1995 with the 
Greens and the FDP). Slowly, the SPD has recognised the need to address this ne\v 
competitor to its Left, whilst trying not to alienate its traditional supporters through 
dealing with what many regarded as an anti-system party. Chapter Three has a more 
comprehensive account of these coalitions.
Nevertheless, despite evidence that the SPD has had little to regret in its dealings with the 
Greens, this lesson has not as yet been applied to the party's dealings with the PDS 16. 
As the successors of the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany (SED), the 
PDS have attracted opprobrium. Labels such as 'ex-Stasi', the 'Eastern League', the 
'nostalgic association1 or even 'Red Polished Fascists' have been used to attack the party. 
Ironically, this has apparently helped the PDS as much as hindered them. The success of 
the PDS in entering the Bundestag following the October 1994 elections was evidence that 
the party had consolidated their status as the 'eastern' party of protest [Lees 1995: 150- 
154]. Subsequent Land elections - especially their spectacular result in the October 1995 
Berlin elections (where they became the biggest party in the east of the city with 36.3% of 
votes cast) have only confirmed this impression. Moreover, the continued social 
dislocation in the new Lander means that the PDS' position is secure for the time being 17 .
16There is evidence that this is changing. Within days of replacing Rudolf Scharping as party leader in 
1995, Oskar Lafontaine had a highly publicised meeting with his opposite number in the PDS, Gregor 
Gysi. Naturally, the meeting was vehemently denounced by opposition politicians and sections of the 
German media!
l^In programmatic terms, the PDS remains opportunistic and oriented towards the East (it only receives 
about 0.9% of the vote in the West). The PDS sees itself as part of the reform (as opposed to opposition) 
movement in the former GDR and has not explicitly rejected the aims of the former regime. It is against 
what it regards as westernisation and the material and cultural dominance of capital, as represented by the 
BRD political settlement. As far as the PDS is for concrete policies, these would include decisive social 
change through both strong parliamentary representation and extra-parliamentary means, open borders for 
'people in danger' (asylum seekers),, a 30 hour week with full wage compensation and the dismantlement of 
NATO. They have 30 MP's in the Bundestag ( including 9 from the West who are former Greens), and 
100,000 members in the east (compared to 25,000 SPD members) and 30,000 in the west. 90% of the PDS 
membership come from the former SED.
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Up until now, the SPD's response to the PDS has been a continuation of the old 
Communist/Social Democrat schism. This has been formally codified as meaning no co­ 
operation above the local level and absolutely no collaboration in opposition. In a re-run 
of the party's initial response to the Greens, the SPD wants to integrate the PDS 
electorate without absorbing the concepts it represents. The SPD has also demanded some 
form ofmea culpa on the part of the PDS with regards to socialism and the GDR and the 
enforced merger between the Communists and SPD in 1946.
The Berlin debacle of 22 October 1995 18 proved to be fatal for party leader Rudolf 
Scharping, who was replaced by Oskar Lafontaine at the SPD annual conference in 
November 1995. Indeed, the choice of the mercurial Left-winger Lafontaine over the staid 
centrist Scharping is indicative of the party's ideological ambivalence. Rudolf Scharping's 
strategy was based around projecting the SPD's governmental competence at all costs. As 
a result, he always refused to rule out the possibility of re-entering national government as 
a junior partner to the CDU. Oskar Lafontaine, on the other hand, promised a more 
confrontational and explicitly Left-wing stance in opposition. However, as the 1998 
Bundestag elections approach, the pendulum appears to be swinging away from 
Lafontaine towards the more centrist, but equally abrasive, Minister President of Lower 
Saxony, Gerhard Schroder.
18The SPD lost 6.6% overall, with their vote share dropping by 4% in the Western half of the city and a 
devastating 12.1% in the east. The SPD is no longer the strongest party in any district of the city. In the 
east, it was the strongest party but now lies behind the PDS and CDU. In the west, it even slumped to 
29.8% in its once rock-solid heartland of Wedding and was beaten by the Greens in post-materialist 
Kreuzberg and Mitte 01. Bearing in mind that, under Willy Brandt in 1963 the Berlin SPD scored 62%, 
humiliation is not too strong a word in describing the SPD's 1995 performance. It was certainly their 
worst-ever performance in Berlin and provoked speculation as to the SPD's long-term future as a 
Volkspartei. Moreover, it opened up a fresh split within the local party as to its future strategy. On the one 
hand, the leadership of the party and the traditionalist elements of the rank-and-file were broadly in favour of 
a renewal of the Grand Coalition after the necessary negotiations. On the other hand, the New Left and a 
significant proportion of the ordinary membership argued that the Berlin SPD's only chance was to go into 
opposition and renew itself programmatically. Underlying this argument was the implicit assumption that 
the party would move back towards the Left and re-build co-operation with the Greens, and even the PDS. 
through opposition to a minority CDU senate.
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2.3.2 The Greens
The origins of the German Greens are well documented 19and do not require more than a
brief resume.
The proto-Greens emerged out of the 'citizens initiative' groups of the mid- to late 1970's. 
The early years were characterised by internecine struggle between the ecology 
movement's 'New Left' and conservative wings. The former saw environmental protest as 
one aspect of a wider critique of the capitalist system (and were more prepared to resort 
to violent political protest against it) whilst the latter favoured a more assimilative policy 
in co-operation with the established political order. As a result, the two wings began to 
field rival lists at local and Lander elections. However, it was clear that such factionalism 
was preventing either of the ecological groupings from surmounting the Federal Republic's 
5% electoral barrier and, in July 1978, the two wings in Bavaria decided to combine and 
take part in the state's elections in October of that year as Die Grtinen (The Greens). This 
arrangement became known as the Bavarian Co-operation Model and was to be the 
template for future co-operation in other Lander. Once inside the same organisation, the 
conservative elements became progressively marginalised and the proto-party began to 
assume its familiar Left-libertarian and/or post-materialist character [Markovits and 
Gorski, 1993: 192-7].
The proto-Greens' first opportunities came at the local level: taking advantage of the 
greater willingness of voters to vote innovatively at local elections (as well as the fact that
Scharf, T., 1994, The German Greens: Challenging The Consensus. Berg; Markovits. A.S. and 
Gorski, P.S., 1993, The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond. Polity Press; Kleinert, H., 1992, Aufstieg 
undfall der Griinen: Analyse einer alternativen Partei. Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf.; Hiilsberg, W..1988, 
The German Greens: A Social And Political Profile. Verso.; Bickerich, W. (Ed), 1985, SPD und Grime: 
Das neue Bundnis? Spiegel-Buch; Miiller, E-P, 1984, Die Griinen und das Parteisystem. Deutscher 
Hnstituts-Verlag,; Papadakis, E. 1983, The Green party in contemporary West German polities'. Political 
Quarterly. 54; and Mettke, J.R. (Ed), 1982, Die Griinen: Regierungspartner von morgen? Spiegel-Buch; 
for instance.
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many local communes had no 5% electoral barrier). They also campaigned in the 1979 
elections to the European Parliament.
Although failing to win seats in the European parliament, the various fractured Green 
groupings in the Federal Republic did win a respectable 3.2% of the vote. However, 
although many local Green parties formed during this period, others did not contest local 
elections until after the formation of the national party in 1980. For instance, with the 
exception of Alternative Trier, no local elections were contested in the Rhineland- 
Palatinate until 1984 [Scharf, 1994: 64-66]. Thus, the formative experiences of local Green 
parties did not always follow a set pattern: resulting in quite heterogeneous local political 
cultures that, to some extent, have persisted into the 1990's.
The big breakthrough for the Greens came in March 1983, when the national party entered 
the Bundestag for the first time, having won 5.6% of the vote in national elections 
[Padgett, 1993: 28]. Although von Beyme's assertion that 'the 1983 election transformed 
the Federal Republic from the last refuge of party system immobility into an El Dorado of 
success for alternative polities' [von Beyme, 1991: 161] may be over-stating the case a 
little, it is clear that from that point onwards the German party system was undergoing a 
process of change and adaptation.
Five factors were at work which served to bring the Greens into the political mainstream. 
First, following unification, the merger of the more moderate Bundnis 90 and 'eastern' 
Greens with the Greens in the west has resulted in an overall moderation of both the Green 
voters' and membership's ideological profile. Second, as it becomes increasingly evident 
that the Greens are failing to mobilise the very youngest generational cohort, the cohort 
from which the movement in the West originally arose has got older and, crucially perhaps, 
more established and integrated. Third, as the Greens have become more established
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within the political system, so their internal structure has become more institutionalised 
and hierarchical. Ironically, the fact that the Greens are not a mass membership party 
serves to increase the power of elected politicians vis-a-vis the Basis, or grass roots, to the 
extent that they can be regarded as more of a Fraktions- or Wahlkampfpartei than as the 
epitome of Basisdemokratie. This has meant that an increasingly pragmatic and, I would 
argue, office-seeking elite has been able to move the party away from the previously rigid 
'Fund? position of the 1980's. One result of these developments has been that the demand 
for an explicitly anti-capitalist or anti-system agenda has been replaced to some extent by 
one that reflects 'lifestyle1 or quality of life issues - including a greater emphasis upon an 
environmental agenda - that are more pertinent to the local, city or state level of 
government within which, up until now, the Greens' governmental experience has been 
limited. A fourth development has been the extent to which the agenda around which the 
Greens have mobilised has been co-opted by the other parties. On the one hand, this 
process of Themenklau - especially on the part of the SPD - is a danger to the Greens as it 
serves to lessen the distinctiveness of the party in its attempts to mobilise around the 
post-materialist vote. On the other hand, not only does this process increase the overall 
Koalitionsfahigkeit of the Greens, but the fact that environmental concerns have become an 
accepted part of the political agenda is evidence of the diffuse, but very real, power of the 
discourse. Fifth, with the FDP no longer able to rely on passing the 5% barrier in the 
Lander and increasingly reliant at both the local and national level upon the second-votes 
of CDU supporters, the viability (and therefore the desirability) of the Greens as a 
potential coalition partner has increased. Finally, just as the hegemonic position on the 
Left of the SPD had been eroded by the emergence of the Greens in the late 1970's and 
early 1980's, the old-Left/New-Left duality of the SPD and Greens that has existed since 
then has been eroded by the survival and persistence of the PDS. Not only has the 
resilience of the PDS further fragmented the Left of German politics, but much of the 
stigma that had previously attached itself to the Greens (especially during the cold war)
76
has now been transferred to them. Thus, there is less political risk in other parties co­ 
operating with the Greens.
The Greens can now be regarded as a party of the mainstream at the sub-national level. 
Indeed, one recent headline in the German press stated that the Greens had now taken over 
the function of'king maker1 previously enjoyed by the FDP [Handelsblatt: 16/05/95]. In 
reality, the notion that the Greens are now the 'king maker' within the German party 
system is at least premature and probably inappropriate. This is because the FDP was 
programmatically compatible with both parties, having both an economically and socially 
liberal component within its ideology which could be emphasised depending on who was 
its senior coalition partner. For instance, during the 1969-1982 Social-Liberal coalition, the 
FDP emphasised the 'social' side of its ideology and, after the formation of the coalition 
with the Union parties in 1982, its economic liberalism became more dominant. This 
Janus-like quality traditionally lent credibility to the FDP's ultimate threat to any coalition 
partner: to form a coalition with the opposition.
That the Greens have both stabilised their vote share and become an established feature of 
the party system may have surprised some observers but is not without precedent. 
Indeed, the SPD itself underwent the same process earlier this century [see Padgett, 1993; 
1994].. However, what is perhaps striking is the speed at which this process has taken 
place, despite the Greens' lack of a clear social cleavage around which to mobilise. This 
has led some observers to wonder if a 'post-industrial' cleavage now exists or, alternatively, 
that cleavage structures are no longer relevant to the modern German party system [see 
Raschke and Schmidt-Beck in Burklin et al, (eds.) 1993].
It would be rash, however, to deny the persistence of the old materialist social-political 
divisions or speculate as to their continuing salience in the future. The German part}
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system has adapted to accommodate the Greens rather than been transformed by them. 
Conversely, whilst the two big Volksparteien have seen some slippage in their vote, they 
remain the major players within the party system and the Greens have had to deal with 
this fact.
2.4. The Changing Nature of the German State: from Beamtenstaat to 
Parteienstaat
2.4.1 The Historical Background and Institutional Norms
Traditionally, the German state was perceived as transcending partisan rivalry, steeped in 
the traditions of Roman law, with an emphasis upon the impartial and, crucially, expert 
administrator, the embodiment of a public power to which parties - especially in 
Wilhelmine Germany - had often been peripheral. It was this lack of legitimacy 
surrounding party government in Germany that prevented the emergence of a robust 
democratic culture and finally undermined the Weimar Republic and led to the 'totalitarian 
partnership1 between state, society and party that characterised the Third Reich [Broszat 
1981:348].
Given the consequences of this period of German history, it was perhaps inevitable that 
the post-1945 settlement would involve the integration of political parties into the centre 
of the governmental/administrative nexus of the new Federal Republic. However, this was 
not a clean break with the past, given that the administrative culture within the permanent 
civil service was and remains deeply rationalistic and expert-oriented. Thus, the Federal 
Republic is characterised by a duality between the two ethoses of the contemporary 
Parteienstaat and the residual administrator-led Beamtenstaat.
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The central role of political parties in the new Federal Republic was formally codified in 
Article 21 of the Basic Law, which stated that 'the political parties shall participate in the 
formation of the political will of the people'. This represented a significant re-alignment 
within the German polity, with a new norm of state power: a Parteienstaat in which the 
legitimacy of the state is tied up with the legitimacy of the political parties' [see Paterson in 
Ware (ed.), 1987].
The inter-dependence of the established parties and the administrative structures of the 
Federal Republic is reflected in their penetration of the civil service. For instance, in 1972 
the main political parties had staffed over half the senior posts (state secretaries, heads and 
departmental heads of division) at the state and federal level of the civil service This 
interdependence was not just a question of re-staffing a particular department, but was 
also manifested in discursive terms, with administrative values permeating internal debate 
within the established parties [Lees, 1995: 9] and reinforcing the existing consensus 
between them on the substantive issues of state.
2.4.2 The Structure, Process and Outputs of German Public Administration
As already touched upon, the concept such of 'policy style' is essentially contested and 
depends upon the individual policy sector in question. The 'segmentation' [Dyson, 1982] 
or 'sectorisation' [Bulmer, 1983: 350] of German public policy is a common theme within 
the more recent literature. As discussed in Chapter One, Katzenstein uses different 
terminology and develops the concept of three nodes of the policy net\vork\ that of the 
consensual party system, the division of competencies between Bund and Land, and the 
diverse public and private interests that influence the policy debate [1989: 35-60].
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With regard to process, the impact of such parapublic institutions has less to do with 
inputs (unsolicited policy initiatives) than with their ability to shape outputs (through 
legal redress etc.). For example, as Paterson [1989: 278-280] points out, the political 
opportunity structure [Kitschelt, 1986] for environmental groups has generally been 
limited to the output side of environmental policy, in the form of judicial review [Lees 
1995: 11]. This point is crucial to the thesis, as Part III assesses the degree to which 
Green participation in Red-Green coalitions have enabled environmental groups to 
influence inputs, by opening up the policy network.
The party system's inherent tendency towards coalition politics enhances the degree of 
sectorisation within the policy-making apparatus because of the principle of ministerial 
autonomy laid out in Article 65 of the Basic Law (the Ressortsprinzip). The distribution 
of ministerial seats are central to the processes of coalition formation and maintenance and. 
given the tendency of parties to staff ministries with their own people, policy-making can 
become an adjunct to inter-coalition rivalry. 'Junior' partners within coalitions - such as 
the FDP or Greens - tend to be especially jealous of ministerial autonomy, leading to 
differences in policy style and content across competing ministries. For instance. 
Paterson's study of the politics of regulation of the chemical industry in the 1980s 
describes how, prior to the creation of the Federal Environment Ministry, the FDP-led 
Economics ministry took a far more 'industry-friendly' approach to regulation than the 
Interior ministry [1989: 73-89]. By contrast, Friedrich Zimmermann, the CSU Interior 
Minister, surprised many observers with his imposition of relatively strict environmental 
regulations within his areas of competence [Weidner, 1995: 13-14].
In addition to the horizontal sectorisation of policy-making between ministries, vertical 
sectorisation occurs through the division of competencies between Bund and Land. The 
Ldnder have not only managed to defend a great deal of their constitutional powers, but
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have in recent years actually won new powers. The need to ratify the Single European 
Act and the Maastricht Treaty meant that the Bund was forced to cede a right of co- 
decision (Mitwirkung) to the Lander in the new Article 23 of the Basic Law. Article 23(1) 
states that any future transfer of sovereignty is subject to the approval of the Bundesrat 
under the conditions of Article 79(3), which protects the Federal nature of the German 
state. Article 23(5) enhances the role of the Bundesrat in the formulation of legislation 
relating to Europe, whilst Article 23(6) gives the Bundesrat the right to nominate a 
representative to attend the Council of Ministers as the Federal Republic's representative 
when issues are under consideration that are the sole responsibility of the Lander 
[Paterson, 1996: 178. see also Jeffery, 1994.]. However, even before these changes, the 
Lander have had considerable power influence over policy-making and, quite often, this 
influence is used for party political purposes. However, all Minister presidents are likely 
to put more of an emphasis upon their own particular policy-priorities and, as a result, 
even states governed by the same party can often come into conflict with the Bund. The 
refusal of Kurt Biedenkopf (the CDU Minister President of Saxony) to withdraw 
sweeteners to VW to locate in his state, despite it being ruled against European Union 
competition law, is a good example of where the (job-creating) priorities of a particular 
Land is in conflict with the (integrating) priorities of the Bund.
Additional horizontal and vertical sectorisation occurs at the Lander level. Horizontal 
sectorisation manifests itself in different ways from state to state20 , depending on the
™Every one of the Flachenstaaten has a Cabinet headed by a Minister-President, with ministers and 
supporting state secretaries. The Stadtstaaten, on the other hand, have a Senate and senators: led in 
Hamburg and Berlin by a Chief Biirgermeister, and in Bremen by a Senate President. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the terms ministry and ministers will be the standard usage. All Lander have ministries of the 
Interior, Finance, Economy, Transport, Labour and Social Security but, in the tradition of the old Prussian 
administration, it is Minister of the Interior who is the central figure. The minister is not only in charge of 
the whole administrative structure of the Land, but is also assumed to be responsible for all issues where no 
other ministerial authority is specified. Land ministries also have a number of autonomous units attached 
to them. In the Flachenstaaten, there are lower tiers of government such as the Kreis and the Gemeinde. In 
the Stadtstaaten, however, the Land government doubles as the major local authority as well. As already 
discussed, the Land of Bremen has its own constitutional arrangements. In the larger Lander, there are
8 1
structure of ministries (see section 2.4. on Environmental policy). Vertical sectorisation 
occurs because of the heterogeneous nature of administrative structures at the sub-national 
level. For instance, most Ldnder generally have two administrative tiers below that of the 
Ministry, that of an intermediate level (e.g. the Regierungsbezirke} and a local authority 
(the Gemeinde or Kreis). There are some exceptions to this. For instance, Brandenburg. 
Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and the city-states of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg have no 
intermediate level. Moreover, in different states, different levels have different 
implementation responsibilities [Weidner, 1995: 33] depending on the policy area in 
question.
2.4.3 The Interplay Between Structure, Process, Outputs and Policy Outcomes
As Goldberger points out with regard to the Foreign Policy domain, Germany's 
decentralised policy-making apparatus means that her 'deviation from the state-centric 
model of realism makes unified policy-making and co-ordination more difficult than in its 
more unitary neighbours' [1993: 291]. Conversely, where 'detailed tasks require a 
uniform and agreed co-operation of all the participants' [Kunze, 1968, cited Bulmer and 
Paterson, 1987: 187], vertical and horizontal sectorisation have imposed the necessity of 
consensual policy-formulation (for instance, the Ldnder also provide a great deal of 
information and expertise to the policy-making process).
The emphasis upon consensus means that the German policy apparatus can be, or at least 
appear to be, slow to respond effectively to new problems. As Scharpf has complained, 
although stabilising the German state apparatus, 'our present form of government... is the
government districts, led by a District president, appointed by the Minister-President but under the aegis of 
the Minister of the Interior. The District President draws together tasks from more than one ministry. He 
or she is responsible for police activity in the district, for the activities of the local authorities, the schools 
inspectorate, and funding for schools, roads and housing. The post also functions as an appellate tribunal 
for local authorities, industry and commerce with the power to issue warnings and impose fines.
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least capable of policy innovation' [1989: 17]. This echoes Katzenstein's assertion that in 
'such a tightly integrated policy network..... major changes in policy stand little chance of 
success' [1987: 35]. Yet, the record of policy outputs and outcomes is more mixed than 
Scharpf or Katzenstein's comments indicate. On the one hand, the Federal Republic's 
record in some policy areas, such as environmental policy, is relatively innovative 
compared with some other European states, whilst, on the other, some aspects of the 
Federal Republic's regulatory framework appear to some Anglo-Saxon observers as verging 
on the antediluvian. As Paterson observes with regard to economic policy:
While the overall performance ... continues to elicit approval, concerns 
remain about the impact of unity on German public finances, the 
competitiveness question - Standort like sterbende Wold seems destined 
to be received directly into the English language and a tendency to 
regulation in the notorious LadenschluBgesetz [1996: 173].
One must conclude that no overall conclusion about the effectiveness of policy-making (in 
terms of outputs and outcomes) in the Federal Republic can be drawn, as it appears to 
vary across policy sectors. However, what is clear is the reliance, within German policy- 
making, upon a stable set of relationships between a highly restricted expert membership, 
cut off to certain extent from the wider polity and sharing a common technocratic 
discourse. Thus, using Rhodes' [1986a] criteria, the policy-making environment in the 
Federal Republic can be described as a relatively closed policy community.
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2.5. Environmental Policy
2.5.1. Historical Background and Institutional Norms
German Environmental Policy goes back in one form or another to the 19th Century. Prior 
to 1871, environmental regulation was carried out by the individual Ldnder, through local 
ordinances such as the Prussian Gewerbeordnungen. These ordinances were embedded in 
private and public law, such as building regulations, public health and police laws and 
placed restrictions upon production methods if they were considered to cause an air 
pollution problem. However, the authorities' interpretation of what constituted a 
'problem' was tempered by the Duldungspflicht (duty of toleration) set out in the Civil 
Code of 1873, which stated that individual rights to clean air were contingent upon a duty 
to tolerate a certain degree of hardship in order to promote social welfare. In a rapidly 
industrialising state that was governed by the alliance of 'iron and rye' [Paterson and 
Southern, 1991: 23], social welfare and industrial growth were considered contiguous 
[Wey, 1982: 109; Weidner, 1995: 1]. Early legislation concentrated upon the immediate 
vicinity of the emitting premises and, although technical change and democratisation 
increased the number and scale of legislation, this tendency to focus upon individual 
emissions remains a key element within the German environmental policy discourse today.
Up until the Great War, it was the Ldnder who remained the main innovators in 
Environmental Policy. In the case of air pollution, individual pollution control authorities 
could issue Technische Anleitungen (TAs, or technical instructions) to emitters and, after 
1895, such instructions called upon emitters to take measures commensurate with the 
Stand der Technik (existing state of technology). Water pollution took longer to be 
regulated because of it was so often of a 'trans-boundary' nature (i.e. it involved spillover 
across states, through rivers and other waterways, which increased the difficulty in 
establishing responsibility for individual acts of pollution and enforcing subsequent
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measures against emitters). For instance, when, in 1878, the Deutsche Landwirtschafisrat 
called upon Bismarck to issue guidelines for trans-boundary water pollution across 
Germany, he replied that it was not for the Reichskanzlerei to lay down global guidelines 
for water cleanliness, but for the individual Lander to legislate within their own territory 
[Wey, 1982: 38]. Despite the establishment of the Royal Prussian Office of Research for 
Air and Soil Hygiene in 1901, the Reich was limited to technical advice. In 1912. Prussia 
called for negotiations to begin in order to establish Federal legislation to control water 
pollution [Skou Andersen, 1994: 124], but these did not take place because of the Great 
War and trans-boundary co-operation remained limited to Genossenschaften (set up to 
manage individual rivers) established between adjacent Landed.
After the National Socialists abolished the Lander in 1934, a National Water Law was 
drawn up but, again, the outbreak of war prevented its enactment. Thus, by the end of the 
1950's, there was still no Federal legislation and most of the regulatory devices used by the 
Lander to control both air and water pollution had been in place since 1914 [Dyson, 1992: 
162; Skou Andersen, 1994: 124]. It was clear that the decentralised and piecemeal 
approach to environmental legislation was unsustainable. For instance, in 1949, water 
resources were regulated by over 119 laws, 70 of which applied to the Rhine alone! 
Ironically, having resisted Federal regulation in the past, it was industry who now applied 
pressure to harmonise legislation. As one industrialist stated, 'the division and 
heterogeneity of water legislation have always proved to be a restraint on business life' 
[Wey, 1982: 177. translated by Skou Andersen, 1994: 125]. As a result of such 
sentiments, the first (fairly toothless) items of Federal legislation, the Water Household 
Act of 1957 and the Clean Air Maintenance Law of 1959, were enacted.
2 'The first such arrangment was the Emscher Genossenschaft, which was established after a major spillage 
into the Rhine by BASF's Ludwigshafen plant in 1902. This was followed by similar arrangments for the 
Wuppe, the Lippe and the Ruhr [Dyson, (ed.): 162].
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By the early 1960s, it was clear that the Wirtschaftswunder had inflicted massive damage 
to water and air resources in the Federal Republic. This damage was at its most apparent 
in the highly industrialised Ruhr region, where, for instance, it has been estimated that over 
600 000 tons of dust were discharged annually into the air during the 1950's [Dyson, (ed.) 
1992: 163]. Not surprisingly, it was here that the first significant legislation of the post­ 
war era was adopted. In 1961, Willy Brandt, the then leader of the SPD and Chancellor- 
candidate, declared 'the sky over the Ruhr must become blue again' [Weidner, 95: 1], as 
part of what has become known as the local SPD's 'Blue skies over the Ruhr' programme 
[Paterson, 1989: 267-268]. The SPD-led Land of North-Rhine Westphalia subsequently 
enacted a raft of measures, particularly with regard to air pollution, which were to become 
the models for future Federal legislation [Dreyhaupt, Dierschke, Kropp, Prinz and Schade, 
1979]. These Federal Technische Anleitungen - issued in 1964 - specified licensing 
procedures for Anlagen (facilities) and set out air quality standards for five major 
pollutants (dust, chlorine, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and hydrogen sulphide). 
Anlagen were required to tackle their emissions along the lines of Stand der Technik 
[Dyson, (ed.) 1992: 163].
Environmental Policy at the Federal level received an added impetus with the 
establishment of the SPD-FDP coalition in 1969. This coincided with a world-wide surge 
of concern about environmental matters, and in the USA in particular (Rachel Carson's 
Silent Spring being the most famous of a number of publications at the time). The 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental 
Quality (as well as the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act) in the US provided 
exemplars that the Germans were to follow to a certain extent. Indeed, the very words 
Umweltschutz (environmental protection) and Umweltpolitik (environmental 
policy/politics) are translations of the North American usage [Weidner, 1995: 3], whilst 
the Rat der Sachverstandigen fur Umweltfragen (Council of Experts on Environmental
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Questions), which published its first paper in 1972, was directly modelled on the US 
Council of Environmental Experts [Dyson, (ed.) 1992: 165].
The Brandt-led period of the social-liberal coalition was so innovative (by the standards of 
the time) with regard to environmental policy that it has been described as a phase of 
'active policy design' [Miiller, 1989: 23]. Central to this, was the establishment of three 
principles that have become the normative benchmark of Environmental Policy in the 
Federal Republic: the prevention principle, the 'polluter pays' principle and the co­ 
operation principle. Although Environmental Policy in many other countries set out the 
last two principles, the emphasis on prevention was unusual in the early 1970's [Skou 
Andersen, 1994: 125]. However, the period 1971 to 1974 was to prove a false dawn in 
terms of Environmental Policy. The establishment of the Umweltbundesamt (Federal 
Agency for the Environment) in 1974 was to prove the high-water mark and the 
combination of a world recession following the 1974/5 oil price rises and the replacement
^ Oas Chancellor of Brandt with Schmidt led to a period of stagnation--.
However, the genie was out of the bottle. The late 1970s saw the environmental baton 
taken up by the 'citizens initiative' groups and the, now well documented, formation of the 
proto-Green parties at the sub-national level [see Scharf, 1994; Markovits and Gorski. 
1993; Kleinert, 1992; Hulsberg, 1988; Bickerich, (ed.), 1985; Muller. 1984: Papadakis. 
1983; Mettke, (ed.) 1982].
During this period, significant sections of the populace were well ahead of their political 
and administrative elites on environmental matters [Weidner, 1995: 13].. In time, and after
22Nevertheless, the Brandt period left a legacy of environmental legislation, such as the Air Traffic Noise 
Act (1971), the Leaded Petrol Act (1972), the Waste Disposal Act (1972), the DOT Act (1972), the Federal 
Air Quality Protection Act (1974), as well as administrative directives such as the Technical Instruction for 
the Maintenance of Air Purity of 1974 [Weidner, 1995: 7].
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much civil conflict, the agenda of such groups began to permeate through the wider 
populace. The creation of the Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit (the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor 
Safety) was in many ways symbolic of an emerging new consensus on environmental 
matters in the Federal Republic.
2.5.2. The Structure, Process and Outputs of German Environmental 
Administration
Given the origins of Environmental Policy in the Federal Republic, it is not surprising that 
the regulatory structure is highly sectorised. This sectorisation is both horizontal, 
between ministries at the national level, and vertical, between the Bund and the individual 
Ldnder. Moreover, additional horizontal sectorisation between competing ministries 
occurs at the Ldnder level, although the precise nature of this sectorisation varies from 
case to case.
At the Federal level, the extent of horizontal sectorisation has been considerably reduced 
by the creation of the Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
(BMU) in June 1986, following the reactor catastrophe at Chernobyl. Prior to this the 
structure was more fragmented. Unlike its US antecedent, the Umweltbundesamt had no 
power to create policy, but was rather restricted to research and advice. Policy-making 
competencies were mainly shared between the Bundesministerium fiir Gesundheitswesen 
(Federal Ministry of Health) and Bundesministerium des Innern (the Interior Ministry), 
who took over responsibility for air, noise and water cleanliness from the Health Ministry 
with the advent of the Brandt administration in 1969 [Weale, 1992b: 165-166]. The 
environmental competencies of the two ministries were ceded to the BMU in 1986. not 
just because of public pressure, but also because the environmental protection measures in
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place at the time failed to cope adequately with the consequences of the Chernobyl 
disaster [Weale, O'Riordan and Kramme, 1991: 122-135].
The BMU has since developed into a major ministry of state, which in 1993 had a staff of 
850 and a budget of DM 1,262 million [Weidner, 1995: 29]. Its main tasks are the 
development of technical regulations, to co-ordinate the clean up in the 'New Ldnder\ to 
promote international and supranational co-operation and policy-making and to 
disseminate information to the general public on environmental issues^. Its specific 
policy competencies include the protection of water bodies and the sea, protection of 
ground water, waste water treatment, nature conservation and the disposal of nuclear 
waste. Enforcement functions are carried out by three Federal Agencies. These are:
• Umweltbundesamt (the Federal Environment Agency). Based in Berlin. Amongst 
other aspects of its work, the agency is tasked with the preparation of technical 
standards, public information, monitoring the North Sea and the enforcement of 
legislation relating to chemicals, detergents, pesticides and genetic engineering24 .
• Bundesamt fur Naturschutz (the Federal Agency for Nature Protection). Based in 
Bonn. The agency promotes and co-ordinates the technical aspects of national and 
international nature protection and enforces the Federal Nature Conservation Act 
(protection of designated areas and species, landscape planning etc.).
• Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz (the Federal Agency for Radiological Protection). Based 
in Salzgitter. Implements the Federal Atomic Energy Act and the Act on Preventath e
23 Incidentally, this 'public relations' function was one area where the previous structures failed miserably. 
During the Chernobyl disaster, for instance, the task of passing on information to the public was divided 
between the Health and Interior Ministries, as well as the individual Lander. As a result, the public were 
supplied with partial and often contradictory information, which no doubt contributed to the state of near 
panic which gripped some Germans during this crisis.
24The presence of the Umweltbundesamt in Berlin enhanced the the opportunity structure for ecological 
groups in the city. Not only did it provide a source of expertise (and employment) within the field, but its 
relative isolation from the Federal Government in Bonn meant that it has not been under the sort of scrutiny 
from the CDU-controlled Environment Ministry that would have been the case otherwise. As a result, it 
was more open to the influence and demands of the Environmental lobby.
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Radiological Protection (nuclear safety, transport and disposal of nuclear waste, 
monitoring etc.).
In addition to devolving enforcement functions to these three agencies, some policy- 
making competencies still remain with other Federal ministries. For instance, policy on 
environmental and energy research and development is the task of the Ministry of 
Research and Technology, whilst energy policy itself is the task of the Economics 
Ministry. Other tasks remain with, amongst others, the Ministries of Agriculture. 
Transport and Public Health.
Vertical sectorisation occurs in the many areas of environmental regulation where the 
Federal tier of government shares policy competencies with the individual Ldnder. Under 
the terms of the Basic Law, Article 73 only grants exclusive jurisdiction (ausschliefilichen 
Gesetzgebung) to the Federal Government in fields that are tangential to environmental 
protection (such as Federal railways, air traffic, international affairs etc.). Article 74 grants 
the Bund concurrent jurisdiction (konkurrierenden Gesetzgebung} with the Ldnder in areas 
such as the control of noise and air pollution, nuclear energy, coast protection etc., whilst 
in the areas of nature protection and hunting, regional land use and planning, Article 75 
only grants the Bund frame work jurisdiction (Rahmenvorschriften) [1.1. GG. Art. 73-75 in 
UmweltR. 9. A. 5533:24-26].
It is impossible to construct a general model of environmental regulation at the Ldnder 
level because of the heterogeneous nature of the actual structures in place, involving both 
horizontal and vertical sectorisation. In terms of horizontal sectorisation, all Ldnder have 
some form of Environment Ministry, but the actual competencies vary from state to state. 
One of the reasons for this is that the process of coalition formation in individual states 
often involves trade-offs between parties that affect the structure of ministries. For
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example, the need to accommodate the Hessen Greens' demand for the Ministry of Justice 
means that since 1995, the Environment portfolio has been telescoped together with those 
of Energy, Health, Youth and the Family [Lees, forthcoming), whilst in Berlin in 1989. the 
local Alternative Liste insisted upon the inclusion of the City-development and Traffic 
portfolios in their Environmental Ministry, rather than the SPD-staffed Ministry for 
Construction and Housing [Lees, 1995: 16].
Vertical sectorisation occurs because of the heterogeneous structure of Lander 
administration (three-tier or two-tier depending on the Land) and because the level of 
administration where environmental responsibilities lie vary as well. Most Lander have 
established special units for dealing with Environmental Policy [Weidner, 1995: 33]. such 
as the Niedersachsiches Landesamtfur Okologie (Lower Saxony State Office for Ecology).
2.5.3. The Interplay of Structure, Process, Outputs and Environmental Policy 
Outcomes
In the same way that German engineering has a world-wide reputation for quality, there is 
a common perception that German environmental expertise is second to none. This 
impression of environmental competence is partly the result of the ease with which the 
discourse of environmentalism has permeated the polity of the Federal Republic over the 
last two decades. The reasons for this are both normative and structural. In terms of 
norms, there has been a long tradition of 'romantic 1 environmentalism in Germany, dating 
back to the last century [Lees, 95: 8], as well as the high levels of 'post materialist' value 
orientation amongst the younger generational cohorts of the electorate [Inglehart. 1990: 
163; see also Padgett, 1993; Smith et al, 1992; Paterson and Southern. 1991; Dalton et al. 
1984].
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With regard to structure, the Federal Republic's 'political opportunity structure' - the 
combination of coercive, normative, remunerative and informational resources available, as 
well as the nature of institutional rules (such as state financing of parties, electoral laws 
and those reinforcing interaction between government and interest groups) - has been 
favourable to environmental mobilisation [Kitschelt, 1986: 57-68]. One possible aspect 
of this has been that, at the sub-national level (where much of the Federal Republic's 
environmental regulation is carried out), the Green Party (around which much of the 
environmental expertise is clustered) has often been decisive within coalition negotiations 
(and been able to use this leverage to affect policy). However, this does not explain 
enlightened Environmental Policy in Ldnder where the Greens are not decisive, such as 
Baden-Wurttemberg. As Weale observes in comparing the records of environmental 
regulation in Germany and Britain:
Although the simplest model of office seeking politicians in different 
institutional contexts goes some way to explaining divergent policy 
developments....it may be said to miss an important dimension of the story,
namely how German policy initiatives were legitimised within the relevant 
policy communities and within society at large. For a complex variety of 
historical reasons there are elaborate mechanisms of political accountability 
built into the German system of government........As a result of these
historical pressures there is in Germany a striking (to the outsider at least) 
amount of institutional attention devoted to the detailing and elaboration of 
policy principles and programmes, and there are firm institutional 
safeguards to ensure that administrative and political action is underpinned 
by an account of its rationale [1992a: 74].
92
Weale's assertion is that the combination of norms and structure inherent in the German 
administrative culture is conducive to effective Environmental Policy. The norms of 
expertise and accountability, combined with the sectorised structure of German 
administration enables the efficient dissemination of environmental information, expertise 
and Praxis.
The empirical evidence supports this contention. Germany has more low-emission cars 
than any other European country, has the highest proportional use of lead-free petrol, and 
some of the most stringent emission limits. In a world-wide context, Germany is in 
forefront of sewage purification technology (in the former West Germany, 90% of the 
inhabitants are connected to the sewage mains and 90% of sewage is purified biologically), 
the setting of limits on dioxin emissions from incineration and ranks alongside the US and 
Japan in research and development of renewable energy. Politically, Germany has 
assumed a leadership role in international Environmental Policy, such as at the 1992 
UNCED Conference in Rio, the Helsinki and Sofia protocols on long-range air pollution, 
the Vienna Agreement and Montreal Protocol on protecting the ozone layer, and 
collaborative measures to protect the North Sea and Baltic [Weidner, 1995: 49-50].
2.5.4. The Impact of the Greens on Environmental Policy
The 1980's and early 1990's did, however, see the Green party and the wider 
environmental agenda make an impact upon policy-making. This has come about both in 
discursive terms and as a pragmatic response to the success of the Greens at the ballot box.
In discursive terms, many observers have noted that the Federal Republic's policy-making 
process did not constitute an absolute block on the Green agenda but rather shaped it and 
limited its Left/libertarian impact. Indeed, despite the emphasis upon the rational and
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authoritative cipher of the Beamte, many would argue that, in comparative terms. German 
policy-making is well disposed towards its own 'greening'. Albert Weale's [1992a] 
comparison of the policy-making communities in Germany and UK demonstrates how 
German policy has entered its 'recovery phase' [Edda Miiller, 1986. cited Weale. 1992a: 
68] since the 1970's; to the extent that Weale believes that 'within Europe Germany has 
earned for itself the title of an environmental leader' whilst Britain remains a 'laggard' 
[Weale, 1992a: 69-70]. Weale sees the reason for this as lying in the two countries 
contrasting policy styles, stating:
The German policy style ... is consistent with the operation of a rigid 
constitution. Programmatic statement of general principles is seen as an 
essential prologue to legislation and policy development, a tendency that is 
probably reinforced by the practice of coalition government in which 
political parties of different ideological persuasions have to come to some 
agreement on the running of government. ... the policy community is usually 
wider in Germany than in the UK. The constitutional formalism of German 
policy making means that the courts play an important role in the setting of 
standards [Weale, 1992a: 81-83].
Thus, Weale identifies the paradox at the heart of the Greens' impact upon the policy- 
making process. On the one hand, there are centripetal forces within the administrative 
apparatus, both in terms of the dominance of managerial values (and therefore a cross- 
partisan consensus) within the mainstream parties and the need for the Greens to find 
some form of modus vivendi with the SPD. These forces have constrained the ability of 
the Greens to implement a Left-libertarian environmental agenda. Conversely, the fact that 
the German policy community places such an emphasis upon expert opinion gives it 
width, with the potential to grant access to new actors if in possession of such expertise.
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What is clear from Weale's account is that pressures towards environmental modernisation 
were being brought to bear upon the policy-making process at a relatively early stage in 
the development of the environmental movement and from a much wider front than just 
the Green party. This would imply that the established orthodoxy was not as 
impermeable as, for instance, Scharpf feared. As Geoffrey Roberts observes, in the 
Federal Republic, 'where there is a large degree of consensus, it tends not to be a static 
consensus; it is agreement which adapts, develops, changes, and -most importantly- it is a 
consensus that the parties shape and modify by their inputs into the policy making process' 
[1989: 53]. Nevertheless, again one is struck by the reliance upon a highly technocratic 
and restricted membership, with high vertical interdependence (sharing service/policy 
delivery responsibilities) and a degree of isolation from the wider polity. In short, in the 
Federal Republic, even the environmental policy domain is characterised by what Jordan 
[1986aJ would classify as a Policy Community (and supports the usage of the term 
community used by Weale [1992a]).
2.6. Resume of Chapter Two
This chapter set out to embed the research within its institutional context. It used the 
available literature, in order to establishes a perspective from which the examination and 
explanation of agents' strategic actions and their impact upon coalition behaviour can be 
made without constant reference back to the wider institutional context.
Section 2.2. looked at the party system and the electorate in the Federal Republic and 
concluded that the party system is undergoing a process of de-concentration as 
dealignment takes hold amongst the electorate. It is clear that the inverted social profile of
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the electorate in the 'New Landed has aggravated this process. Because of this greater 
voter volatility, parties are having to re-think their strategies in order to win and keep 
office.
Section 2.3. examined the institutional histories of the SPD and the Greens, in order to 
better understand some of the historical and ideological dimensions that inform the 
strategic behaviour of the two parties. It was demonstrated that both parties face similar 
pressures from Left and Right, fundis and realos. Despite their distinct identities, both the 
Greens and the SPD do experience similar intra-party debates over the whole issue of Red- 
Green political co-operation. Thus, when examining the pressures upon coalition 
formation and maintenance in the two case studies, one must always bear in mind the fact 
that such pressures are of an intra-party (as well as an inter-party) nature.
Section 2.4. looked at the historical background and institutional norms of the German 
administrative state, as well as its present structure and processes and their impact upon 
policy outputs and outcomes. Stress was placed upon how German administrative culture 
has been steeped in the traditions of Roman law, with an emphasis upon the impartial and 
expert administrator as the embodiment of a public power. The duality between the two 
ethoses of the contemporary party-driven Parteienstaat and the residual administrator-led 
Beamtenstaat provides opportunities and constraints upon the parties. The structure of 
German public administration, in terms of vertical (between multiple levels of governance) 
and horizontal (between competing ministries) sectorisation, allows parties to enter the 
policy-making process at various levels, thus providing a relatively benign opportunity 
structure for new parties. However, because of the nature of coalition government, 
sectorised policy-making also means that ministries often come into conflict with one 
another over priorities. Thus, a 'green1 agenda at, say the Environment Ministry can be 
limited by the competencies of other ministries (for instance, an Economics Ministry or
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Labour Ministry). Moreover, the technocratic discourse of the Beamtenstaat has the 
potential to constrain the more polemical and/or idealist strain of Green ideology. As a 
result, the reality of day-to-day policy-making can prove to be very frustrating for the 
Green Basis, who thrive on a more campaigning discursive form. The section concluded 
that the German policy-making environment is characterised by the features of what 
Rhodes [1986a] would call a 'policy community'.
This point was demonstrated in the final section (2.5.), which looked at the specific field 
of environmental policy in the Federal Republic. It assessed the degree to which the 
unique structure and processes of German administration per se, has informed Germany's 
innovative strength (in terms of outputs and outcomes) within the field of environmental 
policy. The chapter examined the historical background and institutional norms of German 
environmental policy making, as well as the structure and process of German 
Environmental administration. It concluded that, although the German policy community 
has the width and potential to grant access to new actors if in possession of policy-related 
expertise (with which the Green Milieu is well -endowed), the centripetal forces within the 
administrative apparatus (the need for the Greens to find some form of modus vivendi 
with the SPD and the dominance of managerial values within the administration) have 
constrained the ability of the Greens to implement a Left-libertarian environmental agenda.
To conclude, the combination of intra- and inter- party conflict, the structure and norms of 
German administration and the role of producer groups and other NGOs are at the heart of 
the 'story' of Red-Green coalitions. It is this 'story' that is will be told in greater detail in 
Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE: A SHORT HISTORY OF RED- 
GREEN COALITIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
3.1. Preamble
The purpose of the chapter is to embed the two case studies within an historical account 
of Red-Green coalitions in the Federal Republic. It provides an overview of such 
coalitions at the sub-national level of the Federal Republic to date, from the tentative 
period of political co-operation in the city-state of Hamburg after 1982, through the 
seminal Hesse coalition of 1985-7, and its successor after 1991, the so-called Traffic-Light' 
coalitions in Brandenburg (1990-1994 with Bilndnis 90 and the FDP) and Bremen (1991- 
1995 with the Greens and the FDP), the Red-Green coalition in the SPD's heartland of 
North-Rhine Westphalia (1995-), as well as a minority coalition ('tolerated' by the PDS) in 
Saxony-Anhalt since 1994. Because the Berlin and Lower Saxony coalitions are examined 
in detail in Chapters Four to Nine, they are only referred to in passing in this chapter.
In the interests of continuity, these coalitions are often looked at thematically rather than 
chronologically. Attention is focused on the problems faced by the Greens in such 
coalitions, in terms of intra-party conflict between the realos andfundis, inter-party 
conflict with the SPD, the problems of staffing ministries and the resistance to Green 
involvement in Land government by other political actors, such as producer groups' peak 
associations.
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3.2. The 'Storv' of Red-Green Coalitions
Green involvement in sub-national coalitions has become an increasingly common 
characteristic of the party system in the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to the 
West Berlin and Lower Saxony cases, the Greens have participated in a number of 
coalitions with the SPD, including the coalitions in Hesse from 1985-1987 and from 1991 
until 1995. The Hesse coalition was re-elected in 1995 and is still in power at present. 
There have also been Red-Green coalitions in the eastern German state of Saxony-Anhalt 
(a minority administration tolerated by the PDS) since 1994, in North-Rhine Westphalia 
since 1995 and in Schleswig-Holstein since 1996. Finally, the increasing acceptability of 
the Greens to the centre-Right parties has not only been demonstrated by the two so- 
called Traffic Light1 coalitions (with the SPD and FDP) in Brandenburg (1990-1994) and 
Bremen (1991-1995), but also by the formation of the first 'Black-Green' coalition (with 
the Christian Democratic CDU) in the Westphalian town of Miilheim. Indeed, some 
commentators consider it only a matter of time before such a coalition is formed at Land 
level [DerSpiegel Nr.31. 01/08/94].
The history of political co-operation between the SPD and the Greens has been one of trial 
and error. From the vantage point of the late 1990s, it is easy to forget that the earliest 
Red-Green experiments often provided a bumpy political ride for all concerned. Since 
then, it has been a process of learning, with co-operation becoming progressively easier 
over time. The learning curve became ever steeper as the Greens assumed a more formal 
and hierarchical party structure. As a result, local Green party organisations have become 
less particularist and more homogenised, their ideological profile more moderate and their 
strategic behaviour more predictable.
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The first example of Red-Green political co-operation took place in the Hanseatic city- 
state of Hamburg. The June 1982 elections to the Hamburg Burgerschaft yielded two 
mathematically feasible coalition outcomes: in both of which the SPD had to be 
represented. These were, either, a 'Grand Coalition' of the SPD and CDU. or some form of 
agreement between the SPD and the local Grime Alternative Liste (GAL). At this time, the 
Hamburg GAL was a stronghold of thefundi tendency and, as such, was not altogether 
well-disposed towards the SPD. However, the local party was put under a great deal of 
pressure by other local Green parties to come to some sort of modus operandi with the 
Social Democrats. The GAL refused to consider a coalition with the SPD, but agreed to a 
degree of co-operation on condition that the Social Democrats meet certain key 
requirements25 . Although the SPD were split over the GAL's demands, they agreed to 
enter into dialogue with the Greens in order to secure their political support. After the 
GAL helped defeat a no confidence motion tabled by the local CDU, the Social Democrats 
invited them into formal negotiations. This first tentative move by the Hamburg SPD was 
greeted with dismay by both the national leadership - in the form of Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt - and other Land leaders, most notably the Minister-President of Hesse Holger 
Borner who was deeply critical of Hamburg Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi.
There then followed a period of successive ups and downs in the climate of co-operation 
between the two parties. At first, the mood lifted as the GAL co-operated in passing a 
bridging credit authorisation in order to keep the city government functioning. However, 
the political weather deteriorated following the involvement of a GAL leader in a squatting 
action, at a time when the Social Democrats were clearing squatted houses. This was 
followed by the GAL Fraktion tabling a proposal to declare Hamburg a nuclear-free zone. 
With no progress on the original demands of the GAL, the SPD called new elections to try
25These were, first, the enaction of an emergency programme to combat the state's rising unemployment. 
Second, the reversal of all budgetary austerity measures. Third, the immediate exit from the use of atomic 
energy \Kernenergieausstieg) [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 200].
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and break the impasse. At a total of 196 days, it had been the shortest legislative period in 
the history of the Hamburg Burgerschaft\ The new elections yielded an absolute majority 
to the SPD, although as Markovits and Gorski point out, the Social Democrats' gains were 
almost entirely at the expanse of the CDU and FDP, rather than the GAL who polled 
almost 7% of the vote [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 202].
The Hamburg experience highlighted two elements that were to become part of the pattern 
of Red Green co-operation. First, that the prospect of co-operation exposed the internal 
divisions within the two parties. In the Hamburg case, the GAL was broadly fundi in its 
outlook and was able to mobilise around a fairly unyielding strategic position, whilst the 
local SPD was split between the traditional Right, who were opposed to co-operation with 
the GAL, and the party's New Left tendency, who were often - such as with regard to the 
proposal to declare Hamburg a nuclear-free zone - more in agreement with the GAL than 
with their own leadership. In other instances, it was to be the Greens who were split and 
the SPD who were able to exploit such divisions. The second element was that the 
strategic decisions taken by the two parties during such a process of co-operation had 
subsequent electoral consequences. For instance, in the Hamburg case, both parties 
ultimately took a hard line with the other. This seems to have had the effect of enhancing 
the SPD's electoral support at the expense of the bourgeois parties whilst, at the same 
time, limiting that of the GAL (who had expected to improve on their previous showing)
Subsequent examples of SPD-Green co-operation seem to support the impression that, 
outside of their hard-core milieu, a great deal of the Greens' electoral support is contingent 
upon them co-operating with the SPD and that an explicitly fundamentalist stance is 
punished by the voters. On the other hand, the SPD appears to benefit from taking a firm 
stance with the Greens. Conversely, where the SPD has been seen to tack too far to the 
Left, it has tended to alienate its blue-collar Stammwahlerschaft. The SPD's strategic
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dilemma - the need to counter political competition from both Left and Right - is a theme 
that is implicit throughout the thesis, informing many of the strategic decisions taken 
during the coalition periods covered by the two case studies.
With the SPD majority in the Hamburg Burgerschaft securely ensconced for the legislative 
period, attention shifted to Hesse. Although not a 'heartland1 in the sense of the blue-collar 
industrial state of North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse was one of the 'reddest1 of the German 
Ldnder. However, the Left tradition in Hesse was relatively heterogeneous, with Old Left 
strongholds in the big cities being balanced by a New Left influence in the University 
towns such as Marburg and in Hessen-Sud, the south of the state. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many of the most salient developments in the Red-Green model of political 
co-operation took place - and indeed continue to take place - within that state's sub- 
national party system.
It is easy, of course, to posit such arguments with the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, in the 
early 1980s, conditions in Hesse were such that the prospects for Red-Green political co­ 
operation were not at all auspicious. Inevitably, the reasons for this were what the the 
Model refers to as 'group-related'. In other words, the institutional specifics of the Hesse 
party system presented barriers to SPD co-operation with the Greens, particularly a 
number of powerful local SPD politicians who had invested substantial political capital in 
opposing the Red-Green model per se. The most important of these was the then 
Minister-President Holger Borner.
As already mentioned, it was Borner who had publicly opposed Klaus von Dohnanyi's 
early efforts to forge an alliance with the Hamburg GAL. Not surprisingly, Borner's 
antipathy extended to the Hesse Greens, despite the fact that they were widely recognised 
as being one of the more moderate of the Green parties in the Lander. That was not to say
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that there were no grounds for mistrust between the two parties. In particular, the ongoing 
Startbahn West16 disorder threw the divide between Old and New Left into sharp relief.
The Landtag elections of 26 September 1982 presented the SPD and the Greens with the 
mathematical possibility of a Red-Green coalition. As a result. Borner found himself 
presented with a dilemma. Not only was he personally antipathetic to co-operation with 
the Greens, but he had made promises during the election to that effect. He was now 
forced to reconsider his position. Within a month of the elections, Borner had recanted 
enough to ensure Green support for his candidature as 'chief parliamentary executive', 
pending planned new elections in the Autumn of 1983. In the meantime, the Hessen 
Greens supported an SPD initiative to tackle unemployment in the state. This 
represented the first instance in the history of the federal Republic in which SPD 
legislation had been passed with the help of the Greens, although this again fell short of a 
formal coalition arrangement.
However, the new spirit of co-operation soon fell foul of politicking. For their part, the 
Greens attempted to up the ante and refused to pass the SPD's budget in the form it was 
presented to the Landtag. With one eye on the recent success of the Hamburg SPD's tough 
stance in relation to the Greens, Borner called new elections earlier than planned. 
Subsequently, the SPD's campaign was sharply-worded against the Greens, although - 
under pressure from the Hessen-Sud delegates - the state party refused to rule out the 
possibility of co-operation with the Greens. This was just as well, as the new 
parliamentary arithmetic still precluded the SPD's return to office without the assistance 
of the Greens.
^Startbahn West was the planned new western runway of Frankfurt international airport. Throughout the 
early 1980s, this development was the focus of a bitter campaign of attrition between the state authorities 
and environmental protesters. These took the shape of a series of set-piece demonstrations in which 
protesters battled with police, resulting in death and injury on both sides.
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Again, the process by which the two parties came to formalise co-operation was difficult. 
The Greens initially took the initiative, offering Kontinuierliche Zusammenarbeit 
(continual co-operation) with the Social Democrats. This was reciprocated by the SPD. 
with Borner himself making a speech at the SPD's party congress in which he stated the 
historical nature of the negotiations with the Greens. With the CDU/CSU and FDP newly 
elected to government in Bonn, Hessen's Red-Green model would provide a much-needed 
counter-weight [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 206]. It was agreed that the Greens would 
support the SPD in passing the 1983 and 1984 budgets.
The euphoria was short-lived, however, as resistance surfaced in both parties. At the 
beginning of 1984, the Greens informed the SPD that their support in passing that year's 
budget was contingent upon the SPD agreeing to a new set of demands. This was an 
attempt to move the political agenda on from what was essentially a holding pattern, 
designed to keep the CDU out of office, to something nearer the 'new polities' that the 
Greens wished to promote. Borner gave assurances to the Greens and, in the June of 
1984, the Hesse SPD's Parteitag approved continued co-operation. Ominously, however, 
their were growing signs of dissent in the SPD ranks. This dissent was given added 
momentum in the October of 1984, when a Green Parteitag passed a motion that made 
further co-operation contingent upon the SPD's cancellation of an extension of the local 
NUKEM nuclear power plant and of an order for weapons-grade plutonium from
*>
ALKEM, another plant in the state. The SPD's Right wing were outraged.
To allow these demands to become entrenched as the sine qua non of Red-Green co­ 
operation would have meant the end of the experiment. For those within the two parties 
who remained well-disposed towards further co-operation - mainly the SPD's New left 
and the realo wing of the Greens - it was clear that the process had to be moved onto a 
more formal footing. In particular, the realos had to be able to have something to show as
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a result of such co-operation, if they were to counter the criticism from thefundi wing. 
For the committed fundis, by definition all co-operation with the SPD was bad per se. 
The crucial battle was for the party's Basis, who were amenable to co-operation if it 
brought results, but anxious that basic Green principles were not sold short. The Basis 
needed to be convinced that working with the SPD would enhance the Greens influence 
upon events.
Throughout the winter of 1984-5, activists on both sides pushed for a formal coalition 
agreement to be signed between the two parties and, in May 1985, Borner formally offered 
such an arrangement. In return for entering into a coalition with the SPD, the Greens 
would get the Ministry for Environment and Energy. The price would be that the Greens 
would not be able to further hold the SPD to ransom over passing the budget. Not only 
would the 1985 budget have to be passed, but also a 'double budget' for 1986-7. The 
Greens rejected the 'double budget' idea and the fundis demanded two ministries, including 
a Ministry for Women. The final deal represented a compromise between the two 
positions. The Greens resisted the commitment to pass the budgets and insisted on two 
separate budget processes, although the SPD insisted that these processes would last no 
more than a year. For its part, the SPD resisted the creation of a second Ministry for 
Women, but the Greens were able to appoint an advisor on Women's issues within the 
Ministry of Health, Family and Education. The bottom line, however, was control of the 
Ministry for Environment and Energy. Local Green realo Joschka Fischer became the 
Greens' first Land Minister for the Environment and the Greens formally entered sub- 
national government for the first time.
The subsequent Red-Green coalition of 1985-1987 (and to a lesser extent its successor of 
1991-1995, which was re-elected in February 1995) in Hesse is considered by many to be 
the template for such coalitions: both in other states and to some extent at the national
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level. It is certainly the most documented [Scharf 1994; Markovits and Gorski 1993: 
Padgett (ed.) 1993; Kleinert 1992; Hulsberg 1988; et al]. One reason for this has been 
Hessen's strong realo tradition, which has meant that local politicians such as Joschka 
Fischer have also been leading figures nationally. Moreover, like most German Ldnder. 
Hesse's election system has a 5% electoral barrier, making it an analogue of the national 
system as a whole. This makes extrapolation up to the national level easier. However, the 
main reason for the importance of the Hessen experience has been threefold. It was the 
first formed at Ldnder level, it has since been the longest-lasting and is the first to have 
been re-elected.
The 'red-green experiment' (as it was branded by its critics) of 1985-1987 is best 
remembered for Joschka Fischer's tenure as the first Green Minister for the 
Environment27 . Moreover, this is a good example of both the facilitating and constraining 
nature of the German policy-making process. As already mentioned, Fischer was firmly 
on the realo wing of the party and this was reflected in his strategy of concentrating on the 
stricter implementation of existing legislation (nach Gesetz und Recht). In this he was 
quite successful. For instance, with regard to the chemical industry, he forced companies 
(in particular Hoechst AG) to implement new instrumentation in order to meet lower 
permitted limits of industrial discharges into the River Main. Given the sheer economic 
and political clout wielded by the Hoechst concern in the state of Hessen, the success of 
Fischer's ministry in enforcing these changes had a seismic impact upon future 
expectations.
Despite this high profile role, Fischer encountered staffing problems within his new 
ministry and was forced to appeal to the Administrative Court in Wiesbaden in order to be
rita Haibach was also appointed Green adviser on women's issues, demonstrating that the German 
Greens are a Left-libertarian/new politics party rather than 'deep green'.
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granted permission to establish a hypothecated personnel advisory board to side-step the 
existing (SPD-dominated) boards in order to address the problem [Grant, Paterson and 
Whitson, 1988: 253-5]. The problem of staffing of Green ministries is not a problem that 
has been confined to the Hesse coalition. As already illustrated in Chapter Two (the 
Institutional Context), the Federal Republic's policy making environment is characterised 
by the penetration of the civil service by the mainstream political parties, who were 
empowered to appoint place-men at all levels of the administration. At the same time, this 
resulted in the reciprocal effect whereby the political parties' own ideological profile was 
shaped by the technocratic discourse of the civil service. With regard to the SPD, this 
resulted in the moderation of what had traditionally been a Marxist -informed ideological 
stance in favour of a technocratic administrative/welfarist orientation. Moreover, this was 
particularly the case in those Lander - such as North-Rhine Westphalia and Berlin - where 
the Social Democrats had been the dominant party. Thus, by the 1970s, the SPD - and 
indeed the trades unions - were dominated by the same growth-oriented, welfarist 
consensus as the CDU/CSU and the FDP (with the exception of its neo-liberal wing). 
Moreover, this consensus extended beyond elected politicians to all levels of public 
administration.
This fusion of Parteienstaat and Beamtestaat has presented the Greens with a four-fold 
problem. First, the fusion presents problems to any new political competitor, regardless 
of ideological profile, to break into what is essentially an 'iron triangle1 between parties, 
administrators and producer/consumer groups, once that iron triangle has achieved a stable 
equilibrium. In other words, the fusion raises the opportunity costs of entry into the 
political/policy-making nexus. Second, as an explicitly Left-libertarian and/or post- 
materialist party, the Greens were particularly hindered by the existence of such a growth- 
oriented cross-party consensus, operating not only at the political level, but also at the 
policy-making level. The potential for institutional resistance to explicitly 'green' policies
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in such an environment is obvious, especially if the (in)action of civil servants is informed 
not only by conservatism (with a small c) towards unfamiliar policy objectives, but also 
by partisan interests. A third problem is that, having identified civil servants who were 
potentially obstructive, if these civil servants were also members of the SPD they were 
harder to transfer or retire, because they were, on paper at least, political allies. If the civil 
servant was high-ranking, such as a State Secretary, the problem was especially acute. Not 
only would such an administrator have a relatively high status and political profile - 
making him/her harder to get rid of anyway - but they were also often in a position to 
protect other resistors lower down the hierarchy of the ministry. Finally, even if all the 
other problems were overcome, the Greens still needed to find sympathetic administrators 
of sufficient calibre to take over from the old hands. One solution was to identify such 
people from within the administration but, given that all organisations are inherently 
conservative, there were no guarantees that sufficient numbers of such 'free-thinkers' could 
be found. The alternative was to 'parachute in' expertise from within the ranks of the 
Greens. The danger with this was that, even if they were brilliant within their field, they 
might not be familiar with the dark arts of bureaucratic in-fighting, especially if this was 
against entrenched institutional resistors. Ideally, they needed to find expertise that was 
sufficiently without the civil service consensus that they were amenable to programmatic 
innovation. If these people came from a non-civil service background, they needed to be 
serious people, preferably with some experience of dealing with hierarchies and relatively 
closed policy networks28 .
Not surprisingly, the Greens' mixed experience in government has made them more 
suspicious of administrative hierarchy than ever. As a result, the structure of
28Inevitably, it would turn out that a rich source of such expertise was Academia! This was especially the 
case in Berlin, which not only benefited from a large university community per se, but was also host to 
numerous environmental consultancies and lobbyists for sources of renewable energy such as solar power. 
This deep resource base of environmental expertise was enhanced by the presence of the Umweltbundesamt 
(the Federal Environment Agency) in Berlin.
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administration in Hesse has recently undergone Enthierarchizierung (quite literally, a 
process of 'de-hierarchisation'), whilst the Lower Saxony Greens have circulated a 
discussion document suggesting the same process for Lower Saxony. All of these 
arguments are dealt with in greater detail later in this thesis.
The Hesse Red-Green coalition was not only faced with problems relating to staffing. 
There had also been explicit threats of disinvestment in the state from Dr. Joachim 
Langmann of Merck, then president of the employers' umbrella organisation the BDI. 
Langmann's threats did not eventually come to much and the period of 1986-1987 - with 
the Greens polling 10.4% in Hamburg and over 8% in the national elections - seemed to 
augur well for the coalition. However, the tension between the realo andfundi wings of 
the Greens and the Left- and Right-wings of the SPD eventually began to spill over more 
and more into the workings of the coalition. One of the reasons for this was that many of 
the more contentious issues that the coalition had to deal with - such as what to do with 
the NUKEM and ALKEM projects29 - were put off rather than tackled head-on. 
Although this bought time for the coalition, by the spring of 1987 it had broken down in 
bitter recrimination over practically every aspect of their programme. The descent into 
'red-green chaos1 was exploited by the SPD and Greens' conservative opponents30 .
Nevertheless, the late 1980s was a period of hope for the Greens and those in the SPD 
who regarded the Red-Green model as a viable option. The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 
had pushed the environment to the forefront of the political agenda, resulting in the
29 The NUKEM and ALKEM nuclear projects highlighted the problems of reconciling the New-Left agenda 
with the 'old polities' of growth and production. Originally, the Greens had made the cancellation of 
funding for these projects the sine qua non of any co-operation with the SPD.
•^Ironically, the 1987 state elections in Hessen did prove to have some relationship with the nature of 
government at the national level, in that they produced a Bonn-style CDU-FDP coalition [Markovits and 
Gorski 1993: 191]. Nevertheless, the Hessen experience was the first step towards a normalisation of the 
Greens' relationship with other parties and, by implication, the German state. Moreover, it spelt the end of 
the growth-oriented consensus in government.
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establishment of the Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
(the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety). The state 
elections in Lower Saxony in the June of 1986 presented a fresh opportunity. Prior to the 
elections, the SPD leader, Gerhard Schroder, had declared himself amenable to overtures 
from the Greens whilst, for their part, the local Greens made an unconditional offer of 
coalition negotiations to the SPD before a single vote had been cast. If a Red-Green 
coalition had formed, it was widely expected that this would put the CDU/CSU-FDP 
coalition in Bonn under pressure in the run-up to the Federal elections scheduled for 
January 25 1987. As it turned out, nothing of the sort was to happen. The CDU-FDP 
coalition in Hannover was returned with a slim majority and the CDU/CSU-FDP would be 
returned to Bonn the following year. Nevertheless, the feeling remained that the Red- 
Green model was an idea whose time was coming.
Ironically, whilst the Chernobyl disaster brought environmental concerns into the political 
mainstream, within the Greens it enhanced the credibility to the absolutist stance of the 
fundi Left. This led to another bout of internal party feuding, given added bitterness by 
the collapse of the Hesse coalition, the failures of the Lower Saxony and Federal elections 
and subsequent set-backs in the elections in Hamburg and the Rhineland-Palatinate in May 
1987 and Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein in September 1987.
This bout of internecine blood-letting was to end with the creation of the centrist A ufbruch 
group in the January of 1988, heralding the eventual demise the fundi wing. However, the 
road ahead was still rocky. In March 1988, the Baden-Wurttemberg Greens scored almost 
8% of the vote, but two months later their Schleswig-Holstein colleagues again failed to 
surmount the 5% barrier. It was not until after the West Berlin elections of January 1989 
that the SPD and Greens seized the opportunity to once more co-operate.
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The following year, in May 1990, the Landtag elections in Lower Saxony coalition made 
another Red-Green coalition possible and, for a few months, there was once more talk of 
such an arrangement in Bonn, if the legislative arithmetic allowed. Again, this was not to 
be, but the same year a variation of the model - the Traffic Light coalition' (with the FDP 
as a third partner) - came to power in the new Land of Brandenburg. The following year, 
electoral reverses for the SPD in Bremen led to the same arrangement there.
By 1995, neither of these coalitions remained in place. The Brandenburg coalition 
collapsed early in 1994, after defections from the Greens. The Brandenburg experience 
suggests that the presence of the economically-liberal FDP within such a coalition puts 
great strain upon the process of coalition maintenance and an even greater strain upon 
party management within the Greens. This is because the inevitable concessions to 
economic liberalism associated with such coalitions are just too much for many Greens, 
especially a significant proportion of the Basis. Similarly, the Bremen coalition collapsed 
in January 1995, forcing the state elections to be brought forward from the Autumn to 
May 1995. Again, the presence of the FDP proved too much for coalition management. 
However, the defections in Bremen came primarily from the SPD's Right wing, who 
objected to the party making too many concessions to the Greens31 .
In 1997, there are four Red-Green coalitions in place at the Lander level in the Federal 
Republic. These are in Hesse, Saxony-Anhalt (tolerated by the PDS), North-Rhine 
Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein. All four coalitions have, at some point, been lauded 
as the model for a future coalition in Bonn. However, their records in office have varied 
somewhat.
3 'in Brandenburg, the charismatic SPD Minister-President Manfred Stolpe was able to keep the SPD united 
and recoverto win the subsequent Landtag election of October 1994 with an absolute majority. In Bremen, 
where it was the SPD that split, the Greens increased their vote-share, whilst the the SPD were forced into a 
Grand Coalition with the CDU. Thus, the pattern appears to be that the electorate punishes intra-partv 
strife.
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In Hesse, the SPD and Greens had returned to government following the Landtag elections 
of 1991. The coalition ruled successfully for a full term and was re-elected in February 
1995. As such, it was the first Red-Green coalition to be voted back into office. 
However, within a matter of months, the Hesse Greens suffered a massive collapse in 
morale. Even though the coalition remains reasonably popular with the voters, the Green 
Fraktion in Wiesbaden is perceived as being out of touch with the Basis, bereft of ideas 
and accident-prone. The problems of the Hesse Greens can, arguably, be directly or 
indirectly blamed on the decision of local political Godfather Joschka Fischer to move to 
Bonn and become Fraktionsvorsitzender. The move to Bonn meant that the local party 
was denied his undoubted political skills and there has been no obvious successor. 
Moreover, the two Green ministers in the coalition are perceived to have frittered away 
their political advantage. This has led Der Spiegel, for instance, to talk about the Greens' 
current difficulties as a 'mid-life crisis'.
The Hesse Greens' troubles are essentially two-fold. First, they are becoming very much 
like the other political parties in both style and substance. This has led to disillusionment 
amongst young voters. As one young academic put it, 'the automatic impulse to vote 
Green is broken'. Although the majority of Green voters remain true to the party, the 
PDS has been able to mobilise support at the margins of what has been the Greens core 
support. This tendency has not been helped by Fischer's insistence that the Hessen 
Greens take over a 'classical' ministerial portfolio like that of Justice. This may have made 
sense in terms of demonstrating the Greens ability to govern, but has not played well with 
the party's Basis. Despite the fact that the Justice portfolio was taken by Rupert von 
Plottnitz (whose credentials as a former lawyer for the Red Army Fraktion seemed ideal 
for the job), the ministry is perceived as not being an appropriate area for a Green 
politician to take an interest. This was despite a commitment in the coalition agreement to 
undertake a programme of reforms, including the reduction of state surveillance of citizens.
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data-protection measures, increased use of non-custodial sentences etc. Second, the trade­ 
off for getting the Justice ministry was that the Greens had to accept the creation of a 
'super-ministry' for the Environment, Energy, Health, Youth and the Family. This 
exposed minister Iris Baul to conflicting political demands that have proved desperately 
hard to reconcile. On the one hand, the 'post-materialist' agenda of environmental 
protection places a premium on a critique of existing biases toward production and 
consumption. On the other, whilst an explicitly Green policy for Health, Youth and the 
Family can be envisaged, in the short term these policy areas are traditionally the domain 
of statist and production/consumption-oriented solutions. Emphasis has always been on 
delivery systems to address specific problems, rather than a holistic approach32 . 
Nevertheless, Iris Baul was faced with trying to reconcile these demands. In addition to 
this strategic problem, Frau Baul never managed to establish a working relationship with 
her State Secretary. She resigned in September 1995.
However, the record of the Hesse coalition since 1995 has not been all bad. On the plus 
side of the ledger, internal disputes have been kept to a minimum and the coalition has 
undertaken a thorough shake-up of the personnel and structure of the Land administration. 
However, taken as a whole, the overwhelming impression has been one of scandals and 
policy drift. When Minister President Hans Eichel recently cancelled at short notice a 
press breakfast to commemorate reaching the half-way mark of the current legislative 
period, this was considered by many journalists to be aptly symbolic of the coalition's 
record.
The Saxony-Anhalt coalition's inauguration was overshadowed by the so-called 'red socks" 
scandal. The Landtag elections of June 1994 had led to the PDS being the third biggest
32These arguments are dealt with at greater length in Chapter Five on Coalition Maintenance.
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party in the legislature, after the CDU (with 34.4% of the vote) and the SPD Gust behind 
with 34.0% of the vote). Although not acceptable as a coalition partner, the PDS 
'tolerated1 the establishment of a minority SPD-Green coalition in the Landtag. Ironically, 
given the opprobrium that all the 'western' bourgeois parties have attached to the PDS. it 
was the national leadership of the SPD in Bonn who pressured the reluctant local part} 
into a minority coalition with the Greens. In the context of the run-up to the 1994 
Bundestag elections, it gave the CDU a clear cut opportunity to play on the fears and 
prejudices of the voters [Lees, 1995] 33 . Despite the scandal, the coalition has been one of 
the most pragmatic on record. Because the Greens are so weak in the 'New' Lcinder, they 
have been unwilling to rock the boat. With the PDS's approval, SPD Minister-President 
Reinhard Hoppner has been able to push through measures, such as planning permission 
for a new autobahn through the Harz mountains, that are distinctly 'ungreen' and growth- 
oriented in their conception.
For many Social Democrats, the North-Rhine Westphalia coalition is an embarrassment. 
The state has traditionally been the SPD's heartland throughout the post-war period. 
Indeed, from 1980 until the state elections of May 1995, they had governed alone. SPD 
Minister-President Johannes Rau had been in office since 1979 and was entrenched as the 
state's Landesvater and, in the run-up to the elections, all the polls indicated that the SPD 
would again be returned with an absolute majority.
The results of the 1985 elections were a grave disappointment for the SPD and Rau 
personally, who had campaigned on a 'strong government' ticket that precluded negotiating 
with the Greens. The SPD suffered a massive loss of support (almost 500,000 votes 
compared with the previous election) amongst its core electorate. At the same time, the
33 Subsequent Landtag elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Thuringen on the 16 October 1994 
resulted in the failure of both the FDP and the Greens to pass the 5% electoral barrier. As a result, both 
state parliaments are now three-party legislatures with the PDS as a significant third party.
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Greens made impressive gains, for instance polling almost 30% in one inner-city 
constituency of Koln [Green, 1995: 155]. Since 1995, Rau and his Green counter-part. 
Construction Minister Michael Vesper, have governed together with little real enthusiasm 
for the project. The local SPD is faction-ridden and Rau is the only figure who has 
sufficient authority to keep the coalition together. Because of this, he was persuaded by 
the national leadership not to resign from politics, but to try and keep the coalition 
together until the Bundestag elections in 1998 (as of February 1998, the coalition was still 
intact). For Vesper, the Construction Ministry job is not made any easier by the fundi 
tendency in his own party. A recent scandal over the planned sale of Diisseldorf Airport 
to a consortium of private financiers was a reminder, if he needed one, that there are still 
many within the Greens' Basis who regard all co-operation with the SPD as undesirable.
In many ways, the current Red-Green coalition which comes nearest to being an ideal-type 
for a future Bonn government is in Schleswig-Holstein. This ironic, because in the 1980s 
the local Greens had a reputation for fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the coalition is 
characterised by a cordial working relationship between SPD Minister-President Heidi 
Simonis and her Green counterpart, Environment Minister Rainder Steenblok, despite the 
fact that Simonis was on the record prior to the election as favouring an alliance with the 
FDP. No doubt some of this harmony can be put down to a honeymoon period (the 
Landtag elections took place in March 1996) and much of it is due to personal chemistry. 
However, party management has also been important, especially for the Greens, where an 
attempt by thefundis to de-rail the coalition at the beginning of 1997 was given short- 
shrift by Steenblok. Indeed, even the opposition has paid a grudging tribute to the 
coalition's record, with CDU Fraktionsvorsitzender Martin Kayenburg admitting that, up 
to then, 'the (Red-Green) chaos had not shown itself in government' [Focus. 23/06/97]34 .
Chaos hat sich in der Regierung nicht gezeigt.
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3.3. Resume of Chapter Three and reflections on the development of Red- 
Green political co-operation.
The chapter has sought to provide the historical context, within which the two case 
studies are grounded. An overview of Red-Green coalitions at the sub-national level of the 
Federal Republic demonstrates that each coalition was subject to the institutional specifics 
of the particular time and place within which it existed. However, the account also reveals 
some common threads that run through all the examples of Red-Green political co­ 
operation to date. From the earliest instance of political co-operation in Hamburg after 
1982, through the seminal Hesse coalitions of 1985-7, 1991-5 and 1995-, to the minority 
coalition ('tolerated' by the PDS) in Saxony-Anhalt since 1994 and the most recent Red- 
Green coalitions in North-Rhine Westphalia since 1995 and Schleswig-Holstein since 
1996, one can discern a distinct learning process taking place.
The early years were characterised by a lack of trust and good faith on both sides. On the 
SPD side, many of the old guard feared and despised the Greens and all they stood for. 
Moreover, when politicians such as Holger Borner did find themselves forced to deal with 
the Greens, they regarded it as a necessary evil rather than an exciting new phase of Left- 
oriented politics. Implicit in this thinking was the assumption that, with time, the Greens 
would go the way of other Left groupings (such as the K Gruppen of the early 1970s) and 
fade away into political obscurity. Those on the SPD's New Left who were well-disposed 
towards the Greens were often from the same milieus of the post-1968 student Left and 
New Social Movements. By and large, they were younger than the SPD's old guard and 
were not to come into the ascendant within the party until the late 1980s. It is no accident 
that this was when co-operation with the Greens became more fruitful.
1 16
For their part, the Greens had an even longer way to travel before they became a 
trustworthy coalition partner. The road has also been more interesting. This was not just 
due to inexperience of the political world in which they found themselves, although this 
may have been a contributing factor. Rather, the problem in the early years was both 
ideological and structural.
In 1988, Werner Hulsberg, who was no stranger to the internecine struggles of the Greens,
summed the problem up as follows:
The Green party lacks an inner equilibrium. The excitement of an 
unexpected electoral success is followed by inner-party strife and fierce 
factional battles. But those fiercely-fought battles are without consequence 
because everyone is aware of the over-riding need for unity. At the same 
time the weakly-developed party apparatus is incapable of organising any 
kind of internal repression. The party, in this sense, is still a kind of 
electoral pact. This situation will not change overnight. Majorities at party 
conferences are not an expression of any kind of long-term development but 
rather the expression of the mood of the moment. The development of 
political strategy takes place in an empirical manner, under the Damoclean 
swordof the five percent hurdle, what Joschka Fischer calls 'the pressure of 
actual circumstances'.[2 12]
It is self-evident that the Greens have undergone a profound metamorphosis since these 
words were written, but less clear as to why this change has come about. In general terms, 
how are we to define such structural and programmatic changes within parties and why do 
they take place?
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There is a rich vein of party-system literature addressing this question [see Michels: 
Lippman 1914; Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1992; for instance]. However, for the 
purposes of the thesis, Harmel and Janda's [1994] definition of party change is sufficient. 
Harmel and Janda regard party change as being the function of three factors: external shock 
(e.g. a bad election performance), leadership change and change in the dominant coalition. 
Of the three, data from both Germany (excluding the Greens) and Britain between 1950 
and 1990 indicate that external shock, whilst important, is the least decisive in bringing 
about changes in the organisational and issue positions of individual parties [Janda et al: 
772-3]. Thus, where changes have taken place, they have been more likely to be the result 
of changes at the very top or within the dominant coalition of the party.
However, Harmel and Janda's model applies only partially to the Greens. Not only do 
they not have a formal party leader in the style of the more established parties, but 
pressures from the exogenous world have obviously forced change upon them. That a 
process of programmatic and structural renewal has taken place has surprised many 
observers. The unstable majorities of the Basis activists at party conventions have tended 
to produce extreme and often contradictory resolutions about the party's strategy and 
programme. As a result, many observers had concluded that, in the absence of a fully 
developed party hierarchy and greater internal discipline, fundamental renewal of the 
party's programme would be impossible and would only lead to further schism and 
dissolution on the Left. Instead, there has been a growing institutionalisation of the 
Greens: both in terms of its internal structures and in its relations with the exogenous 
party system.
It is accepted that the failure of the 'western1 Greens to pass the 5% electoral barrier in the 
1990 Federal elections sped up the process of union between them and the 'eastern' 
Greens. Given that such external shocks have been rare for the Greens at the national
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level, this would appear to be fully in line with Harmel and Janda's hypotheses. However, 
at the sub-national level, the Greens have suffered external shocks that have not only 
brought about organisational and programmatic change, but have also been central to 
changes in the dominant coalition itself. For instance, in West Berlin, hostile media 
coverage of the crises and eventual collapse of the Red-Green coalition led the AL to tone 
down its policy of transparency in internal debate and adopt a more disciplined approach. 
At the same time, the practice by which Green ministers had to refer all major decisions 
back to their Basis was phased out. In Hamburg, the uncompromising stance of the GAL 
led to their vote share dropping from 10% to 7% in the May 1987 elections and fuelled the 
strategic debate at the national level [Hiilsberg, 1988: 213-4]. In Lower Saxony, it is a 
matter of record that the ambiguity of some elements in the local party towards political 
violence was regarded as a major factor in the failure of the Left to unseat the CDU-FDP 
coalition and led to a review of the local party's hard-line approach [Markovits and 
Gorski, 1993: 211-17]. The electoral reward for their moderation came in 1990.
Whilst electoral disappointments at the sub-national level spurred the processes of change 
within the party, they were not decisive in themselves. Even if such external shocks were 
avoided, one could argue that such changes were inevitable, given the 'pressure of actual 
circumstances' that Fischer described. Petra Kelly's original description of the 'anti-party 
party', for whom 'parliament is not a goal but a strategy' [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 
121] remained a rallying call, but the most mundane day-to-day problems associated w ith 
political praxis generated solutions that inevitably distanced the Greens from this vision 
and led to the development of an increasingly recognisable hierarchy within the party.
Harmel and Janda's hypothesis is borne out to the extent that the pressures for change 
were not just of a diffuse and technical nature but also the direct result of the actions of 
individuals and coalitions within the party. In this, the example of the realo-fimdi conflict
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is illuminating. Over time, ad hoc divisions of responsibility (and by implication, chains 
of command) sprung up within both the parliamentary Fraktion and in the wider party in 
response to the power struggle. As personalities, such as Joschka Fischer on the realo 
side or thefundi Jutta Ditfurth, became publicly associated with a particular political 
stance, hierarchies inevitably grew around them to deal with the logistics. In practice, 
these hierarchies roughly divided between the party's executive (where the fundis were in 
the ascendant) and its Fraktion (were the realos were stronger), thus exacerbating the 
division between Fraktion and party. These debates became increasingly public and, fired 
by external shocks such as electoral set-backs, the normal procedures of Basisdemokratie 
broke down and policy often appeared to be made in the media arena rather than via 
internal debate.
Up until the late 1980s, this made the Greens an often uncomfortable and unreliable 
coalition partner, confirming the worst suspicions of senior members of the SPD old guard 
such as Holger Bo'rner. In the late 1980s, however, the fundis lost the ascendancy that 
they had enjoyed in the early and mid-1980's. There appear to be three main reasons for 
this. First, the technical imperatives associated with the praxis of party politics spurred 
on the growing institutionalisation of the Greens. Second, as the realo-fundi debate 
polarised at the national level between the Fraktion and the party executive, the Fraktion's 
superior resource-base (such as access to the media, office facilities and funding) began to 
exert a decisive influence upon the Greens' external image and internal discourse. Third, in 
the absence of a mass membership, the party as a whole relied upon state funding for its 
representatives in order to survive, which in turn strengthened the realo position. These 
three factors were also working at the sub-national level, although at different speeds from 
state to state. Thus, whilst the Land party in Hesse were known as 'super-realos' from 
quite early on, the Greens in Schleswig-Holstein remained in thrall to the fundis well into 
the 1990s.
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Nevertheless, it was to be the ordinary party membership who finally ended the 'battle 
among the mullahs' with the emergence of Aufbruch in the late 1980's. The alliance 
between Aufbruch and the realos at the party's federal convention in December 1988 
replaced the incumbent (fundi dominated) executive with a more representative committee 
Silvia, S.J., 1993: 178]. The realo-fundi conflict was effectively over and with it the 
explicitly 'anti-system' phase in the party's development. The Greens were moving from 
the political margins towards becoming a potential party of government.
All of these developments are evident in the Berlin and Lower Saxony cases, which will be 
examined next in Part III. The following chapters (Four to Seven) will look sequentially at 
(i) the relationship between the parties; (ii) a comparison of party programmes; (iii) the 
process of post-election bargaining; (iv) an account of the political life of the two 
coalitions over their period in office, and, finally (v) at selected examples of programmatic 
and institutional innovation. These chapters will build upon themes common to all Red- 
Green coalitions, such as the problems faced by the Greens, in terms of intra-party 
conflict between the realos andfundis, inter-party conflict with the SPD, the problems of 
staffing ministries and the resistance to Green involvement in Land government by other 
political actors, such as producer groups' peak associations. In both cases, there are 
similar characteristics. As will be demonstrated, there appears to be a clear pattern to the 
formation of both coalitions and similar problems associated with their maintenance over 
time. These problems are related to:
• The day-to-day Praxis of party politics (intra- and inter-party conflict management, 
institutional constraints and NGOs)
• The difficulties associated with both (i) the structure and process and (ii) the outputs 
and outcomes of policy-making
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After examining the case studies from both a party-politics and policy-oriented 
perspective, Part IV applies the empirical evidence to the theoretical framework. Chapters 
Eight and Nine undertake a comparative analysis of the processes of coalition formation 
and maintenance. After reviewing the evidence from these chapters and the rest of thesis. 
Chapter Ten makes an assessment of the nature of payoffs associated with these 
coalitions and considers, in the light of the research question, whether the Greens' 
preferences and strategic behaviour can be predicted.
This chapter demonstrates that, taken in the round, the political record of the Red-Green 
coalitions to date have been mixed. For reasons of location, history and longevity, the 
Hesse coalitions have been regarded as the seminal example of the genre. In terms of 
history and longevity, the Berlin and Lower Saxony coalitions represent the two extremes. 
The Berlin coalition lasted less than two years and collapsed amongst mutual political 
recrimination and not a little personal bitterness. By contrast, the Lower Saxony coalition 
lasted the full term and, the legislative arithmetic notwithstanding, would probably have 
been re-constituted after the 1994 Landtag elections. Yet, to assume that they are 
completely dissimilar would be wrong. As Part III will demonstrate, an analysis of the 
politics and policy of both coalitions reveals that many of the themes, strengths and 
weaknesses of the two coalitions were broadly the same.
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Part III: Politics, Policy and Institutional 
Innovation in Berlin and Lower Saxony
(I) CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICS IN BERLIN
(II) CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICS IN LOWER SAXONY
(III) CHAPTER SIX: PROGRAMMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INNOVATION IN BERLIN
(IV) CHAPTER SEVEN: PROGRAMMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INNOVATION IN LOWER SAXONY
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICS IN BERLIN
4.1. Preamble
Chapter Four examines the political history of the Red-Green coalition in the city of Berlin 
from 1989 until 1990. It is part of the 'party polities' strand of the thesis. The chapter is 
structured sequentially into four sections.
• Section 4.2. looks at the relationship between the parties before the elections to the 
city legislature in 1989.
• Section 4.3. looks at a comparison of party programmes, both in terms of content and 
also in terms of discursive form35 .
• Section 4.4. looks at the process of post-election bargaining.
• Section 4.5. gives an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in 
office.
The first three sections provide a discursive account of their subjects, in order to establish 
an empirical base with which to apply the models of coalition formation in Chapter Eight.. 
Section 4.5. provides a fairly substantial account of how the coalition fared politically over 
its time in office (relevant to Chaper Nine on Coalition Maintenance). The section looks 
at some of the more salient political themes impacting on the coalition and critically 
examines their impact upon the process of coalition maintenance. This serves to establish 
a contextual base from which to look at selected issues of programmatic and institutional
35Discursive form is important to the policy-oriented strand of thesis, because, although the established 
parties have adopted a technocratic/managerial discourse (possibly from years in office), the Greens have 
tended to use a more polemical discourse (which often lacked detailed policy proposals). It could be argued 
that this would make it harder to make the leap to a more administrative discourse if in office.
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innovation in Chapter Six (for instance, the Energiegbeirat), which are also of specific 
relevance to Chapter Nine. Where these issues are mentioned in the general accounts of 
the coalitions, they are introduced only in outline in order to prevent unnecessary 
repetition.
4.2 The Relationship Between the Parties
4.2.1. The Berlin Alternative Liste
The Berlin Alternative Liste was one of the more radical local Green parties in the Federal 
Republic. Not only had it opposed the initial foundation of a Republic-wide Green party, 
but had maintained a semi-autonomous stance towards it. As Markovits and Gorski point 
out, the Berlin AL 'were in many respects closer in substance and spirit to the Fundis than 
theReaM [1993: 231].
Because of this record of ideological fundamentalism, not only was co-operation with the 
CDU out of the question, but even co-operation with the ideologically adjacent SPD was 
the subject of intense in internal discussion. Prior to the 1989 election, the AL portrayed 
such a strategy as being primarily a means of removing the incumbent CDU-FDP 
administration rather than as a positive move in itself^. Yet, even such a tentative stance 
towards the SPD was roundly condemned by many within the AL, highlighting the 
ideological and tactical struggle between the party's fundamentalist executive and relatively 
pragmatic Fraktion [TAZ. 19/08/88].
36When the AL announced their candidates for the 1989 elections, they declared the dissolution of the 
incumbent administration to be their Wahlziel (primary electoral goal). In their belief this was onh 
possible in tandem with the SPD and should not be seen to fail because of the AL. [TAZ.. 04'10/88].
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4.2.2. The Berlin SPD
For its part, the Berlin SPD entered the election with a leader, Walter Momper. who 
represented the younger generation of SPD leaders personified by Oskar Lafontaine, Bjorn 
Engholm and Gerhard Schroder. The 1980's had not been a success for the Berlin SPD. 
who had lost two municipal elections in succession and were a long way from recovering 
their previously strong position in the city. Momper was not regarded as a strong enough 
candidate to defeat the CDU's charismatic Eberhard Diepgen and opinion prior to the 
election foresaw another CDU-FDP victory. Thus, prior to the 1989 elections, any 
possibility of the SPD re-gaining office lay in the possibility of a coalition agreement with 
the FDP, CDU or AL. Subsequently, as the FDP was not to pass the Federal Republic's 
5% electoral barrier, the SPD's potential bargaining set consisted of just the CDU and AL.
4.3 Comparison of Party Programmes
But how close, in policy terms, was the SPD to the other two parties? A typology of all 
three local party platforms is displayed in Table 4.3. (below). As is apparent in this 
typology, of the seven general 'domains' of policy, only three ('Welfare'. 'Fabric Of 
Society 1 and 'Social Groups') presented viable dimensions of policy congruence between 
the SPD and AL. Within the other four domains ('Foreign Affairs', 'Freedom And 
Democracy1 , 'Government1 and 'Economy'), the SPD was closer to the CDU in both style 
and substance than it was to the AL. In a direct analogue of the SPD's national 
programme, the Berlin party's economic policy presented an unconvincing attempt to both 
re-formulate the SPD's hitherto Keynsian approach to demand mnagement and try and
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Table 4.3. A Typology Of Party Programmes Within The Bargaining 
Set. West Berlin, 198937
Domain
( 1 ) Foreign Affairs
























(i)Expansion of State 
Provision And Increased 
Self-Help. 















on 'Western Values'. 
(iii)Pro-Disarmament.
( i)Acceptance Of 
'Bourgeois democracy'. 
(ii)Moderate Emphasis 
On Autonomy Of 
Individual.
(i)State-Oriented. 




(But Emphasis On Role 
Of The State).
.(i)Expansion Of State 
Provision. 




















(ii)State As Guardian Of 
Individual Freedoms.
(i)State-Oriented. 




(But Emphasis On Role 
Of Private Enterprise).
(i)Limited Expansion Of 
State Provision. 




(ii)Strong Emphasis On 
Nuclear Family And 
Gender Roles.
(i)Ambivalence. 





Sources: SPD Berlin. 1989; AL Berlin. 1989; CDU Berlin. 1988
Table uses Budge's seven general 'domains' of policy, as used in his analysis of election programmes 
in 19 Democracies (1987: 23). To this I have added the category 'Discursive Form', as the two 
Volksparteien produced far more policy-focused documents than the AL. Please note that all data is of a 
judgmental/qualitative nature, rather than quantitative content analysis (see Chapter One: Methods).
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reconcile it with the more post-modernist agenda presented elsewhere in the document^. 
Where the interests of the economy and the environmental policy coincided, the SPD 
attempted to reconcile the concerns of its New Left supporters with the more materialist 
demands of its traditional Wahlkreise\ stating rather clumsily that 'protecting the 
environment is also a growth industry, protecting the environment creates jobs!' [SPD. 
1990: 7]. This may indeed be true, but differs only in terms of nuance with the stated 
policy of the CDU. Unlike the AL, at no time does the SPD challenge the economic and 
political order that underpins modern industrial society. On the contrary, the SPD's 
instinct for more traditional corporatist solutions was demonstrated by its proposal for 
setting-up an all-party commission to tackle Berlin's unemployment and environmental 
problems.
With regard to the domains of 'Foreign Affairs', 'Freedom And Democracy' and 
'Government', it is perhaps understandable that the Berlin SPD erred on the side of caution 
and the maintenance of the status quo. Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Four-Power 
Agreement endowed a peculiar constitutional status upon the city. Central to this status 
was the presence in West Berlin of the three Western allies. The privileges that the allies 
enjoyed as protecting powers was not only formally codified in West Berlin's Basic Law, 
but, owing to the city's post-war experience, also possessed considerable normative power 
of its own.
Because the Allied presence was so central to the city's identity and political discourse, 
attitudes towards it were arguably the litmus test of a party's wider political ideology. 
Thus, no self-consciously 'constitutional' party could seriously challenge the post-war
38Thus, in the same document, the SPD identified the need for modernising the city's industrial base, 
reducing the state sector as a percentage of the total economy and improving Standort Berlin as an attractive 
location for investment. At the same time, the party advocated a reduction in working hours with no drop 
in pay and the expansion of state-run work creation schemes (ABM).
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settlement and, perhaps just as importantly, no truly 'anti-party party' could easily 
accommodate it. Given this context, it is not surprising that, following the elections, 
Momper demanded clarification of the AL's stance towards this issue as proof of its 
Koalitionsfahigkeit^'. The fact that the AL did modify their stance, in order to enter 
government, must be interpreted as a tactical victory for Momper and the SPD.
There was, however, one policy area within these particular domains that did provide 
opportunities for policy agreement between the SPD and the AL: with regard to internal 
security. Under the aegis of two successive CDU-FDP coalitions, and originally in 
response to disorder related to the squatters' movement in the early 1980's, the West 
Berlin police-force expanded dramatically, accompanied by the introduction of quite 
draconian operational tactics^O. These measures proved very popular with a significant 
proportion of the population, to the extent that the CDU's 1989 manifesto pledged to 
continue this policing strategy: stating that the police could 'count on the support of the 
Berlin CDU ' [CDU, 1989: 21]. For the SPD, although squatters and the like were not 
popular with their Stammwahlerkreise, the issue was contentious. Not only had the use 
of the police become to some extent a partisan issue, but much of the Left-wing vote that 
they hoped to garner was highly critical of the CDU's policy and had sympathy for the 
AL's stance on the issue. Therefore, although they did not go anything like as far as the 
AL on the issue^l, the SPD did propose a policy of 'de-escalation' that put it much closer 
to the AL than to the CDU on this issue [SPD, 1990: 22]. Ironically, the policy of de- 
escalation was not only to hamper the coalition from within weeks of its inception (when
t, the different stances on this issue within the two parties election literature are quite pronounced. The 
SPD supported the Allied presence (although it adopted a less bellicose attitude towards the Honecker 
regime than the CDU), whilst the AL wanted it reduced to a 'symbolic remnant' [AL, 1990:] 
40(Dne notorious example of such tactics occurred during the World Bank/IMF conference in 1987. Fearing 
protest demonstrations marching on the venue, the city government ordered the complete sealing-off of the 
city's Kreuzberg district. During this time, no-one was allowed in or out of the entire SO36 postal district. 
41 Who refused to draw any distinction between criminal- and 'state violence'. As a result they demanded 
the abolition of the entire criminal code relating to political violence. [AL, 1990: 5-6]
129
the 'autonomous groups' began to open up new squats in an attempt to embarrass the 
coalition), but would prove to be the issue that brought it to a close.
As Table 4.3 indicates , within the domains of 'Welfare', 'Fabric Of Society' and 'Social 
Groups', the SDP's proposals were closer to the AL than they were to the CDU. This 
post-materialist stance that underpinned these proposals may have constituted a classic 
example of Themenklau [Papadakis, 1983: 61], but did provide the possibility of policy 
co-operation between the two parties.
One example of such a policy area related to what could broadly be termed 'women's 
issues' (although, in the SPD's case, they were often sublimated into other areas such as, 
for example, employment rights and training). The SPD's proposals were, once again, less 
radical than the AL's - who demanded a minimum quota of 50% of all work and training 
places for women - but nevertheless much more progressive than the CDU's stance on the 
issued Moreover, Momper made it part of his personal appeal to promote women into 
his putative cabinet. Along with the AL's commitment to the issue^, the eventual 
representation of women in the coalition would, at that time, be the highest ever in a Land 
government^
Another area where the SPD and the AL had identical positions was with regard to voting 
rights for foreigners. The CDU opposed the right of long-term foreign residents to vote in 
local elections; no doubt for reasons of electoral logic as well as a point of principle.
SPD proposed to expand the provision of nursery education by 10,000 places in four years. They 
also proposed a night-taxi service for women (which was implemented) [ibid. p. 13]. The CDU proposed 
some progressive measures, but made it clear that these were to help women better manage their 
responsibilities at work and at home! [CDU, 1989: 10]
43The AL selected 14 women to help fill the 25 places on their Lisle. Moreover, they filled eight of the 
first ten places: thus guaranteeing a high representation.
44A11 three AL portfolios and six of the 11 SPD portfolios. However, cynical observers also pointed out 
that, for Momper, the positive image of a 'Frauensenate' diverted attention from any potential 'Rot-Grim 
chaos'. [TAZ. 18/03/89]
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However, the SPD, the trades unions and the AL favoured such a right and proposed to 
lobby the Constitutional Court on the issue. This proposal was highly contested, not 
least after the election by the 11 Republicans in the legislature, but did provide a 
normatively powerful topic around which the coalition could mobilise.
One final example of an area where the SPD and AL were programmaticly close was in the 
field of cultural politics, including the legacy of Germany's past^5. In the context of 
Berlin, this debate was particularly fierce; not just because of the city's history also 
because of the CDU-FDP administration's policies during the 1980's. The outgoing 
coalition invested a great deal of political as well as monetary capital in a number of 
prestige projects, designed to re-establish Berlin's reputation as a Weltmetropol. The most 
controversial of these was the planned German Historical Museum, which both the AL 
and SPD rejected as inappropriate and proposed to scrap. Moreover, both parties rejected 
the previous concentration upon centralised, capital-intensive projects and planned to 
introduce a more decentralised and heterogeneous policy, which they regarded as more in 
keeping with the multi-cultural reality of contemporary Berlin46 .
To conclude, a comparison of party programmes demonstrates that the SPD was only 
party within the bargaining environment that was able to find common ideological ground 
with both the other parties. If it chose, it could profile the more socially-conservative and 
authoritarian side of its ideological profile (in order to bargain with the CDU). or it could
a nation where symbols have such resonance, the debate over the nature of German culture is far more 
politicised than such a debate is in, for example, mainland Britain. This was particularly true on the 
German Left, many of whom are steeped in what Jurgen Habermas has called Verfassungpatriotismus 
(constitutional patriotism), with its emphasis upon the existing reality of the Federal republic and its 
rejection of the older symbolism of the German nation [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: .276] 
46 in a sense, these proposals were somewhat parochial and reflected the status and ambitions of Berlin at 
the time. Since unification, of course, both of these have expanded: as the massive building sites that cover 
the city demonstrate.
131
pursue a more post-materialist, new Left-oriented agenda (in order to bargain with the 
AL).
4.4. Bargaining
The results of the city elections of 29 January 1989 are arranged (with a breakdown of 
first and second votes) in Table 4.4. (a) below.



























Total Vote: 1,220, 423 Turnout: 79.6%48
Source: Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 1990
is interesting to note that the Republican party effectively entered the legislature through the Second 
Vote: traditionally the domain of the FDP. Moreover, it would appear that this was gained from the 
electorate of both main Volksparteien.
48Note that the turnout throughout the period 1981-1989 fell 5.7% overall. This is in keeping with the 
trend towards increased non-voting noted by Paterson and Southern (1991) amongst others.
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The failure of the FDP to pass the Federal Republic's 5% electoral barrier, and its 
consequent exclusion from the Berlin legislature, meant that the CDU would have to look 
elsewhere for coalition partners if it was to muster the 70 seats needed for a legislative 
majority49. However, the bargaining set was constrained by the presence of 11 
representatives from the Republican party. Although, as Padgett points out, in the past 
'...Right wing parties have come and gone without making a permanent impact' [1993: 92], 
the legacy of Germany's past has continued to put such parties 'beyond the pale' as 
potential coalition partners.
Clearly, the Republican party was excluded from the bargaining set on the grounds of 
ideology and institutional norms. However, the CDU also ruled out any bargaining with 
the AL [TAZ. 01/02/89]. This was clearly due to the ideological distance between the two 
parties, yet the CDU leadership also tried to invoke institutional norms against the AL - 
by equating them with the Republicans [TAZ. 10/02/89] - in an attempt to narrow the 
bargaining set to their advantage. To this end, Diepgen adopted a high media profile: giving 
numerous interviews in which he stressed what he saw as the potential danger to West 
Berlin of a 'Red-Green' coalition and asserted the CDU's claim to be the strongest political 
force in the city. Diepgen made it clear what he expected from the SPD, describing any 
future SPD-AL coalition as 'not very tenable' and the possibility of a CDU-tolerated SPD 
minority government as 'not very plausible'. Moreover, Diepgen re-emphasised what he 
described as the CDU's 'claim to leadership' of the Berlin government [TAZ. 02/02/89].
is a tradition of majority government in the Federal Republic that reflects the consensual ethos of 
the post-war state [Paterson and Southern, 1991; Padgett, 1993. etc.]. At the federal level, this has 
enhanced the status of the FDP as a 'pivot party' between the two Volksparteien [Pappi, 1977]. However, at 
the Land or city-state level, this role is diminished as it is often possible for a single party to achieve a 
majority on its own. Moreover, it has been known for a minority executive to be 'tolerated' by an 
opposition party in the legislature. The current arrangement in Sachsen-Anhalt -where a 'Red - Green' 
coalition is being tolerated by the PDS- is a controversial example.
133
Despite Diepgen's efforts, it was apparent at the time that the real initiative lay with the 
SPD. In electoral terms, the SPD had made substantial gains over the previous election 
(up 9.3%) and had fulfilled Momper's declared aim of breaking the CDU-FDP hegemony 
in Berlin [TAZ. 22/10/88]. Moreover, the high degree of ideological polarisation in the new 
legislature, and the SPD's ideological location between the other two parties in the 
bargaining set, virtually assured it of a place in government. However, this polarisation 
also meant that the SPD would have to exercise political skill if it was to exploit its 
position to the full without alienating either of its two prospective coalition partners^. 
Thus, whilst asserting that the result of the election signalled a desire on the part of the 
electorate for a 'new, social, liberal and ecological reform-polities' [TAZ. 01/02/89]. 
Momper also stressed that he intended to enter into negotiations with both the AL and 
CDU with no prior preferences [TAZ. 02/02/89]. So skilful was Momper's performance 
during this period of coalition bargaining that an editorial in the TAZ. written after the 
formal codification of the SPD-AL coalition, described it as that of a 'skilful, unscrupulous 
and power-conscious tactician' [TAZ. 18/02/89].
It could be argued, however, that Momper's task was made easier by tactical naivete on 
the part of the AL. Not only had the AL made the removal of the incumbent CDU-FDP 
administration its Wahziel, but its spokesperson had even speculated in public about the 
AL tolerating an SPD minority government for an interim period. This could hardly be 
described as 'keeping one's powder dry'! One can speculate as to why one of the more 
fundamentalist Green parties in the Federal Republic chose to embark on such a strategy.
5 ^in this, the Berlin SPD were lucky enough to have been led by Momper; even though prior to the 
election he had not been particularly highly regarded. Coming from the 'New Left' tendency within the 
SPD, Momper had a history of support and involvement in Left-wing causes, including protest activity 
against the Allied presence in West Berlin [Mattox and Bradley Shingleton, (eds.) 1992: 68.]. In this sense 
he came from the same milieu as many in the AL. At the same time, however, he was a pragmatic 
politician and had moderated both his policy stance and political style since assuming the SPD leadership. 
Indeed, his party's campaign manifesto, for which he campaigned vigorously, explicitly recognised the role 
of the three Allied powers in Berlin [SPD Berlin 1989]. As already mentioned, he consequently made the 
AL's clarification of their own stance on the issue the sine qua non of any coalition agreement.
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As already mentioned, where similar tactical dilemmas have arisen elsewhere in Germany, 
empirical evidence has shown that a strategy of non-co-operation or even confrontation 
with the SPD can prove counter-productive; with the Greens losing support in the 
following election [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 202]. However, this evidence is not 
conclusive, as other local variables, such as local political personalities, must be taken into 
account. Nevertheless, although Momper had expressed no interest in new elections, the 
possibility remained that they might be called in the event of an impasse. Therefore, it 
was possible that the AL calculated that a strategy of not co-operating with the SPD might 
place them in a no-win situation, resulting in either a Grand Coalition between the CDU 
and SPD or new elections, after which the AL's bargaining position could be considerably 
worse. Beyond such bargaining logic, there was considerable pressure from the Basis to 
negotiate with the SPD on the grounds of policy. There were some policy domains within 
which there were real possibilities for agreement. On the other hand, there were areas 
where the two parties held potentially incompatible positions. Moreover, the AL was, 
arguably, disadvantaged in as much as the SPD could claim a wider mandate: not just 
numerically but as a 'catch-all' party. As a TAZ article ruefully observed, 'the SPD 
bargained - even if true or not - in the name of the Berliners and in the name of a 
politicised, mistrustful city; the AL bargained only in the name of its grass-roots' [TAZ. 
07/03/89]. Given the residual normative (and numerical) weight of the SPD as a 
Volkspartei, the AL was, perhaps inevitably, at a disadvantage during the bargaining 
process^1.
After two rounds of negotiations in the first weeks of February, it had become clear that 
the SPD was not prepared to recognise the CDU's 'claim to leadership'. However, there 
were still difficulties with regard to the AL. In the context of a deteriorating situation in
51 For an exposition of the coercive, normative and informational variables within political institutions see 
Kitschelt, on Political Opportunity Structures (1986, 1988).
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the city's finances, and what almost amounted to panic amongst some elements of the 
business community at the thought of the AL in government, Momper engaged in 
widespread consultations with trades unions, employers organisations and other civic 
groups, during which he spelt out his plans for tackling unemployment and the skills 
deficit in the city. However, despite these difficulties, Momper was clearly gaining the 
upper hand in the bargaining process.
One might have expected the AL to be enjoying its pivotal role with regard to the two 
Volksparteien. However, in reality the AL's options were limited, and provoked 
considerable bitterness towards the SPD as well as internal disagreement. Clearly, any 
form of co-operation with an establishment party will present both ideological and tactical 
difficulties for Green parties. For the Berlin AL, these were focused on the fact that the 
SPD was competing with them along some elements of 'their' policy dimension.
The process of coalition negotiation following the January elections took a number of 
weeks. Although the rank and file of both parties were overwhelmingly in favour of such a 
coalition, the AL's 'fundi' wing were not in favour of parliamentary co-operation per se, 
whilst there remained some elements within the local SPD elite who regarded the AL as a 
radical Left-wing party and not a suitable coalition partner [Jun, 1994: 218]. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that local SPD leader Walter Momper was privately less than enthusiastic 
for such a coalition. Nevertheless, most public disagreement occurred over the division of 
cabinet posts between the parties. This manifested itself in a long, acrimonious and very 
public process of bargaining. Indeed, six weeks after the election, an AL spokesperson 
stated that the party still awaited an 'acceptable offer' from the SPD and criticised the 
SPD's 'unfair bargaining style' [TAZ. 10/03/89]. The crucial issue that divided the two 
parties was the form and allocation of the portfolio for women's issues. The AL
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demanded that this portfolio should be a ministerial post in its right and, naturally, that 
they should be allocated it.
Eventually, a compromise was reached. On the 13 March, the SPD and AL agreed the 
composition of the city government. The AL did indeed receive the women's issues; albeit 
sublimated within a wider ministry. The full division of ministerial posts is set out in 
Table 4.4. (b) below.
In purely numerical terms, the AL did not do as well as the SPD in terms of the division of 
portfolios. The 29 January elections had resulted in the election to the city legislature of 
17 AL representatives and 55 from the SPD. However, the AL received only three out of 
the fourteen cabinet posts on offer: a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of almost 
six-to-one. By contrast, the SPD ratio was just five-to-one, in addition to which Walter 
Momper became Governing Mayor. At first glance, this would seem peculiar given that 
the AL arguably held the balance of power and could be interpreted as an indication of 
political naivete on their part. Yet, such a narrow interpretation ignores the fact that 
certain policy sectors, such as the environment held disproportionate weight for the AL. 
Moreover, the coupling-together of city-development and traffic policy with 
environmental protection (rather than with construction and housing, for example) was 
considered a hard-fought and essential victory for the AL in the teeth of SPD opposition. 
As one member of the former AL city-parliament grouping recently observed: 'we didn't 
want just a ministry for environmental propaganda. We wanted to make policy'.
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that Frau Stahmer held the symbolic post of Mayor in addition to her Health And Social Affairs 
portfolio.
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4.5. The Politics of the Berlin Coalition
The coalition agreement between the SPD and AL was formally codified on 13 March 
1989. Three days later, the appointment of West Berlin's new executive was ratified by 
the city's legislature amid a mood of some optimism. As an article in the Left-wing 
Tageszeitung remarked at the time, the ratification process had passed with an ease that 
was unprecedented in the recent history of West Berlin's relatively polarised local politics. 
As to why this was the case, the TAZ - despite its often critical attitude towards the Berlin 
SPD - gave most of the credit to the negotiating skills of the SPD's Walter Momper [TAZ.. 
18/03/89].
For Momper, this was the high-point of his career. Written off by many commentators 
before the election as a political lightweight, the subsequent bargaining process revealed 
another side to his character. In doing so, he had established the primacy of the SPD in the 
coalition, with the AL apparently content to take the role of junior partner. After the vote 
of ratification, Governing Mayor Momper walked to the podium and prophesied that 'the 
great unity shown by both governing factions in today's vote is also a sign and signal of the 
predictability and stability of this coalition' [Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin. 
Plenarprotokollen. Band i. 1 bis 18. Sitzung. 1991: 37]
At the time, such optimism did not seem misplaced. The coalition had not only drawn up 
a progressive reform programme, but also boasted the highest percentage of women 
ministers of any Land government in the history of the Federal Republic. With Federal 
elections due in 1990, and Helmut Kohl and the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition doing badh in 
the polls, there was some degree of speculation amongst SPD and AL activists at least that 
successful co-operation between their parties could even provide a model for government 
inBonn[L4Z 15/02/89].
139
Yet, by the time those elections took place, the Berlin Wall had fallen. Germany was 
unified and a triumphant Kohl returned to the Chancellery in Bonn. Moreover, in Berlin, 
the coalition had collapsed in disarray and mutual recrimination. The AL, who had left the 
coalition and tabled a vote of no confidence in Momper, were accused by him of 
irresponsibility and pursuing a perverse form of scorched earth' politics [TAZ. 17/11/90]. 
In reply, the AL's Christian Strobele declared that the real problem lay with the SPD's 
cautious approach to the reform agenda. However, Strobele also observed that policy 
disagreements 'were not always the SPD's fault, as they must consider completely different 
sections of the electorate than we would want to and have to' [TAZ. 17/11/90].
So what went wrong? Gudrun Heinrich has described the Berlin Red-Green coalition as 
having three distinct phases. The first phase, lasting from the Spring until late Summer of 
1989, can be described as the coalition's 'honeymoon period'. The second phase, lasting 
from the late Summer of 1989 until early 1990, was characterised by a slow break-down in 
trust between the two parties. The third and final phase, lasting from the beginning of 
1990 until its collapse was, in Heinrich's words, characterised by 'At'o parties governing 
next to and against each other, with no joint strategy to follow' [1993: 39]. Obviously, the 
cataclysmic changes of November 1989 completely transformed the political environment 
within which the coalition was trying to function and must have put an enormous strain 
upon the participants. Nevertheless, the break-down in relations between the two parties 
was striking, and played out in the full view of the wider German polity.
As soon as the coalition was inaugurated, it was put under pressure. Elements from the 
autonome Szene, the so-called 'autonomous groups' who enjoyed links with elements of 
the AL (arising out of the Berlin squatters movement of the early 1980s), promptly 
squatted a number of flats in the Kreuzberg area of the city. This was widely regarded as
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an explicit act of provocation for a coalition of which the autonome disapproved 
wholeheartedly.
The squatting action presented the AL with a conflict between the priorities of party 
management and coalition maintenance. Given that the AL had entered into the coalition 
against the wishes of elements of its own milieu, it was loathe to further antagonise them 
by moving against the squatters. On the other hand, the SPD Interior Minister Erich 
Patzold was determined the hold the line against such an early challenge to his own 
authority and, by definition, that of the coalition. As a result, Patzold demanded and 
obtained the reluctant support of his AL colleagues in clearing the squatters [TAZ. 
23/03/89].
This first skirmish with the squatters groups highlighted a fundamental tension within the 
coalition. Like any political party, the AL needed to deliver tangible results for its client 
groups in order to maintain party unity. At the same time, it needed to give itself a free 
hand, both in its dealings with the SPD and as a party of government per se. However, by 
its very nature, some elements of the AL's milieu had interests that ran counter to the AL's 
as a coalition partner. Although the Red-Green coalition enjoyed the support of the 
majority of the AL's members and voters, the AL's internal structure - or lack of it - 
allowed vociferous minorities to make their views heard. The AL's system of delegational 
democracy meant that Fraktion members (including coalition ministers) were required to 
regularly report back to the party caucus. These caucus meetings were often quite heated 
and, now that the AL was in government, well-reported. As a result, Berliners were now 
treated to the spectacle of AL ministers being cross-examined by their local caucus on the 
evening news. Inevitably, there was no shortage of highly-quotable members of the 
'counter-culture', ready to play to the prejudices of'middle-Berlin' (to coin a phrase). Even 
so early on, it all looked frighteningly like the much-promised 'Red-Green chaos'!
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For the AL ministers themselves, and for much of their rank and file, it was soon apparent 
that the responsibilities of government could be quite uncomfortable. As Heinrich 
observes, the early days of the coalition demonstrated to the AL that they now 'had to go 
along with decisions that they had previously opposed '[1993: 42].
Indeed, the political Praxis of the first few months of government saw the AL in the thick 
of the action and forced into making contentious decisions. The first big row within the 
coalition concerned the planned extension of the city's Rudolf-Vircho\\'-Klinikums (the 
Rudolf Virchow Clinic), under plans agreed by the previous CDU-FDP administration. 
The AL opposed the project, on the grounds that it went against the spirit of the principle 
of decentralisation per se, and the enhancement of mobile community-based care facilities 
in particular. However, in June 1989, the AL ministers eventually gave in and approved 
the extension plans on the grounds that they were so far underway and alternative plans 
did not exist. Next, the two coalition parties fell out over a planned border crossing to the 
GDR at Schichauweg. Although a compromise was eventually reached, the AL's Plenary 
Session53 called on its representatives in the legislature to do all they could to stop the 
border crossing coming about [Heinrich, 1993: 41].
In addition to these internal disagreements, the coalition found itself up against the 
powerful motorists lobby, following the decision by SPD Minister Wagner to impose a 
100 km per hour sped limit on West Berlin's only stretch of Autobahn, the AVUS. 
Although justifiable on environmental grounds, the AVUS decision was bad politics. 
Overnight, the motorists association ADAC was gifted with an issue around which to 
mobilise opposition to the coalition.
53 The Plenary Session, or Mitgliedsvollversammlung (MVV), was - in the tradition of delegational 
democracy - the highest decision-making body within the AL.
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Both parties seemed aware of the significance of their political co-operation. This was 
clearly demonstrated by a number of press conferences held in June 1989 to celebrate (and 
take stock of) the first 100 days of the coalition. For its part, the AL deemed the first 
phase of the coalition a success, although they felt that the realities of government had 
eroded any initial euphoria. They now regarded the coalition as a 'high risk and exciting 
experiment' in government [AL Pressestelle. 26/06/89]. For its part, the SPD was satisfied 
with the first 100 days, but were beginning to show signs of frustration and impatience at 
the slow pace of decision-making within the coalition. The blame for this was put 
squarely at the AL's door, because of their insistence on referring everything back to their 
local caucus. As Momper observed, the AL had to 'develop (internal) structures that 
would make the entire coalition more capable of taking decisions' [Press Statement by 
Momper. 23/06/89]. The first phase was coming to an end.
No sooner had the 100-day honeymoon period been passed than the coalition entered its 
first really major crisis. The cause of the crisis was an agreement between Berliner 
Elektrizitatswerke (BEWAG: the local city-owned electricity generator), and Preussen 
Electra and Intrac to supply electricity between the GDR and Berlin. The contract had 
been closed by the previous CDU-FDP administration, but was vehemently opposed by 
the AL. As a result, the coalition agreement stated that the coalition intended to 'cancel or 
make adjustments' to the contract once in power [SPD Berlin 1989: 23]. For many in the 
AL, this issue was a fundamental test of the coalition's environmental credentials 
[Heinrich, 1993:42].
However, the policy area fell within the remit of SPD Economics Minister Peter 
Mitzscherling, who proposed that the contract should go ahead. Mitzscherling's decision 
was vehemently opposed by the AL's Michaele Schreyer, whose Ministry for City 
Development and Environmental Protection also had competencies in this field. The AL
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ministry also had access to advice from a circle of environmental initiative groups, research 
centres and individual activists (see Chapter Six on the Energy Advisory Council 
(Energiebeiraf)\ As a result of this over-lap of powers, both the Economics ministry and 
the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection undertook a review of 
the legal basis of the contract.
On the 22 September 1989, the MVV of the AL passed a resolution stating their 
implacable opposition to the contract going ahead. The plenum issued an imperative 
mandate to the AL Fraktion (including ministers), making the issue the sine qua non of 
continued co-operation with the SPD. Implicit in the AL's critique was what they called 
their 'dissatisfaction with the timid implementation of certain elements of the coalition 
agreement' [Protocol of the AL Plenary session of 22 September 1989. cited Heinrich. 
1993:43].
The final decision on the contract was an exercise in political brinkmanship. However, 
after the SPD made it clear that any veto of the contract would signal the end of the 
coalition, in December 1989, the AL ministers reluctantly gave their consent to the 
agreement.
The next major source of conflict within the coalition began in late November and early 
December of 1989, with the onset of strike action by care-workers at Berlin's 
Kindertagesstdten (KITAS: children's day-care centres), with the aim of improving pay 
and working conditions (in particular the achievement of an agreement on a minimum wage 
or Tarijvertrag). The AL, who enjoyed substantial support amongst KITA workers, 
came out clearly in favour of the demands of the strikers. However, Interior Minister 
Patzold rejected the strikers demands, with the support of the rest of the SPD. Again, the 
AL had found itself in the ambiguous situation of both being in power and advocating a
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stance that was implicitly in opposition to the stance adopted by the coalition as a whole. 
After ten weeks the strike collapsed without success.
At this point, the AL were in an invidious situation. On several occasions they had found 
themselves in a situation where they were unable to defend the interests of their client 
groups against the decisions of the city-government as a whole. This prompted the AL's 
extra-parliamentary organisation to issue a harsh critique of the actions of the coalition and 
demand, despite the fact that the strike had failed, that negotiations on the subject of the 
minimum wage should start immediately.
The AL's demands fell on deaf ears and. at the plenum of 24 March 1990, Heidi Bischoff- 
Pflanz (the chair of the AL's Fraktion and a vociferous supporter of the KITA strike) 
announced her resignation. Frau Bischoff-Pflanz was widely regarded as a representative 
of the AL's Left-wing. Therefore, her support had been essential in maintaining intra- 
party peace and support for the coalition. The Red-Green coalition was entering its final 
phase.
The last phase of the West Berlin Red-Green Coalition coincided with the final stages of 
the process of German unification. Therefore, it is perhaps fitting that one of the major 
sources of conflict between the parties in these final months concerned the sale of 61,710 
square metres of real estate on the Potsdamer Platz to Daimler-Benz. The initial 
negotiations between Governing Mayor Momper, Minister for Construction and Housing 
Wolfgang Nagel and Daimler-Benz had taken place in the summer of 1989. As Heinrich 
observes, the intervening months had transformed the Potsdamer Platz from waste-ground 
on the edge of the allied-occupied city to the centre of a re-united Berlin [Heinrich. 1993: 
47]. However, by the time that the AL and, indeed the SPD as a whole, were informed the 
deal had gone through.
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The Daimler-Benz deal not only aggravated the already sensitive feelings of the AL. but 
also significant elements of the SPD itself. At issue was not only the fact that the changed 
circumstances of the area had rendered the sale price ridiculously low, but also that the sale 
of what was now prime real estate now raised questions as to the suitability of siting the 
Daimler Benz building in the centre of a new unified Berlin. The fact that the deal was 
going ahead, combined with the manner in which it had been arranged and announced, made 
a mockery of the idea of an integrated and environmentally-sound city-planning concept.
Such a plan was within the remit of the Ministry for City Development and 
Environmental Protection, whose Minister Michaele Schreyer was now on the verge of 
resignation. As a result, by the time that the contract with Daimler Benz was signed in 
June 1990, relations between the two coalition partners had reached a new low point. The 
deal went ahead on the strength the votes of the SPD and CDU in the legislature, with the 
AL voting against. In effect, this meant that the SPD had implicitly sidelined Frau 
Schreyer and undermined the principle of ministerial autonomy.
The Daimler Benz debacle led the AL to debate their continued participation in the 
coalition. The debate, which took place on the 15 and 16 June 1990, was given added 
urgency because, following the first free elections of 6 May 1990, East Berlin was now 
governed by a Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU. Indeed, at this point. 
Momper announced proposals to send West Berlin ministers over to East Berlin in order 
to take over responsibilities as a precursor to unification of the two city governments 
[Heinrich, 1993: 48]. The initiative failed in the teeth of the opposition of both the AL 
and SPD rank-and-file. Nevertheless the rules of the game had changed and the AL had got 
the message.
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By the early Autumn of 1990, the AL Basis was in almost open defiance of the coalition. 
At the local level, the mood amongst the AL's rank-and-file was now openly in favour of 
ending political co-operation with the SPD. This process precipitated a major crisis of 
party management for the AL when, in August 1990, 51 leading Left-wingers within the 
AL declared that they were now 'going into opposition to the majority of the AL [Heinrich, 
1993: 49]. The rebels even suggested that the AL was in danger of self-destructing over 
the issue. Clearly, if the AL was going to hold together as a party, it had to find an issue 
around which it could mobilise.
The next source of conflict between the SPD and AL concerned the future of the Research 
Reactor at the Hahn-Meitner Research Instititute (HMI). Like the contract between the 
electricity generators, the AL regarded the cancellation of the reactor project as a test of 
the coalition's environmental credentials and, again, the SPD appeared to be back-sliding on 
the issue. As a result, the AL Minister for City Development and Environmental 
Protection Schreyer found herself in direct conflict with the SPD Minister for Science and 
Research Barbara Riedmuller-Seel. In May 1990, despite the overlap in competencies 
between her ministry and that of Schreyer, Riedmuller-Seel had unilaterally given the go 
ahead to the reactor coming on-line, although the final decision was put back until August. 
At the beginning of August, at the behest of the SPD, the legislature ordered Schreyer to 
confirm Riedmuller-Seel's decision within two weeks [Suddeutsche Zeitung. 9/08/90]. 
Citing technical advice, Schreyer refused to comply and resigned.
Clearly, the coalition was falling apart, and only needed a sufficiently emotive issue to kill 
it off. Indeed, with new all-Berlin elections just around the corner, some observers would 
argue that it suited both parties to do just that, in order to profile themselves to their 
supporters and mobilise their full electoral potential [Jun, 1994: 219].
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It will be recalled that the Berlin Red-Green coalition's first big test, in the early days of 
government, involved the squatters' movement. Therefore, it was ironic that it was 
another squatters' action that precipitated the final collapse of the coalition. On 15 
November, SPD Interior Minister Patzold ordered the eviction of a number of squatted 
houses in East Berlin's Mainzer StraBe. In the aftermath of the evictions, there was a 
number of serious street disturbances in the city. The AL responded immediately with a 
press statement in which they declared that they 'were no longer prepared ...to share 
responsibility for these policies' [Heinrich, 1993: 51]. The Berlin Red-Green coalition was 
at an end.
4.6. Resume of Chapter Four
Chapter Four examined the political history of the Red-Green coalition by structuring the 
events sequentially into four sections. Section 4.2. looked at the relationship between the 
parties and concluded that the Berlin AL was a relatively fundi-oriented party compared 
with some other Green Landesverbande. For its part, the SPD was a party in decline, 
having lost hegemony that it had enjoyed in first three decades after the Second World 
War. However, although it had a traditionalist Right-wing, it also had a growing New Left 
tendency. This - and the fact that it could no longer win a majority of seats on its own - 
made it fairly receptive to the idea of a Red-Green coalition.
The chapter then compared the party programmes of the three parties that were 
eventually left in the bargaining set. It concluded that the Berlin CDU were socially- 
conservative and relatively authoritarian, whilst the AL were profoundly New Left and 
libertarian in their outlook. The SPD, however, displayed elements of both ideological
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stances within its election literature. This meant that it was able to bargain with either 
party if it so wished. No other party was in that position. Interestingly, the polemical 
discursive form displayed in the AL's election literature did not dissuade the SPD from 
entering into negotiations with them. It remains to be seen how this translates in to 
programmatic and institutional innovation (Chapter Six).
The chapter then described the process of post-election bargaining and demonstrated that 
it was the SPD that held most of the cards during the bargaining process. This was 
because of its ideological stance and because of its share of the seats. The SPD's strength 
was reflected in its share of cabinet portfolios.
Finally, the chapter gave an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in 
office. It looked at some of the more salient political themes impacting on the coalition 
and examined their impact upon the process of coalition maintenance. The chapter built 
upon Gudrun Heinrich's idea of the Berlin Red-Green coalition having three distinct 
phases. The 'honeymoon period' from the Spring until late Summer of 1989; the second 
phase, from the late Summer of 1989 until early 1990, with a slow break-down in trust 
between the two parties and, finally, a third phase, lasting from the beginning of 1990 until 
its collapse, characterised by 'two parties governing next to and against each other, with no 
joint strategy to follow' [1993: 39]. The underlying economic weakness of Berlin (and its 
impact upon the city's budget) was one reason for the coalition's slow decline, as was the 
upheaval of November 1989, which transformed the political environment within which 
the coalition was trying to function and put enormous strains upon the participants. 
However, much of the coalition's problems stemmed from political manoeuvring by both 
parties. For the AL, the Praxis of everyday government proved hard to maintain, 
especially as the party's rules meant that every decision had to be referred back to a 
suspicious Basis. For the SPD, the pull to the Left (which led to the Red-Green coalition)
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was countered by the resistance of its more authoritarian Right-wing. Moreover, as the 
1990 elections came closer, the Right's influence grew as the temptation to tack back 
towards the centre became overwhelming.
The coalition parties fell out over issues that perfectly encompassed these tensions. 
These included the influence of big business (the Preussen Electra and Intrac affair, the 
Daimler-Benz row), fiscal rectitude versus social provision (the KITA strike), 'Green' 
shibboleths such as nuclear power (the row over the Research Reactor at the Hahn- 
Meitner Research Instititute), the ever-present ambiguity of many Greens towards private 
property and the state monopoly on violence (SPD Interior Minister Patzold's eviction of 
the squatted houses in Mainzer StraBe being the final straw). However, what was clear 
from the research was that they also fell out because Walter Momper's political style 
alienated the AL (and many of his own colleagues). He is no longer a major figure in the 
Berlin SPD.
Taken in combination with the analysis of the institutional environment within which Red- 
Green coalitions were formed (Chapter Two) and the wider historical context of such 
coalitions (Chapter Three), the chapter serves to establish a contextual base from which to 
look at selected issues of programmatic and institutional innovation in Berlin in Chapter 
Six.
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CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICS IN LOWER SAXONY
5.1. Preamble
Chapter Five looks at the political history of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony 
between 1990 and 1994. Like Chapter Four, the chapter is part of the 'party polities' 
strand of the thesis and is structured sequentially into four sections.
• Section 5.2. looks at the relationship between the parties leading up to the 1990 
Landtag elections.
• Section 5.3. makes a comparison of party programmes, both in content and in terms of 
discursive form.
• Section 5.4. looks at the process of post-election bargaining and assesses the allocation 
of portfolios, in the same manner as Chapter Four.
• Section 5.5. gives an account of the political history of the coalition over its full term in 
office.
Again, the first three sections provide a discursive account of their subject, whilst the 
fourth section (5.5.) provides a longer account of how the coalition fared politically over 
its time in office. The section looks at some of the more salient political themes impacting 
on each coalition and critically examines their impact upon the process of coalition 
maintenance. This serves to establish a contextual base from which to apply the model of 
coalition formation and maintenance in Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Seven isolates 
certain topic areas (such as the Kernenergieausstiegsbeirat) in order to provide certain 
tests of programmatic and institutional innovation (relevant to coalition maintenance).
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Because of this, these topics are introduced only in outline in the general account of the 
coalition.
As a final note, Chapter Five is somewhat lengthier than Chapter Four. The relative 
lengths of the two chapters reflect the relative lengths of the coalitions themselves, rather 
than any disparity in the comparative importance of the two coalitions within the wider 
'story1 of such coalitions.
5.2. The Relationship Between the Parties
By the late 1980's, the Lower Saxony polity was in the final phase of the so-called 
'Albrecht era', which lasted from 1978 until 1990. These years were characterised by a 
period of CDU hegemony in which, either alone or with the FDP as junior partner, the 
Christian Democrats, led by Ernst Albrecht, had run the state and excluded the SPD from 
power. By 1989, however, the CDU-FDP administration was looking a little ragged at the 
edges. Opinion polls showed a rise in support for the political extremes, as well as a 
growth in support for the idea for a Red-Green coalition along the lines of the Berlin 
coalition that had come to power earlier that year.
Lower Saxony was far more rural and conservative than West Berlin and this was reflected 
in the conservative value-orientation of the local SPD, which had been far more suspicious 
of the Greens that their Berlin counterparts. Nevertheless, it was significant that the 
Lower Saxony SPD refused to rule out the possibility of a coalition with the Greens 
following the 1990 state elections [FAZ. 25/2/89]. For their part, the Lower Saxony 
Greens had explicitly campaigned for the removal of the 'Skandal-Regierung Albrechf and
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its replacement with a Red-Green alternative. This was to seriously hinder their room for 
manoeuvre after the elections [Neue Presse. 18/5/90].
Despite the obvious differences between the two states, the parallel with Berlin stuck in 
the public mind and the press began to speculate as to whether Albrecht could succeed 
where Eberhard Diepgen had failed and remain in power. The opinion polls at this time 
showed the CDU vote dropping, whilst the FDP's support appeared to be around 12% 
(albeit on the strength of second votes from CDU supporters). If the CDU-FDP 
administration was to continue in power, it had to make a success of a raft of FDP- 
inspired reforms. However, perhaps as a result of the debilitating effects of a long period 
in office or because of the tense pre-election atmosphere, these reforms were becoming 
increasing contentious within the coalition itself54 . As a result, Minister President 
Albrecht and his FraktionschefGansauer came under fire for making too many concessions 
to the FDP. Many CDU colleagues argued that, in the run-up to the state elections, the 
FDP would need to profile themselves against their coalition partners whatever 
concessions were made. Ominously, many within the CDU began to publicly compare the 
actual record of the coalition with the plans that had been drawn-up in the coalition 
agreement.
For its part, the SPD kept up the pressure on the coalition. The SPD's Fraktion-chief 
Gerhard Schroder, had introduced what had been described as 'a new sharpness into the 
Landtag' [HAZ. 24/4/90] and the party harried the coalition across a range of issues. 
Already in the December of 1988, they had unsuccessfully brought a motion of no-
54One example of these reforms was a limited re-organisation of local government in Lower Saxony at the 
Gemeinde level, which was intended to enhance local democracy and increase transparency in spending 
decisions. However, the reforms (which were a partial reversal of the 1972 shake-up of local government) 
set local FDP associations against each other, to the extent that even an FDP member of the Bundesrat 
became involved in the row. Another example was the FDP's rejection of the 'Wasserpfennig' principle, by 
which CDU environment minister had hoped to link harmonisation payments (Ausgleichzahlitng) for 
Agriculture with measures to preserve water through a tax on its use (Wasserentnahmeentgelt}.
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confidence in the coalition's financial management and, in particular, Albrecht's role in the 
Federal tax reforms (which came into operation in 1989). Albrecht was politically exposed 
on the issue because, as a member of the national CDU Presidium, he had been involved in 
the approval of the reforms, even though Lower Saxony had suffered a revenue loss of 
DM 1.2 billion as a result. Albrecht had managed to partially off-set this loss by securing 
DM 680 million of structural funds from the Federal government, as befitted the role of 
Landesvater which he endeavoured to cast himself [FAZ. 25/2/89].
The SPD responded by campaigning with the slogan 'down with the tax reforms' and 
proposed an additional means of aiding the regions. Under the SPD's plan, 50% of 
Sozialhilfe payments from the Bund to the Kommunen would be held back and used as 
direct aid to the most disadvantaged of the Gemeinden. This tactic was a classic example 
of Schroder at his most unashamedly populist best. The plan had, prior to the Federal tax 
reforms, been known as the 'Albrecht Plan': because it had originally been a product of the 
Staatskanzlei. With Albrecht compromised by his federal role, Schroder was free to 
plunder the CDU's own policies and use them against the coalition.
As the state elections approached, the parties implicitly began to coalesce into two blocs. 
At a joint press conference a month before the election, the CDU and FDP put their 
differences aside and praised each other's 'good work under difficult conditions' across the 
economic, social, ecological and cultural fields. Albrecht stated that, bearing in mind that it 
had only enjoyed a majority of one, the CDU-FDP coalition had been 'the best functioning 
coalition' in the Federal Republic [HAZ. 25/4/90].
The chances of its continuation looked favourable as well. CDU Fraktion-chief Gansauer 
pointed to an EMNID poll in the run-up to the election that gave the CDU 43.5%, the 
SPD on 42.5%, with both the FDP and the Greens on 6.5% of the vote. The poll also
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indicated that 55% of voters expected a CDU-FDP victory on May 13. Moreover. 
Schroder lagged badly behind Albrecht as the popular choice for Minister President55 , 
whilst 59% of those polled thought that a Red-Green coalition would be bad for Lower 
Saxony. Thus, as the parties went into the state elections, there was little to indicate that 
a there would be any change in the governing coalition at the Hannover Landtag.
5.3. Comparison of Party Programmes
In the case of Lower Saxony, the comparison of individual party programmes is of limited 
explanatory value. This is because, by the end of the Albrecht era, the party system 
within the state had polarised into two competing blocs. One bloc consisted of the out­ 
going government coalition of the CDU and FDP, who were opposed by a de facto 'Red- 
Green' bloc of the SPD and Greens.
According to Jun, this process of polarisation first became evident in the early 1970s. 
Whilst neither of the two Volksparteien were able to decisively dominate the party 
system, the CDU was able to win a majority of the seats in 1978 and 1982 by taking 
advantage of the SPD's problems at the Federal level56 . However, in 1986, the CDU could 
only remain in power with the help of the FDP. Thus, although the CDU and FDP were 
ostensibly in some form of electoral competition with one another, they were equally
55The EMNID poll put Albrecht on 55% and Schroder on 36%. Moreover, as one of the most extrovert of 
the so-called Toscana socialists' within the SPD, Schroder's personal style appeared to aggravate the 
traditionally dour citizens of Lower Saxony. For instance, SPD voters polled objected to his 'dramatic' 
manner. Moreover, on a 1-5 sympathy rating, Schroder only scored 1.63 amongst SPD supporters. 
Bearing in mind that this was only marginally ahead of the 1.56 scored by the CDU's Rita Sussmuth (the 
Bundestag speaker and designated successor to Albrecht as Minister-President if the CDU returned to 
power), it indicated that Schroder's personality was a political problem.
56Jun asserts that these problems were: (i)1978. Mid-term unpopularity of the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn 
and (ii)1982. Inner-party differences, a bad candidate and the feeling of'fin de ciecle' in Bonn.
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fighting on their joint record in government. Jun argues that the rise of the Greens, and the 
inability of the SPD to unseat the coalition, had aggravated this process. As a result, 
voters were in no doubt that they were voting for either a continuation of the existing 
administration or a Red-Green coalition [1994: 192-3].
The perception of the voters was re-inforced by the pronouncements of the politicians 
themselves. Although the SPD had made a point of keeping its coalition options open, 
Schroder was not popular within the FDP Landesverband. As a result. FDP Fraktion- 
chief Hildebrandt had already stressed that they were not prepared to enter into coalition 
with the SPD [HAZ. 24/4/90]. Finally, the Greens had no other possible coalition partner 
than the SPD.
This polarisation is not so evident in the comparison of party programmes set out in 
Table 5.3. (below). For instance, within the domains of 'Foreign Affairs', 'Freedom and 
Democracy', 'Government', 'Economy' and 'Fabric of Society', the SPD was much closer to 
the FDP (and, of course, the CDU) than it was to the Greens. In terms of 'Discursive 
Form', the election literature of the Lower Saxony Greens was nowhere near as polemical 
as that produced by the Berlin Alternative Liste. Nevertheless, the SPD's discursive style 
had more in common with the FDP and CDU than it did with the Greens.
The areas where there were potential for the selective emphasis of common policy 
positions between the SPD and the Greens lay within the domains of 'Welfare', 'Fabric of 
Society' and 'Social Groups'. Obviously, differences remained. For instance, within the 
domain of 'Fabric of Society', the SPD continued to be far more cautious than the Greens, 
who took a more libertarian approach. Similarly, with regard to 'Social Groups', the SPD 
adopted a more pragmatic and incremental stance than the Greens.
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Table 5.3. Typology Of Party Programmes Within the Bargaining Set 
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Sources: Landeswahlprogramme 1990. SPD Niedersachsen; Wahlprogramme '90. CDU Niedersachsen: 
Landtags-Wahlprogramme '90, Gesamt-Ausgabe. FDP Landesverband Niedersachsen; Die Griinen. 
Landesverband Niedersachsen. 1990.
Berlin case for notes.
58Compared with the Berlin case, the Domain of 'Foreign Affairs' was of far less salience in local terms. 
However, the specific historical context of the state elections [i.e. in the run-up to German unification) 
meant that the general emphasis of foreign affairs was quite pronounced.
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These differences notwithstanding, there were areas of broad consensus between the two 
parties, in similar policy areas as those selectively emphasised in West Berlin a year 
earlier. Within the area of Innenpolitik, both favoured a more socially-proactive and less 
authoritarian form of government compared with the Albrecht era. For instance, both 
parties agreed about the need to make a clearer distinction between the work of the police 
and the Verfassungsschutzbehorde (security services), and to enhance parliamentary 
control over the latter. Both parties were also broadly in agreement on the need to make 
more of an effort to integrate foreigners into German society (including keeping the right to 
asylum as it stood prior to its amendment in 1993) and on the de-centralisation of powers 
to the Kommunen. With regard to Gleichstellungspolitik (equality, Women's issues etc.), 
both parties were in favour of setting-up a Women's Ministry, the extension of equal 
opportunities legislation across the field of education and training, as well as the reduction 
of working hours for both men and women. Within the area of Sozialpolitik, both parties 
favoured the extension of participation and autonomy for self-help groups, the physically- 
and mentally-handicapped as well as a proposition that the state of Lower Saxony should 
guide a Gesundheitsreformgesetz (Health Reform Law) through the Bundesrat.
However, within the areas of Wohnungs- und Stadtebaupolitik (Housing and Town 
Planning), Economic policies and the Environment, there were differences of both style 
and substance. In particular, the SPD where concerned to strike a balance between the 
ideals of ecological modernisation and the need to maintain levels of employment and 
investment, whilst the Greens tended to take a more unyielding stance. This was 
particularly true of Nuclear power and the disposal of industrial and household waste. At 
the time, these differences appeared to be of little significance. Nevertheless, as the 
coalition moved into mid-term, the combination of a deteriorating economic situation and 




The polls going into the Lower Saxony state elections of 13 May 1990 predicted a narrow 
victory for the governing CDU-FDP coalition. However, the actual results were quite 
different. The results are laid out in Table 5.4 (a) (below).





















Turnout: 74.6%; Source: Statistisches Amt Niedersachsens
Table 5.4 (a) demonstrates that, contrary to expectations, the SPD emerged from the state 
elections as the biggest party, with 44.2% of the vote. This represented a modest gain of 
2.1% from the previous state election in 1986. The CDU lost 2.2.% of the vote over the 
previous election, becoming the second biggest party in the state with 42.0%. The CDU's 
previous coalition partners, the FDP, maintained their 6.0% vote-share and became the 
third-biggest party in the legislature. The surprise losers were the Greens, whose vote 
dropped from 7.1% to 5.5%: making them the smallest party in the 155-seat Landtag. 
The new distribution of seats was: SPD 71, CDU 67, FDP 9 and Greens 8.
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The results of the election raised a number of possibilities for the parties, given that no 
party had a blocking majority in the legislature. However, it was clear that any coalition 
that excluded the SPD would be hard to defend, given their gains in the elections. In 
reality, the only two likely coalitions were an SPD-FDP coalition or a Red-Green 
coalition. But, as already made clear by the politicians, SPD-FDP co-operation was 
already effectively ruled-out before the election. This was re-confirmed by Hildebrandt 
after the election [FAZ. 16/5/90]. Therefore, although it could not be ruled out (and, 
indeed, Schroder did not rule it out), for the SPD, the 'FDP option' was not as attractive or 
plausible as that of co-operation with the Greens.
Moreover, the attractiveness of the Greens was enhanced as they were in no position to 
'call the shots' in any coalition negotiations. The fall in their share of the vote had been a 
bitter pill for the party to swallow: not just for its own sake but also because it deprived 
them of any 'king maker' role within the legislature. If the SPD preferred the Greens to the 
FDP (which it did), it was not out of pure necessity. The Greens' leverage was reduced as 
a result.
However, whoever the coalition-partner was to be, the SPD were determined to take over 
power by the 21 June 1990, in time to send their representatives to the Bundesratssitzung 
on the 22 June. For their part, the CDU was determined to prevent this happening. 
Gansauer, newly re-elected as the CDU's Fraktion -chief, stated that the CDU were 
determined that the first scheduled Landtagssitzung, scheduled for 27 June, would not be 
brought forward to accommodate the Bundesrat session [FAZ. 16/5/90]. The reason why 
the Bundesratssitzung was so important was that it was due to debate the Staatsvertrag, 
by which the German Democratic Republic was to become part of the Federal Republic. 
If the CDU could not prevent the formation of a new coalition before the 22 of June.
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Schrb'der would become Minister-President and the SPD would have a majority in the 
Bundesrat when the Staatsvertrag was debated59 .
The SPD and Greens both agreed that coalition negotiations should start immediately. In a 
press conference immediately after the election results were confirmed, the Greens' 
Fraktion-chief Jiirgen Trittin identified a number of areas of potential conflict, as well as 
stressing those policy domains where agreement was possible. The potential areas of 
conflict were (i) Ecological issues, in particular the Greens opposition of the incineration 
of waste and their advocacy of waste prevention and re-cycling (Vermeidung und 
Verwertung); (ii) Women's issues and (iii) Interior politics, civil rights and the rule of law. 
Potential consensus areas, in Trittin's opinion, (i) Training and schools (including the 
development and expansion of the Kindergarten network); (ii) Care for the Elderly and 
other areas of social provision [FAZ. 16/5/90]. Trittin demanded that the Greens receive 
three ministries, assumed at the time to be Environment, Women's Issues and one more 
within the field of social provision.
In another press conference the following day, Trittin stated that the Greens wanted to 
negotiate an agreement that would last the full term of government. In Trittin's view, 
everything was negotiable, 'as long as Schroder does not want to mess us about ' [HAZ. 
17/5/90]. Inevitably, solid proof of the SPD's good will was demanded.
59In theory, the need to form a coalition before the Bundesratssitzung gave the Greens some degree of 
leverage with the SPD. However, the situation was more complex than it first appeared. Saarland Minister- 
President Oskar Lafontaine was the SPD's Chancellor-candidate and, under his leadership, the SPD Fraktion 
in the Bundesrat had adopted an obstructional stance to the Staatsvertrag process. On the one hand, 
Schroder's victory helped the SPD because they formed the new majority within the Bundesrat. However. 
it was no secret Schroder and Lafontaine were rivals. Therefore, although the Lower Saxony SPD did 
intend to be present at the Staaatsvertrag debate, if for any reason this was not possible and the CDU won 
the debate, this was not an unmitigated disaster for Schroder's long-term ambitions to lead the SPD. 
Therefore, Schroder could afford to be sanguine about the timetable for coalition talks.
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The areas where the Greens intended to take a hard line were energy policy and waste 
disposal, where Trittin insisted that the SPD must make it clear that they were not scared 
of coming into conflict with the Bonn government and, if necessary, fighting them in the 
courts. For Trittin, the rejection of the principle of Nuclear energy in particular was the 
sine qua non of co-operation.
However, as press commentators observed, the Greens' room for manoeuvre was limited. 
This was not only because of their poor electoral performance, but also because of the 
explicit link they had made in the election campaign between voting Green and co­ 
operating with the SPD to remove the Albrecht administration. Trittin's demand for three 
ministries was 'understandable', but two was possibly more realistic. Women's issues was 
considered to be a certainty, as was one other within the field of social provision. 
However, it was unlikely that they would get the Environment portfolio. Monika 
Griefahn (the leader of Greenpeace in the Federal Republic and, at that point, not a 
member of any political party) appeared the most likely choice of Environment Minister, 
supported by a Green state secretary [Neue Presse. 18/5/90; HAZ. 18/5/90]. The Greens 
would have to lower their expectations.
This down-beat mood was reflected in the run-up to the start of negotiations, on the 20 
May 1990, when the Greens met for a short conference at Wallenhorst. The membership 
were on the back-foot, as a result of their poor showing in the elections, and this was 
reflected in the tone of the speeches. One demoralised member of the executive argued that 
the party had not been able to convince the electorate that they could actually change 
anything whilst, at the other extreme, an executive member from Osnabriick stressed the 
need for the party to come out fighting in order to profile itself anew before the upcoming 
Federal elections. The post-election gloom was deepened by a general sense of unease at 
the idea of the Greens not getting the Environment ministry in any coalition agreement.
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Indeed, one speaker from the floor demanded that the Greens hold out for the Economics 
ministry as a quid pro quo for losing 'their1 environment portfolio. This was not likely 
and, in his speech to the conference, Jiirgen Trittin stressed that the Greens would have to 
accept some unpleasant political facts60 . He paraphrased an old quote from Adenauer and 
declared that the Greens and the SPD 'were condemned to a positive outcome from the 
negotiations' [HAZ. 27/5/90].
By contrast, the mood of the Lower Saxony SPD was positively bullish. As the architect 
of the party's return to power after 14 years in opposition, Schroder's stock within the 
SPD Fraktion was at its height. The 'robuster Schlingel' 61 , as CDU Landeschef 
Hasselemann had memorably named him, declared that he wanted immediate 'success- 
oriented negotiations with the Greens [HAZ. 75/5/90]. However, it was clear that such 
negotiations were to be within parameters established by the SPD. Not only had the 
SPD's vote gone up but, in the 'Green heartlands' such as the university-town of 
Gottingen, this rise had been at the expense of the Greens. It was argued in the press that 
the rise in the SPD vote and its distribution seemed to indicate two things. First, the 
voters wanted a Red-Green coalition. Second, that in the long run Schroder's SPD could 
make the Greens a superfluous force within the Lower Saxony party system [FAZ. 
23/5/90], starting by questioning the Greens' claim on the Environment portfolio.. By 
arguing before coalition talks had even begun that his choice of Monika Griefahn for 
Environment Minister was 'non-negotiable', Schroder seemed to agree.
It was agreed beforehand that the negotiations would take place in three 'Gesprachskreise', 
or discussion circles. First, a daily preliminary meeting of the delegations before the
60Trittin's actual words were: 'Wir werden auch Kroten schlucken miissen'. A quaint phrase which was to 
become much-quoted over the ensuing years. It translates roughly as 'we too will have to accept some 
things that are hard to swallow'. 
61 There is no direct translation, but it is a(double-edged) term of approval.
163
opening of official business. Second, the official bilateral coalition negotiations between 
the full teams from both parties. Finally, a more focused policy-specific round of talks 
between the relevant specialists on each team [Jun, U. 1994: 197].
The coalition negotiations began amid high expectations on the part of the SPD and Green 
membership. Indeed, such was the mood of optimism that both parties made a point of 
using their press releases to lower the level of expectations amongst their supporters [FAZ. 
29/5/90]. Nevertheless, from the beginning it was clear that the two themes of Nuclear 
Energy and Waste Disposal were to be the most salient topics for discussion. Indeed, one 
of the first joint announcements of the two parties was used to issue a condemnation of 
the decision of the (SPD-governed) state of North Rhine-Westphalia to allow waste to be 
disposed of in Industrial incinerators. Whilst the SPD's preferred candidate for the 
Environment Ministry, Frau Griefahn, was very close to the Greens' position on this 
theme, there were still differences to reconcile. The SPD's stance was noticeably more 
pragmatic than that of the Greens and Frau Griefahn refused to completely rule out the 
possibility of installing high-temperature incinerators in order to burn waste [HAZ. 29! 
5/90]. For the Greens, any form of incineration was undesirable.
Within the domain of social policy, both parties were broadly in agreement and 
negotiations went well. The shape and allocation of the planned Women's Ministry was 
agreed (it would go to the Greens), and the coalition agreed that it would be desirable to 
adopt the German Democratic Republic's relatively liberal laws on the termination of 
pregnancy if at all possible. In addition, it was intended that the new coalition would 
become far more proactive in the training and re-training of the unemployed, drug- 
rehabilitation projects and the promotion of self-help groups. The provision of housing 
would be enhanced, with 50,000 new housing units planned for 1990. of which 15,000 
would be social-housing [FAZ. 29/5/90]. Because of Lower Saxony's tight financial
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situation, the house building programme would be funded by diverting resources from large 
infra-structure projects already in the pipeline, such as the extension of the A 26 arterial 
road into the Emsland, the building of a tunnel under the river Weser and the extension of 
the port at Cuxhaven. These projects would probably be cancelled [Neue Presse. 31/5/90]. 
Finally, it was intended that the coalition would repeal the Extremistenbeschlufi, by which 
individuals who were members or supporters of parties that were considered 'extremist' 
were banned from the civil service [HAZ. 31/5/90]. Obviously, the repeal of the measure 
would also open the door to members of the extreme Right. Nevertheless, the 
Extremistenbeschlufi was an obvious block to the Greens' ability to open-up the policy 
network.
The coalition negotiations had made such good progress that their success was soon taken 
for granted by everybody. For instance, by the beginning of June, an article in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung referred to 'the forthcoming Red-Green state government of 
Lower Saxony' [FAZ. 05/6/90]. Nevertheless, as the allocation of seats in the new Red- 
Green cabinet became evident, many of the Greens' Basis became uneasy at what they 
regarded as the failure of their chief negotiator Jurgen Trittin to secure more than two 
portfolios. At a meeting of the local party in Hannover, party members demanded a more 
robust stance by Trittin and his team. At the very least, many regarded the Economics 
Ministry as the sine qua non of participation in the coalition, whilst the more ambitious 
also coveted the sectors of Transport and Energy. Moreover, the realisation that they 
were not going to get the Environment portfolio still rankled [HAZ. 06/6/90]. As a result, 
many within the party argued that a second Environmentally-related post should be 
created because, as one Green put it 'we don't want ourselves to say good-bye to the area of 
Environment completely'. It was suggested that the new ministry might also include
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Planning, Traffic and Nature Protection62 and that it would be filled by Jurgen Trittin 
himself [Neue Presse. 07/6/90].
Finally, on the 7 of June, the negotiations came to an end. The division of posts is laid-out 
in Table 5.4. (b) (below). Contrary to any hopes of the Greens' Basis, the party had to be 
content with just two portfolios, in contrast to the SPD's ten. The Greens did not get the 
Environment portfolio, let alone the Economics portfolio that some had demanded. 
Moreover, Jurgen Trittin did not get the proposed Planning. Traffic and Nature Protection 
portfolio, but rather became Minister for Federal and European Affairs. This was not an 
environmentally-related post, but possessed a certain degree of status and prestige.
In addition to Trittin's ministry, the Greens also received the newly-created Women's 
Ministry. Moreover, they would appoint the State Secretary for both the Environment 
and Social Ministry. However, the 'blue-chip' posts remained in the SPD's hands.
In purely numerical terms, the Greens did better than the SPD in terms of the division of 
portfolios. The May elections had resulted in the election to the legislature of 8 Green 
representatives and 71 from the SPD. Moreover, the Greens received only two out of the 
twelve cabinet posts on offer: a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of four-to-one. 
By contrast, the SPD ratio was just seven-to-one. At first glance, this would seem 
peculiar given that the SPD held the political initiative (because of the gains they had made 
at the state elections). However, such an interpretation ignores the fact that although 
certain policy sectors, such as the environment, held disproportionate weight for the 
Greens, they failed to win the portfolio during the bargaining process. The allocation of 
the state secretary posts, or even well as Federal and European Affairs and Women's '
^Raumordnung, Verkehr und Naturschutz.
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* Frau Griefahn later joined the SPD.
Sources: HAZ. 8/6/90; Koalitionsverembarung Zwischen SPD Und Die Griinen Vom 19
Juni 1990. SPD Landesverband Niedersachsen 1990.
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ministries, could not make up for the loss of what should have been their 'core portfolio. 
Thus, it was no surprise that the Neue Presse [08/6/90] described the outcome of the 
bargaining process as ' Schroder's success', stating that 'the soon-to-be-elected head of 
Government ...had displayed strength and only permitted the Greens to have competence 
for two relatively unimportant mini-ministries'1 .
5.5. The Politics of the Lower Saxonv Coalition
With the coalition agreement finalised, Schroder was elected Minister President on the 21 
June 1990 with a majority of three votes in the Landtag. His was the only candidature for 
the post. The newly elected Parliamentary Speaker, Horst Milde (SPD), announced the 
result to sustained applause from the SPD and Green benches.
Almost immediately, the new coalition was at the centre of controversy over its decision 
to not attend the Bundesrat vote on the Staatsvertrag between the Federal Republic and 
the GDR, due on the 22 June 1990. In retrospect, the decision was a classic example of 
Schroder's political pragmatism. It allowed his Green coalition partners - who were on the 
record as opposing the treaty - of the hook, whilst not directly defying the SPD's agreed 
line on the issue. No doubt it also had the added attraction to Schroder in that it was 
another tactical move in his long-running rivalry with Oskar Lafontaine, the Minister 
President of the Saarland and the SPD's Chancellor-candidate for the 1990 Bundestag 
elections. Whatever the thinking behind the decision, it provoked a scathing editorial in the 
local Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, in which it was claimed that 'the glue that holds 
the Red and Green together is no more than the enormous appetite for power' [HAZ. 
22/6/90].
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However, the HAZ journalist's opinion notwithstanding, the new administration appeared 
to be anything but an empty office-seeking coalition. Across a wide range of policy areas, 
Schroder's inaugural speech as Minister President signalled the coalition's intention to 
embark upon a bold and reforming political programme. In particular, Schroder singled out 
Law and Order, Gender politics, Environmental policy, Education and Training. 
Economics and Finance as specific areas through which the coalition's record as a whole 
would be judged [HAZ. 28/6/90]. Inevitably, the new CDU and FDP opposition parties 
condemned the speech.
CDU Fraktionschef Jiirgen Gansauer accused Schroder of summoning-up visions of a 
'flowery Utopia', of creating a 'paper tiger' with the coalition's planned policy on nuclear 
energy, and of planning to turn Norddeutsche Rundfunk into 'a propaganda instrument for 
Red-Green ideology', whilst the SPD's allies in the communications union IG Medien 
unleashed a 'witch hunt' against the few journalists openly associated with the CDU within 
the organisation. Nevertheless, whilst FDP Fraktionschef 'Martin Hildebrandt was equally 
scathing in his remarks, neither he nor Gansauer ruled out some degree of co-operation 
with the new coalition, given that they had a clear mandate from the electorate. Indeed, 
Hildebrandt signalled that the FDP would tacitly support any measures to reform Land 
legislation on the powers of the police and the Verfassungsschutz (the Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution, in other words the security services) [Neue Presse. 
29/6/90].
Unlike the Berlin coalition, the Lower Saxony coalition was not immediately beset with 
problems. In fact, after 100 days of office, opinion polls gave the coalition a 46% 
approval rating [HAZ. 02/10/90]. Nevertheless, it was only a matter of time before the 
honeymoon ended and the coalition had to make hard choices that would stretch the 
patience of the Green rank-and-file to the limit.
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Inevitably, the source of the coalition's troubles was the parlous state of the Land budget. 
Already in 1990, it was clear that, by mid-term, the coalition would have to deal with a 
substantial budget deficit. This was estimated as being around DM 2 billion by 1992 
[Neue Presse. 17/04/90]. As a result, the coalition would have to cut planned expenditure 
by a similar amount over the period. At the same time, as part of the unification process, 
Lower Saxony was committed to provide over 4.4. billion Marks of aid to the new Land of 
Saxony-Anhalt over the four years to 1994. Given the ambivalence of the Greens to the 
whole issue of German unification, the diversion of scarce funds to the east was highly 
unpopular! This was even more the case given the growing evidence that the social safety 
net in Lower Saxony was under considerable strain. For instance, a report from the highly 
respected Eduard Pestel Instituts fur Systemforschung (ISP) estimated that, in 1989, the 
state was already short of over 100, 000 housing units and that the deficit was forecast to 
rise to 190,000 by 1994, mainly because of economic migration into Lower Saxony from 
elsewhere within the Federal Republic [HAZ. 16/04/90]. Obviously, much of the projected 
short-fall was an inevitable result of unification. However, the fact that Lower Saxony 
was already so short of flats and houses in 1989 was a result of the policies pursued by 
the outgoing administration. Indeed, even a local FDP politician - Adolf Bannier - 
admitted that the 'social component' of CDU-FDP policy had been neglected under 
Albrecht [HAZ: 12/04/90].
Nevertheless, it was the new coalition that had to deal with the situation: even though the 
means by which they could go about it had been severely restricted for political reasons. 
For instance, given the scarcity of Federal resources following unification, the bulk of 
measures to address the housing crisis would have to be self-financing. The most obvious 
tactic would have been to initiate a steep rise in public sector rent rates. This would have 
had two effects . First, it would have increased supply in the medium to long term by 
raising revenue that could have been invested into new housing stock. Second, it would
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have restricted demand over the short to medium term, by making public sector housing 
less attractive. However, the costs of such a strategy would have obviously fallen on the 
most economically vulnerable sections of society and it was politically difficult for a new 
Left-of-centre administration to adopt it. So, in the short term, the problem was fudged. 
Indeed, a rise in public sector rents that had been agreed by the previous administration 
was subsequently restricted by the new coalition. Moreover, it was decided that any 
future rent rises would be capped at no more than 30% over the period up to 1995 [HAZ. 
17/04/90].
It was not just the housing sector that was affected by the new budgetary austerity. The 
new coalition had also committed itself to providing start-up funds for a programme of 
construction of hospital facilities throughout Lower Saxony. By 1991, eleven new 
hospitals under construction with an investment of DM 110 million of state funds were 
threatened with massive delays or even cancellation because of liquidity problems [HAZ. 
30/03/91]. As the need to save money became more apparent, it was becoming harder for 
individual ministries to square the circle of available finances and manifesto commitments.
Inevitably, the debate over the coalition's first budget was bitter, with the opposition 
parties resisting the coalition's efforts to pin the blame on the previous administration. 
The centre-piece of the budget was a planned saving of DM 444 million for the following 
financial year. Not only were the planned cuts politically contestable in general terms, but 
the Land government planned to achieve a significant proportion of these savings by 
clawing back DM 130 million of public funds normally allocated to the Kommunen in 
order to offset transfers to the new Ldnder. Given that the CDU and FDP were still in 
power in many of these Kommunen, they took a dim view of such methods. Eventually, 
the CDU Fraktion walked out of the session, criticising Schroder's tough stance as 
'defamation and dishonest demagoguery* [HAZ. 18/03/91]. However, underlying the
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invective the state of Lower Saxony's finances did make depressing reading. The total 
1991 budget was DM 34.2 billion, which represented an increase of DM 1.8 billion on the 
previous year. The budget deficit for 1991 was DM 2.4 billion, which was an increase of 
DM 500 million over the previous year, which meant that the total Land debt was now 
DM 43.2 billion. The size of the state debt meant that, in 1991 alone, DM 6.2 billion 
were needed merely to pay the interest on it. This was more than the total budget of any 
individual ministry [HAZ. 16/03/91].
At the same time as the Land was trying to off-set some of the state's costs onto the 
Kommunen, its Finance Minister Hinrich Swieter (SPD) was engaged in an increasingly 
bitter fight with Bonn over Lower Saxony's share of federal structural funds. As already 
noted, Albrecht had managed to secure an annual DM 680 million of structural funds from 
the Federal government shortly before being voted out of office [FAZ. 25/2/89]. Now. 
however, Bonn needed to cut back on aid to the western Lander in order to fund the 
increasingly huge transfers to the former GDR. As a result, the DM 2.45 billion of aid ear­ 
marked for Lower Saxony up until 1988 was to be axed with only a one-off 'bridging 
payment' of 600 million Marks to shore-up the 1250 projects across the state that were 
dependant on the funding [HAZ. 06/09/91]. This led Swieter to accuse Bonn of a 'breach 
of trust' [Neue Presse. 06/09/91].
A few days later, the opposition FDP came out as unlikely allies of Swieter in his war of 
words with Bonn. Despite being implicated in the huge mountain of debt that the 
Albrecht regime had bequested to its successor, the FDP's Lower Saxony Landesv or stand 
issued a sharp critique of Federal Finance Minister Theo Waigel for reneging on the 
promise of Federal aid. Nevertheless, at the same time the FDP could not resist criticising 
the SPD and Greens for not getting spending under control [HAZ. 09/09/91 ].
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If one looked at the figures, there was some truth to the FDP's criticism. In an article in 
the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung reviewing the coalition's record after two years in 
office, it was pointed out that the coalition had enjoyed the highest gross income in the 
state's history (DM 6.2 billion) and still managed to generate new net debts of DM 6.6 
billion. In addition, the coalition had also 'plundered' DM 1.6 billion out of the state's 
reserves [HAZ. 04/05/92]. This, despite the fact that many of the coalition's manifesto 
promises remained unfulfilled.
One of the most high-profile of these promises was with regard to education. In the 
coalition agreement, the SPD and Greens committed themselves to, amongst other things, 
the creation of 600 new teaching posts, the setting up of a special fund of DM 3 million in 
order to promote autonomous parent-child groups, and a general expansion of education 
and training across the sector [SPD Niedersachsen. 1990: 30-36]. The scope of the 
coalition's promises reflected the fact that, as in Berlin (and indeed the Federal Republic as 
a whole), the Greens were especially well represented within the educational sector and 
the relevant trades unions. As in Berlin, any perceived failure to deliver within the sector 
carried with it a heavy political price.
By the summer of 1993, with less than a year before the next Land elections, teachers 
were at the forefront of an increasingly large group of public sector workers who felt 
aggrieved by the failure of the coalition to improve working conditions. The cause of the 
conflict was the plan, originally put forward by the Federal government but taken up by 
the Land governments, to increase the working week for teachers by an hour, starting in 
the academic year 1994/5. The rationale for this was that, given that everyone agreed that 
more teaching was needed, education authorities were faced with the choice of taking on 
more teachers or, alternatively, making existing employees work longer to cover any short­ 
fall. Given the relatively large social costs associated with blue- and white-collar workers
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in the Federal Republic, the latter was considered a far more cost-effective option, even 
when remuneration for the extra hour was taken into account. At the same time, it was 
proposed by Jiirgen Trittin that the status of Beamten should be removed from all but a 
nugatory core of teachers [Niedersachsiches Ministerium fur Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten. 20/06/93]. Trittin argued that, over the long term, this would 
prove to be a far more effective method of saving money as it would mean that the Land 
was less exposed to the unsustainable pension commitments associated with Beamten 
status. Under Trittin's plan, most of the Lands teachers would be employed with the 
status and rights of'public sector1 worker (Angestellte im Offentlichen Diensi).
The teachers' union GEW reacted badly to the plan to increase the working week and 
threatened strike action in the Autumn of 1993 and in the run-up to the Land elections in 
1994 [HAZ. 17/06/93]. In this, they were supported by the Greens' Landesverband, 
which issued a statement giving some support to the plan to remove the Beamten status, 
especially if it was accompanied by the introduction of a clearly defined right to strike, but 
sharply criticising the plan to lengthen the working week. Although a Green himself, 
Trittin was criticised for failing to block the plan in cabinet, at least until other methods for 
saving money had been explored [Die Griinen. Landesverband Niedersachsen. 
PressemitteilungN*. 42/6/93].
If the actions of the GEW and the Green Landesverband could be regarded as throwing 
down some form of gauntlet to the coalition, Schroder was not slow in rising to the 
challenge. Although the SPD made a point of setting up a consultation process with 
teachers' representatives across Lower Saxony, heavy briefing of journalists made it clear 
that the substance of the proposal was not negotiable: prompting a rash of headlines 
emphasising the SPD's stand against the Greens' Landesverband and their allies in the 
unions [HAZ. 11/09/93; Oldenburgische Volkszeitung. 11/09/93; Achimer Kreiszeitung.
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11/09/93; Verdener Aller-Zeitung. 11/09/93. Nordsee Zeitung 11/09/93. etc.]. What had 
started as a technical issue arising out of the inadequate state of the Land finances had, in 
the run-up to the Landtag elections in 1994, become a political trial of strength between 
Minister President Schroder's SPD and their junior partners the Greens in league with their 
public sector allies.
The profiling of issues as intra-coalition trials of strength is a recurring theme throughout 
the life of the coalition. These were inevitably within the domains of ecological themes (in 
particular the incineration of waste, waste prevention and re-cycling) which Trittin had 
identified as being potentially contentious at the outset of coalition negotiations, as well as 
with regard to industrial policy (where Schroder's stance was considerably more business 
friendly than the Greens). This was perhaps aggravated by the fact that budgetary 
restraints were inhibiting progress within those areas (training and schools, care for the 
elderly etc.) where Trittin had stated that the SPD and Greens were broadly in agreement 
[FAZ. 16/5/90].
One example of such a conflict was over the decision - taken at the beginning of 1992 - to 
build an incinerator for poisonous waste in Lower Saxony. On the advice of the Federal 
government's Technische Anleitung Abfdlle (TA, the technical directorate for waste 
disposal), the Land was advised that it should build a high-temperature incinerator to 
dispose of waste. The main advocate of such a strategy within the coalition was SPD 
Fraktionvorsitzende Johann Bruns, who stated he was 'convinced that the coalition will 
come to an agreement in the first half of this year to build a build a high temperature 
incineration facility in Lower Saxony' [Ostfriesische Nachtrichten. 10/01/92].
It will be recalled that the subject of incineration was a source of controversy during the 
process of coalition negotiations, with one of the first joint announcements of the two
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parties being a condemnation of the decision of the (SPD-governed) state of North Rhine- 
Westphalia to allow waste to be burned in industrial incinerators. Not only did the Greens 
fail to secure the Environment ministry for themselves, but the SPD's candidate Monika 
Griefahn refused to completely rule out the possibility of installing high-temperature 
incinerators [HAZ. 291 5/90].
Given that, for the Greens, any form of incineration was undesirable, Bruns' declaration 
was greeted with dismay. The thought that Bruns' might have been deliberately provoking 
the Greens in to some form of over-reaction did not seem to occur to them. The same day. 
the Green Landesvorstand issued a press release condemning Bruns' and stating:
The Greens are convinced of the fact that such a decision will not be taken 
at this time. The coalition agreement clearly anticipates that priority will be 
given to a programme of waste avoidance, and the Greens will be pushing 
strongly for this over the next months. 
[Die Grunen Landesverband Niedersachsen. Pressemitteilung Nr. 60/1/92].
A more detailed account of the Vermeidung und Verwertung programme is given in 
Chapter Seven. In the context of this chapter, however, the issue illustrates how certain 
political themes took on a symbolic importance as a litmus test of coalition management. 
For instance, the dispute over the planned incinerator prompted a revealing comment by 
Johann Bruns, when he declared that the previous year (1991) had been one of 'political 
innovation', but that now the priority had to be 'consolidation' [Ostfriesen Zeitung. 
11/01/92]. In this, the SPD was tacking back towards the political centre.
No doubt, this was partly in response to a sequence of electoral reverses for the SPD in 
North Germany. For instance, on the 7 October 1991 - just a week after the Bremen SPD
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had suffered heavy losses in the state elections - the Lower Saxony SPD suffered a 
significant loss of support in the mid-term Kommunalwahl. The SPD scored 39.7%, a 
percentage point down on the previous Kommunalwahl in 1986 but 5% down on their 
vote-share in the Landtag elections the previous year. By contrast, the Greens polled 
6.4%, up a percentage point from 1986 and 1990. Of the opposition parties, the CDU 
scored 43.9% (still down from their 1986 score but up almost two percentage points on 
the Landtagswahl) and the FDP scored 6.5% (up on 1986 and 1990 and higher than the 
Greens despite their gains) [HAZ. 07/10/91 ].
For the SPD, the results boded ill for the Landtagswahl in 1994. The Social Democrats 
had lost support to both the CDU and the SPD, whilst the success of the Greens meant 
that it could not be written off as 'mid-term1 blues. It was clear that the party had to 
regain the political initiative from both the opposition and its political allies in the 
coalition. Given the nature of the SPD (and Gerhard Schroder's political instincts in 
particular), the party assumed a more centrist and populist tone.
Another political theme that enabled the SPD to profile itself was the much maligned 
EXPO 2000, due to take place in Hannover's huge exhibition and conference complex. The 
original decision to hold the exhibition in the Lower Saxony state capital had been taken in 
1989, under the previous Albrecht regime and before the collapse of the GDR. The new 
coalition had inherited the plan, with all the costs that came with it, but were not at one 
with regard to how they would proceed. Significant elements within the Greens advocated 
cancelling the project completely and using the money saved elsewhere.
There was some merit to this argument, given the huge pressure on resources in order to 
not only finance the coalition's policy commitments but also the massive transfers to the 
new Lander. However, the Greens' objections were not merely pragmatic but also
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ideological. As with those projects designed to re-establish Berlin's reputation as a 
Weltmetropol (such as the German Historical Museum) which were opposed by the city's 
AL, the Lower Saxony Greens' objections were also motivated by an atavistic dislike of big 
capital-intensive prestige projects per se. This combination of practical and ideological 
objections is captured by a press statement released by the Greens' Landesverband at the 
beginning of 1992, which stated inter alia:
The Lower Saxony Greens agree with their neighbouring state party 
organisation in Saxony Anhalt, that the urgently important comprehensive 
ecological development in the five new states is not realisable through 
prestige projects informed by the 'faster-higher-further ideology'. In short, 
cancel the EXPO and invest the resources in a programme of ecological 
structural development in the five new states 
[Die Griinen Landesverband Niedersachsen. Pressemitteilung Nr. 61/1/92.]
Unlike the Greens, the SPD was torn between cancelling or continuing the EXPO. On the 
one hand, as in Berlin, it saw the attraction of transferring the resources to other (and more 
immediate) projects. There were economic benefits in going ahead as well (especially with 
regard to employment prospects within the construction industry), but they were more 
diffuse and mainly in the medium-term. However, as mainstream politicians, senior Social 
Democrats also appreciated the popularity and prestige that such projects can bring and 
saw the advantages in being associated with it in the public mind. Nevertheless, as the 
originators of the whole EXPO project, the CDU were also keen for EXPO to go ahead. 
The trick, therefore, was for the SPD to come up with a strategy that distanced itself from 
its coalition allies, did not allow the CDU to claim a victory either and most importantly, 
allowed the party to keep its options open.
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The answer was a referendum of the citizens of Hannover on the subject of should there or 
should there not be an EXPO. Under pressure from the SPD - and against the wishes of 
its Landesvorstand - the Greens in the parliamentary Fraktion grudgingly accepted the 
idea of a referendum as a way out of what had become an impasse. The idea had the added 
attraction for the Land government in that it was ostensibly taking place at the Kommunal 
level in the city of Hannover, which allowed them to distance themselves from the 
process. Given that he was on record as being opposed to such referenda, Gerhard 
Schroder wasted little time in doing so, declaring that although he was not disturbed by the 
prospect of such a referendum, it 'was not really his theme, but something for which the 
communal politicians in Hannover had to be held responsible for' [HAZ. 16/01/92]. The 
referendum was arranged for some time in the first two weeks of the July of 1992.
The SPD's strategy worked on two levels, in order to shore-up moderate support amongst 
the voters of Lower Saxony. First, the logistics of the EXPO continued to go ahead, 
including a promise of financial support form the Federal Government in Bonn, as part of 
a framework agreement on the exhibition. This was a triumph for Schroder as the state's 
Landesvater, especially as, only the previous December, Finance Minister Theo Waigel 
had cast doubt on the possibility of an aid package from the Bund [HAZ. 02/12/91]. 
Second, it served to distance the SPD from the abstentionist stance of the Greens. In their 
Landesparteitag in Hildesheim at the end of March 1992, the Greens' Basis reacted in 
predictable fashion. A motion from the floor rejecting the whole idea of EXPO 2000, on 
the grounds of it being contrary to the coalition agreement, was passed unanimously 
[Nordsee Zeitung. 30/03/92]. The conference also rejected Johann Bruns' plan for a high 
temperature incinerator, which was still a highly contentious issue within the coalition. 
Indeed, what is noticeable about press reports from this period of the coalition is the 
degree to which the two issues were linked by the Greens as being evidence of the 
treachery of the SPD, with calls for a withdrawal form the coalition. This was resisted by
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the more realistic members of the Greens, such as Chairperson Thea Duckert, who pleaded 
that it would be 'foolhardiness' to focus the entire issue of continuing the coalition on the 
one issue [HAZ. 31/03/92]. Nevertheless, that the issue of continuing the coalition was 
already so openly discussed was evidence of the process of distancing between the two 
parties in the second half of the life of the coalition.
Despite the growing tension within the coalition, at the level of national political debate. 
Minister President Gerhard Schroder was still an enthusiast for the whole concept of 'Red- 
Green1 political co-operation. This was in marked contrast to Walter Momper, whose 
experiences in Berlin had left him bitter and disillusioned with the Greens. Indeed, 
Momper went as far as to call the Red-Green coalition an 'exhausted model', a phrase that 
was picked-up by CDU politicians in Lower Saxony such as their candidate for Minister 
President Christian Wulff [HAZ. 05.05/93].
The differences in the two approaches was partly a reflection of the comparatively 
successful process of coalition maintenance in Lower Saxony. However, Schroder's 
continuing advocacy of the 'Red-Green' idea per se coincided with a period of speculation 
that he might be adopted as the SPD's chancellor-candidate, following the resignation of 
Bjorn Engholm in 1993 63 . In this context, the continued success of the coalition was an 
asset, especially given that it was generally accepted within the SPD that the party had to 
find new sources of electoral support if it was to have any hope of returning to Bonn as a
63Engholm was the Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein. . He was a member of the Bundestag from 
1969 to 1982 and Minister for Training (Bundesbildungsminister) in the Social-Liberal coalition from 1981 
to 1982. In his home state, he became a member of the Landtag in 1983 and became leader of the SPD 
grouping in 1988. In the same year, he became Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein. Following 
Oskar Lafontaine's failure to unseat Helmut Kohl in the 1990 Bundestag elections, Engholm became SPD 
leader and provisional Chancellor-candidate in 1991. However, following revelations that he had lied over 
aspects of the 'Barschel affair' in Schleswig-Holstein, Engholm stood down form his post and was replaced 
by Rudolf Scharping. He is no longer a major figure within the SPD.
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(hopefully senior) member of the Federal Government. In an interview with the down­ 
market tabloid Neue Presse, Schroder stated:
/ -will give you some idea of how I would imagine the 1994 election 
campaign: the toppling of the Kohl government. I have made it very clear, 
that in my opinion this is only possible in a Red-Green constellation. 
[Neue Presse. 04/05/93].
It was clear that Schroder was not speaking for the national SPD at the time. However, 
within a day of Schroder's interview it was apparent that his opinion was not even 
universally held within his own party in Lower Saxony. Land Party Chairperson Johann 
Bruns issued a press statement criticising any 'commitment' by Schroder to a Red-Green 
coalition at the national level, saying that it 'wasn't very helpful' [HAZ. 05/05/93]. Bruns' 
comments are interesting for two reasons. First, it gives one an insight into the nature of 
intra-party power relationships within the Lower Saxony SPD. What is clear from this is 
that Schroder was under pressure from elements within his own party who were not as 
relaxed about co-operating with the Greens as he was. Second, it casts light on inter-party 
power relationships within the coalition. In particular, Bruns' provocation of the Greens 
over the matter of the high temperature reactor and the need to make 1992 'a year of 
consolidation' begin to appear to be part of a pattern of resistance to both Schroder as a 
coalition manager and the Greens as coalition partners.
Of course, the Greens had their own share of resistors. At their Landesparteitag in June 
1993 at Osnabriick, the Greens launched a number of bitter attacks on their coalition 
partners, particularly Schroder and Monika Griefahn. These attacks were immediately 
dismissed by the SPD as nothing more than early electoral manoeuvring on behalf of the 
Greens [HAZ. 08/06/93]. Yet this was not really the case, given that the attacks covered a 
wide range of coalition policies, including the environment, asylum policy and schooling.
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and were primarily from the Greens' Basis (who were far more concerned with Green 
shibboleths than with acquiring an early electoral advantage). Indeed, prominent 
politicians from the Green Fraktion were relatively positive about the coalition. For 
instance, Trittin echoed Schroder's claim that only a Red-Green coalition could topple 
Kohl's government in Bonn, although he ruled out any co-operation with the FDP at either 
Land or Bund level [HAZ. 07/06/93].
However, although both sides were still keen to continue the coalition, by the time of the 
Osnabruck Landesparteitag, politicians of every ideological colour were becoming 
increasingly pre-occupied with the forthcoming elections in 1994. In the Federal Republic, 
there was going to be a busy year of state and local elections (17 in all), culminating in the 
European elections in June and the national elections to the Bundestag in October. As 
result, 1994 was already known as Superwahljahr, with the more senior Lower Saxony 
politicians (and especially Schroder) expecting to play a major role in at least three 
elections. Of course, the first hurdle was the Landtagswahl on 13 March and, in 
consequence, polling of the state's electorate took on a new salience.
It has to be remembered that the 1994 election would be fought under somewhat different 
economic circumstances than that of 1990. Whilst the 1990 elections were fought at the 
top of the economic cycle (which the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the GDR had 
stoked up into a national economic boom), the 1994 elections were to be fought in the 
midst of a recession. Given the more straightened economic circumstances, the public 
mood had shifted somewhat away from 'post- materialist' themes such as the environment, 
towards 'bread and butter issues', such as unemployment. Nevertheless, polling showed 
that politicians of the Left had to steer a fine line between materialist and post-materialist 
concerns. For instance, a six-month time series analysis of opinion in Lower Saxony, 
carried out in the first half of 1993 by a private polling organisation, showed that
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unemployment was identified as the biggest problem facing the state, with 17% of those 
polled citing it. Within the total, it was clear that blue-collar worker (23%) and/or SPD 
voters (20%) were most likely to identify it as the biggest problem. On the other hand, 
there seemed to be a clear tendency across almost all social groups towards pessimism 
when asked if they expected their own economic circumstances to get better or worse over 
the next year (with a ratio of more than 2:1 amongst blue-collar workers).
However, the next most important issue was still the environment (7%). followed by the 
economy (6%, but with an upward trend towards the end of the series), the asylum issue 
and politics in general (5%), the housing crisis (4%), EXPO 2000 and fear of foreigners 
(3%). Only 2% of those polled cited education, public borrowing or foreigners as 
problems. However, the most striking thing - and this is highlighted in the executive 
summary to the report - was the huge number of those polled who said there was no 
problem that they could think of (39%). Such a large amount of essentially satisfied (or 
apathetic) voters was also reflected in generally good approval ratings for Schroder and the 
coalition parties. For instance, Schroder's approval ratings (ranked along a scale from +5 
to -5) stayed in the positive throughout the period, with his approval rating double that of 
his CDU rival Christian Wulff. Finally, the SPD led the CDU by a clear margin (47% to 
34%), with the Greens (9%) well ahead of the FDP (5%). Moreover, the SPD's 
popularity compared with that of the CDU grew over the course of the series [FORSA. 
gesellschaft fur Sozialforschung und statistiche Analysen mbH. 1993: 1-14].
Given these polling figures, the coalition appeared to be set fair for the next Landtag 
elections. However, if one was a Green strategist, one might be forgiven for wishing that 
the SPD was a little less popular. For a politician as shrewd as Schroder could not help 
but realise that, given a fair wind, 47% or thereabouts of the vote in the next Landtagswahl 
could well deliver the Lower Saxony SPD a working majority in the Landtag. This was
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because the 5% electoral barrier to representation might, on the strength of these opinion 
poll figures, deny the FDP any seats in the Landtag. This would leave three parties (the 
SPD, CDU and Greens) in the legislature. Given that a coalition between the CDU and 
Greens was unlikely to say the least, the SPD might be able to govern alone if the sums 
added up on election night.
Nevertheless, the election was still a year away and the SPD still had a lot of work to do in 
order to secure such a majority. Given that it would be hard to imagine the CDU's 
support being driven down any further and bearing in mind the demographic evidence 
about the size of Left-leaning support amongst the electorate, any further political capital 
would quite conceivably have to be won at the expense of the Greens.
Of course, one can only speculate as to what calculations were made by the parties in the 
run-up to the 1994 elections. However, what is clear is that the last year of the coalition 
was characterised by a rash of intra-coalition disputes which served to profile those areas 
of policy which had the potential to be contentious. Moreover, to some extent they all 
carried an ideological charge, with a (sometimes explicit) trade-off between quality of life 
issues such as the environment and so-called 'bread and butter' issues (i.e. jobs and 
investment).
The common approach to environmental policy began to unravel in October 1993, when 
Schroder officially approved the so-called 'Europipe' project. The project involved the 
laying of a gas pipeline from the North Sea Oil and Gas fields to the Federal Republic. 
The project was to be built by the Norwegian Shipping Engineering Company Statoil, who 
planned to invest DM. 3.3. billion into the project. Obviously, such a huge investment 
would have a beneficial effect on the depressed local economy of the North Sea coast and 
beyond. However, the project had been resisted by the Greens on ecological grounds, not
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least that the pipeline ran through the Nationalpark Wattenmeer, a unique and delicate 
habitat of mud flats. The pipeline was planned to come on-line in October 1995.
Although the actual decision was taken by the local planning office in Claustal-Zellerfeld. 
no-one doubted that Schroder's hand had been in the decision. As Gila Altmann, the 
Greens' press spokesperson, put it:
.... It has nothing to do with a bureaucratic act by art office, but rather is
about the political will of the Minister President - its a black day for
environmental politics in Lower Saxony.
[Bundnis 90/Die Griinen Landesverband Niedersachsen Geschaftsstelle.
PressemitteilungNr. 85/10/93.]
Two other thorns of contention were the 'Eurofighter' debate and the scandal over the 
Atomic reactor at Stade. The decision of the Land to support the policy of securing jobs in 
the state, through such pump-priming measures as supporting the role of the DASA (the 
Daimler-Benz aerospace division had a factory in the Lower Saxony town of Lemwerder 
which was threatened with closure) in the multi-national Eurofighter project enraged the 
Greens. For the SPD, such high-tech projects were essential in order to maintain Lower 
Saxony's industrial base, but for many in the Greens, such projects represented the 
military-industrial complex at its worst. A decision, taken in the same period of time, by 
Monika Griefahn to cut short the safety audit of the nuclear power station at Stade64 . 
rather than shut it down as originally envisaged, only served to rub salt into the wound and 
was taken as a signal that the SPD was deliberately trying to provoke their coalition 
partners. At the same time, the Greens were aware that the SPD had more coalition
64See Chapter Seven on the Kernenegieausstiegsbeirat.
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options than they. Nevertheless, attitudes began to harden. In an interview with the 
magazine Bild in November 1993, Andrea Hoops, the Greens' Spitzenkandidat for the up­ 
coming elections pointed out that, despite the obvious successes of the coalition (45,000 
new nursery places; 60,000 new flats etc.), there was a limit to the party's patience with 
their Social Democratic allies. 'We are not going to run after the SPD!\ she declared [Bild. 
22/11/93].
The Greens' Landesparteitag in Aurich that month allowed the Basis to voice their 
displeasure at these projects. The Eurofighter project was particularly resented, with calls 
for the project to be cancelled and the money spent on developing more environmentally- 
friendly forms of civil aviation. With regard to the Stade nuclear reactor, delegates pinned 
the blame for the reversal of policy squarely on Monika Griefahn. Rage at Griefahn now 
had an added venom, given that she was no longer ostensibly independent from either 
party, but had joined the SPD. Thus, what the Greens regarded as political 
disappointments in the environmental field, such as within the fields of nuclear policy and 
waste disposal, were laid at the door of their Social Democratic allies [Suddeutsche 
Zeitung. 22/11/93; TAZ. 22/11/93].
Schroder was not slow in responding in kind to these attacks. The following day, he gave 
an interview to the broad-sheet Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, in which he declared 
that Greens 'did not understand how serious the economic crisis was' and that the SPD 
was only prepared to co-operate with politicians whose first priority was the preservation 
of jobs. As a result, Schroder declared, the SPD now regarded the continuation of the 
coalition after the March elections as the second-best option. For the SPD, the aim was 
now to win an absolute majority in the Landtag [HAZ. 23/11/93]. This was taken up by 
SPD Landesvorsitzende Johann Bruns, who said that, in his opinion, the Greens had not 
been able to reconcile their instinct for fundamentalist opposition, with what he called the
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'urge for office and political influence'. Although he saw no alternative to the coalition 
before the Landtag elections, Bruns also stated his preference for an absolute majority for 
the SPD in the next legislative period [Braunschweiger Zeitung. 23/11/93].
The gloves were now off and the Greens found themselves on the receiving end of some 
sustained criticism. Underlying this debate was the feeling that the Greens were not able 
to come to terms with the new realities of post-unification Germany, particularly the more 
straightened economic circumstances. If any future coalition with the Greens was to take 
place, the SPD demanded a new realism on the part of their partners. In an interview with 
the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung the following month, Johann Bruns stated that the 
Greens would have to accept that the preservation and creation of jobs sometimes took 
precedence over environmental considerations. He pointed to the long litany of projects 
that the Greens had opposed over the life of the coalition. These included the Europipe 
project, the Mercedes test-track at Papenburg (Schroder had been personally involved in 
its transfer from Baden-Wurrtemberg to Lower Saxony) and the dredging of the Ems in 
order to make it deep enough for the super-liner Oriana to pass through after it was built. 
Bruns declared that the Greens would have to accept that projects of this type would 
inevitably take place in the future, because economic policy was going to be the most 
important task in the next few years and the SPD would only co-operate with those who 
were prepared to help [HAZ. 16/12/93].
Others went further than Bruns was prepared to go. The previous month, an editorial in 
the same paper had suggested that a Grand Coalition was more desirable than a 
continuation of the Red-Green option, because Schroder and CDU Fraktionsvorsitzende 
Jiirgen Gansauer understood the need to preserve the state's industrial base. The editorial 
scorned the antics of the Greens' Basis at their conference a few days earlier, stating:
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Whoever now ...uses the economic crisis solely in order to politically profile 
themselves four months before the election is not fit to govern. In this 
context, the Greens have simply already excluded themselves from the 
coalition as a serious partner. 
[HAZ. 25/11/93].
Given the populist instincts of Schroder, the accusation of political opportunism was a 
little unfair. Nevertheless, the Greens were in trouble politically. As the new year came 
around, polls still put the SPD on course for a possible majority after the Landtagswahl. 
Moreover, the Greens were doing badly and looked set to lose support. In January 1994, 
the Greens' Spitzenkandidaten Andrea Hoops undertook a series of interviews with the 
press, in which she defended the Greens' record in government and set out their stall for 
the elections and beyond. She stated that the presence of the Greens had 'added some 
backbone and innovation' to the coalition. For instance, nearly all the legal frameworks 
which governed such areas as education, nature protection, policing and the security and 
intelligence services had been modified. However, she professed to be unhappy with the 
record of Monika Griefahn's Environment Ministry and saw the issuing of that portfolio 
to the Greens as the sine qua non of any future coalition with the SPD. Moreover. Hoops 
saw the Greens main task for the Landtagswahl as preventing the SPD from gaining an 
absolute majority. This was essential if Schroder was to be prevented from nurturing his 
'authoritarian style' still further over the next four years [Cellesche Zeitung. 28/01/94; Bild. 
02/02/94].
For all her fighting talk, Hoops was not arguing from a position of strength. Not only was 
her party languishing in the polls, but the Fraktion itself was now split between those 
who wanted to continue co-operating with the SPD and those who wanted to embark on a
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more confrontational course. Moreover, even those Greens who had been well-disposed 
towards the SPD now realised that the SPD had manoeuvred them in to an impossible 
position. Jiirgen Trittin was on record as saying that the Schroder's emphasis on bread and 
butter issues, which had started the previous Autumn was more than just a political tactic 
in the run-up to the election. He saw it as a profound change of emphasis, especially on 
the part of Gerhard Schroder. Trittin had spent much of the last four years defending 
Schroder, Griefahn and the Red-Green coalition in general against the more paranoid 
suspicions of the Greens' Basis. However, now he said defiantly 'the biggest enemy of the 
Red-Green Land government is the Minister President' [HAZ. 19/02/94]. For all intents 
and purposes, the coalition was at an end.
On Sunday the 13 March 1994, the citizens of Lower Saxony went to the polls to elect a 
new Landtag. The SPD polled 44.3% of the vote, giving them 80 of the 159 seats (an 
overall majority of one). The Greens did better than expected, polling 7.4% (up almost 
2% on their 1990 showing). The CDU was down almost six percentage points at 36.4%, 
whilst the FDP (4.4%) failed to enter the new Landtag [Statistisches Amt Niedersachsens}. 
Schroder's instincts had been proved correct.
It was Schroder's triumph and he was now firmly entrenched as the Lower Saxony 
Landesvater. His coalition had survived the full term through some difficult economic 
circumstances. Moreover, despite intra-party conflicts, both coalition partners had 
improved their vote share at the expense of their opponents on the Right. Nevertheless, 
the Greens were now consigned to the opposition benches, having failed in their stated 
objective of preventing the SPD gaining an absolute majority.
Having endured so much criticism from a Green party that regarded the Environment 
portfolio as theirs by right, the last word must go to Monika Griefhan. At 18.50 hours on
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Sunday 13 March, with the exit polls indicating an SPD victory, she turned to a journalist 
working for the tabloid Neue Presse and declared that 'the SPD can also make very good 
Green policy without the Greens' [Neue Presse. 14/03/94].
5.6. Resume of Chapter Five
The chapter examined the political history of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony 
between 1990 and 1994, structured sequentially into four sections. The first section (5.2.) 
looked at the relationship between the parties leading up to the 1990 Landtag elections 
and concluded that there was a de facto two-bloc party system in Lower Saxony by the 
time of the 1990 elections. Moreover, this was understood to be the case by both the 
parties and the electorate. Although the Lower Saxony Greens' ideological profile had been 
quite extreme in the 1980s, by 1990 they had moderated their stance a great deal and were 
relatively pragmatic, compared with many other Green Landesverbdnde. Indeed, instead 
of showing suspicion of the Social Democrats, they had declared their enthusiasm for co­ 
operation with the SPD before the Landtag elections. For its part, many in the Lower 
Saxony SPD were by inclination suspicious of the Greens. However, Gerhard Schroder 
was well-disposed towards them and managed to bring his party with him. The fact that 
the FDP had ruled out defecting from the CDU to the SPD also made undecided Social 
Democrats more receptive to the idea of a Red-Green coalition.
Section 5.3. then compared the party programmes of the four parties in the bargaining set. 
As in Berlin, it concluded that the Lower Saxony CDU were socially-conservative and 
relatively authoritarian, whilst the Greens were New Left and libertarian in their outlook. 
The FDP was somewhat less authoritarian than the CDU but very pro-market. As in
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Berlin, the SPD displayed elements of both ideological stances within its election 
literature, which meant that it was able to bargain with any party if it so wished. Again, 
no other party was in that position. In terms of discursive form, the Lower Saxony 
Greens were far less polemical in their election literature than the Berlin AL. Chapter 
Eight examines how their election pledges translated into programmatic and institutional 
innovation.
Section 5.4. described the process of post-election bargaining following the Landtag 
elections. It demonstrated that it was the SPD that held most of the cards during the 
bargaining process, because of its ideological stance and because of its share of the seats. 
However, the SPD's strength was not as strongly reflected in its numerical share of cabinet 
portfolios. The chapter concluded that this was due to the fact that the Greens did better 
numerically because they were denied the Environment Ministry. In other words, a trade­ 
off was made between policy-oriented and office-seeking payoffs.
Finally, section 5.5. gave an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in 
office. It looked at some of the more salient political themes impacting on the coalition 
and examined their impact upon the process of coalition maintenance. Although the 
coalition lasted a full term, it is possible to discern an analogue of Heinrich's three phases if 
one so wished.
The 'honeymoon period' lasted longer that in Berlin: arguably until the beginning of 1992. 
when Bruns floated the idea that the Land would build a high temperature solid waste 
incinerator after all. Certainly, his calls for an end to 'political innovation' and a period of 
'consolidation' [Ostfriesen Zeitung. 11/01/92] must have alarmed the Greens. The second 
phase, characterised by a slow break-down in trust between the two parties, lasted from 
early 1992 until mid-1993. Issues like the row over the teachers' working week and EXPO
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2000 gradually eroded good will on both sides. The third phase, in which both parties 
were effectively estranged from one another, lasted from mid-1993 until the Landtag 
elections the following year. However, unlike in Berlin, it is not evident that there were 
'two parties governing next to and against each other, with no joint strategy to follow' 
[Heinrich, 1993: 39]. On the contrary, from the time that opinion polls indicated that the 
SPD could achieve an overall majority in the summer of 1993, everything that Schroder did 
can be explained in terms of forcing the Greens into a corner whilst winning moderate 
support from the centre. Schroder's re-profiling of himself as a job-creating Landesvater 
was the action of a consummate political strategist. The rows over the Europipe project, 
the Mercedes test-track at Papenburg and the dredging of the Ems for the super-liner 
Oriana were all means to this political end.
As in Berlin, the underlying economic weakness of Lower Saxony (and its impact upon the 
city's budget) contributed to the coalition's slow decline as did, to a lesser extent, the 
upheaval of November 1989, which led to resources being transferred away to the 'New' 
Ldnder. However, as in Berlin the bulk of the coalition's problems were self-inflicted. 
Again, the disciplines of everyday government clashed with the more Utopian views of the 
Lower Saxony Greens' Basis, as demonstrated by the hostile resolutions of their 
conferences. Similarly, for the SPD, the pull to the Left was countered by the resistance 
of its more authoritarian Right-wing. As the 1994 elections came closer, the Right's 
influence grew as the temptation to tack back towards the centre became overwhelming.
Once more, the coalition parties fell out over issues that perfectly encompassed these 
tensions. This time the influence of big business was flagged by EXPO 2000. the 
Europipe affair and another Daimler-Benz row (over the test-track at Papenburg). whilst 
the tensions between fiscal rectitude and social provision were evident in the row over the 
teachers' working week. Again, there were the 'Green' shibboleths, this time over high
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temperature incinerators and nuclear power (for example Stade, in both instances). 
However, after the troubles of 1980s, there were no real problems regarding the ambiguity 
of many Greens towards private property and the state monopoly on violence, with both 
parties supporting reforms of the security services. Moreover, one cannot compare 
Gerhard Schroder's handling of the Lower Saxony coalition with Walter Momper's in 
Berlin. Despite his political manoeuvrings, the author was struck by how popular 
Schroder remained with many Greens, whilst, within the Lower Saxony SPD, his position 
was unassailable. Indeed, at the time of writing, he is well placed to be appointed the 
SPD's Chancellor-candidate for the 1998 Bundestag elections.
When combined with the analysis of the institutional environment within which Red- 
Green coalitions were formed (Chapter Two) and the wider historical context of such 
coalitions (Chapter Three), the chapter serves to establish a contextual base from which to 
look at selected issues of programmatic and institutional innovation in Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER SIX: PROGRAMMATIC AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN BERLIN
6.1. Preamble
The purpose of this chapter (and Chapter Seven) is to examine in greater depth the degree 
to which Red-Green coalitions were able to break down the established hierarchies within 
the policy-making process in their respective Lander. The need for brevity rules out a 
comprehensive review of all areas of the policy-making process. Therefore, this chapter 
examines a selection of programmatic and institutional innovations carried out within the 
field of environmental policy in Berlin. These are :
• The Berlin Energy Law (Energiegesetze) of 2 October 1990
• The Berlin Energy Advisory Council (Energiebeirat)
• The Berlin 'Energy Concept1 (Energiekonzept Berlin)
The two chapters are part of the policy-oriented strand of the thesis. As such, its scope is 
informed by the 'policy networks' idiom (see Chapter One). Therefore, the chapter will 
build upon Katzenstein's [1987] 'three nodes' of the policy network and concentrate upon 
three types of agency:
• Political parties
• Tiers of multi-level governance (the Bund, Lander and Kommunen)
• NGOs
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The three examples of programmatic and institutional innovation are all linked thematically 
and looked at chronologically. The chapter first looks at the Berlin Energy Law. The 
introduction to the Energy Law stated its intention to 'promote the most conservationally- 
minded, rational, socially and environmentally sustainable....production and utilisation of 
energy....through the ....rational relationship with energy and the engagement of renewable 
energy' [Section One, Paragraphs One and Two]. To this end, the coalition set out to 
create an Energy Advisory Council which would give advice on technical problems and 
best practice within the field. The end result of such advice would be the codification of a 
new Energy Concept for Berlin, the aim of which was to provide a holistic approach to 
sustainable energy provision, consumption and preservation in the city. Apart from 
describing some of the policy measures introduced, the chapter sets out to determine the 
nature of the policy network prior to the these innovations, the degree to which this 
involved the opening-up of the policy network during the life of the coalition and, given its 
relative brevity, beyond.
However, it first looks at some of the inherent problems associated with policy- 
implementation in Berlin as they confronted the Red-Green coalition. Three important 
points are looked at. First, the degree to which West Berlin's unique Geo.-political 
position at the time impacted upon the city's political economy. Second, the degree to 
which Berlin's polarised party system constrained policy-implementation by the coalition. 
In particular, the chapter looks at the AL's ideological profile and discursive form, 
resistance from producer groups and other NGOs and the attitude of the civil service 
(including problems of staffing ministries). Third, the chapter assesses the degree to which 
the coalition's policies represented continuity or change in terms of their use of economic 
instruments when taken in the round, in preparation for a closer look at some of the 
specifics of programmatic and institutional innovation.
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6.2. Inherent Problems of Policy-Implementation In Berlin
At the time of the January 1989 municipal elections in West Berlin, it was clear that, by 
any objective criteria, the city was confronted by a number of serious economic and 
environmental problems. These stemmed from both the peculiar geographical position of 
Berlin as well as its internal economy and structure.
Since the beginning of the cold war, the city's links with its immediate surroundings had 
been constrained by the Berlin Wall. This meant that everything from transport and 
energy provision to waste disposal and pollution control had developed in a somewhat 
fractured and ad-hoc basis. The city was dependent upon the co-operation of the German 
Democratic Republic yet unintegrated with it (for obvious reasons), whilst politically tied 
to the Federal Republic, yet geographically distant. The city was subject to (indeed, its 
own status often aggravated) the prevailing state of inter-German relations, so that such 
agreements that existed were primarily concerned with trade and travel and operated 
within quite rigid parameters. Moreover, the German Democratic Republic's own 
environmental record was appalling and the effects of this, particularly its debilitating 
reliance upon brown coal, were directly felt in West Berlin in the form of its own forced 
over-reliance upon brown coal and severe particulate air pollution (manifesting itself in 
frequent smog alarms during the winter months).
These external constraints contributed to the relative economic weakness of the West 
Berlin economy and the often poor state of its own environment. The obvious need to 
ecologically modernise the economy was not only recognised by the Alternative Liste but 
also by the mainstream parties. Thus, although the SPD was still constrained by the 
traditional materialist discourse and saw the maintenance of jobs as equally important, 
there was some commonalty with the Greens about the problems the city faced.
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With regard to specific problem areas, both parties identified in their election literature the 
most pressing areas of environmental concern as those of waste disposal, housing. 
transport and energy policy. However, as would be expected, the AL's proposals were 
more radical and less concerned with the impact of their policy proposals upon economic 
growth and employment. Indeed, their election literature carried an implicit rejection of 
growth as an economic objective per se. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Four, all their 
proposals were embedded in what can be described as a 'non-administrative1 discourse that 
was almost evangelical in style but lacked policy detail65 . This polemical style provides 
some contrast with the more measured and specific proposals put forward by the SPD 
[SPD Landesverband Berlin 1988: 9].
However, three points have to be considered when making this comparison, which apply 
to the Lower Saxony case as well. First, as the Greens in Germany are not a 'deep green' 
party but rather a left-libertarian/'New Polities' party (albeit with a strong ecological 
component within their ideological profile) environmental policy is not dealt with as a 
discreet self-standing policy area but rather is often subsumed into a more far-reaching 
discourse about the nature of power within society and between society and the exogenous 
universe. Second, given that the Greens contain such disparate elements, they have been 
more effective when playing a 'mobilising' role for 'green' issues than when dealing with 
specifics. This was not only because gaining office was less of an immediate priority, but 
also because until recently conflicts between the various strands of party thought soon 
became apparent when dealing with specifics. In other words, the party agreed more 
about what it was against than the nature of the society it was actually working towards
6$ For instance, in the AL's main election pamphlet, the party's ecological proposals are summed up 
within a few lines of polemic: 'Ecology must take precedence over short-term economic interests. We need 
less consumption of raw materials and energy, [more] decontamination, less refuse, less traffic, less 
noise, less concrete and therefore more public transport, more ecological raw materials, more green, 
more free-time, more responsibility and more democracy ......... money should be spent on proposals that
are made with regard to ecological and social criteria.' [Alternative Lisle Berlin 1989: 3].
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[Scharf, 1994; Hulsberg, 1988; Markovits and Gorski 1993 etc.]. Finally, given the 
Greens' 'outsider1 status and their relatively non-hierarchical structure, they lacked the 
policy-making resources of the established parties described earlier and had to rely upon 
outside expertise [see Poguntke, 1989 for instance]. Thus, policy-formulation processes 
did exist; but in a more decentralised and less visible fashion than within the SPD. In the 
West Berlin case for instance, the AL were able to harness the rich pool of environmental 
expertise centred around the city's universities (in particular the Free University). In 
short, if one was to use Rhodes' [1986a] typology, the Greens only had access to an 'Issue 
Network' (characterised by a number of participants, a limited degree of interdependence 
and a relatively atomised structure), albeit a reasonably well established one.
The coalition took office to a mixed reception from West Berlin's intermediary 
organisations. Opposition from employers' organisations - as in the previous coalition 
experiment in Hesse - took the form of dire warnings of 'red-green chaos' and a further 
deterioration in the city's economic circumstances. However, it is interesting to note that 
the outcry from employers lacked the vitriolic edge that greeted the appointment of 
Joschka Fischer as Environment Minister in Hesse (see Chapter Three)66 . One reason 
why this was less the case in West Berlin was because Langmann's threats had rapidly 
been exposed as essentially empty and ineffective in Hesse [Grant, Paterson and 
Whitston, 1988: 253] and perhaps also an early indicator that the Greens were becoming 
marginally less stigmatised within the German polity. Essentially, the employers took a 
'wait and see' attitude, possibly reflecting the wide-spread belief, articulated by CDU 
leader (and former Governing-Mayor) Eberhard Diepgen, that the coalition would soon 
collapse under its own internal contradictions [TAZ. 02/02/89].
66in that instance, there had been explicit threats of disinvestment in the state from Dr. Joachim Langmann 
of Merck, then president of the employers' umbrella organisation the BDI (see Chapter Three).
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Equally predictably - but from the SPD's point of view more worrying - was the reaction 
of the local trades unions to the new coalition. The traditionally right-wing unions, such as 
the construction workers' union (7G BSE), displayed outright hostility to the idea of a 
Red-Green coalition, whilst the education and science union (GEW), which also had quite 
strong links with the AL (Schools' Minister Sybille Volkholz had been a union official) 
was far more sympathetic to the idea. As usual, there was a marked correlation between 
the stance of individual unions, the producer interests they represented and the priority 
given to certain areas of policy by the new coalition! 67
Amongst the permanent civil service, attitudes towards the new coalition were also mixed. 
The established political parties staffed a high proportion of civil service posts (see 
Chapter Two) and, given the eight-year incumbency of the previous administration, it was 
to be assumed that a significant proportion of the Beamten were CDU or FDP placemen. 
This trend was particularly pronounced amongst the top tier of permanent officials.
Under German law these officials enjoyed security of tenure and could not be sacked; 
although they could be granted indefinite leave (Ruhestand) at the public expense. Whilst 
it could be expected that some, especially the more senior and/or well-connected officials, 
would retire or move on, any incoming minister wanting to make major changes was 
confronted with the cost of keeping superfluous civil servants on the pay-roll and finding 
men and women of sufficient credibility and expertise to replace them. Traditionally, this 
would not have been a problem given the degree of consensus inherent in the German 
policy community but there were fears that, with the entry of the AL into government, 
this consensus would break down. Thus there was a danger that the new coalition could
67 For instance, the coalition was committed to an early expansion of nursery education and creche 
facilities, whilst its attitude towards the building sector was more ambiguous.
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be hampered by what could best be described as 'implementation drag' on the part of 
recalcitrant officials68 .
Such implementation drag does not appear to have taken place in the City Development. 
Environmental Protection and Traffic ministry. There appear to be three reasons for this. 
First, as the ministry was only set up in 1981, it had not become part of a rigid policy 
network (based on producer interests) in the manner of some of the more established 
ministries. Second, it was staffed with younger officials who, as discussed earlier, could be 
assumed to be inherently well-disposed to ecological modernisation policies and therefore 
more open to innovation. Third, the ministry had previously been close to the FDP and - 
as they had failed to pass West Berlin's five percent electoral barrier - they were not 
represented in the legislature, any latent opposition that did exist amongst permanent 
officials lacked a parliamentary focus. As a result, the new Environment Minister and her 
staff were confident they could successfully implement the agreed programme (see 
Appendix Five for a more detailed break-down of the Programme).
The programme placed great emphasis upon greater transparency in what they called the 
city's 'planning culture'. Other specific commitments included new controls over air 
emissions and the encouragement of new clean air technologies; removal of lead piping in 
the city's water provision; imposition of state of the art technology within the water 
industry; improved river management; imposition of an integrated and coherent waste 
disposal policy in co-operation with other Lander; a freeze on the new development of 
'green field' sites; the development and imposition of a 'sparing, rational and socially 
sustainable' system of energy provision and use (including a new energy tax); modification 
of existing laws on energy use; modification of pricing system and decentralisation of
6& This did appear to be the case in the Schools, Training and Sport ministry where, as one SPD official 
put it, 'sabotage was mentioned'!
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energy production); a long-term plan to completely re-open the city's railway system (S- 
Bahn), the expansion of public transport through extension of bus-lanes, reduced waiting 
times, reduced fares including introduction of cheap all-inclusive travel card 
('Umweltkarte').
Three main observations can be made about the coalition's proposed programme. First, 
with the exception of some aspects of transport policy (for instance, the reduction of fares 
for public transport, introduction of the Umweltkarte system and the imposition of traffic 
controls) most of the programme required implementation over the medium- to long-term. 
This meant that political costs (such as funding that would have otherwise gone on 
construction and service provision) were felt immediately, whilst the benefits were of little 
short-term utility. This was because the political benefits of many of the proposals were 
either deferred, intangible or counter-factual in nature (in other words the greater costs of 
non-implementation would not be apparent as they would presumably have been 
avoided)69.
Second, as discussed, the policy document is in many ways the product of two distinct 
and often contradictory discourses. The left-libertarian/post-materialist-oriented linkage 
between environmental policy and wider societal power structures is plainly evident, for 
instance in the greater role allocated to local communities in future planning decisions and 
the opening out of the policy community itself (through more horizontally-structured 
'working groups' and the inclusion of non-governmental organisations and self-help 
groups). At the same time, however, a more statist approach remains evident and arguably 
could hardly have been avoided, given that the coalition remained reliant upon the
69 Indeed, for many Berliners, the coalition's introduction of the Umweltkarte remains the coalition's one 
concrete achievement! This perceived lack of results was a source of frustration for both coalition partners as 
expectations from both the SPD's supporters and the AL's Basis was to prove a constant source of pressure 
upon the maintenance of the coalition.
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Beamtenstaat to, for instance, recodify law, administer increased subsidies to public 
transport and collect eco-taxes. It is this tension between the two approaches that is at 
the heart of the 'old leftVnew left1 dialectic.
Finally, one is struck by the primary reliance upon bureaucratic instruments (such as 
judicial review, state regulation and subsidy), with economic instruments (such as eco- 
taxes and pricing) taking a secondary role (see Table 6.2. below). This is especially the 
case in those sectors that constitute indivisible public goods such as air and water and is in 
keeping with traditions of public policy in the Federal Republic. This reliance upon 
bureaucratic instruments represents continuity rather than change in the style, if not the 
content, of policy. The significance of this is discussed at greater length in the conclusion 
to the thesis (Chapter Ten).
Table 6.2. Six Environmental Policy Sectors And The Choice Of 
















* The 'Polluter Pays' Principle
Source: Berliner Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen SPD undAL vom 13. Kliirz 1989. 
(SPD Landesverband 1989)
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6.3. The Berlin Energy Law (Energiegesetze} of 2 October 1990
In keeping with the coalition agreement, the preamble to the Berlin Energy Law of 2 
October 1990 (see Appendix Six for a more detailed breakdown of the Energy Law) 
explicitly stated its intention that the law should:
promote the most conservationally-minded, rational socially and 
environmentally sustainable, resource-friendly, low risk and - in terms 
of the wider economy - low cost means as possible for the production 
and utilisation of energy and, at the same time, secure the long-term 
provision of energy for the benefit of the citizens of the state of 
Berlin....through the ... rational relationship with energy and the 
engagement of renewable energy [Section One, Paragraphs One and 
Two).
These objectives would be achieved by the adherence to a number of basic principles of 
energy use including: the lowest possible consumption of non-renewable energy; the 
prioritisation of energy sources that minimise damage to the natural environment; that limit 
demand and consumption of energy (i.e. 'waste heat' and 'heat retrieval' technology); the 
most efficient use will be made of the inherent energy within 'primary energy' resources: 
the prioritisation of'low value-added1 energy forms (i.e. waste heat); the formulation of the 
sparing, rational, social, environmentally sustainable and resource-friendly utilisation of 
energy as a dutiful task of the state (Staatsaufgabe) and its citizenry. In order to further 
these basic principles, the Berlin senate proposed measures for both the public and private 
sectors.
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In the public sector, the Berlin Senate proposed to introduce guidelines that would be 
observed by the state in all planning decisions (especially investment and construction- 
related decisions). These included:
• The promotion of energy-limiting technology, regulating and controlling technology, 
the use of waste-heat, re-newable energy and heat retrieval installations, the conversion 
from electrical to non-electrical means of room- and water-heating and the installation 
of electricity-saving instruments and devices.
• Priority to be given to the conversion of state-owned buildings and installations to 
municipal heating using combined heat and power (CHP) or the utilisation of waste 
heat or solar-and/or block-heating, including a ban on the installation of electric heating 
in new or extended buildings and installations belonging to the state of Berlin.
• The introduction of an 'Energy Pass' system (Paragraph Seven) which would be 
required in order to carry out any extensions, modernisation, conversion or any 
particular changes to buildings belonging to the city of Berlin. The energy pass would 
require an audit of the energy requirements of a given flat or premises, under guidelines 
set out by the senate.
• New guidelines for State Procurement of supplies and services, giving priority to the 
procurement of experimental devices and installations wherever possible. Priority 
would also be given to the promotion of installations using re-newable energy (such as 
CHP), in particular: gas-fired heat pumps, heat networks, transfer stations, gas- 
recovery and related technology.
All such measures were to be predicated upon the Berlin Senate's planned development of 
an 'Energy Concept' (Paragraph Six, Article 4). In addition to amending its planning 
priorities, the Energy Concept would lead to the Berlin Senate implementing an Energy 
Programme. This would be on a four-yearly basis and would include measures to promote 
the conservation of energy, as well as restrictions on the growth of energy use and
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environmental damage (Paragraph Fifteen). The public would be consulted at all stages of
the programme. In addition, the Berlin Senate would present the state parliament with an
annual Energy Report.
In the private sector, the Berlin Senate also proposed the a number of measures. These
included:
• A move to enforce an immediate ban upon the new installation of electric heaters and 
night storage heaters for domestic use with a capacity of more than 2 kW and to 
stipulate the use where possible of municipal or localised heating networks, CHP 
and/or waste heat retrieval.
• The establishment of maximum levels for the energy needs of buildings; the control the 
installation of ventilation and air-conditioning systems; a reduction in the unnecessary 
use of User-energy ; the reduction of User-energy requirements and an improvement in 
the degree of utilisation of energy for end-use (Paragraph Twenty-Two).
• The appointment of a network of Energy Officials at the local Bezirke level (Paragraph 
Twenty). The Energy Officials would be tasked with: the scrutiny of existing energy 
requirements for room-heating, household technology and the supply of warm water 
within the local building stock; the assessment of measures to conserve energy in 
buildings and installations within the district; the monitoring of energy-consuming 
installations and the advocacy of measures to improve their effectiveness and the 
presentation of an annual report to the District Office (Bezirksamt) and District 
Council (Bezirksverordneten versammlung). The Energy Official would also be 
involved in the planning and implementation of energy-saving measures and the issue 
of Energy Passes in accordance with Paragraph Seven. They would have the authority 
to refer cases immediately to the District Office and District Council.
To help provide the best expertise to back up the introduction of these measures, the 
Berlin Senate proposed to convene an 'Energy Advisory Council' (Paragraph Twenty-One).
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The Energy Advisory Council would advise the senate of their judgements upon basic 
questions of energy-economics and energy policy. It would discuss those matters salient 
to the provision of energy for Berlin (from a technical, economic and social viewpoint), 
with the aim of highlighting potential problems and suggesting possible solutions. In 
particular, the Energy Advisory Council would advise and co-operate in the setting- up 
and application of the state Energy Programme. The members of the Energy Advisory 
Council would be chosen from the different areas of the energy sector, consumer and civil 
interest groups. The number of members on the council would not exceed 25.
6.4. The Berlin Energy Advisory Council (Energiebeirat)
Traditionally, the policy-making environment for the energy sector in Berlin was relatively 
closed, with a very restricted membership, to the extent that it appeared distinctly 
corporatist in nature. The extent of this closure was demonstrated by the fact that there 
had been a period in the 1970's when the Chairman of BEWAG (West Berlin's monopoly 
electricity generator at the time) had also been the leader of what was then the dominant 
SPD Fraktion in the West Berlin Legislature. In terms of Rhodes' [1986a] model, the 
policy-making establishment displayed all the manifestations of an entrenched 'Policy 
Community' (characterised by stable relationships between a highly restricted 
membership, high vertical interdependence and insulation from other networks and the 
wider polity).
The Energy Advisory Council was set-up in accordance with Paragraph Twenty-One of 
the Red-Green coalition's new Energy Law, with the task of opening up this tight network 
and providing a forum for the exchange of technical and economic expertise and the
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advocacy of the social dimension of environmental regulation. It was intended that the 
Energy Advisory Council would be an inclusive body, bringing together individuals and 
organisations from across the social, political and technological spectrum of the energy 
debate, who eventually would be able to work-out the details of the Energy Concept, as 
envisaged in Paragraph Six of the Energy Law.
Ironically, its progenitor, the Red-Green coalition, would not survive long enough to 
witness the advisory council's deliberations. Nevertheless, the council still reports to 
Referat IE, the Energy Executive (Energieleitstelle, Energie- und Okologieplanungen), 
which is situated in Abteilung 1, responsible for central affairs (Zentral Angelegenheiten) 
within the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection. As such, its 
institutional location provides the means for the products of its deliberations to be 
disseminated throughout the policy formulation and planning culture of the ministry. 
Moreover, its continued existence can be regarded as an achievement for the Red-Green 
coalition.
The Energy Advisory Council was and remains a heterogeneous body, drawn from the 
political parties, the permanent administration, as well as producer and consumer groups 
from both sides of the Green debate (see Table 6.4 below). Thus, in terms of the policy 
network literature, it represents all of Katzenstein's [1987] 'three nodes' ideal type. 
Moreover, the presence of individuals acting 'in a private capacity' is in keeping with 
Richardson and Jordan's [1979] thinking that informal interpersonal relations within 
networks are as important as structurally-contingent relationships (and is a long way from 
Schneider's [1988] corporatist ideal-type), where the actions of individuals are significant 
only in so far as they are the agents of organisations.
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Table 6.4. Composition of the Berlin Energy Advisory Council 
(Energiebeirat\ as of 1996.
1.HerrnProf. Winje
2. Herrn A. Reintjes
3. Herrn Stumpf
4. Frau B. Bruhl.
5. Herrn Dr. L. Metz.
6. Herrn Prof. Janicke.
7. Herrn Dr. H-J. Ziesing.
8. Herrn Dr. K. Raschke.
9. Herrn F. Matthes.
10. Herrn Prof. Dr. Kreibich.
11. Herrn Dr. Bramigk.
12. Herrn Prof. Dr. W. Harms.
13. Herrn Dr. Rommling.
14. Frau Neise.
15. Herrn Dr. Schutt.
16. Herrn H. Bottcher
17. Herrn Simon.





23. Herrn Dr. P. Meyer.
24. Herrn Berger.
25. Fau Dr. MUller. 
26/27/28. Representatives of:
Azencv
BEWAG (Monopoly electricity generator and supplier). 
GASAG (Monopoly gas producer)
Public Service, Transport and Traffic Union (Gewerkschaft 
offentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr). 
In a private capacity.
'Energy and Work' (Energie undArbeit e. V.).
Research Unit for Environmental Politics (Forschungsstelle filr 
Umweltpolitik) at the Free University Berlin. 
In a private capacity. 
Siemens AG (Energieerzeugung). 
'Ecological Institute' (Oko-Institut) 
IZT.
'Society for rational energy use' (Gesellschaft fur rationelle 
Energieverwendung e. V.}
Institute for Energy Law (Institutfur Energierecht). 
Institute for the Preservation and Modernisation of Buildings 
(Institutfur Erhaltung und Modernisierung van Bauwerken e. I'.). 
Representing IHK Berlin.
Industrial Energy and Power Generation Association (Verband der 
Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e.T.). 
Architect.
Berlin Chamber of Skilled Trades (Handwerkskammer Berlin). 
Eurosolar
Berlin-Brandenburg Association of Housing Entrepreneurs ( Verband 
Berlin-Brandenburgischer Wohnungsunternehmen e. V). 
Berlin-Brandenburg Branch of the German Federation of Trades 
Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Landesbezirk Berlin- 
Brandenburg).





Ministries of Construction, Housing and Traffic; Finance; Economics 
and Business.
Source: Senatsverwaltung fur Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz, 1996
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Some groups on the Advisory Council are essentially technically-oriented, whilst others 
regard themselves as advocates for Green solutions in their most broad-brush sense. What 
was important from the Greens point of view in particular, was that the energy debate was 
being widened-out and, for the first time, some of what can be regarded as their client 
groups were being included within the policy network.
The most important producer groups represented on the Advisory Council were the local 
municipal electricity and gas producers BEWAG70 and GASAG. The sheer size of both
70In the demonology of the Greens, the BEWAG organisation was considered particularly regressive. Set­ 
up in 1899 with two generating-plants as the 'Berliner Elektricitdts Werke' (BEW),the organisation grew 
rapidly. By 1909, it had established the first city-wide electricity grid on the European continent. 
However, it was the effect of the Second World War and the subsequent division of Berlin that led to the 
development of an institutional culture that placed a premium upon the production of as much cheap 
(subsidised) power as was possible. Within months of the end of the war, the Soviets had dismantled all 
three of BEWAG's most modern plants: in the Charlottenburg, Spandau and Wilmersdorf districts of the 
city. All three districts were in what was to become West Berlin; creating a strategic problem for the 
western allies.
Following the imposition of the Berlin blockade in June 1948, the Soviets banned a number of high- 
ranking BEWAG officials from East Berlin, set up a separate electricity generator and stopped all supplies 
of electricity or coal to West Berlin. At the same time, the British Military Authorities stepped-up their 
support for the re-building of the generating plants in the western sector of the city. To this end, during the 
13-month Berlin blockade, over 1500 tons of machine-parts were flown into the city by the air-lift. On the 
1 December 1949, Governing-Mayor Ernst Reuter officially opened the new 'Kraftwerke West'. By 1951, 
Kraftwerke West had a capacity of 208 megawatts and supplied over a third of the city's electricity needs 
[BEWAG, 1993: 5-6].
Despite a brief return to normality following the Berlin blockade, there would be no reversal of the 
development of BEWAG as an autarchic and subsidy-hungry generator, whose role was as much political as 
it was merely a supplier of electricity. On the 4 March 1952, the East Berlin authorities announced that all 
arrangements for the supply of electricity between the two halves of the city were at an end. From now on 
West Berliners were to become all too aware that - in terms of electricity - they were now living on an 
island ('Strominsel'). Although the result of political necessity, there were a number of disadvantages 
arising form BEWAG's so-called 'Inselbetriebe'. The most obvious problem was that BEWAG no longer 
had the option of relying upon a wider electricity grid in order to cope with peaks in demand. Therefore. 
the organisation had to maintain an over-capacity in production facilities. As a result, each generator had to 
be run at less than its most efficient level, which served to push up costs even further. Moreover, for a 
combination of political and geological reasons, cheap primary energy sources such as brown coal, nuclear 
power or hydro-electric power were not available to BEWAG. This meant that the company had to rely 
upon more expensive primary energy sources, such as premium-quality coal, light- and heavy- grade heating 
oil and, after the beginning of 1989, natural gas. Given that it was confronted by such unique constraints 
upon its choice of primary energy sources, the company itself is proud of its record. For instance, it claims 
that in the ten years form 1982, it reduced emissions of Sulphur Dioxide and Nitrous Oxide by 85% and 
95% respectively, whilst increasing electricity generation by 30% over the same period [1993. 8]. 
By the mid- 1990s, BEWAG was a partially privatised company with 10,215 employees, total capital assets 
of DM 560 million, profits of DM 78, 400,000 and a share dividend of DM 7 for every DM 50 invested 
[BEWAG, 1995: 1-92]. By any standards, it is a major player in the energy debate and could be a 
formidable opponent of any advocates of'alternative' energy sources within the advisory council, of which it 
is a permanent member.
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organisations, along with their close political links with both the SPD and CDU, meant 
that BEWAG and GASAG had always enjoyed privileged access to the policy network.
For the Greens and the SPD's New Left, it was just this kind of cosy relationship between 
politicians and producer groups that prevented radical reform of the energy industry. As 
such, the setting-up of an Advisory Council with guaranteed access for the "alternative" 
energy lobby was a positive move to break down the old closed network between 
producer groups, politicians and industrial consumers. Because the list of of participants 
was rotated, the actual composition of the Energy Advisory Council changed with time. 
However, the dichotomy between 'producer interests' and advocates of 'alternative' forms 
of energy production has remained a constant factor within the policy network.
At other end of the spectrum were groups such as Eurosolar1 ^, an internationally 
organised advocate of alternative energy technologies based upon the use of solar power. 
Traditionally, Eurosolar had been excluded from the policy network in Berlin, especially 
during the Strominsel period for the 1950s until the 1980s, when the emphasis was upon 
West Berlin being as self-sufficient as possible in sources of cheap industrial and domestic
71 ' Eurosolar' was typical of the kind of new members who had become part of the policy network as a 
result of the setting-up of the Energy Advisory Council. It was set up in 1988 as a Europe-wide association 
with the aim of promoting the replacement of atomic energy and fossil-fuels by renewable energy sources 
such as solar energy, bio-mass energy, and various forms of water-generated power (see Appendix Three). 
It is organised as Federation, with branches in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Greece, Italy and Switzerland.
Although not directly linked to any political party, institution or interest group, Eurosolar's interests 
coincide to a large extent with those of the Greens. Its international membership included Ahedou Quid 
Abdallah (Special UN Co-ordinator for New and Re-newable Sources of Energy), Donald W. Aitken (Chair 
of the American Solar Energy Society), Dr. R. K. Pachauri (President of the Solar Energy Society of India) 
and Sir Norman Foster, whilst its German membership included Dr. Rolf Bohme (Mayor of Freiburg), 
Beate Weber (Mayor of Heidelburg), Monika Wulf-Mathies (Chair of the OTV union). Harald B. Schafer 
(Environment Minister for Baden-Wurttemberg), Dr. Friedbert Pfluger (CDU MdB) and Matthias 
Engelsberger (former CSU MdB).
At the core of Eurosolar'?, activities are a number of pilot projects set up by its members across Europe, 
including the National Gallery in Berlin as well as buildings as diverse as the SAS Building in Stockholm. 
De Montfort University Campus in Leicester and Parsons Brewery in Malta! [Eurosolar, 1995: 56-57]. 
Eurosolar is financed by both individual and group membership and joined the Energy Advisory Council 
in 1995.
210
power. With the growth of environmental consciousness during the 1970s and 1980s, 
groups like Eurosolar became increasingly influential. For reasons of principle or self- 
interests, the stance adopted by Eurosolar and BEWAG on most issues of energy policy 
is diametrically opposed. However, given that Eurosolar and groups like it were not just 
advocates, but also suppliers of solar energy installations, this does beg the question 
whether, in terms of the policy network literature, they constituted something more 
established than Rhodes' [1986a] idea of an 'Issue Network', and were more like the 
'Producer Network' ideal-type (characterised by the prominent role of economic interests). 
This point will be returned to in the conclusion (Chapter Ten).
BEWAG and Eurosolar represent the two poles, in terms of both objectives and 
organisation, of the policy network within the Advisory Council. Within this ideological 
range, the other groups on the council have tended to gravitate towards one pole or the 
other in their general stance. As one would expect, this divide is more evident with regard 
to the 'strategic' debate about energy policy than in the more 'tactical' or technical 
arguments.
On the 'producer interest' side of the debate, BEWAG tends to be supported by GASAG 
and, to a lesser extent, by industrial and labour interests. For instance, the Industrial 
Energy and Power Generation Association (Verband der Industriellen Energie- und 
Krafrwirtscha.fi e. V. or VIK) has, since unification, made a great deal out of the 'Standort 
Berlin' argument, stating that measures designed to promote 'greener' energy production, 
such as eco-taxes, would undermine the long term future of Berlin as an enterprise 
centre72 . Nevertheless, VIK has its own agenda which does not always fall inside the
72 in a recent report the VIK argued that, compared with her European competitors, German industry is 
already burdened by high energy prices. According to the report, at 1995 prices, electricity and gas prices 
per kilowatt-hour in Dusseldorf were far higher (at 13.92 and 3.66 pfennigs respectively) that those in 
London (9.67 and 2.23), Paris (8.68 and 2.14) or Rotterdam (8.84 and 2.52) [VIK 1996 (1): 6].
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BEWAG camp. For instance, apart from resisting eco-taxes on the basis of cost, it has 
also argued for the opening-up of the Berlin electricity market to competitors such as 
PreussenElektra AG. For their part, whilst the labour unions have not been overtly 
hostile to environmentalism per se, in practice the industrial unions have been resistant to 
many such initiatives because of fears about their impact upon their members' jobs. 
Moreover, as already noted in Chapter Four, many trades unionists were by instinct 
suspicious of the Greens.
The advocacy of a more 'alternative1 approach to energy use tended to be centred within a 
small number of academic research institutes, which can be regarded as part of the 
Green/New Left milieu. Membership of these groups tends to be very close-knit and 
often over-lapping, as demonstrated by their published work. For instance, in 1992, 
Hans-Joachim Ziesing and Felix Christian Matthes (Oko-Institut] co-produced a report on 
Berlin's energy policy for the Ministry for City Development and Environmental 
Protection with Gimther Borch, a colleague working on the Energy Concept project. The 
following year, the Ministry co-produced a paper on the energy concept with Prof. 
Janicke's Research Unit for Environmental Politics (Forschungsstelle fur Umweltpolitik), 
based at the Free University, which also contained contributions from the Oko-Institut's 
Felix Christian Matthes and Gunther Borch, as well as Klaus Miischen from the 
Energieleitstelle. Similarly, Dr. Ziesing and Herr Miischen's names appear on the 
Advisory Council of Berlin's International Solar Centre, whose Managing Committee 
includes Astrid Schneider from Eurosolar.
Taken as a whole, this close-knit group represented a formidable resource of environmental 
expertise which would serve to counter the established producer interests on the Advisory 
Council as it advised the Ministry in drawing-up Berlin's Energy Concept.
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6.5. The Berlin 'Energy Concept' (Energiekonzept Berlin)
The Berlin Energy Concept was set-up with the objective of reconciling two potentially 
contradictory aims. First, the division of Berlin had led to the two sections of the city 
growing apart, both in physical terms and with regard to the technical standard of the 
city's infrastructure. As a result, East Berlin's technical standard of energy consumption 
had to be raised to the same standard as that in West Berlin as well as both sides having to 
be physically re-integrated with one another. Second, the city authorities intended to 
make the new united Berlin a model for innovation in the environmental field. This meant 
ecologically modernising the energy infrastructure in both parts of the city. Obviously, 
the process of ecological modernisation would have to be achieved concurrently with the 
process of re-uniting the halves of the city. Given the frail nature of the Berlin economy, 
if the Energy Concept was to have any chance of reconciling these two objectives it had to 
have the tacit support of both the 'producer' and 'alternative' lobbies. Moreover, following 
the decision of the Federal Government on the 11 December 1991 to aim to achieve a 25- 
30% reduction in CO2 emissions across Germany by 2005, the Berlin Energy Concept 
was had assumed something like flag-ship status politically.
In 1992, after a process of consultation with the Energiebeirat, the Energieleitstelle of the 
Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection produced the first Berlin 
Energy Concept73 . Despite the fact that the Greens were no longer in government, the
73Using 1990 as its base-line year, the Energy Concept presented three alternative scenarios . In the best- 
case scenario it intended to reduce CO2 emissions by 50% over the time-period, although there were doubts 
whether this was achievable. Inevitably, the participants disagreed over how reduced CO2 emissions could 
be achieved, depending upon if they fell into the 'producer interest' or the 'alternative' camp. For example. 
BEWAG argued for a system of price differentials in order to dissuade the use of brown coal, whilst the 
Association of the German Brown Coal Industry (Deutscher Braun-Kohlen Indmtrieverein) suggested a 
system of subsidies in order to bring brown coal burning technology up to the highest environmental 
standard. On the other hand, the 'Alternative' groups were totally opposed to any form of energy generation 
from brown coal [Senatsverwaltungfur Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz. 1993 (5) 45-47].
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document built upon much of what had been advocated in the Energiegesetz, including a 
number of valuable concessions to the 'alternative' lobby. These included:
• A system of subsidies for developing alternative power sources (especially solar 
energy); the setting-up of a Berlin Energy Agency and the appointment of 'trouble- 
shooters' to oversee the ecological modernisation of East Berlin (especially the 
conversion of homes from brown-coal heating)
• The progressive extension of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) systems and a parallel 
phasing-out of all forms of domestic electrical heating.
• The promotion of housing associations and other forms of communal living.
• A radical overhaul of legislation affecting the power industry.
• The prioritisation of environmental objectives in all new public housing.
• A radical re-think of existing transport policies and sharper controls over industrial 
energy use, including emission controls and enhanced least cost planning 
[Senatsverwaltungfur Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz, 1992: 379].
Reaction to the Energy Concept was predictably mixed, according to the wider interests of 
those involved. For the government (now a Grand Coalition), the CDU Fraktion 
welcomed the document but were quick to lower expectations about the extent to which 
environmental policy could be carried out at the city-state or even regional level, whilst the 
SPD claimed that the Energy Concept was a disappointment, because the existence of 
three different theoretical scenarios within the document was a de facto recognition that the 
planned reductions in CO2 emissions would not be achieved.
For the opposition, the Greens unsurprisingly praised the high standard of technical 
debate within the document, but criticised its failure to question the basic tenets of the 
capitalist order, in particular the emphasis upon growth. It regarded the planned reduction 
in CO2 emissions as almost impossible to achieve under the present economic
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arrangements. The FDP praised the document as 'a step in the right direction, but no more 
than a beginning'. From the FDP's point of view, the division of the competent ministries 
between the different coalition partners (the CDU and SPD after 1990) made progress 
difficult, as did the specialist-oriented nature of the policy network. The PDS took a 
similar line to that of the Greens, claiming that the Energy Concept was flawed because it 
did not address the wider questions of economic organisation and state structure.
Of the NGOs, the environmental organisation BUND also pursued this theme, whilst the 
Bi Energieplanung und Umweltschutz organisation stated that it would have been more 
appropriate had the document been called 'Old Energy Policies for Berlin'. The OTV 
public service union especially welcomed the extension of CHP systems, but stressed that 
all changes had to be carried out with a regard for the preservation of jobs, whilst the 
Berlin Chambers of Commerce (Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin (IHK)) broadly 
welcomed the document but warned against the drawing-up of environmental 'wish-lists' 
without taking into account the effect of such reforms upon the local economy [Grundstifi, 
March 1993: 11-19].
6.6. Resume of Chapter Six
The chapter set out to examine in greater depth the degree to which Red-Green coalitions 
were able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in 
their respective Ldnder, by examining three examples of programmatic and institutional 
innovations carried out within the field of environmental policy in Berlin.
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6.6.1. Inherent Problems of Policy-Implementation In Berlin
Section 6.2. of the chapter looked at three of the inherent problems associated with policy- 
implementation in Berlin as they confronted the Red-Green coalition. First, it concluded 
that West Berlin's unique geo-political position had a huge impact upon the city's political 
economy, with the city being confronted by a number of serious economic and 
environmental problems. The need to reduce dependency upon the German Democratic 
Republic for the provision or transport of resources, as well as its exposure to the 
externalities of the GDR's appalling environmental record meant that the city was 
economically weak, environmentally degraded and lacking a coherent strategy for a 
sustainable energy policy.
Second, it looked at the degree to which Berlin's polarised party system constrained 
policy-implementation by the coalition. It concluded that, although the SPD was still 
constrained by the traditional materialist discourse, there was some areas of agreement 
with the Greens as to the problems the city faced. However, the AL's solutions were 
more radical, less concerned with their impact upon economic growth and employment and 
embedded in a polemical discourse (in contrast to the more measured tone of the SPD's 
election literature). It concluded that the Greens' 'outsider' status and their relatively non- 
hierarchical structure meant that they relied upon decentralised policy-formulation 
processes, for instance by harnessing the environmental expertise centred around the city's 
universities, conforming to Rhodes [1986a] 'Issue Network' ideal-type.
It went on to examine the degree of resistance from the NGOs and concluded that although 
there was resistance (from industrialists, some trades unions and elements of the civil 
service), this was of only limited significance. In terms of the civil service, once the Berlin 
AL was allocated the Environment ministry, the actual process of staffing the ministry 
was not a problem. The section identified four reasons for this. First, as the ministry' had
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not developed the rigid policy networks found in some older ministries. Second, it was 
staffed with younger officials (relatively well-disposed to programmatic innovation). 
Third, as the ministry had previously been close to the FDP and they were not 
represented in the legislature, partisan opposition amongst permanent officials lacked a 
parliamentary focus. Fourth, as already noted, there was a plentiful source of 
environmental expertise outside the established policy network that could be brought in to 
replace recalcitrant civil servants if needed.
Finally, the section looked at the degree to which the coalition's policies represented 
continuity or change in terms of their use of economic instruments, when taken in the 
round. It concluded that, although there was evidence of the left-libertarian/post- 
materialist discourse within the proposals, a traditional reliance upon statist solutions 
(with the Beamtenstaat administering bureaucratic instruments) represented continuity 
rather than change in the style (if not the content) of policy making.
6.6.2. The Berlin Energy Law (Energiegesetze) of 2 October 1990
The chapter then looked at the Berlin Energy Law, which sought to promote the lowest 
possible consumption of non-renewable energy, the prioritisation of energy sources, the 
limiting of the demand for and consumption of energy and the utilisation of 'low value- 
added1 energy forms.
The section described how, in order to further these basic principles, the Berlin senate 
proposed measures for both the public and private sectors. These included an 'Energy 
Pass' system, new procurement guidelines and a network of Energy Officials at the local 
Bezirke level. However, the most important innovations were the proposed development 
of an 'Energy Concept' through the convening of an 'Energy Advisory Council.'
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6.6.3. The Berlin Energy Advisory Council (Energiebeirat)
The chapter then looked at the Energy Advisory Council, set up to discuss the salient 
issues relating to the state Energy Concept. It concluded that the Energy Advisory 
Council was quite successful in opening up the policy network to the Greens' client 
groups.
There were two reasons for this. First, the advisory council's institutional location 
(reporting to the section for central affairs within the Ministry for City Development and 
Environmental Protection) meant that its deliberations were disseminated throughout the 
policy formulation and planning culture of the ministry. Second, it was a heterogeneous 
body, drawn from all 'three nodes' of Katzenstein's [1987] policy network ideal type, 
including producer and consumer groups from both sides of the Green debate. Thus. 
although producer groups such as BEWAG and GASAG remained highly influential, the 
advisory council also provided a vehicle for advocates of alternative energy, such as 
Eurosolar. It concluded that BEWAG and Eurosolar represented the two poles of 
opinion within the council, with the other groups on the council gravitating towards one 
pole or the other. In other words, it was not a consensual body. The section also opened 
up the discussion as to whether groups like Eurosolar were more than an 'Issue Network' 
and in fact conformed to Rhodes' [1986a] 'Producer Network' ideal-type.
Siding with Eurosolar on the advisory council were a small number of academic research 
institutes, with a very close-knit and often over-lapping membership. These included the 
Oko-institut, the Forschungsstelle fur Umweltpolitik (whose published work included 
contributors from the Energieleitstelle) and the Berlin International Solar Centre. The 
section concluded that this close-knit group represented a formidable resource of 
environmental expertise which would serve to counter the producer interests on the 
Advisory Council.
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6.6.4. The Berlin 'Energy Concept' (Energiekonzept Berlin)
The chapter then examined the eventual outcome of the work of the advisory council, the 
Berlin Energy Concept. It identified the two aims of (i) raising East Berlin's technical 
standard of energy consumption to the same standard as that in West Berlin and 
physically re-integrating one with other and (ii) making the new united Berlin a model for 
innovation in the environmental field by ecologically modernising the energy infrastructure 
in both parts of the city as being potentially contradictory. The section demonstrated 
that, when the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection produced 
the first Berlin Energy Concept in 1992, the document built upon much of what had been 
advocated in the Energiegesetz, representing a long term policy-oriented payoff for the 
AL.
This conclusion was reflected in the AL's reaction to the Energy Concept, in which they 
praised the high standard of technical debate within the document. As the section pointed 
out, reaction elsewhere (from parties and NGOs) was more mixed according to their 
interests.
As for the SPD, it claimed that the Energy Concept was a disappointment (because it was 
a de facto recognition that the planned reductions in CO2 emissions would not be 
achieved).. Chapter Ten will go into a wider discussion as to why this should be the case, 
but the Social Democrats response is interesting given that, on the evidence of this chapter, 
the coalition's record of institutional and programmatic innovation was (by the criteria set 
out in this thesis) a relative success.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PROGRAMMATIC AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN LOWER SAXONY
7.1. Preamble
The purpose of this chapter (like Chapter Six looking at Berlin) is to examine in greater 
depth the degree to which the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony was able to break 
down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in the Land 
administration. Again, the need for brevity rules out a comprehensive review of all areas 
of the policy-making process. Therefore, the chapter examines a selection of 
programmatic and institutional innovations carried out within the field of environmental 
policy in Lower Saxony. These are:
• The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (Niedersachsiches Landesamt fur 
Okologie)
• Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power 
(Beirut zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs)
• Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On Avoidance And 
Use Of Waste (Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung)
Like the previous chapter, Chapter Seven is part of the policy-oriented strand of the thesis 
and is informed by the 'policy networks' idiom (see Chapter One). The chapter builds 
upon Katzenstein's [1987] 'three nodes' of the policy network and looks at:
• Political parties
• Tiers of multi-level governance (the Bund, Lander and Kommuneri)
220
NGOs
Although they are not looked at chronologically, the three examples are all linked 
thematically. The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (Niedersdchsiches 
Landesamt fur Okologie or NLO) was set up as an umbrella organisation that would 
profile and co-ordinate environmental policy across the state, by breaking down 
disciplinary and media-oriented barriers under the buzz-word of Integrationsgeddnke 
(integrated thinking). Monika Griefahn declared that the NLO would be the 'technical 
backbone for the environmental policy strategy of the state Government' 
[Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium Pressestelle, 01/10/92]. The chapter will assess 
what she meant by this and the extent to which this was achieved.
The chapter then goes on to look at the setting up the Beirat zu Fragen des 
Kernenergieausstiegs (or BfK) and the events that precipitated it. It examines the extent 
to which the Nuclear power policy issue was complicated by the Basic Law, with 
competencies cutting across Lander and Bund tiers of government. The section looks at 
the constraints (legal and political) upon the coalition in moving towards a nuclear-free 
Lower Saxony and the role of the BfK in mediating contested policy issues and 
disseminating advice and information about its work.
The next section looks at the operation of the Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, 
Verwertung (the Second Government Commission), set up to further the coalition's waste- 
disposal strategy. Although a specialist area of interest, the topic was flagged-up during 
the bargaining phase and in the coalition agreement as crucial to the Greens. In particular, 
they vehemently opposed the expansion of incineration as a means of solid waste 
disposal. The section assesses the coalition's success in avoiding the incineration option, 
by expanding the state's existing landfills along the lines of Stand der Technik, preventing
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the transport of solid wastes out of Lower Saxony and re-shaping solid waste disposal 
measures according to the 'polluter pays ' principle. It goes on to look at the re- 
codification of Lower Saxony's laws on waste disposal, and examines the Land 
government's efforts to amend the Federal legislation that constrained their room for 
manoeuvre.
Again, the chapter begins by looking at some of the inherent problems associated with 
policy-implementation in Lower Saxony as they confronted the Red-Green coalition when 
they took office in 1990. First, it looks at the poor economic health of Lower Saxony, due 
to its reliance upon by agricultural subsidies, the impact of the tax reforms of the late 
1980's and de-industrialisation, and assesses its impact upon the state's finances. Second, 
given these financial constraints, the section examines the difficulties faced by the two 
parties in formulating a common policy platform within a number of potentially divisive 
policy domains. The section then goes on to look at the subject of staffing, particularly 
Gerhard Schroder's designs upon the highest levels of officialdom in the Lower Saxony 
civil service. Finally, the chapter assesses the degree to which the coalition's policies 
represented continuity or change in terms of their use of economic instruments when taken 
in the round, in preparation for a closer look at some of the specifics of programmatic and 
institutional innovation.
7.2. Inherent Problems of Policy Implementation in Lower Saxony
The most pressing problem facing the incoming coalition was the poor financial status of 
Lower Saxony. There were two underlying reasons for this. First, the region was 
dominated by agriculture and heavily reliant upon subsidies for the sector, either from
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Bonn or through the CAP. The tax reforms of the late 1980's had hit Lower Saxony hard 
and structural funds had not made up the short-fall. Second, in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
the state had undergone a process of partial de-industrialisation as its declining industries 
(such as ship-building and motor-vehicles) either went to the wall or were rationalised. 
This meant that Lower Saxony suffered a fall in tax revenue coupled with a rise in demand 
for welfare.
By the time of the 1990 Landtag elections, the out-going Finance Minister announced that, 
for the year ending 1989, the state's finances were in deficit to the tune of DM 1.4 billion. 
Moreover, since 1987, measures to reduce spending had only saved DM 140 million, 
despite the loss of 3000 posts within the Land administration and public service. In 
particular, staffing within the ministries had been cut to the bone. Nevertheless, it was 
hoped that, by 1993, the state's debts could be brought below DM 1 billion [FAZ. 
29/5/90]. Thus, any expansion of social provision, such as the housing programme 
announced during the bargaining phase, would be limited and at the expense of other 
projects.
Given that there was little scope for expansion of welfare provision, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the focus of the coalition was more on the issues of civil 
rights/constitutional protection, atomic energy, waste disposal and transport policy. The 
problem for the coalition was that these were potentially divisive policy domains, with 
only limited scope for the selected emphasis of areas of consensus. For instance, it has 
already been noted that both parties favoured abandoning the plans agreed by the Albrecht 
administration to use the sites at Gorleben and Schacht Konrad as final storage facilities for 
nuclear waste (see Chapter Five). However, the SPD took a more cautious stance than the 
Greens, who were impatient to wind-up these facilities straight away. Similarly, whilst 
the Greens were hostile to any form of incineration of industrial and household waste,
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Monika Greifahn would not rule-out the possibility of developing at least one high- 
temperature facility.
Nevertheless, these difficulties lay in the future and for the time being both parties stood 
behind the coalition agreement. The agreement set out a relatively ambitious programme of 
ecological modernisation, with the an emphasis upon 'energy conservation and efficiency as 
well as the promotion of alternative energy sources'. Moreover, the coalition did not 
regard this as purely the task of one ministry, but rather a fundamental task that cut across 
all activities of government (in German, a Querschnittsaufgabe). As in Berlin, although the 
programme was often couched in a Left-libertarian or post-materialist discourse (with 
many references to the freedom of the individual and the Ausstieg from the worst excesses 
of consumer society), when 'unpacked' the programme was still reliant upon a 
statist/technocratic set of policy instruments. These are set out in Table 7.2. (below).
With the coalition's programme agreed, attention turned to the subject of staffing. As the 
new coalition prepared to take office, it was clear that the SPD (and Schroder in particular) 
intended to make some significant changes at the highest level of officialdom in the Lower 
Saxony civil service. Although the CDU had been in power since 1976, a significant raft of 
SPD members had flourished at all levels within the state civil service74 . As a result, the 
SPD at least could draw upon a great deal of in-house expertise if they so wished.
However, this SPD rump within the civil service was indicative of the cosy (and 
consensual) relationship between the parties, the administration and the NGOs that had
74Although Paragraph 47 of the Landesbeamtengesetzes stated that officials 'jederzeit ohne angabe van 
Grunden in den einstweiligen Ruhestand versetzt werden konneri, the CDU had not undertaken a wholesale 
re-staffing of the civil service when it came to power in 1976. One reason for this was undoubtedly the fact 
that it is estimated that in 1976 80% of the permanent officials were SPD members. This represented a 
source of expertise that any incoming party would break-up at their peril. The irony was that, having 
survived 14 years of CDU government, some of these SPD-affiliated officials were on their own party's 'hit- 
list1 of officials to be retired! [FAZ. 18/5/90].
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developed over successive SPD and CDU-led administrations. Indeed, it conformed very 
closely to Rhodes [1986a] ideal-type of an entrenched 'Policy Community' (characterised 
by stable relationships between a highly restricted membership, high vertical 
interdependence and insulation from other networks and the wider polity). As was to 
become evident, Schroder was very much a 'new broom', with a profound suspicion of this 
policy-making establishment. Heads were to roll.
Table 7.2. Six Environmental Policy Sectors And The Choice Of 
















* The 'Polluter Pays' Principle.
Source: Koalitionsvereinbarung vom 19 Juni 1990 zwischen Der Landesverband 
Niedersachsen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und der Landesverband Die 
Grunen Niedersachsen, schliefienfur die 12. Wahlperiode des niedersachsichen Landtages 
die nachfolgende Verienbarung zur Zusammenarbeit in einer Regierungskoalition (SPD 
Landesverband 1990).
All in all, Schroder made 11 changes to existing senior positions within the civil service. 
The head of the Polizeiabteilung, Mahn, was a CDU placeman and had been on Schroder's 
'hit-list' prior to the election. He was replaced. In addition, the SPD made it clear that 
they intended to replace all of the State Secretaries in the Ministries, regardless of party
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membership. For instance, the head of the Lower Saxony Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, Bautsch (an SPD member of the old school) was replaced because he 
opposed the proposed liberalisation of the culture of the Interior Ministry. His successor. 
Schaper, was his antithesis, having come to prominence as a Data Protection campaigner 
and firmly on the 'New Left'.
Four of the state's Regierungsprdsidenten were also to be retired, including CDU members 
Niemann and Schweer in Braunschweig and Oldenburg respectively, and the FDP's Jakob 
in Hannover. Other candidates for Ruhestand included the Polizeiprasidenten of 
Braunschweig and Hannover, the Head of the Press Office and the head of the Land 
delegation in Bonn. In addition, Schroder wanted to replace the head of the State Radio 
Authority in Hannover (who was a CDU member) and the head of Norddeutsche 
Rundfunk (NDR)75 .
In addition to servants of the Ancien Regime being sacked or 'kicked upstairs', the coalition 
proposed to create a number of new posts within the Land administration. For instance, 
Schroder had committed himself to expanding the size and role of the Staatskanzlei., with 
the new State Secretary assuming a co-ordinating role between the Minister President and 
the ministries. With regard to these ministries, the Environment and Women's ministries 
were the object of intense intra- and inter-party conflict within the coalition as people 
jockeyed for position within the emerging new hierarchy. In such a state of flux, no-one 
was safe. Even the secretary in the Minister President's office, one Frau Petermann. 
received notice to quit! [FAZ. 18/5/90].
75The last two posts were linked to the highly politicised question of media policy, and thus much 
contested. Moreover, the NDR post was not in Schroder's fiat alone, but relied upon the co-operation of the 
states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein.
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For the Greens, the problem of finding sufficient staff to fill posts within the 
administration would put them at a considerable disadvantage during the life of the 
coalition. Although there a great deal of expertise in the state (particularly in the 
Universities), it was not on the scale of Berlin (which also benefited from the presence of 
the Umweltbundesamt). In terms of the policy networks literature, it was an example of 
Rhodes' [1986aJ ideal-type of an 'Issue Network1 , characterised by a number of 
participants with a limited degree of interdependence (and a more atomised structure than 
its Berlin equivalent).
7.3. The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (Niedersdchsiches 
Landesamt fur Okologie}
The Niedersdchsiches Landesamt fur Okologie (from now on to be referred to as the State 
Environmental Office or NLO) was officially founded on 1 October 1992. It has over 500 
full-time employees and is currently headed by Horst Wilbrand zur Horst (formerly Letter 
der Abteilung Kernenergie und Strahlenschutz in the Environment Ministry).
The NLO was set up as an umbrella organisation that would profile and co-ordinate 
environmental policy across the state. In its official publicity, the NLO explicitly codified 
its role as serving to break down disciplinary and media-oriented barriers. Such barriers 
and, in particular, the concentration upon specific media (air. water, and land) had 
traditionally prevented pollution being controlled 'in the round1 [Weale, 1992a] 76 and
76In his The New Politics of Pollution, Weale quotes a lengthy passage from a speech delivered by Richard 
Nixon, on the occasion of the establishment of the US Environmental protection Agency in 1969. which 
sums up the idea of controlling pollution in the round. Nixon said:
'Despite its complexity, for pollution control purposes the environment must be perceived as a single 
interrelated system. Present assignments of departmental responsibilities do not reflect this
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limited the capacity of the planning process to address the problems of environmental 
degradation at source. The new spirit of Integrationsgedanke (integrated thinking) within 
the environmental policy community led to the coalition's decision to form the NLO by 
bringing existing state offices under one umbrella. These state offices were the 
Niedersachsiches Landesamt fur Wasser und Abfall (the Lower Saxony State Office for 
Water and Waste), the Niedersachsiches Landesamt fur Immissionsschutz (the Lower 
Saxony Sate Office for Protection from Emissions) and the Fachbehorde filr Naturschut- 
(Technical Agency for Nature Protection).
It was intended that the NLO would provide a 'one-stop shop' across all of the polluting 
media, in addition to institutionally linking these issue areas to the more general and 'de- 
politicised' theme of nature protection. Although open to all policy actors, the new NLO 
worked primarily to the Environment Ministry, with a mission to provide 'advice, help 
and direction for policy and administration' in Lower Saxony. In practice, the NLO's work 
divided into four core tasks. First, the 'investigation and documentation of the state of the 
environment'. Second, the 'analysis, development, evaluation of methods and causal inter­ 
relations' of environmental policy. Third, 'development of goals, environmentally friendly 
methods and strategies'. Finally, the 'processing of technical questions within the areas of 
nature and resource protection, the care of the countryside, water resources and the coast, 
waste disposal, health and safety and protection against emissions and radiation' [NLO . 
1995].
interrelatedness. Many agency missions, for example, are designed primarily along media lines -air, 
water, and land. Yet, the sources of air, water, and land pollution are interrelated and sometimes 
interchangeable.... A far more effective approach to pollution control would: identify pollutants; trace 
them through the entire ecological chain; .... determine the total expense of man and his environment; 
examine interactions among forms of pollution; and identify where the ecological chain interdiction would 
be most appropriate' [cited Weale, 1992: 96].
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Although laudable in its objectives, when one examines the structure and functions of the 
NLO, two potential problems are immediately apparent. The first problem is one of 
organisation. Despite the policy of Integrationsgeddnke , the NLO was still effectively 
broken up along functional lines. Whilst the central directorate (Abt. 1) and the offices 
dealing with water and waste management (Abt. 3 and 4.) were in Hildesheim, the rest of 
the NLO was scattered across Lower Saxony. For instance, the office for nature 
protection (Abt. 2) and the offices for work protection and emission and radiation 
protection (Abt. 5 and 6) occupied different addresses in Hannover, whilst the 
Forschungsstelle Ktiste (coastal research centre) was in Norderney in the north of the 
state. Obviously, some degree of decentralisation is inevitable or even necessary (such as 
the location of the Forschungsstelle Ktiste on the coast!), but the balkanisation of the NLO 
demonstrated that the ideal model of an integrated one-stop shop is easier in theory than in 
practice. In reality, despite the best of intentions, it was inevitable that the old 
disciplinary or media-oriented divisions remained.
The second problem was more political and primarily concerned the Greens. In theory, 
the principle of Integrationsgedanke appealed to the Green ideal of making environmental 
policy central to the planning process per se and tackling it in the round rather than as a 
secondary or peripheral concern. In practice, however, it meant that there was danger that 
issues of huge political salience to the Greens would be reduced to a technical or problem- 
solving discourse. It will be recalled that the Greens opposition to the incineration of 
waste and their advocacy of waste prevention and re-cycling (Vermeidung und 
Verwertung) [FAZ. 16/5/90] and the rejection of nuclear energy were the sine qua non of 
co-operation with the SPD. At the time Jiirgen Trittin wanted assurances from Schroder 
over these issues [HAZ. 17/5/90]. Yet, if Schroder did indeed want to 'mess about' (to use 
Trittin's words) the Greens over these policy issues, the sublimation of the 
Niedersachsiches Landesamt fur Wasser und Abfall and, to a lesser extent, the
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Niedersachsiches Landesamt fur Immissionsschutz into the NLO provided the perfect 
opportunity to bury difficult issues (and indeed personnel) within a large decentralised 
administrative apparatus.
However, two factors indicated that there was no danger of this happening. First, as the 
SPD had invested much political capital in securing the Environment portfolio at the 
expense of their office-seeking payoffs, it was unlikely that they has done so merely in 
order to bury contentious issues. Second, two years before its official foundation, Monika 
Griefahn had tasked Horst Wilbrand zur Horst with the task of setting up the NLO, of 
which he would become President. At the time of his appointment, the 52 year-old Herr 
zur Horst, a Physicist by profession, was Letter der Abteilung Kernenergie und 
Strahlenschutz within the Environment Ministry, having held the post since the 
foundation of the Ministry in 1988. He had been at the forefront of the debate over the 
future of nuclear power in Lower Saxony from 1974 onwards, having served in the 
Sozialministeriums and the Bundesratsministeriums [Niedersachsisches 
Umweltministerium Pressestelle, 10/12/90]. Herr zur Horst was obviously a political 
heavyweight, with technical and administrative clout (the Abteilung Kernenergie und 
Strahlenschutz had over 40 full-time officials). His appointment indicated that the success 
of the NLO was a high priority for both coalition partners.
Despite the political and organisational difficulties discussed above - and the fact that 
representatives of the Greens' client groups are only modestly represented within it - the 
NLO appears to have been a successful institutional innovation. There is far less criticism 
of the State Office from the Greens than any other relevant organ of state, and it still 
enjoys cross-party support. This is partly because of the limited terms of reference 
enjoyed by the NLO. In a speech given at the press party to launch the NLO. Monika 
Griefahn declared that the NLO would be the 'technical backbone for the environmental
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policy strategy of the state Government' 77 [Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium 
Pressestelle, 01/10/92]. What Griefahn meant when she said that the NLO should be a 
'technical backbone1 was that it would be a source of Value-free 1 expertise, rather than a 
ginger-group. It did not represent a significant 'opening up' of the policy network and 
enjoyed little or no scope for programmatic innovation.
As the sections looking at the Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs and the Zweite 
Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung demonstrate, where institutions were set 
up to explicitly advocate and advise programmatic innovation, they attracted far more 
criticism.
7.4. Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of 
Nuclear Power (Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs)
The saga of setting up the Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs (or BfK), was to 
become a real problem of coalition management between the SPD and Greens. This was 
perhaps not a surprise in retrospect, given that whole issue of phasing-out nuclear power 
was essentially contested and considered a litmus test for political co-operation by the 
Greens.
The Nuclear power policy issue was additionally complicated because it involves what the 
Basic Law calls Auftragsverwaltung or 'delegated administration' 78 . As such, it cuts across
77Das Neue Amt ist das fachliche Ruckrat fur umweltpolitische Strategien der Landesregierung. 
7%Delegated and/or Autonomous Administration. The Basic Law distinguishes between 'delegated 
administration', known in German as Auftragsverwaltung, and 'autonomous administration' or I'erwaltung 
als eigene Angelegenheit. In the early period of the Federal Republic, the latter was more common than the 
former, as it was protected under the Basic Law. Delegated administration takes place where the Federal
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Lander and Bund competencies. This had obvious consequences in terms of party 
politics. Given that the Federal Government was comprised of the CDU/CSU and the 
FDP, they were predisposed to oppose policy initiatives put forward by any the Red- 
Green coalition, even in the context of the Federal Republic's relatively consensual political 
culture. In addition, the division of competencies also meant the vertical sectorisation of 
policy-making, with all the difficulties that entailed (see Chapter Two).
The idea to set up an Advisory Council was not in the coalition agreement of 1990, but its 
origins lie in the ambitious programme set out in that document. Although (or perhaps 
because) the Greens did not get the Environment ministry portfolio, they made it very 
clear that the issue of nuclear power was high on their agenda. This was reflected in the 
coalition agreement.
According to the coalition agreement, the ultimate aim of the coalition was stated as being 
nothing less than the ultimate abandonment of nuclear technology as a means of providing 
energy by the state of Lower Saxony and, by implication, the Federal Republic as a whole. 
In setting out the goals of the coalition's nuclear policy, the agreement states:
The coalition parties share the same opinion that the use of atomic energy 
for the provision of energy has recently, after the reactor accident at 
Chernobyl with its catastrophic consequences, been shown to be an 
irresponsible risk. Moreover, to this day the question of how to process 
and store the resulting atomic waste has been unresolved. The disposal that
Government has sole powers of execution, but, because of its reliance upon the Lander, cannot undertake 
those tasks itself. The Lander are then delegated to act as the agent of the Federation. These fields are 
atomic energy (under Article 87c of the Basic Law), inland waterways (under Article 89(2)). civil defence 
(Article 87b(2)) and the collection of certain federal taxes (Article 108(4)). Also, the Lander have been 
directly prescribed the delegated administration of federal autobahns under Article 104a(3). In addition, as a 
rule of thumb, wherever something is administered by the Lander, but the Federation provides more than 
50% of a given subsidy, the Lander are deemed to be acting as agents of the Federation. In all other cases 
bar the ones just described, the autonomous Land administration of Federal law is assumed to prevail, 
except when Federal law prescribes otherwise.
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has been pursued up until now has been shown to be of no use. The 
coalition partners will use their political mandate to pursue every 
possibility, within the relevant legal framework, in order to achieve an exit 
from the atomic sector. 
[SPD-LandesverbandNiedersachsen, 1990: 16].
There was nothing ambiguous in the wording of the agreement, which went on to list a 
number of facilities and activities that the coalition would like to see closed-down. At the 
very least, the coalition intended to use its powers to have such nuclear power-related 
plants and practices reviewed with a view to closure on health and safety grounds, where 
the Lander had competence under the terms of the Aufsichtspflicht (literally, the duty to 
monitor).
The agreement singled-out ten specific cases which would be subject to Lower Saxony's 
competence of Aufsichtspflicht. These included:
• A review of health and safety permits at the Stade nuclear power station and the 
introduction of stringent new safety regulations for Stade and other such facilities in 
Lower Saxony.
• Cancelling the permit review process for the planned long-term disposal facility for 
nuclear waste at Gorleben (Endlager Gorlebeh) which the coalition regarded as being 
seriously flawed79 .
79The International Atomic Energy Agency uses five classifications of Nuclear Wasts. High-level nuclear 
wastes (Class I and II) result form the nuclear fuel process. Fuel production, known as fuel fabrication 
within the industry, produces significant levels of this kind of watse. The wastes take the form of the hulls 
or containers for the fuel elements and the storage pond residues. However, the highest levels of waste are 
produced by the reprocessing of spent fuel. Class I waste is high level and long-lived (in terms of 
radioactive half-life) and is characterised by high levels of radiotoxicityand high levels of heat output over a 
long period of time. Class II waste is intermediate level and long-lived. It has a lower radiotoxicity. lower 
heat output, but still has a long half-life. Like nearly all of the advanced industrial states, the Federal 
Republic relies upon the deep geological disposal of high level nuclear waste. This involves placing the
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• Shelving plans to build a pilot reprocessing plant (Pilotkonditionierungsanlage or 
PKA) for spent fuel rods in Lower Saxony, pending a total review of the state's nuclear 
waste disposal concept80 . Even if eventually approved, the PKA was only be situated 
on the sight of any future Endlager. Given that the approval of a future long-term 
facility was, the coalition hoped, unlikely, so was the PKA.
• A review of conditions at the storage facility already situated at Gorleben. 
Transportbehalter-Lager Gorleben (TBL, for hulls or containers used during transit of 
nuclear waste). Special attention to be paid to the possible effect of accidents at TBL 
upon the surrounding area.
• Notwithstanding that the coalition accepted that it had little legal redress to challenge 
the license for Fafilager Gorleben (the storage pond within which active fuel rods are 
placed), the coalition intended to appoint a team of independent scientists to review 
the licenses.
• The use of all legal means to prevent the further progress of the licensing of the 
Endlager Schacht Konrad and the Asse II facility. In particular, the coalition opposed 
the storage of Glaskokillen, the highly radiotoxic and heat-emitting glassy residue left 
over from the reprocessing of spent fuel rods.
• Use of the state's agencies empowered with the tasks of granting licenses and 
monitoring health and safety at work (the Genehmigungs- und Aufsichtsbehorde), in 
order to review the safety of the transport of atomic material and make its findings 
available to the public.
waste at depths of 2,000 to 3,000 feet below ground. The medium within which it is deposited is either 
salt, granite, shale, or basalt. In the Federal Republic, the normal practice is to use salt as the receiving 
medium [Wells, 1996: 106-115].
80Reprocessing uses a variety of chemical and mechanical processes in order to recover fissionable, 
uranium, plutonium, thorium and other valuable material form nuclear waste. Once reprocessing has taken 
place, one is left with a highly readiocative and heat-emitting liquid residue. The residue undergoes a 
process of vitrification, in which it is exposed to great heat in order to solidify it. This leaves a glassy type 
of material that must be disposed of [Wells, 1996: 113].
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• Within the legal framework of Auftragsverwaltung, to enter into a dialogue with the 
Federal Government at the level of state secretary, in order to recodify the whole 
nuclear waste disposal concept. In particular, the Federal Republic should be 
encouraged to cancel all contracts for the re-processing of nuclear waste abroad.
• The review and re-organisation of Lower Saxony's Katastrophenschutz (civil defence 
measures) for areas adjacent to the transport and storage of waste. All information 
would be put in the public domain in order to stress what the coalition regarded as a 
high level of collective risk relating to such activities.
• An official statement, recording the state of Lower Saxony's unease about the safety of 
nearby nuclear facilities in the GDR (for instance the 'Bruno Leuschner' power station 
and the Endlager Morsleberi) and demanding that all licenses granted to these facilities 
be annulled and re-submitted as part of the Staatsvertrag (to be signed that summer by 
the GDR and the Federal Republic as a prelude to unification).
The scope of these proposals indicate that, when Gerhard Schroder declared in his 
inaugural address to the Landtag that 'this coalition is on the way to correcting the wrong 
decisions of atomic policy', these were not empty words.. However, such a wish-list of 
commitments presented a multitude of problems which demanded solutions of a political, 
policy-oriented or legal nature. Moreover, whatever they were, such decisions were not 
only of environmental importance, but would also involve a great deal of other people's 
money (be it the tax-payer's or that of private enterprise). At the same time, the political 
temperature within the coalition regarding the whole nuclear issue was rising and, over the 
next few years, the words Gorleben, Schacht Konrad and Unteweser ceased to be the 
preserve of a small self-referential policy community and entered the mainstream political 
discourse.
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Obviously, the Green parliamentary Fraktion was coming under a huge amount of 
pressure from the party's Basis and from the wider environmental movement to get 
results, but this pressure was not just confined to the Greens. As Environment Minister, 
Monika Griefhan was also finding it increasingly hard to reconcile the rhetoric of anti- 
nuclear campaigning with the realities of running an Environment Ministry in a relatively 
poor Land, with limited room for manoeuvre financially (because of the depressed 
economy and parlous state finances) or constitutionally (because the whole policy area 
was essentially delegated down to the Lower Saxony as Auftragsvenvaltung under the 
Basic Law).
As the coalition moved into mid-term, the much anticipated break-through on phasing out 
nuclear energy had still not materialised and the relevant government agencies and sub­ 
committees were increasingly bogged down in the minutiae of re-assessing academic 
evidence, examining individual sites for deep Geological disposal and the relative merits of 
various proposals for transporting waste to the sites in question. This was all part and 
parcel of the process of policy making, but reeked of unnecessary prevarication in the 
opinion of many in the wider environmental movement. For some time, elements within 
the movement, including Greenpeace, had begun to increase the pressure with a series of 
high-profile actions at sites that were undergoing review81 . These actions were occurring 
with increasing regularity, in a climate of growing public criticism of the nuclear industry.
Given that the public mood that was increasingly hostile to the nuclear industry, Griefahn 
was under huge political pressure to take advantage of its poor PR profile and make some 
sort of gesture, regardless of her limited powers. The question was, where she would
8 'Whilst they had been invaluable to the SPD in denying the Greens the Environment portfolio (see 
Chapter Three), Griefhan's credentials as a leading member of Greenpeace were less of an advantage now. 
The connection between Griefahn and Greenpeace did not go unnoticed, either by the Greens (who regarded 
her as selling out the movement) or the opposition (who sought to portray her as anti-enterprise and in thrall 
of the eco-Left).
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choose to make such a stand. She chose the question of issuing licenses for the interim 
storage of high-level wastes at Gorleben. To add to the political potency of her decision, it 
coincided with the arrival of a shipment of waste from Mol in Belgium. As a result, not 
only did her decision have the potential to antagonise the Federal Government, it also 
involved a de facto intrusion upon the Bund's, foreign and security policy.
Griefahn made her move on June 14 1991, announcing that she was going to remove the 
storage permit for Gorleben, thus effectively cancelling the Mol shipment, on the grounds 
that the shipment's origin was unclear [HAZ. 14/06/91]. The containers that were already 
underway were temporarily stored at police premises in the town of Liichow. These 
events coincided with three other major press stories related to nuclear politics in the state. 
First, the 'Robin Wood' group occupied the winding tower of the Schacht Konrad site in a 
blizzard of publicity [HAZ. 14/06/91]. Second, there was a renewed scare about childhood 
leukaemia in the Elbe marsh region of Lower Saxony [HAZ. 17/06/91] and, finally, the 
Oko-institut leaked documents that appeared to show that the Stade reactor was ageing and 
unsafe [HAZ. NWZ. Neue Presse. 19/06/91]. Although there is no evidence to assume that 
the emergence of these stories were co-ordinated, Griefhan could not have hoped for a 
better PR climate in which to make her announcement.
The decision to halt the shipments from Mol brought an instant response from the Federal 
Government. Within days, Klaus Topfer (CDU), the Federal Environment Minister, had 
issued an order reversing Griefahn's decision on the grounds that the issue of origin was of 
no legal significance. Topfer gave her a deadline of 1500 hours on the 17 June to inform 
him that the Lower Saxony Gewerbeaufsichtsamt had lifted its ban on the transport and 
that the containers were on their way from Liichow to Gorleben [Neue Presse. \ 7/06/91 ]. 
Griefahn had no choice but to comply, albeit accompanied by a flurry of press briefings.
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Griefahn was pilloried by the press. In an editorial in the tabloid Neue Presse. her actions 
were likened to that of Don Quixote tilting at windmills; an analogy that, given the 
constitutional balance of power between Land and Bund laid out in the Basic Law, has its 
merits. Other hands were also suspected to have played a role in the Mol debacle. As the 
editorial put it:
Is Lower Saxony's head of government deliberately allowing his 
'Environment woman' to be provocative so that he can profile himself more 
powerfully as a politician with a sense of reality and responsibility? 
Gerhard Schroder seeks to achieve the exit from the policy of nuclear power 
- well aware that the law of the state does not give much [room for 
manoeuvre] - through a consensus with the power generators. 
[Neue Presse. 17/06/91].
The coalition had set out to achieve an exit from the use of nuclear power, the reprocessing 
and the storage of high-level wastes. Yet, as the editorial correctly pointed out , the 
principle of delegated legislation did leave the state government with little room for 
manoeuvre. The powers of monitoring health and safety could only be used in extremis in 
order to actually cancel a shipment and could in practice be over-ridden by the Bund. 
Multi-level governance represents Katzenstein's [1987] 'second node' of the Nuclear 
energy policy network and, within this node, the Land was seriously constrained by a 
conservative Federal government that was successfully making common purpose with 
producer interests amongst the NGOs. At the same time, the Land coalition was under 
increasing pressure from the anti-nuclear NGOs to make solid progress but, because of the 
Federal government's superior share of (legal and political) resources, was failing to do so. 
The Lower Saxony government was in a political trap.
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In the absence of Dens ex machina, the coalition decided to get out of the trap by tried- 
and-trusted social democratic means. They appointed a committee of the experts! The 
decision to set up the BfK was taken in cabinet on 24 September 1991, with a planned 
start date of 16 December 1991. On the 25 October 1991 the setting up of the BfK was 
made public. The BfK was announced as the body tasked with sign-posting the coalition's 
way to the Aussteig, by mediating conflicting interests and opinions within the policy 
community and taking the heat out of the issue.
Given its remit, the BfK had the potential to be the decisive player within the policy 
network. As result, the council's composition and terms of reference were of crucial 
importance to all concerned. It was to have 13 members, drawn from the energy industry, 
the natural sciences and Law, many in a private capacity. Like the Berlin EnergiebeiraL 
this prevalence of agents working in a private capacity supports Richardson and Jordan's 
[1979] contention that informal interpersonal relations within networks are as important 
as structurally-contingent relationships (as opposed to Schneider's [1988] corporatist 
ideal-type). The BfK was to work mainly (but not exclusively) to the Environment 
Ministry and have an estimated budget of around DM 450,000 per annum.
The terms of reference of the BfK were as follows. First, the provision of advice to the 
Environment Ministry regarding technical questions of safety and security of nuclear 
facilities and the creation of a Brennstoffkreislaufes (literally, 'fuel circulation'), an 
integrated system for the handling of nuclear fuel from first fission through reprocessing to 
final disposal. Second, to advise on how to protect from the dangerous effects of ionised 
radiation. Third, the development and implementation of policies relating to the operation 
of the energy-sector and its political consequences for the aim of an Ausstieg from nuclear 
power. Finally to advise on the coalition's legal position where its policies were subject to 
existing laws relating to atomic waste, radiation-protection, energy and mining. However.
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the BfK's terms of reference did not include any licensing or monitoring function. These 
tasks were left with the NLO. The full membership of the BfK is laid out Table 7.4. 
below. The BfK was to be organised into six committees, covering reactor safety, long- 
term storage and disposal of high-level wastes, radiation protection and the legal 
implications for energy sector policy, some of which was were further sub-divided into an 
umbrella sub-committee and a number of'project-oriented' sub-committees.
The first committee is a good example of this sub-division. The committee was divided 
into sub-committees l(a) Ausschufi 'Reaktorsicherheit', and l(b) Projehtorientierte 
Ausschusse 'Handlungsbedarf auf dem Gebiet der Reaktorsicherheit' und 'Sicherheits 
forderungen bei Kernkrafhverken'. Sub-committee l(a) had a dual function. On the one 
hand, as its name suggests, it had a general responsibility for reactor safety in the state and 
was tasked with setting guidelines to best practice. On the other, it was tasked with 
safety problems relating to specific named facilities, in particular the Stade (KKS) and 
Unterweser (KKU) nuclear power stations. It would look at the first principles of safety 
monitoring and regularly re-assess the results of existing safety protocols (for instance, 
regarding technical standards and fire safety) and re-draft the monitoring protocols as they 
related to KKU. Sub-committee 1 (b) was divided into project-oriented groups. One was 
tasked with looking at the terms of reference enjoyed by the BfK in the realm of reactor 
safety (Handlungsbedarf auf dem Gebiet der Reaktorsicherheit}, whilst the other was to 
look at suggested improvements within the field (Sicherheits forderungen bei 
Kernkrafrwerken).
Sub-committee 2 Ausschufi Endlagerung, was tasked to look at the long-term storage of 
high-level wastes. This meant direct involvement with the Gorleben and Asse II storage 
facilities. The sub-committee would set-up a public enquiry into the whole concept of 
long term storage (in German an Endlagerhearing), in which many of the members of the
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Table 7.4. The Lower Saxony Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out 




1. Herrn Dr. Helmut Hirsch.
2. Herrn Prof. Dr. Klaus Traube.
3. Herrn. Dr. Reiner Geulen.
4. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Alexander 
RoBnagel.
5. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Wolfgang 
Strobele.
6. Frau Prof. Dr. Inge Schmitz- 
Feuerhake.
7. Herrn Lothar Hahn.
8. Herrn Dr. Detlef Appel.
9. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Horst Kuni.
10. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Dieter von 
Ehrenstein.
11. Frau Dr. Use Tweer.
12. Herrn Nikolaus Piontek.
13. Herrn Prof. Dr. Peter 
Hennicke.
External Members (Externe 
Beiratmitglieder)
1. Herrn Dr. Rainer Wolf.
2. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz 
Lux.
3. Herrn. Dr. Bernhard Knipping 
(deceased).
4. Frau Prof. Dr. Gertrude 
Lubbe-Wolf.
5. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Gerhard 
Jentzch.
6. Herrn. Dr. Klaus Groth.
7. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Klaus 
Duphorn.
8. Herrn Otfried Schumacher.
9. Herrn. Detlef Rieck. ____
Asencv
Hannover Ecology Group (Gruppe Okologie Hannover).
In a private capacity.
In a private capacity.
Darmstadt Polytechnic (Fachhochschule Darmstadt).
Oldenburg University. 
Bremen University.
Ecological Institute (Oko-Institut) in Darmstadt. 
In a private capacity. 
In a private capacity. 
Bremen University.
In a private capacity. 
In a private capacity. 
Darmstadt Polytechnic.
In a private capacity. 
In a private capacity.
In a private capacity. 
In a private capacity. 
In a private capacity.
In a private capacity. 
In a private capacity.
In a private capacity. 
In a private capacity.
Source: Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium, 1992.
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sub-committee intended to give evidence. Hearings were scheduled to begin in September 
1993.
The third sub-committee was also sub-divided. Sub-committee 3 (a) Ausschufi 
'Entsorgungskonzept' would look at the whole question of the disposal of high-level 
wastes, be it deep geological disposal or reprocessing. The sub-committee would look at 
the Gorleben pilot re-processing plant, as well as the arrangements for the safe transport 
and disposal of high-level wastes at Endlager Schacht Konrad and would also examine 
ways to stop spent fuel rods from the Federal Republic being reprocessed abroad. Sub­ 
committee 3 (b) 'Projektorientierte Aussschufi 'Kritieirien und methodische Vorgaben fur 
Entsorgungskonzepte' was tasked with formulating the abstract criteria and methodological 
first principles of an integrated disposal concept for high-level wastes, with a focus upon 
the question of deep geological disposal at Gorleben.
The fourth committee divided into sub-committee 4 (a) Ausschub 'Strahlenschutz' and 4 
(b) Projektorientierter Ausschufi 'Dokumentation der Tschernobyl-Folgen'. 4 (a) was 
tasked with the practicalities of radiation protection, including the evaluation of a 10 -year 
study into levels of childhood cancer (including leukaemia clusters in the Elbe region of 
Lower Saxony) in the vicinity of nuclear installations, undertaken by academics at Mainz 
University. It was hoped that an official sliding-scale of potential danger, based upon 
proximity and emissions, would be established by 1994. 4 (b) was planned as a ginger- 
group with the specific task of investigating and making public all the available information 
on the Chernobyl disaster (the sub-committee never reported back, as it was abandoned on 
budgetary grounds).
The fifth committee was also sub-divided, this time into sub-committee 5 (a) Ausschub 
'Energiewirtschaft und -politik' and 5 (b) Projektorientierter Ausschufi 'Wirkung eines
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Atomenergieausstiegs auf energiepolitischen Rahmenbedingungen'. 5 (a) concentrated 
upon the political possibilities and consequences of a move towards a more sustainable 
system of energy provision. It was to look at a range of initiatives, very much in the same 
vein as those promoted by the Berlin Energiegesetz, including the de-centralisation of 
energy generation down to the level of the Kommunen and the extension of the use of 
Kraft-Warme-Kopplung (Combined Heat and Power) and wind energy. 5 (b) was meant to 
look at how the move away from atomic power would impact upon the wider framework 
of energy policy. However, it was to become a victim of the failure of the SPD and 
Greens to agree a long term energy policy during the Energiekonsens-Verhandhmgen (an 
ongoing set of negotiations between the parties and other policy actors designed to 
formulate a policy of sustainable energy provision that would enjoy a wide-spread 
acceptance across the policy community).
Committee 6 ^Rechtsfrageri} was tasked with assessing the legal implications of the BfK's 
findings. Thus, it was at the sharp end of the council's work. In particular, committee 6 
had to make sure that the BfK did not find itself infringing upon the legal rights of the 
private sector and/or the Federal Government.
Finally, there were two more committees, 8. for planning and 9., which was tasked with 
setting the agenda for the Energiekonsens-Verhandlungen. Unlike the other committees, 
sub-committee 9. worked to the Staatskanzlei rather than the Environment Ministry.
A number of criticisms are immediately apparent when examining the BfK's terms of 
reference and organisation. First, looking at the tasks of these sub-committees in the 
round, it is clear that the BfK's terms of reference were extremely wide-ranging. Whilst the 
project-oriented sub-committees are relatively focused, the more generalist sub-committees 
are not. Moreover, some sub-committees appear very close in their terms of reference
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(those sub-committees covering the practicalities of enforcing reactor safety and radiation 
protection could easily duplicate work between themselves as well as with the legal sub­ 
committee).
Second, not only did the BfK intend to provide the widest possible coverage of all the 
relevant themes within the policy area, but it touched upon the interests of competencies 
of the Federal Government. It was inevitable, given the policy area, that these were not 
just domestic interests, but also involved overseas links (through the reprocessing of spent 
fuel rods abroad), some of which were of a security-oriented nature.
Third, not only were the BfK's terms of reference wide-ranging and its bureaucracy 
unwieldy, but it was quite expensive. Although, in absolute terms, an estimated operating 
budget of DM 450,000 per annum (almost definitely an understatement) is small, it was 
hard to defend politically. The danger of accusations of'jobs for the boys' are obvious.
Indeed, this was precisely the response of the CDU when the foundation of the BfK as 
announced, portraying it as a 'maintenance-club for the Red-Green circle' and 'making a 
mockery of the tax-payer in Lower Saxony' [HAZ. 26/09/91]. Yet the list of names that 
were announced by the speaker from the Staatskanzlei was not the same as the eventual 
list of members of the BfK. Even after making allowances for unforeseen circumstances, it 
was clear that the membership of the BfK was the subject of much behind the scenes horse 
trading, some of which was quite bitter82 .
82The author vividly remembers conducting an interview with a particular (SPD) Abteilungsleiter in the 
Environment Ministry who, when asked about the process of staffing the BfK, was evidently still bitter 
about the Greens actions over the issue. He criticised the Greens for forcing some personnel onto the Beirat 
who were, in his opinion, not up to the job. Although there is no way of assessing this claim, the author 
was left with an impression of wide-spread bad-feeling surrounding the formation of the BfK.
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Despite the setting-up of the BfK, the coalition continued to find itself under pressure 
from the anti-nuclear lobby, yet unable to force through fundamental changes in the face of 
opposition from the Federal government and the energy industry itself. In February 1992. 
a conference of Lower Saxony anti-nuclear activists declared that, despite the coalition's 
professed desire to correct the wrong decisions of nuclear policy, 'no concrete steps in this 
direction have been undertaken at all' in the two years since the election [Frankfurter 
Rundschau. 11/02/92]. Although the Environment Ministry immediately issued a 
statement denying that this was the case, it was a charge which carried some weight. As 
the Frankfurter Rundschau pointed out, since the Red-Green coalition had come to power, 
building work at the planned Endlager Gorleben had made quick progress, despite 
attempts by the Land to slow the process down through stringent monitoring of health 
and safety standards and the reviewing of existing licenses. Similarly, despite stating that 
they intended to cancel the project, the licensing process for the Asse II facility (where it 
was intended to store Glaskokillen - the glassy residue arising form the recycling of waste 
- from the United States nuclear weapons programme) was still underway. Moreover, the 
Federal government had made it clear that they wanted to see a license for the Schacht 
Konrad facility granted (and expected it to be so). With the Bund making threatening 
noises, the review procedures of individual plants still underway and the BfK not yet up 
to speed, the coalition's anti-nuclear policy appeared becalmed.
However, the nuclear issue was about to widen out into a more existential argument, about 
energy consumption per se, that was to again open-up a fundamental fault-line between 
the SPD and Greens. Ironically, it was to be provoked by non-nuclear policy options.
By early 1992, Gerhard Schroder believed he had found a way to get the Land out of the 
impasse in which it found itself on the nuclear issue. The gist of Schroder's initiative was 
to build conventional power stations, powered by gas and/or coal, in place of nuclear
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power stations at Wilhelmshaven and Stade. Once they heard about this, the Greens' 
Landesvorstand reacted vehemently, claiming that the proposals were not justified by any 
assessment of the region's energy needs [Neue Presse. 07/02/92]. Nevertheless, Schroder 
went ahead and signed a deal with the firm PreussenElektra to build a gas-fired power 
station at Stade. The power station would generate 700 megawatts of power using North 
Sea gas and was planned to come on-line in 1994, at the same time as it was planned to 
take the 20-year old reactor at Stade off-line [Nord-West Zeitung. 08/02/92].
The Stade decision temporarily drove a wedge between the Greens' Landesvorstand and 
the parliamentary Fraktion. The former condemned the decision, on the basis that the 
construction of new Grofikraftwerken (large-scale power stations) ran counter to the 
thinking behind the coalition's own energy policy (which, like in West Berlin, was 
committed to the construction of small de-centralised power stations as close as possible 
to the end-user). The latter were more circumspect, aware that the coalition regarded the 
closure of the Stade reactor by the time of the next Landtagswahl in 1994 as the litmus 
test of the commitment to the Ausstieg from nuclear energy. As a result, the 
parliamentary Fraktion's spokesperson was forced to posit the Jesuitical argument that 
the decision to build a new Groftkraftwerke was actually the exception that proved the 
rule of the coalitions energy policy.
Such evasion reflected the fact that the Greens' Fraktion were in a difficult position. On 
the one hand, they resented the decision to build a new power station, which was against 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the coalition agreement. However, they were also committed 
to the de-commissioning of the nuclear reactor at Stade by the next Landtagswahl. for the 
reasons already discussed. The option of building conventional power stations provided a
246
pragmatic way out of the impasse or, as Schroder called it, an 'Einstieg in den Ausstieg'^ 
from a reliance upon nuclear power in Lower Saxony and, it was hoped, the Federal 
Republic [Nordwest-Zeitung. 05/12/92]. As the Berlin Tageszeitung put it, 'the exit from 
the use of atomic energy in the Federal Republic begins with an unideological compromise' 
[TAZ. 05/12/92]. With the initiative being given a cautious welcome by the Bonn 
government, Schroder had apparently got the coalition off the hook.
However, as 1992 moved into 1993 and the Landtags\vahl began to assume more 
importance, opinion hardened within the Greens' Fraktion. Fraktionsvorsitzencle Thea 
Diickert declared that, although the Stade compromise was 'a sensible interim solution', the 
Greens were not prepared to accept it as the basis of a long-term energy policy [Nordwest- 
Zeitung. 11/2/93. HAZ. 11/02/93]. Schroder's initiative was in trouble.
As the year progressed, relations deteriorated. By October 1993, when Schroder officially 
approved the much-maligned Europipe project (see Chapter Five), the Greens had left the 
energy consensus talks and were effectively out of the coalition. Somewhat belatedly, 
they had realised the degree to which Schroder had outmanoeuvred them over the Stade 
compromise which, as it involved the building of a gas-fired power station, was 
inextricably linked to the Europipe proposal. As Schroder repositioned himself as a 
politician whose main concern was jobs, he was happy to be seen getting much closer to 
big capitalist concerns such as PreussenElektra (who were to build Stade) and Statoil (the 
Norwegian Shipping Engineering Company who planned to invest DM. 3.3. billion into 
the Europipe project). The Greens had become marginalised.
^Translated roughly, 'buying in to the selling out'.
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As for the BfK itself, its record is a mixed one. To date, the Beirat is still operative, 
although its terms of reference have become more modest since it was re-organised at the 
beginning of 1995 on the ground of cost and efficiency. The number of sub-committees 
was reduced to five and they are now all project-oriented (eschewing the more normative 
and all-encompassing briefs that many of the original six sub-committees originally 
enjoyed).
With the Greens in opposition following the 1994 Landtag elections, the re-organisation 
ensured that nearly all traces of the Greens polemical approach to environmental policy 
had gone. What remained was a more familiar and technocratic institution, which was to 
tackle the salient issues of nuclear policy and the wider question of sustainable energy 
provision as a set of problems to be solved within the framework of the duality of the 
Beamtestaat and the Partienstaat.
This is not to say that it has been an institutional failure. The BfK was set up by an SPD- 
dominated coalition to mediate the ideological and legal/constitutional problems 
encountered by a Land that had over-reached itself politically on the nuclear issue. 
Moreover, it worked to the Environment Ministry (whose Minister was soon to become 
an SPD member) and the Staatskanzlei (which was essentially Schroder's fiefdom).
Given all of these contributing factors, especially when placed in the context of Schroder's 
sometimes ruthless style of coalition management, it is not surprising that the Greens 
quickly found themselves out in the cold.
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7.5. Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On 
Avoidance And Use Of Waste (Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung. 
Venvertung)
Given that its was set up in order to find ways of reducing the consumption and waste of 
resources, it is ironic that the amount of printed material generated by the operation of the 
Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung (from now on to be referred to as 
the Second Government Commission) is vast! However, this is no surprise, given the 
relative importance of solid waste disposal84 as a policy issue within the state of Lower 
Saxony by the beginning of the 1990s. New and innovative ways of solving the state's 
waste problem were needed. As Schneider puts it:
Lower Saxony is a so-called 'Landfill-state', in which domestic waste is 
never or hardly ever processed before being stored at the landfill. In 1990. 
98.3% of all domestic waste was dumped and only 1.1% went for 
incineration [Source: Federal Statistics Office. 1994: 70]. The situation was 
characterised by a threatening state of crisis in the waste disposal system in 
certain communes because of the impending over-filling of the dumps there. 
The solution at that time was to extend the landfill or, in exceptional cases, 
its incineration or transfer to another dump. 
[1996: 73].
Municipal solid waste has traditionally been disposed of by means of disposal, of which 
there are three methods: landfill, incineration and ocean disposal. Schneider's account begs
84Wells defines three kinds of solid waste. First, municipal waste, including household waste, waste 
similar to household waste generated from small firms and waste from lawns and gardens. Second. 
industrial waste, including hazradous waste. Third, SQHW, or small quantity hazardous waste [1996: 128].
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the idea that the root cause of Lower Saxony's waste disposal crisis was an imbalance 
between the landfill option and the incineration85 or ocean disposal options. But the latter 
option was out of the question given the Greens' concern about the delicate balance of the 
North Sea and the adjacent Wattenmeer (see Chapter Five). Moreover, given the Greens 
opposition to incineration, the coalition agreement had made it clear that an extension of its 
use was also out of the question, stating:
The coalition partners will immediately exploit all legal means in order to 
put a stop to the incineration of household waste. To this end it will be 
ensured that all current plans and exploratory research into household 
incineration facilities will be broken off. 
[SPD Landesverband, 1990: 24].
Rather than pursue the incineration option, the coalition proposed the following: 
• The expansion of the state's existing landfills and the development of new sites along 
the lines of the highest possible Stand der Technik. These controlled landfills to be 
subject to strict engineering requirements, relating to climate, topography, surface and 
groundwater systems (particularly important in Lower Saxony), solid composition and 
more general land use plans for each locality. More stress to be placed upon leachate
85To say that the state of Lower Saxony made only limited use of incineration is to speak relatively. In 
reality, even the 1.1% of waste added up to an alarming set of figures. For instance, in Hameln 90,000 
tonnes of domestic waste were burnt in 1990, compared with 270,000 tonnes in Bremen, 250,000 tonnes in 
Emsland, 300,000 tonnes in Oldenburg, 392,000 tonnes in Stade, 500,000 tonnes in Salzgitter and 750.000 
tonnes in Hannover. In addition, 10,000 tonnes of toxic waste was burnt in Osnabruck, 35,000 tonnes in 
Salzgitter, 30,0000 tonnes in Stade and 16,000 tonnes in Stadthagen. Moreover, at the time of the Red- 
Green coalition coming to power, there were plans to build additional incinerators at Dorpen (80,000 
tonnes), Georgsmarienhutte (40,000 tonnes) and Munster (no figures available). [Grune Illustrierte. 1-2. 
1990].
The first official tests into incineration in Europe took place in England in 1874. For many years. 
incineration was regarded as the way forward. However, incineration is now widely regarded as having 
unacceptable environmental impacts, because of the emissions into the air of criteria pollutants (such as 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons) and the problem of disposal of the 
resulting ash [Wells, 1996: 136-137).
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systems (preventing contamination of groundwater), gas emissions, odours and noise. 
If Federal funding could not be found for this, the coalition intended to introduce a 
special toll on waste at the Land level.
• The transport of solid wastes out of Lower Saxony to be prevented wherever possible.
• The implementation of measures designed to reduce the production of solid waste by 
means of greater transparency of costs and an extension of the 'polluter pays ' 
principle. Measures to be introduced to include a system of charges and strengthened 
storage rules, the outlawing of dumping any re-cyclable waste, a legally-enforceable 
waste-return system placing responsibility for the disposal or re-use of dangerous or 
non-sustainable materials on the producer and the introduction of an 
Umweltvertraglichkeitsprufung (environmental impact assessment) system for 
industrial wastes.
• The re-codification of Lower Saxony's laws on waste disposal. Amongst other things, 
the re-codification to ensure that the state, private firms and citizens were duty-bound 
to separate waste, as well as to give priority to re-cycled materials in all procurement 
decisions, to introduce a toll on every ton of disposable waste (hypothecated for the 
sanitation of existing landfill sites) and provide advice and information to producers 
and consumers.
• The introduction of a bill into the Bundesrat in order to amend the Federal legislation, 
in particular the Gesetz itber die Vermeidung und Entsorgung von Abfdllen 
(Abfallgesetz -AbfG) of 1986, which dealt specifically with the disposal of solid 
wastes, with the intention of enhancing the priority given to the material (rather than 
thermal) re-use of waste, the promotion of re-usable packaging (such as Mehrweg or 
deposit bottles), the standardisation of waste classification and the reduction of 
incineration. 
[SPD Landesverband, 1990: 22-26].
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Like the coalition's nuclear policy, this programme was very ambitious. Moreover, in a 
similar way to the Kernenergieaustieg programme, it required the surmounting of a number 
of obstacles of a legal and party political nature. First, in legal terms, the Land was not a 
sovereign actor within the field, but shared technical competencies with the Kommunen 
and, more importantly, legislative power with the Bund. Moreover, competencies are both 
horizontally and vertically sectorised. This is because Article 79 of the Basic Law states 
that the policy area is subject to concurrent legislation (konkurriende Gesetzgebung)*6 
between the Bundestag and Bundesrat (hence the initiative to amend the Federal law), as 
well as with the Lander. Given that, as already mentioned, the Land relies upon the 
Kommunen to carry out waste disposal, this legal division presents a number of 
institutional blocks on the policy process. Second, although such multi-level governance is 
meant to be carried out in a spirit of co-operative federalism, it inevitably has party- 
political overtones. Thus, the Red-Green coalition in Hannover could rely upon a 
sympathetic SPD majority in the Bundesrat, but not in the Bundestag. Moreover, it had 
to expect a number of (CDU- and/or FDP-controlled) Kommunen making common cause 
with their political allies in the Federal government against the Landesregierung.
In a similar vein to the BfK, the Second Government Commission was designed to mediate 
between these conflicting institutional and partisan interests within the policy community. 
However, unlike the BfK, it was not an ad hoc arrangement put together in mid-term.
On the contrary, the Regierungskommission 'Vermeidung Sonderabfalle' (the First 
Government Commission on the subject) had been set up in the Albrecht era. The First 
Commission had 11 Arbeitskreise (working groups), looking at the disposal of sand form
Basic Law makes four distinctions between different forms of legislation. First, Exclusive 
Legislation, on which the Bundestag alone can legislate. Second, Concurrent Legislation, on which both 
the Bundestag and the Lander can legislate. Third, those areas where the Bundestag can issue Framework 
Legislation. Finally, the sphere of Reserved Legislation, which is the competence of the Lander.
252
spillages, shredded materials, the re-cycling of building material, waste metals, varnishes 
and paints, halogen etc. However, these were essentially end-of-pipe solutions, rather 
than ways of amending production processes and patterns of consumption. The coalition 
agreement stated the new administration's intention to re-scrutinise the findings of the 
First Commission and extend its brief.
The Second Commission, as it would be called, would also have 5 new Arbeitskreise. 
looking at themes such as the disposal of polyurethane, old electronic equipment, oil 
polluted metal waste and the re-cycling of aluminium and automobiles. These new 
working groups marked a shift away from production-oriented waste towards what has 
been called 'post-consumer' waste.
The Second Commission was officially set up at the beginning of 1991, consisting of 17 
members appointed from business and industrialist groups, trades unions, ecology groups, 
the sciences and the civil service. It was Chaired by Herrn Maximilian Ardelt, a board- 
member of PreussagAG, with Herr Dr. Volker Miiller, from the Lower Saxony Institute 
of Commerce as CEO. Both posts were deputised by senior civil servants from the 
Farming87 and Environment Ministries. Of the other 17 permanent members of the 
commission, six came from industry and commerce, two from the trades unions, two from 
the sciences, two from the wider ecological movement, and five from the civil service. Of 
these civil servants, two came from the (effectively SPD-controlled) Environment 
Ministry, one from the SPD-run Economics Ministry, one from the Schroder-dominated 
Staatskanzlei and, finally, one from the Umweltbundesamt (not a cabinet portfolio, but 
working to the CDU-controlled Environment Ministry at the Federal level). The full list 
of permanent members is laid out in Table 7.5. below.
87 Interestingly, Herrn Konrad Keller, the civil servant in question, was from the new Land of Saxony 
Anhalt.
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Table 7.5. The Second Government Commission On Avoidance And 













1. Dr. Kurt Eiglmeier.
2. Jutta Schwarzer.
3. Walter Blum.
4. Dr. Werner Loges.
5. Dr. Schulz-Rickmann.
6. Herrn Jens Petersen.. 
Permanent Members from 
Trades Unions.
7. Prof. Dr. Thomas Hopner.
8. Bernd Heins.
Permanent Members from the
Sciences.
9. Prof. Dr. Dr. Mufit Bahadir.
10. Prof. Dr. Georg Redeker. 
Permanent Members from 
Ecological Groups.
11. Christoph Ewen.
12. Dr Uwe Lahl. 
Administration.
13. Dr. Christel Moller.
14. Dr. Otto Stumpf.
15. Dr. Hans Sutler.





Ministerium fur Erndhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes 
Sachsen-Anhalt.
Institut des Niedersachsisches Wirtschaft e. V. 
Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium.




Nds. Gesellschaft :ur Endablagerung. 
IHK Luneburg-Wolfsburg
Institut fur Chemie und Biologie des Meeres der Uni Oldenburg. 
IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik.
Institut fur Okologische Chemie.
Institut fur Qualitatssicherung der Universitat Hannover.
Oko -Institut e. V. 




Niedersachsisches Ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Technologie und
Verkehr.
Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium._______
Source: Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium. 1991
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In addition to the permanent members, each Arbeitskreise was staffed by a number of 
specialists in roughly the same proportion as the permanent members. So, for instance, 
Arbeitskreise 12 (Polyurethanschaume) had four members seconded from industry, two 
from the trades unions, four from the sciences, two from the ecology groups, one from the 
Kommunen and was chaired by a senior civil servant from the Environment Ministry. 
Similarly, Arbeitskreise 15 (Aluminiumrcycling) had four members seconded from 
industry, one from the trades unions, three from the sciences, three from the ecological 
groups, one from the Kommunen and was again chaired by a senior Environment Ministry 
official.
The significance of this mix is discussed in greater depth in section on payoffs, but what it 
obvious is that (unlike in, for example, the Berlin Energiebeirat) the Greens only managed 
to secure a limited amount of access to the Second Commission by their own client groups 
\Niedersachsiches Umweltministerium AbschluJ3RegKom-502, 1995]. On this evidence, it 
appears that the topic area of solid waste disposal, particularly industrial waste, presents 
high opportunity costs to entry (based on expertise and access to the means of 
production) and is a relatively closed network. This is supported by two other 
observations. First, even one of the trades union representatives came from a university 
faculty (Oldenburg), which supports the idea of limited entry to the network based on 
expertise. Second, there is only one individual on the Commission acting in a private 
capacity, which supports the idea of limited entry based upon access to the means of 
production. In terms of the policy network literature, this comes much closer to 
Schneider's [1988] corporatist ideal-type, than the more informal interpersonal model put 
forward by Richardson and Jordan [1979].
On the other hand, unlike the energy sector (particularly nuclear power), although the 
policy network was closed, in general terms the whole issue of recycling and the
255
sustainable disposal of solid waste was relatively uncontested. Policy actors might 
disagree on the minutiae of disposing of metal wastes or the limits to recycling aluminium, 
but no-one was opposed to the principle of it per se. Indeed, the Federal Republic is 
internationally noted for the degree of consensus around this issue (see Chapter Three). 
Thus, although the Second Commission was characterised by the limited participation of 
ecological groups compared with other structures examined in this chapter, in political 
terms this was only a limited set-back for the Greens.
This explains the good reception given to the planned Second Commission in the Green 
press, who did not appear overly concerned by the Second Commission's closed network. 
For instance., an article in the Grune Illustrierte professed faith in the commission and its 
ability to use the existing structures pragmatically, declaring that 'the state of Lower Saxony 
can use and develop the existing instruments of economic management in order to support 
an ecological orientation, which also incorporates the main features of waste prevention' 
[1-2, 1990]. Despite the optimism, in the short- to medium-term, Lower Saxony's solid 
waste disposal crisis, or 'Mullkolllaps' as it was labelled by the press, continued. By the 
beginning of 1991, the problem was so acute that Schroder and Griefahn called a special 
conference in Hannover, inviting all the leaders of the Landkreise and kreisefreien Stadte in 
Lower Saxony. Given that many of these were CDU or FDP politicians, this was a 
significant example of'big tent' politics which aroused the suspicions of many Greens.
In a series of press briefings, Griefahn let it be known that the crisis had reached such 
proportions that she had informed the cabinet that the coalition might be forced to take 
emergency measures. In particular, she hinted that the coalition might be forced to 
temporarily revert to plans drawn up during the Albrecht era. This would mean that 
142,000 tonnes of SondermilU would go to landfills, 8500 tonnes be put in short-term
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storage and another 180,000 treated chemically. However, it also meant that 90,000 
tonnes of waste would have to be incinerated [Osnabrucker Zeitung. 08/02/91].
Nevertheless, Griefahn stressed that this was an interim measure and that the coalition 
remained committed to phasing out incineration. However, this view was challenged by 
SPD Fraktionvorsitzende Johann Bruns who declared in an interview that the Land would 
not be able to avoid building a high temperature incinerator, despite the coalition agreement 
with the Greens [Nordsee Zeitung. 20/03/91].
As was discussed in Chapter Five, Bruns was on the traditional Right of the SPD and was 
regarded by the Greens as something of a 'Betonkopf (literally 'concrete head', someone 
with an unshakeable faith in the virtues of high-profile prestige building projects). He was 
also suspicious of the Greens, as demonstrated by his warnings to Schroder over the 
'commitment' to a Red-Green coalition at the Federal level. Given these facts, Bruns' 
behaviour over the next months is a little more explicable, as he appeared to deliberately 
pick away at the issue (which was obviously of some sensitivity to the coalition, given the 
way it had been flagged up in the agreement). As already noted, when the Federal 
government's technical directorate for waste disposal advised the Land that it should build 
a high-temperature incinerator, it was Bruns who was the main advocate of such a strategy 
within the coalition [Ostfriesische Nachtrichten. 10/01/92]. It will also be recalled that 
Monika Griefahn refused completely to rule out the possibility of installing high- 
temperature incinerators [HAZ. 291 5/90]. Nevertheless, it was a provocation to the 
Greens, as demonstrated by the language used by the Green Landesv or stand in their 
subsequent press releases [Die Griinen Landesverband Niedersachsen. Pressemitteilung 
Nr. 60/1/92]. Eventually, the Land decided to go ahead with constructing a high 
temperature incinerator near the town of Bramsche [Griine Zeiten. 10/92].
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Regardless of whether it was deliberate provocation or not, the incinerator decision served 
to hasten the growing atmosphere of distrust between the two coalition parties in the run­ 
up to the Landtag elections. Yet, it was indeed a pragmatic exception to the rule rather 
than a U-turn in policy. Indeed, one legacy of the Red-Green coalition (and its successor) 
has been Lower Saxony's pro-active stance in modernising the technical standards and legal 
framework of solid waste disposal at both the Land and Federal level. For instance, the 
new Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law (NAbfAbgG) came into force on 1 January 1992. 
In a speech to welcome the new law, Griefahn defended the 'polluter pays' principle, 
saying that 'economic instruments give economic signals ....to waste producers which 
encourage them in their own self-interest to develop constructive methods of waste 
reduction' \Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium. Presseinformation. 11/12/91]. It was 
calculated that self-interest would lead to the reduction of hazardous waste by 1 million 
tonnes per annum, so that it would only reach a total of 1.3 million tonnes by 1996/7 
[Niedersachsisches Umweltministerium. Presseinformation. 109/03/92]. Griefahn also 
made clear her hope that these principles would be extended to the Federal level.
Federal technical standards and legislation have since been amended, with a much stronger 
application of the 'polluter pays' principle. The 1993 Technical Instructions on 
Residential Waste (TA Siedlungsabfalle} has introduced amongst other things:
• New requirements on the reduction of harmful substances.
• The promotion of re-use and re-cycling.
• The compulsory preliminary treatment of residential wastes (Siedlungsabfalle: 
domestic waste, bulky waste, household waste-type industrial wastes, building waste 
and sewage sludge) prior to disposal.
• Incineration facilities, if unavoidable, to be at Stand der Technik. with strict 
requirements on air emissions.
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Moreover, the 1994 Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Recycling (KrW- 
/AbfG) codified these technical instructions into law. Building upon the 1986 Waste 
Management Act (AbfG) as Griefahn had wanted, its main features are:
• On the basis of 'comprehensive' responsibility for the product, the transfer of 
responsibility for the product and wastes arising from its production and consumption 
from the government to manufacturers, distributors and consumers.
• An obligation upon producers and owners of wastes to:
-give priority to avoiding wastes (using return systems)
-to fully recover non-avoidable wastes in a non-damaging way (recycling or 
energy recovery)
-to dispose of only non-recoverable wastes in an environmentally-sound manner
-on Trade and industry themselves to fulfil these directives within the framework f 
stringent legal requirements.
• The government to remain responsible for waste management if safe waste
management cannot be ensured by the producers. 
[Federal Environment Ministry. Public Relations Division. 1994, 73-74].
The imprint of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony is clear on these documents. 
This is not surprising, given the amount of political capital and financial resources that the 
coalition had invested in changing the technical and legal framework at Land level. The 
coalition used the experience of Lower Saxony to exert influence on the Federal 
government through the SPD majority in the Bundesrat, backed up by the technical 
expertise of the Second Commission.
The Second Commission' work continued until September 1996, when it was replaced by 
the Third Commission (which is to concentrate upon integrated systems of waste
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management, as part of the implementation of the 1994 Federal Act on Waste 
Management and Product Recycling (KrW-/AbfG), which came into force in 1996).
As for the question of how successful the Second Commission has been, the record is 
mixed. Given that the coalition could not avoid building a high temperature incinerator, 
one could argue that it had failed in political terms. Moreover, as already noted, the 
relatively closed policy network dealing with solid waste management, especially 
industrial waste, meant that the Greens' client groups had only limited success in breaking 
down the established hierarchies. Neither the Commission itself or its individual 
Arbeitskreise had more than a handful of members that were explicitly from the wider 
ecological movement. Thus, in terms of opening up the policy network, it failed.
Nevertheless, as has already been argued, the Federal Republic is internationally renowned 
for the high degree of consensus on the basic principles of the solid waste disposal issue. 
This meant that the under-representation of ecological groups was of less importance in 
this case. To conclude, the Red-Green coalition's record within this policy field has been a 
relative success. It is just ironic that the Greens' direct role in this achievement was so 
limited.
7.6. Resume of Chapter Seven
The chapter examined in greater depth the degree to which the Red-Green coalition in 
Lower Saxony was able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy- 
making process in the Land administration, by examining a selection of programmatic and 
institutional innovations carried out within the field of environmental policy in Lower 
Saxony. The three examples are all linked thematically.
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7.6.1. Inherent Problems of Policy Implementation in Lower Saxony
The chapter first looked some of the inherent problems associated with policy- 
implementation in Lower Saxony as they confronted the Red-Green coalition.
It discussed the poor economic health of Lower Saxony and concluded that this had acted 
as a severe constraint upon the state's finances (and thus, the coalition's room for 
manoeuvre). As a result, the parties had some difficulty in formulating a common policy 
platform. This was because a significant expansion of welfare provision (in which both 
parties had an interest) was not possible. As a result a common alternative platform had 
be carved out from a number of potentially divisive policy domains.
The subject of staffing was then looked at. It concluded that (compared to Berlin) staffing 
was much more of an issue in Lower Saxony. Moreover, given that the Land policy- 
network was so closed, concerns about recalcitrant officialdom were shared by the SPD as 
well as the Greens (including civil servants who were members of the SPD). The chapter 
gave an account of the early days of the Lower Saxony coalition, marked by the removal or 
'kicking upstairs' of many high-profile civil servants. The chapter noted that, for the 
Greens, the staffing problem was aggravated by the fact that they lacked expertise in 
depth, did not get the Environment portfolio and had to be content with the post of State 
Secretary. It noted the fact that within policy areas such as Recycling/Waste Disposal, the 
policy network was relatively closed, resource- and path-dependent. 88
The chapter concluded that the coalition's policies represented continuity, rather than 
change, in terms of their use of economic instruments.
88Thus, the dark arts of the civil service - such as agenda setting and the dissemination of information - 
were at a premium, which meant that the Greens were outmanoeuvred by the Staatskan.lei on issues such as 
the decision to build a high temperature incinerator.
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7.6.2. The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (Niedersachsiches Landesamt 
fur Okologie)
The chapter looked at the Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (NLO) and concluded 
that the policy of breaking down disciplinary and media-oriented barriers 
(Integrationsgedanke) was only partially successful, given that the actual physical location 
of its constituent offices remained spread across Lower Saxony. It was noted that such 
integrated institutional systems are often easier to envisage in theory than put into 
practice.
The chapter demonstrated that, because of both its size and its terms of reference (Monika 
Griefahn's declaration that the NLO would be the 'technical backbone for the 
environmental policy strategy of the state Government' [Niedersachsisches 
Umweltministerium Pressestelle, 01/10/92]) the NLO was of little use in pro-actively 
breaking down the established hierarchies within the policy network. Nevertheless, it 
speculated whether it was this limited role that had allowed the NLO to escape the severe 
criticism that the Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs and the Zweite 
Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Venvertung attracted.
7.6.3. Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear 
Power (Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs)
The chapter then looked at the setting up the Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs
(BfK) and the events that precipitated it. It gave an account of how the Nuclear power 
policy issue was complicated by the Basic Law, with competencies cutting across Lander 
and Bund tiers of government. This led to the Land having to 'work around' the Federal 
government's powers, by using its powers of the Aufsichtspflicht (the duty to monitor) to 
review nuclear power-related plants and practices with an eye to closure on health and
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safety grounds. The chapter then used the example of the row between Griefahn and 
Federal Environment Minister Topfer to illustrate the limited nature of Lcinder powers in 
this 'second node1 [after Katzenstein, 1987] of the policy network.
The chapter described how the BfK was set-up, as a way of getting the coalition off the 
hook on this issue. The BfK's structure and terms of reference was then assessed and a 
number of criticisms made. First, that the BfK's terms of reference were extremely wide- 
ranging and very close in their terms of reference (with the danger of duplication). Second, 
that they touched upon the interests of competencies of the Federal Government 
(including those of a security-oriented nature). Third, that with an estimated operating 
budget of DM 450,000 per annum it invited the charge of'jobs for the boys'.
The chapter then described how little of the coalition's nuclear energy policy had been 
achieved. It was noted that building work at the planned Endlager Gorleben and the 
licensing process for the Asse II facility were still underway, despite the state's 
Aufsichtspflicht powers. Moreover, the Federal government was forcing through a license 
for the Schacht Konrad facility.
The chapter then described how, since the Greens had left the Land government, the BfK's 
terms of reference had become more modest, with a reduction in the number and terms of 
reference of the sub-committees (reduced to five project-oriented sub-committees in 1995). 
It described how nearly all traces of the Greens polemical approach to environmental 
policy have gone, with a re-emphasis upon technocratic solutions within the framework of 
the duality between the Beamtestaat and the Partienstaat. However, the chapter 
concluded that, in its own terms, the BfK had not been an institutional failure, as it had 
been set up by an SPD-dominated coalition and worked to the (SPD-ran) Environment 
Ministry and Staatskanzlei (which was essentially Schroder's fiefdom). It concluded that
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the Greens never enjoyed enough institutional leverage to make their gains in this field 
permanent and prevent the reduction of the BfK's role from that of a normative and 
proselytising force to a mere project-oriented think tank.
7.6.4. Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On 
Avoidance And Use Of Waste (Zweite Regiemngskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung)
The chapter then looked at the operation of the Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, 
Verwertung, set up to further the coalition's waste-disposal strategy, and described how 
the topic of waste disposal was flagged-up during the bargaining phase and in the coalition 
agreement. It described the coalition's desire to avoid the incineration option, by 
expanding the state's existing landfills along the lines of Stand der Technik, preventing the 
transport of solid wastes out of Lower Saxony and re-shaping solid waste disposal 
measures according to the 'polluter pays ' principle. The chapter described how the 
coalition was eventually forced to make a political U-turn and build a high temperature 
incinerator in Lower Saxony, much to the disgust of the Greens' Vorstand and Basis (the 
Fraktion were forced to accept it).
The chapter leaves open the question open as to whether the decision to build an 
incinerator was a deliberate provocation of the Greens in the run-up to the 1994 Landtag 
election. It notes that, whilst the decision did have that effect, the overall record of the 
Red-Green coalition (and its SPD successor) has been relatively successful. The chapter 
gives a resume of the Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law (NAbfAbgG) of 1992. and 
described how it was hoped that it would lead to the reduction of hazardous waste by 1 
million tonnes per annum.
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The chapter then gave an account of how the relevant Federal technical standards (the 
1993 Technical Instructions on Residential Waste) and legislation (the 1994 Federal Act on 
Waste management and Product Recycling) have also been amended, with a much stronger 
application of the 'polluter pays1 principle. It detected the imprint of the Red-Green 
coalition (and the Second Commission) on these documents.
The chapter then described how the Second Commission's work continued until September 
1996, when it was replaced by a Third Commission (concentrating upon integrated 
systems of waste management). It concluded that it failed in political terms and that the 
Greens' client groups had only limited success in breaking down the established 
hierarchies, because entry into the network was constrained by opportunity costs related 
to expertise and access to the means of production. As such, it represented a much more 
corporatist model than the other bodies studies in Chapters Six and Seven. However, the 
chapter also noted that such an under-representation of ecological groups was of limited 
importance, given the degree of consensus in the Federal Republic over the basic principles 
of solid waste management.
In terms of policy outputs, the chapter concluded that the Second Commission was a 
success. However, it noted the irony of the Greens' limited role in this. Chapter Ten will 
go into a wider discussion as to what this says about the nature of payoffs.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: COALITION FORMATION
8.1. Preamble
Chapters Eight and Nine represent the most crucial point of the thesis, in that they re­ 
integrate the 'party polities' and policy-oriented strands of the empirical study and test 
them against the theoretical model. The most significant element of this process is in 
Chapter Nine, where Assumption 3 (/) on Coalition Maintenance is tested against the two 
case studies. As already discussed in Chapter One, the modelling of coalition maintenance 
is the most significant theoretical element within the thesis and determines the scope of the 
empirical case studies.
The purpose of Chapter Eight is to prepare the ground for Chapter Nine, by testing the 
theoretical assumptions of a selection of models of coalition formation against the 
empirical evidence in the two case studies. This is divided into three sections. In section
8.2. the two case studies are examined in the light of three established models from the 
literature. These are:
• Riker's (1962) Minimum/Minimal- Winning Theory
• Axelrod's (1970) Minimal Connected Winning Theory
• de Swaan's (1973) Median Legislator Model
As will be recalled from the literature review (Chapter One), these models represent three 
of the seminal examples of numerically-driven deductive modelling as they developed from 
the 'policy-blind' size principle of Riker's model, through the inclusion of ideological
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distance as a secondary formation criteria in Axelrod's model to de Swaan's model of the 
median legislator, which gives policy a much higher weighting whilst retaining a numerical 
formation criteria.
The purpose of this section is to problematise the trade-off between, first, predictive and 
explanatory modelling and, second, between office-seeking and policy-driven accounts of 
coalition formation. The section will demonstrate that whilst those models that are 
policy-blind are not very explanatory, they are reasonably good predictors of the actual 
outcome. It will also demonstrate that, unless some form of numerical formation criteria is 
retained, models that do include policy as a formation criteria have little or no predictive 
value.
Having drawn the appropriate conclusions from this section, section 8.3. will use the 
empirical data to test the new model of coalition formation. In doing this, this second 
section and the subsequent conclusion will demonstrate that, having accounted for (or 
discounted) policy-driven formation criteria, a numerical office-seeking formation criteria is 
essential if the model is to be explanatory and predictive.
8.2. Applying Established Models of Coalition Formation
As was discussed in Chapter One, both office-seeking and policy driven accounts of 
coalition bargaining make a priori assumptions that can be challenged on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds. This is no less the case in the context of the two case studies. For 
instance, during the 1989 bargaining process in West Berlin, institutional norms - such as 
the norm of non-co-operation with far-Right parties - and a high degree of ideological
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polarisation within the party system presented a more constrained political environment 
than the US-type legislatures on which much of this modelling has previously been tested. 
The Lower Saxony case presented a more fluid institutional environment, but even an arch 
pragmatist such as Gerhard Schroder was constrained, not least by the degree of animosity 
he had generated between himself and senior members of the FDP.
These constraints, and in particular the exclusion of a party from the bargaining set (as in 
the Berlin case), skew any 'pure1 application of deductive coalition theory, which tends to 
start from an a priori assumption of Allgemeinekoalitionsfahigkeit on the part of all parties 
within a given party system. Such an assumption may give the model a certain theoretical 
elegance, but makes it harder to apply to the untidy reality of, for example, a sub-national 
European party system. This is particularly the case when applying office-seeking 
accounts of coalition formation which, like Riker's, deliberately ignore or neglect ideological 
variables.
8.2.1. Minimum/Minimal-Winning Coalition Theory.
Berlin. Riker's model pure 'office-seeking' interpretation of coalition bargaining predicts 
some interesting possibilities when applied to the distribution of party weights in the 
Berlin case. After ruling out a minority government of some description (usually 
unacceptable in the context of German political norms), in numerical terms a minimal 
winning 'Black-Green' coalition between the CDU and AL would be just as likely as 
one between the SPD and AL. Indeed, one could argue that the 'incumbency factor' 
reduces the opportunity costs to the CDU in forming a new coalition, which would 
predict a Black-Green coalition as the most likely outcome. The least likely outcome 
under any circumstances would be a 'Grand Coalition1 between the CDU and SPD.
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because this would create an unnecessary 'surplus majority' within which to distribute 
payoffs.
An obvious riposte to these two predictions is to cite the copious empirical evidence 
to the contrary. In reality, there was no likelihood of the AL entering into coalition 
with the CDU because of the ideological distance between them. As to the second 
logical consequence of Riker's criteria, Grand Coalitions between the CDU and SPD 
have occurred, not least at the federal level between 1966 and 1969. Indeed, following 
the all-Berlin municipal elections of 2 December 1990, a Grand Coalition was formed, 
remained in office for a full-term and was re-elected in 1995.
Lower Saxony. Riker's model predicts the actual outcome of the process of coalition 
formation. In a legislature of 155 seats, 78 seats gives a majority of one (the minimum- 
winning-coalition). Barring a minority government, a Red-Green coalition creates a 
minimal-winning-coalition with a majority of two seats. The other possible outcomes 
would be a Grand Coalition, a CDU-FDP-Green coalition or a coalition of 'all the 
talents'. However, they would all provide a surplus majority, with a subsequent sub- 
optimal distribution of payoffs.
As already noted, the Lower Saxony party system was not as polarised as that in 
West Berlin. As a result, the opportunity costs of the SPD and the Greens co­ 
operating were arguably lower than in West Berlin (where 'foreign policy' issues, such 
as the city's 'Four-power' status, encroached onto the sub-national political agenda). 
Nevertheless, surplus majorities notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine any alternative 
to the actual outcome other than a Grand Coalition. All of the other outcomes can be 
discounted on the grounds of them having too great an ideological range. Although 
getting the actual outcome right, Riker's model would not have taken such factors into 
account. It is predictive, but not explanatory.
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8.2.2. Minimal Connected Winning Theory.
Berlin. Axelrod's minimal connected winning model makes the correct prediction that an 
SPD-AL coalition would be the most likely outcome of the 1989 bargaining process; 
given that such a coalition is the smallest ideologically-adjacent winning set.
However, in the context of the Berlin political arena, the implicit Downsian 
environment, within which parties compete and manoeuvre along a single policy 
dimension, raises a serious objection as if all the parties were able to manoeuvre in such 
a way. In 1982, Klaus Harting, editor of the Berlin-based Die Tageszeitung. stressed 
that the 'successes of the Green and Alternative Lists.....(reflects) an awareness among 
young people....that things are now really serious, that it is really a question of our 
future survival' [Papadakis, 1984: 209]. Even if one accepts that the Greens became 
more pragmatic during the course of the 1980's, such sentiments still carried enormous 
resonance inside the party and amongst its voters. Thus, the Berlin AL's election 
manifesto made it clear that co-operation with the SPD would only take place if it 
included 'concrete steps towards the introduction of an ecological and social form of 
politics'^. As already noted in Chapter Four, the Berlin SPD was not willing to co­ 
operate with the AL unless the latter clarified their position on political violence and 
the status of the three Allied powers in West Berlin. Clearly, although the two parties 
were ideologically adjacent, there was considerable ideological distance between them.
Lower Saxony. Axelrod's minimal connected winning model makes the correct prediction 
that an SPD-Green coalition would be the most likely outcome of the 1990 bargaining 
process. Not only is it the smallest winning set, but it is also ideologically-adjacent.
89'...wenn dies mit konkreten Schritten zur Einleitung einer okologischen und sozialen Politik verbunden 
ist'. [Das Kurzprogramme der Alternative?! Liste. Berlin, 1989.]
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As discussed in Chapter Six, by the time of the 1990 elections, the ideological distance 
between the two parties had become small enough for Jun [1994: 192-3] to claim that 
voters in Lower Saxony were presented with what was effectively a choice between 
two blocs: a continuation of the CDU-FDP coalition or a Red-Green alternative. 
However, it had not been always thus. Given different circumstances (a better 
showing in the previous Land election for example) the Lower Saxony Greens might 
not have moderated their position. If what Markovits and Reich called the local 
'wrecking-ball faction' [1993: 216] had still been decisive in 1990, the SPD would have 
found it very hard to carry their own people with them into a coalition with the 
Greens even though they would still be ideologically adjacent. Thus, ideological 
distance is important and Axelrod's model does not take it into account. Again, the 
model is predictive but not explanatory.
8.2.3. The Policy-Driven Median Legislator Model.
Berlin. In his account of coalition formation, De S waan argues that the party that controls 
the median legislator is decisive within the bargaining set, as it blocks the axis (or axes) 
along which any connected winning coalition must form. In the context of the 1989 
West Berlin elections, this position was enjoyed by the SPD (as Table 8.2.3 (a) 
illustrates).
Within the full legislature, the median legislator sits on the Right of the SPD's 
parliamentary Fraktion, thus giving them a dictatorial role. However, with the 
exclusion of the Republican party from the bargaining set, the median legislator sits 
somewhat further to the Left within the Fraktion. If one accepts this assumption, the 
fact that the SPD and AL did in fact eventually form the coalition can be explained on 
ideological as well as office-seeking grounds. Moreover, it would explain why the SPD
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gained the initiative following the elections (and why the CDU attempted to equate the 
AL with the Republicans and thus further constrain the normatively-defensible 
bargaining set)90.












R Republican party 11
Lower Saxony. If the median legislator is decisive within the bargaining set, as it blocks 
the axis (or axes) along which any connected winning coalition must form, then De 
S waan's model correctly predicts the outcome of the 1 990 Landtag elections in Lower 
Saxony. This is demonstrated in Table 8.2.3. (b) (below).
Again, the median legislator sits on the Right of the SPD's parliamentary Fraktion. 
thus giving them a dictatorial role but, in this case, no parties are excluded from the
is useful to note, however, that the positioning of parties along the Left-Right axis does not assume an 
elegant continuum as Table 9.2.3. might suggest Opinions differ as to the size of the ideological range 
between the parties. For instance, at the national level, Castles and Mair (using a Left-Right scale of one to 
ten) place the SPD within 0.5 of a point of the Greens and 3.4 points distant from the CDU. On the other 
hand, Laver and Budge (using a Left-Right scale of-50 to +50) place the SPD slightly closer towards the 
CDU (17 points) than towards the Greens (19 points). [Laver and Schofield,, 1990: .257].
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bargaining set. As in the Berlin case, the actual outcome of an SPD-Green coalition can 
be explained on ideological grounds as well as office-seeking grounds. Moreover, the 
decisiveness of the SPD within the bargaining-set would account for why the Social 
Democrats took the initiative following the elections. Not only were the Greens on the 
Left of the bargaining-set, but the fall in their vote share denied them a 'king-making' 
role anyway. They had two choices: a coalition with the SPD or opposition.















8.2.4. An Appraisal Of The Established Models As Predictors Of Coalition 
Formation In West Berlin and Lower Saxony.
The three office-seeking accounts of coalition formation examined in this chapter display 
some variance of predictive power when applied to the two case studies.
As discussed earlier, the explanatory power of all three models is limited by their neglect 
of the dynamics of ideological distance, and its affect upon policy disagreements within 
the bargaining set. However, only Riker's account, which totally ignores policy, even as a
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secondary formation criterion, fails to correctly predict the outcome of the bargaining 
process in the Berlin cases (and even Riker's model predicts the Lower Saxony outcome).
Table 8.2.4 Accounts And Predictions Of The Actual Outcomes of 
the Bargaining Process in West Berlin (1989) and Lower Saxony 
(1990)

















upon Bargaining Set in







Party With Median 
Legislator Is Decisive 
Within Bargaining Set
Berlin: SPD-AL Coalition* 
Lower Saxony: SPD-Green*
*assuming secondary minimal- 
winning formation criteria
The evidence suggests that accounts that contain a policy dimension, such as De Swaan's. 
are more explanatory but, if one does not factor in a secondary minimal-winning formation 
criterion, the potential for theoretical ambiguity within a multi-dimensional bargaining 
space inhibits the model's predictive power. Even in the one-dimensional bargaining 
spaces conceptualised in this section, the models are only predictive if some minimal- 
winning formation is included. In other words, a numerical formation criteria remains
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important in both case-studies. Resumes of all three models' assumptions and predictions 
are displayed in Table 8.2.4 (above).
The two cases indicate that a satisfactory model of coalition formation requires the 
integration of both a policy-based and minimal-winning formation criterion. Which of 
these two criteria should take precedence depends upon the trade-off between a model's 
predictive and explanatory power. The debate over such trade-offs are ubiquitous within 
the social sciences and will be resumed in Chapter Ten (section 10.3 on payoffs). 
However, if one assumes for now that Friedman is correct in assuming that it is a model's 
predictive power that is important [1966], then only Riker's account fails the test (and 
then only in the case of West Berlin).
8.3. Applying the New Model of Coalition Formation
8.3.1. Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining.
(a) The bargaining set is self-selecting and excludes all parties that are perceived not to be
normatively-defensible, according to accepted democratic criteria.
Berlin. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Berlin Alternative Lisle was considered to 
traditionally be one of the most/w«£//-oriented Green parties in the Federal Republic 
[Markovits and Reich, 1993: 231]. This not only limited the coalition options open to 
the AL in terms of what was acceptable to their own rank-and-file, but also imposed 
significant constraints upon any other party when dealing with them. Thus, before the 
coalition negotiations could begin in earnest, the SPD had to satisfy itself - and the
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wider polity - that the AL was normatively defensible, according to accepted 
democratic criteria. In other words, in the short-run at least, office-seeking preferences 
were secondary to normative criteria. Inevitably, the precise nature of such normative 
criteria is contingent upon the institutional context in which they are embedded.
As already mentioned, in West Berlin in the late 1980s, the domain of Foreign Policy 
had a much higher degree of salience than is normally the case at the sub-national level. 
In this context, Momper's insistence that the AL accept the principle of the Allied 
presence represents an attempt to establish the AL's bona fides on the abstract level of 
democratic acceptability per se. The fact that the AL modified its stance can be 
interpreted as an indication that they understood the significance of Momper's 
demands.
Lower Saxony. Like the Berlin AL, the Lower Saxony Greens had a 'wild and woolly' 
past. There had been periods in the 1980s when the so-called 'wrecking-ball' faction in 
the wider Green/New Left milieus held the party in thrall. In addition to the party's 
ambivalence towards political violence and rejection of the state's monopoly of force, 
the local Greens were immersed in the discourse of American 'warmongering' and 
opposition to NATO. As a result, the 1987 Landtag elections had been called a 
Richtungswahl, which would determine the shape of the Federal Republic' political 
landscape for years to come, by the then CDU General Secretary Heiner Geissler. The 
Germans had the choice between stability, or 'red-green chaos' that would bring 'ruin 
to the nation' [Markovits and Reich, 1993: 211-3]. Yet, by the 1990 elections, the 
Greens were relatively Salonsfdhig, compared with 1987 and also with the Berlin AL.
There appears to be four reasons for this process of moderation, related to place and/or 
time . First, in the intervening years, the fundi-realo conflict had been effectively won
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by the realos. This meant that, although the leadership still had to behave in a manner 
that was acceptable to their Basis, the ascendancy of a more moderate leadership 
within the Greens imposed less constraints upon any other party when dealing with 
them. Second, unlike in West Berlin, the relatively parochial institutional context of 
Lower Saxony meant that the Greens' anti-NATO stance was of less salience. In other 
words, although this aspect of their ideological profile was the most normatively 
defensible, it was relatively unimportant and could be discounted. Third, with the 
collapse of the GDR and the resolution of the Cold War, the entire 'east-west'/Nato- 
anti-Nato debate had lost its ideological edge. The west had 'won' the battle of 
ideologies and the bourgeois parties could be more relaxed about the Greens' residual 
hostility to its defence and security arrangements. Finally, the SPD were led by a 
politician who, like Momper, had come up through the party's Juso youth section and 
was a quintessential example of the breed of New Left 'tuscany socialists'. Where 
Gerhard Schroder differed from Momper was in his political skills and pragmatic 
approach to coalition-building. Where political differences remained salient. Schroder 
was able to 'reach out' to the Greens and bring them into the political mainstream.
(b) AH parties possess bundles of preferences, based on a combination of office-seeking
and policy-driven criteria.
Berlin. As shown by the examples above, it is clear that, in entering the coalition 
bargaining phase, parties embark upon a sophisticated series of calculations about their 
own bundles of preferences and those of their prospective coalition partners. For the 
Berlin SPD, it was necessary to risk the office-seeking payoff that would accrue to 
them as the largest party within a minimum-connected-winning coalition with the least 
partners, in order to secure the democratic bona fides of the AL. For the AL. they 
were faced with the choice of either refusing to compromise on the issue of the Allied
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presence and forfeiting the payoffs accruing to them as a coalition partner, or 
compromising on the Allied presence in order to gain access to the office-seeking stage 
of the negotiations. Both parties must calculate the balance of profit and loss across 
their complete bundle of preferences, whilst trying to second-guess the other party's 
response to its own calculations.
However, the parties' calculations are made more complicated because it was not just a 
one-shot game. For the SPD, the issue of the Allied presence was not only of 
normative importance per se, but also served to secure its office-seeking payoffs in the 
medium- to long-term, in that if it had failed to secure the AL's democratic bona fides 
before entering into coalition negotiations with them, any short-term utility would 
have been cancelled-out by the negative reaction of significant sections of its 
membership and, especially important for a Volkspartei, its electorate. For the AL as 
well, the calculation was not just one of sacrificing a major plank of its 'anti-party 
party' stance in order secure office. Both options risked negative payoffs in both 
policy-oriented and office-seeking terms.
Of course, the AL's presence in a coalition government could generate immediate 
policy-oriented and office-seeking payoffs and, it was hoped, widen their electoral 
base (breaking down the fear within the electorate of 'Red-Green chaos' by the Praxis 
of stable government). On the other hand, in accepting the principle of the Allied 
presence, the AL risked alienating its existing membership and electoral base without 
gaining sufficient new support (because the inevitable internal disputes that would 
follow such a process of alienation would only serve to confirm the impression of such 
voters that the AL were not fit for government).
279
Lower Saxony. Such a sophisticated series of calculations about their own bundles of 
preferences and those of their prospective coalition partners undoubtedly took place in 
Lower Saxony as well. However, whilst all of the benefits described above applied to 
the Lower Saxony case, the risks were less sharply-defined.
For the Lower Saxony SPD, there was little reason to risk the office-seeking payoffs 
that would accrue to them as the largest party within a minimum-connected-winning 
coalition with the least partners, in order to secure the democratic bona fides of the 
Greens. However, whilst the Greens remained relatively extreme in their attitude 
towards Nato, the time (1990) and the place (provincial Lower Saxony) allowed these 
difficulties to be discounted. On the other hand, many in the local SPD shared the 
Greens' passion for reform of the security services and police, the integration of 
foreigners into society, the de-centralisation of powers to the Kommitnen, the 
promotion of women's issues etc. In short, the SPD were not confronted with a stark 
choice between their office-seeking and policy-driven preferences. For the Greens, the 
choice was more stark. They were faced with the choice of either refusing to 
compromise on the issue of the Environment portfolio and forfeiting the payoffs 
accruing to them as a coalition partner, or compromising in order to gain access to more 
general office-seeking related payoffs. They had to calculate the balance of profit and 
loss across their complete bundle of preferences, whilst aware of the fact that they 
were now the smallest party in the Landtag and not decisive within the bargaining 
game. Whatever decision they made had negative and positive consequences.
On the negative side of the ledger, Schroder had made it clear that his choice of Monika 
Griefahn was non-negotiable and that the most the Greens could hope for was the post 
of State Secretary. Given that the Greens regarded the Environment portfolio as 
almost their political birthright, giving it up would be extremely painful (and very hard
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to sell to the Basis). On the positive side, as in West Berlin, the Greens' presence in a 
coalition government could widen their electoral base, by breaking down the fear within 
the electorate of 'Red-Green chaos1 and the 'wrecking-ball 1 tendency by being seen to 
deliver stable government. Moreover, there were still policy domains, in the social 
politics field, that were important to the Greens. The danger was that, in accepting 
Griefahn's appointment to Environment Minister, the two ministries that the Greens 
did get, Federal and European Affairs and the Women's Ministry, would not be enough 
to compensate for alienating its existing membership and electoral base.
(c) The policy preferences of all parties are a function of one or more ideological
dimensions, such as the Downsian Left-Right and/or the 'materialist/post-materialist'policy
dimension.
Berlin Table 4.3. (Chapter Four) demonstrates that all the salient policy divisions 
between the three parties within the bargaining set can be adequately conceptualised as 
a function of one or more ideological dimensions. The SPD's position was unique, in 
that its ambivalent ideological profile allowed it to positively engage with either of the 
other parties along either the Downsian Left-Right and/or the materialist/post- 
materialist dimension. As already stated (and especially with regard to the unique set 
of institutional norms that characterised the West Berlin polity), the domain of Foreign 
Affairs can be conceptualised as a function of the materialist/post-materialist policy 
dimension.
Lower Saxonv. As with West Berlin, Table 5.3. (Chapter Five) conceptualises all the 
salient policy divisions between the four parties as a function of one or more 
ideological dimensions. Again, the SPD's position was unique, in that it was able to 
positively engage with either of the other parties along either the Downsian Left-Right
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and/or the materialist/post-materialist dimension. Unlike West Berlin, however, the 
domain of Foreign Affairs was not particularly salient (although it can be 
conceptualised as a function of the materialist/post-materialist policy dimension). 
Moreover, the discursive form in which the Lower Saxony Greens presented their 
policies was far more conventional, problem-solving-oriented and less polemical than 
the Berlin AL's literature.
(d) Where policy differences are not salient, office-seeking is normally assumed to be
paramount.
Berlin. Essentially, this precondition is a counter-factual affirmation of the previous three 
points. It states that, where policy differences are not salient (or have been resolved), 
parties' preferences will mainly be of an office-seeking nature. Thus, once the AL 
passed the test of being seen to conform to accepted democratic criteria (and had 
satisfied itself that there were policy-oriented utility gains to be made by participating 
in coalition negotiations), all other calculations were of an office-seeking nature 
(including the medium- to long-term effect of participation in a given coalition on its 
membership and electoral support, as well as the short-term utility of gaining 
ministerial office).
Lower Saxony. Again, where policy differences are not salient (or have been resolved), 
parties' preferences will mainly be of an office-seeking nature. Obviously, for the 
Lower Saxony Greens, the failure to secure the Environment portfolio was a blow to 
their ambitions (especially as sub-national Green parties had come to regard it as 
'theirs' by right). However, having accepted the failure to win the portfolio, and that 
there were still policy-oriented utility gains to be made by participating in coalition
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negotiations (such as with regard to the Women's Ministry portfolio), all calculations 
can explained by assuming that they were of an office-seeking nature.
(e) Where (d) is not the case, it is assumed that office-seeking has been subordinated to
another group-related preference.
Precondition (e) is intended to account for any strategic decision taken by a party which
cannot be explained by previous preconditions. Again, it is counter-factual in nature.
Berlin. With regard to the Berlin case, no such decisions were salient at the point of 
coalition formation. However, hypothetically-speaking, the most obvious potential 
strategic decision of this kind would have been for the AL to have decided to not take 
part in coalition negotiations despite evidence that this decision would have no worse 
than a neutral effect upon its policy-oriented or office-seeking utility.
The following observation is a counter-factual point as the AL did eventually agree to 
join the SPD in a Red-Green coalition. Nevertheless, if, after all other preconditions 
and assumptions had been satisfied, it had made such a decision to stay out, it could be 
explained by the assumption that a group-related preference (such as the desire for 
party unity as an end in itself) was dominant91 .
Lower Saxony. As above.
91 An obvious example where such a group-related preference is highly salient is within the Irish Republican 
movement, where the maintenance of internal unity is a major objective in itself. This helps to explain 
what is to many observers a curious ambiguity between those supporters of the political wing of the 
movement and the 'physical force' tradition. Obviously, this aversion to disunity has its roots in the 
history of Irish Republicanism (the experience of the Civil War for instance). However, today it has become 
an end in itself, to the extent that strategic decisions are made that are hard for an outside observer to 
explain in either policy-oriented or office-seeking terms.
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(f) All times parties within the bargaining set pursue their preferences in a rational and
instrumental manner.
All the assumptions made about the strategic actions of the parties are predicated upon the
precondition that they are always acting in the rational and instrumental pursuit of their
preferences.
8.3.2. Assumptions about Coalition Formation
(a) All parties -want to be a member of the potential coalition that is closest to them in
policy terms. Such a coalition is assumed to be ideologically 'connected' along one or more
policy-dimension.
Following on from the observations made about Precondition (c) to Coalition Bargaining.
Tables 4.3. and 5.3. demonstrate that no ideologically connected minimal-winning
coalition could form without the SPD in either case.
Berlin. The CDU had the option of engaging the SPD along the Downsian-esque Left- 
Right policy dimension, such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs, Freedom and 
Democracy, Government, the Economy and, to a lesser extent. Welfare, Fabric of 
Society, Social Groups and Discursive Form (important after the initial process of 
coalition formation in terms of the detailed drafting of policy).
The AL was initially at odds with the SPD with regard to the Domain of Foreign 
Affairs until its acceptance of the principle of the Allied presence in West Berlin. 
However, on the evidence of its election programme, it remained isolated within the 
domains of Freedom and Democracy (the acceptance of the Allied presence 
notwithstanding), Government, the Economy and Discursive Form. Only in the
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Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups did the possibility exist for 
the selective emphasis of policy areas with which it and the SPD could forge some 
form of modus operandi. Moreover, because of the ideological ambivalence of the 
SPD, even within these domains, the CDU could compete with the AL.
Lower Saxony. Both the CDU and the FDP had the option of engaging the SPD along the 
Downsian Left-Right policy dimension, such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs. 
Freedom and Democracy, Government, the Economy and, to a lesser extent, Welfare, 
Fabric of Society and Social Groups.
However, the issue of Discursive Form (although important in terms of the detailed 
drafting of policy) was of less salience because the Greens policy proposals were 
relatively conventional in their formulation. Moreover, the Greens' differences with 
the SPD with regard to the Domain of Foreign Affairs was also less of an issue. It was 
also less isolated within the domains of Freedom and Democracy because of the 
common ground it shared with the Lower Saxony SPD on issues such as reform of the 
Security Services. Differences remained on issues related to the domains of 
Government and the Economy. The Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social 
Groups provided fertile ground for the selective emphasis of shared policy areas with 
the SPD. However, because of the ideological ambivalence of the SPD, the SPD still 
had an authoritarian welfarist side to their ideological profile that would re-appear in 
the final days of the coalition.
(b) Parties calculate policy-distance in terms of their relative positions with regard to 
policy sectors along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post-materialist dimensions. The r\\'o
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dimensions have different relative weights for each party, depending upon their respective 
ideological profiles.
Given that, in the broadest theoretical terms, both the CDU and the AL (in the Berlin case) 
and the CDU, FDP and Greens (in Lower Saxony) could make common cause with the 
SPD (and vice versa), the actual outcome of the process of coalition formation is 
contingent upon all parties being able to calculate the degree of common ground between 
them (conceptualised as policy distance). Assumption (b) about coalition formation 
therefore requires that all three political parties are reflexive92 . This means that they can 
constantly review their strategic decisions and, although they do not enjoy perfect 
information about either their own policy stance or those of the other two parties, that 
they can act rationally and instrumentally upon such calculations. 
Berlin. As it is fairly evident which issues can be harnessed by either the CDU or the AL
in order to positively engage the SPD, the most important calculations in the bargaining
process are those that are made by the SPD.
Given that the SPD has a choice of two possible coalition partners, it must make the 
most complicated calculations. These calculations concern the relative positions of 
both the CDU and the AL in relation to its own. If engaging the AL. it must calculate 
the extent to which it can make concessions along the policy-dimensions where it has 
some competitive advantage without either disproportionately discounting its policy-
is assumption touches upon Giddens' 'theory of structuration', within which neither the subject (agent) 
nor the object (structure) has primacy, but are rather interdependent [1982: 8]. With regard to agency. 
Giddens makes two points. Firstly, he describes 'knowledgeability' as the human feature of practical 
consciousness. He argues that the lack of this concept in functionalist and structuralist theory makes them 
weak, as it incorporates the basic praxis of agents - the knowledge they possess on how to behave in 
society. Second, 'capability' must also be a consideration, as it refers to human consciousness of potential 
alternatives of action. Giddens believes that the 'possibilities of 'doing otherwise" are a matter of routine 
and crucial to any explanation of human behaviour [ibid: 9]. Concerning structure. Giddens argues that 
institutions are 'structured social practices' which are recognised by the majority of society. His theory is 
that the structure indicates the 'rules' and 'resources' which manifest themselves, but which have only 
'virtual' existence. They must be constantly re-constructed by the Praxis of reflexive agents. In short, 
although their actions are contingent upon institutional norms, Giddens regards actors not as 'cultural dopes' 
but as practical performers of accomplishment in society.
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oriented and/or office-seeking utility. The actual outcome of these calculations is 
contingent upon the relative importance each party places upon the policy-dimension. 
For instance, with reference to Table 4.3., the SPD would have to calculate the relative 
importance of its implicit support for 'Bourgeois democracy' (Freedom and 
Democracy) and the nuclear family (Fabric of Society) against its support for 
affirmative action and broad civil rights (Social Groups). Moreover, it would have to 
calculate the impact of, for example, the AL's different stance on these issues and 
assess the extent to which a compromise between these differing stances can be 
reconciled.
Lower Saxony. Again, it is fairly evident which issues can be harnessed by the other 
parties in order to positively engage the SPD and that the most important calculations 
in the bargaining process are those that are made by the SPD.
What is clear is that the SPD's actual choice cannot be bested in office-seeking terms. 
To choose either the CDU or the FDP would result in a surplus majority with a sub- 
optimal distribution of payoffs. Therefore, its main concern was the relative policy 
positions of both the CDU, FDP and Greens to its own. As a coalition with the 
Greens would be the best numerical outcome, the SPD has to calculate the extent to 
which it can make concessions along the policy-dimensions where it has some 
competitive advantage without either disproportionately discounting its policy- 
oriented and/or office-seeking utility. Table 5.3 shows that the SPD balanced the 
relative importance of its implicit support for 'Bourgeois democracy' (Freedom and 
Democracy) and the nuclear family (Fabric of Society) against its support for 
affirmative action and broad civil rights (Social Groups). Moreover, by securing the 
Environment portfolio, it neutralised much of the Greens ideological thrust. In short.
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the Environment portfolio is the litmus test of the extent to which the SPD was calling 
the shots during the coalition bargaining process.
(c) The party or parties to which a party X is most in agreement, across the (weighted)
aggregate of policy sectors, is considered by party X to be the closest to them in policy
terms.
Assumption (c) about coalition formation assumes that, having made these calculations.
the parties make an informed decision as to which party is closest to them in policy terms
and acts upon such a decision in a rational and instrumental manner.
Berlin. Therefore, in the Berlin case, the model assumes that the actual outcome was the 
revealed preference of all three parties. In other words, the SPD calculated that the AL 
was closer to it than the CDU in policy terms, and that the CDU was unable/unwilling 
to offer a more attractive alternative to that offered by the AL. In practical terms, this 
meant that the SPD selectively emphasised those elements within the domains of 
Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups. On these particular issues (women's 
issues, multi-culturalism and cultural politics) the AL consistently took a more extreme 
stance than the SPD. However, both parties evidently felt confident that these 
differences were ones of emphasis rather than substance.
Lower Saxony. The model assumes that the actual outcome was the revealed preference of 
all four parties. In other words, the SPD calculated that they were closer to the Greens 
than either the CDU or FDP, and that none of the other two parties could offer a more 
attractive alternative. This meant that the SPD selectively emphasised those elements 
within the domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups where they shared 
common ground with the Greens. Although, on these particular issues (nuclear energy. 
waste disposal, women's issues etc.) the Greens consistently took a more extreme
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stance than the SPD, the differences were not irreconcilable. As it will be recalled 
Jiirgen Trittin wryly pointed out, the SPD and the Greens were 'condemned to a 
positive outcome from the negotiations' [HAZ. 21/05/90].
(d) If conditions (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied, parties will choose to be a member of the 
coalition that will maximise office-seeking payoffs. It follows this will be the minimal- 
connected-winning coalition with the least partners.
Assumption (d) assumes that, once all the parties had made their calculations with regard 
to policy distance, all things being equal, numerical criteria will decide the outcome of the 
coalition formation process. This assumption becomes more important as the number of 
parties within the bargaining set increases and/or the set's ideological range narrows. 
Berlin. In the Berlin case, two things are clear. First, there is only a limited number of 
parties within the bargaining set and only three possible coalition outcomes: 
(i) a single-party minority administration (not unknown in West Berlin - see Appendix 
Two - but highly unlikely as it would be subject to the 'toleration1 of the opposition 
parties and normally unacceptable according to German political norms), 
(ii) a Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU, which would constitute a surplus 
majority and a sub-optimal distribution of payoffs.
(iii) a Red-Green coalition with the AL which would constitute a minimal-connected- 
winning coalition with the best possible distribution of payoffs.
Second, although the ideological range of the bargaining set in West Berlin was 
relatively wide, the SPD's ideological ambivalence allowed it the possibility of forming 
a connected-winning coalition with both. Given that policy differences between the 
SPD and the two other parties were roughly equal, one must assume that, having
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satisfied itself in terms of policy-oriented preferences, the SPD's final decision was 
motivated by numerical criteria related to office-seeking.
Lower Saxony. Unlike Berlin, the bargaining set is larger, with none excluded on the 
grounds that they are not normatively-defensible according to democratic criteria (as 
the Republikaner were in Berlin). This means that there are five possible coalition 
outcomes:
(i) a minority administration of either a variant of the incumbent CDU-FDP 
administration or the SPD (both highly unlikely).
(ii) a Red-Green coalition, creating a minimal-winning-coalition with a majority of two 
seats.
(iii) a Grand Coalition, 
(iv) a CDU-FDP-Green coalition. 
(v)a coalition of'all the talents'.
However, all except (ii) provide a surplus majority, with a subsequent sub-optimal 
distribution of payoffs.
Although the ideological range of the bargaining set in Lower Saxony was wide, the 
SPD's ideological ambivalence allowed it the possibility of forming a connected- 
winning coalition with any of the three other parties. As in Berlin, one must assume 
the SPD's final decision was motivated by numerical criteria related to office-seeking.
(e) If all other conditions are satisfied, it follows that the party that controls the median 
legislator within the most policy sectors is decisive, as no minimal connected winning 
coalition can be formed without it. Such a decisive party could be assumed to gain a 
disproportionate share of the payoffs.
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Logically, Assumption (c) follows on from the previous assumptions93 , in that any part} 
that performs such a 'gate-keeping' function will have the leverage to extract the best 
possible deal from a potential coalition partner in return for its participation with it in 
government.
Berlin. In West Berlin, this was clearly the case. With reference to Table 8.2.3.(a), the 
SPD is decisive on the Downsian Left-Right dimension. However, in this instance, one 
could just as easily have used the materialist/postmaterialist dichotomy and generated 
the same outcome. Therefore, we would expect the SPD to win a disproportionate 
share of the payoffs.
Table 4.4.(b) demonstrates that the SPD did well out of the distribution of cabinet 
portfolios. The AL only received three out of fourteen cabinet posts, none of which 
was a traditional blue-chip portfolio. This represents a ratio of legislative seats to 
cabinet posts of almost six-to-one. By contrast, the SPD ratio is five-to-one: including 
all the traditional 'blue-chip' posts . In addition, the Berlin SPD leader Walter Momper 
became Governing Mayor. Obviously, as already noted, this outcome may have been 
partly due to the combined impact of the AL's tactical naivete and Momper's political 
guile during the bargaining process. Nevertheless, the SPD's payoffs at T2 does not 
just reflect the skill with which the Berlin SPD played the bargaining game. It is also 
indicative of the underlying strength of their bargaining position at Tl. For its part, the 
AL stood out for and eventually won responsibility for women's issues (albeit
93 The model does not require any normative account of the nature of the individuals preferences, only that
they are ordered rationally according to the four conditions of Reflexivity, Completeness, TransitivitN and
Continuity [Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992: 5-6], though some scholars use different terminology.
(1) REFLEXIVITY. The a priori assumption that a preference (Xi) is always worth it's inherent value.
i.e.Xi >Xi (> = preference or indifference )
(2) COMPLETENESS. Preferences(Xi / Xj) can be cross-compared and ranked.
i.e.Xi > Xj or Xj > Xi.
(3) TRANSITIVITY. That preference ranking holds true throughout the ordering.
i.e.Xi > Xj and Xj > Xk therefore Xi > Xk.
(4) CONTINUITY. No preference is inherently preferable to another if the marginal utility of the other can
be raised so as to make the comparative utility of the two preferences indifferent to the individual.
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sublimated within a wider ministry) and Education (an area within much of the AL's 
client groups existed). Moreover, they had won what was for them the all-important 
Environment portfolio. The successful maintenance of the new coalition would in 
many ways be contingent on the AL's stewardship of this portfolio in particular.
Lower Saxony. All four parties in the Lower Saxony legislature were potential members of 
any coalition (unlike in West Berlin, where the Republikaner were excluded). 
Nevertheless, the SPD remains decisive. Table 8.2.3.(b) demonstrates that the SPD is 
decisive on the Downsian Left-Right dimension. Again, one could just as easily have 
used the materialist/postmaterialist dichotomy and generated the same outcome, with a 
similar assumption about payoffs.
Nevertheless, Table 5.4.(b) presents a complicated picture. It is true that the Greens 
had to be content with just two portfolios to the SPD's ten and that they did not get 
the prized Environment portfolio. However, given that they only had eight 
representatives in the Landtag as opposed to the SPD's 71, they did numerically well 
out of the division of portfolios, with a ratio of seats to posts of four-to-one, 
compared with the SPD's ratio of seven-to-one. This is better than the ratio of six-to- 
one (AL)/five-to-one (SPD) in Berlin. Obviously, the role of the AL's tactical naivete 
in the Berlin case has been discussed. Yet, the Lower Saxony Greens were not 
obviously more politically street-wise than their Berlin counter-parts. Moreover, as 
the smallest party in legislature, their bargaining position at Tl cannot explain their 
relatively generous share of the payoffs at T2. A more plausible explanation was that 
the outcome was the result of strategic decisions taken by both the Greens and the 
SPD during the bargaining process.. For the former, the loss of the policy-related 
payoffs associated with the Environment portfolio could only be compensated by a 
greater share of office-seeking related payoffs (albeit less than they demanded). For
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the SPD (and, one suspects, Schroder in particular) the coup of prising the 
Environment portfolio away from the Greens was worth taking a smaller absolute 
share of the office-seeking payoffs.
8.4. Resume of Chapter Eight
Chapter Eight set out to test the theoretical assumptions of a selection of models of 
coalition formation against the empirical evidence in the two case studies. Section 8.2. 
examined the two case studies in the light of (i) Riker's (1962) Minimum/Minimal-Winning 
Theory; (ii) Axelrods (1970) Minimal Connected Winning Theory and (iii) de Swaan's 
(1973) Median Legislator Model. The three models display some variance of predictive 
power when applied to the two case studies. As discussed, the explanatory power of all 
three models is limited by their neglect of the dynamics of ideological distance, and its 
affect upon policy disagreements, within the bargaining set. However, only Riker's 
account fails to correctly predict the outcome of the bargaining process (once, in the Berlin 
case, and it still correctly predicts the Lower Saxony outcome). Accounts that contain a 
policy dimension, such as De Swaan's, are more explanatory but, the models are only 
predictive if some minimal-winning formation is included (even in a one-dimensional 
bargaining space). Thus, in the trade-off between predictive and explanatory power, once 
the policy-dimension has been accounted for (or discounted), a numerical formation criteria 
remains important in both case-studies.
Moving on to the new model of coalition formation, section 8.3. applied the new model of 
coalition formation to the two case studies. From the evidence, the model appears to be 
both predictive and explanatory in both cases.
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In both Berlin and Lower Saxony the Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining stood up 
against the empirical evidence. As Precondition (a) predicted, the bargaining set was self- 
selecting and excluded all parties that were perceived not to be normative!} -defensible, 
according to accepted democratic criteria. Thus, the Berlin Alternative Liste had to satisfy 
the SPD (and the wider polity) that the AL was normatively defensible. As already noted, 
the most obvious example of this was the AL's grudging acceptance of the principle of the 
Allied presence. Similarly, in Lower Saxony the Greens had rejected the 'wrecking-ball' 
option by 1990.
The assertion in Precondition (b) that all parties possess bundles of preferences, based on 
a combination of office-seeking and policy-driven criteria was also supported by the 
evidence. In Berlin, for example, the AL were faced with the choice of compromise on the 
issue of the Allied presence, whilst in Lower Saxony the Greens were faced with the 
choice of either refusing to compromise on the issue of the Environment portfolio (and 
forfeiting the payoffs accruing to them as a coalition partner) or compromising in order to 
gain access to more general office-seeking related payoffs.
The evidence also demonstrates that the policy preferences of all parties are a function of 
one or more ideological dimensions, such as the Downsian Left-Right and/or the 
'materialist/post-materialist' policy dimension (Precondition (c)). In both Berlin and 
Lower Saxony (see Tables 4.3. and 5.3. (Chapters Four and Five) all the salient policy 
divisions between the three parties within the bargaining set can be adequately 
conceptualised as a function of one or more ideological dimensions. The SPD's Janus- 
faced ideological profile was unique, and allowed it to positively engage with either of the 
other parties along either the Downsian Left-Right and/or the materialist/post-materialist 
dimension.
294
Having accounted for (or discounted) the salience of policy differences. Precondition (d)'s 
counter-factual assumption that office-seeking is paramount is indeed not contradicted by 
the evidence. Thus, once the Berlin AL passed the test of being seen to conform to 
accepted democratic criteria, and had satisfied itself that there were policy-oriented utility 
gains to be made by participating in coalition negotiations, one can assume that all other 
calculations were of an office-seeking nature. Similarly, the Lower Saxony Greens got over 
the 'loss' of the Environment portfolio!
Finally, as both coalitions did eventually take place, there is no evidence to prove or 
disprove the other counter-factual Precondition (e), that where (d) is not the case, it is 
assumed that office-seeking has been subordinated to another group-related preference. 
Assumption (/), that at all times parties within the bargaining set pursue their preferences 
in a rational and instrumental manner is self-explanatory.
All of the assumptions within the model about Coalition Formation are also well 
supported by the evidence. Assumption (a), that all parties want to be a member of the 
potential coalition that is closest to them in policy terms and that such a coalition is 
assumed to be ideologically 'connected1 along one or more policy-dimension(s), is fulfilled 
in both cases. Tables 4.3. and 5.3 demonstrate that no ideologically connected minimal- 
winning coalition could form without the SPD in either case. The CDU (in Berlin) and the 
CDU and/or FDP (in Lower Saxony) had the option of engaging the SPD along the 
Downsian Left-Right policy dimension, such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs, Freedom 
and Democracy, Government, the Economy and, to a lesser extent. Welfare. Fabric of 
Society, Social Groups and Discursive Form, whilst the Berlin AL and the Lower Saxony 
Greens were able to selectively emphasise the common ground they shared with the SPD 
within the Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups.
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The Assumption (fr), that parties calculate policy-distance in terms of their relative 
positions with regard to policy sectors along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post- 
materialist dimensions and that the two dimensions have different relative weights for each 
party, depending upon their respective ideological profiles, is also supported by the 
evidence. .In both cases the most important calculations in the bargaining process are 
those that are made by the SPD. These concerned the relative positions of the other 
parties to its own. Tables 4.3. and 5.3. demonstrate that the SPD would have to calculate 
the relative importance of its implicit support for 'Bourgeois democracy' (Freedom and 
Democracy) and the nuclear family (Fabric of Society) against its support for affirmative 
action and broad civil rights (Social Groups).
Moving on from this, Assumption (c) that the party or parties to which a party X is most 
in agreement, across the weighted aggregate of policy sectors, is considered by party X to 
be the closest to them in policy terms conforms to the empirical reality. Therefore, in 
both cases, the model assumes that the actual outcome was the revealed preference of all 
parties. In Berlin, the SPD calculated that the AL was closer to it than the CDU in policy 
terms, and that the CDU was unable/unwilling to offer a more attractive alternative to that 
offered by the AL. In Lower Saxony, the SPD calculated that they were closer to the 
Greens than either the CDU or FDP, and that none of the other two parties could offer a 
more attractive alternative. In both cases, the SPD selectively emphasised those elements 
within the domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups where they shared 
common ground with the Greens.
Having accounted for (or discounted) policy-oriented considerations, Assumption (d) that 
parties will choose to be a member of the coalition that will maximise office-seeking 
payoffs, (the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least partners) is also 
supported by the evidence. In Berlin and Lower Saxony, a Red-Green coalition with the
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AL which constituted the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the best possible 
distribution of payoffs.
Interestingly, the evidence form the two case studies does not support Assumption (e), 
that if all other conditions are satisfied, the party that controls the median legislator within 
the most policy sectors is decisive, as no minimal connected winning coalition can be 
formed without it, and that such a decisive party could be assumed to gain a 
disproportionate share of the payoffs.
Although the SPD performs a 'gate-keeping' function in both cases, there is a numerical 
variance in its payoffs between the two cases. However, this variance can be explained by 
the difference in the type of portfolios it wins in either case. For instance, in West Berlin, 
the AL only received three out of fourteen cabinet posts, none of which was a traditional 
blue-chip portfolio, representing a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of almost six- 
to-one. By contrast, the SPD ratio is five-to-one: including all the traditional 'blue-chip' 
posts (and Berlin SPD leader Walter Momper as Governing Mayor). On the other hand, 
considering that the Lower Saxony Greens only had eight representatives in the Landtag as 
opposed to the SPD's 71, they did numerically well out of the division of portfolios, with 
a ratio of seats to posts of four-to-one, compared with the SPD's ratio of seven-to-one.
The explanation that the difference in numerical outcomes between Berlin and Lower 
Saxony reflected the Lower Saxony Greens' compensation for the loss of the policy-related 
payoffs associated with the Environment portfolio with a greater share of office-seeking 
related payoffs is a powerful one.
To conclude, the chapter uses the established models to successfully problematise the 
trade-off between prediction and explanation, office-seeking and policy-oriented payoffs.
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It then goes on to test the new model against the empirical data which, within the confines 
of the available information, proved to possess considerable predictive and explanatory 
power.
However, in both cases, it is predicting and explaining a one-off outcome: the formation of 
a coalition. Such a one-off outcome is easily conceptualised as a single-play game and is 
relatively easy to model. It is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over time, 
such as those that would take place in a deductive model of coalition maintenance. The 
attempt to produce such a model is at the heart of the thesis and is addressed in the 
following chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE: APPLYING THE NEW MODEL OF 
COALITION MAINTENANCE TO THE TWO CASE 
STUDIES
9.1. Preamble
As already noted in Chapter Eight, this and the previous chapter are central to the thesis, 
in that they re-integrate the 'party polities' and policy-oriented strands of the empirical 
study and test them against the theoretical model. The most significant element of this 
process is in this chapter, where Assumption 3 (/) on Coalition Maintenance is tested 
against the two case studies.
Assumption 3(f) is the key to the whole thesis, as it posits the question: what were the 
parties' preferences and were they successfully pursued? As discussed in Chapter One, 
the other preconditions and assumptions are either self-evident, a logical consequence or a 
counter factual argument to a previous precondition or assumption, or relatively easy to 
demonstrate through quantitative means. However, in raising the issue of the pursuit of 
preferences over time (and the nature of the related payoffs), the model moves in game- 
theoretical terms, from a single-play game to a multiple-play game. It is much harder to 
model multiple plays of a game over time and having done so, to operationalise the game in 
terms of the empirical research. As also discussed in Chapter One, the thesis works from 
the assumption that the Greens considered it just as important to change the structure and 
process of policy-making as to affect the outputs and outcomes. Thus, their 'bundle' of 
preferences is a composite of aspirations regarding structure, process, outputs and
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outcomes of the coalition and that their continued participation in a given coalition 
depended upon enough of these preferences being fulfilled.
The previous chapter prepared the ground for Chapter Nine, by testing a selection of 
models of coalition formation against the empirical evidence in the two case studies, before 
moving on to the new model of coalition formation. The chapter successfully 
problematised the trade-off between prediction and explanation, office-seeking and policy- 
oriented payoffs and went on to test the new model against the empirical data. This 
demonstrated that, within the confines of the available information, the new model 
possessed considerable predictive and explanatory power.
Section 9.2. has two purposes. First, it builds upon the previous chapter and models 
multiple plays over time, in order to better understand the processes of coalition 
formation. In doing so, it will extrapolate up from the particular circumstances of each 
coalition, in order to identify the general phenomena that are taking place in the studies. 
Second, it will test the model against the actual 'events' of each case study, moving down 
from the general to the particular, in order to identify any assumptions that may be 
unrealistic or just plain wrong.
Each assumption is examined sequentially, first against the Berlin case and then against the 
equivalent events in Lower Saxony. In the interests of brevity, where there is nothing to 
add from the Lower Saxony case, the chapter will move on to the next assumption.
Section 9.3. will review the evidence and assess its implications for both the case studies 
and the explanatory value of the model.
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9.2. The Model
(a) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range.
Berlin. In terms of longevity, the Berlin Red-Green coalition was not a great success. 
lasting less than two years. Its political life was tempestuous and it dissolved in 
acrimony prior to the 1990 elections. In short, it was not a relatively stable coalition.
However, its duration spanned the most momentous period of post-war German 
history, to the extent that the parameters of the political discourse within the city 
changed profoundly over its period in office. As a result, those elements of the two 
parties ideological stance that had been selectively emphasised in the coalition 
agreement had lost their saliency by the end of the coalition period. At the same time, 
those elements that had the potential to cause problems between the coalition partners 
had increased in salience under the new political conditions. Thus, in the new all- 
Berlin polity, the policy domains of Fabric of Society and Social Groups which had 
been stressed in the coalition's programme were of less importance than those of 
Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy, Government and the Economy. The social 
authoritarianism of 'old1 SPD thinking had once more become dominant. Moreover, 
given the accelerating economic dislocation in East Berlin, even in the domain of 
Welfare there was a return to the old 'social democratic' priorities of 'mopping up1 the 
social costs of capitalist economic organisation, whilst the post-materialist priorities 
stressed in the coalition agreement became less urgent. The Red-Green coalition was 
no longer playing to its strengths in ideological terms and in practice, its ideological 
range had widened.
Lower Saxony. Given that the Eower Saxony coalition lasted a full term, it can be regarded 
as having been relatively stable in terms of longevity. In terms of'events', it was fairly
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collegiate by the relative standards of Red-Green coalitions (in particular, the Berlin 
coalition).
Although steadily deteriorating economic circumstances imposed quite a strain upon 
the coalition, it was never confronted with an upheaval on the scale of that encountered 
by the Berlin coalition. The only significant deleterious effect of unification upon 
Lower Saxony was the transfer of resources away from relatively poor western Lcinder 
in the 'old' Federal Republic, to the absolutely poor 'New' Lander. Austerity aside, the 
internal conditions of the Lower Saxony polity remained constant (unlike in Berlin). 
Therefore, it is hard to assess whether the coalition's ideological range was narrow 
enough to survive a real crisis along the lines of the one that hit the Berlin coalition. In 
that sense, comparing the two cases directly is like comparing apples and oranges.
Nevertheless, the ideological range was wide enough for Schroder to exploit in the run­ 
up to the Landtag elections. The final year of the coalition was marked by the SPD's 
re-emphasis of 'old' SPD values. However, these did not constitute a socially 
authoritarian profile (as in Berlin, where the Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy 
and Government domains were emphasised), but rather, through, for example, the 
EXPO 2000. Europipe and Pappenburg test-track rows, emphasised the domain of the 
Economy. Nevertheless, they were all issues where the Greens' post-materialist 
instincts allowed themselves to be marginalised.
(b) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative majority.
Berlin. Although this would appear to be a common-sense assumption, it is hard to find 
evidence in the Berlin case to support it. Not only was the Red-Green coalition the 
only minimal-connected-winning coalition within the bargaining set. it was also the
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minimal-winning coalition per se. In theory, there was no alternative coalition 
arrangement to the one that actually formed that better satisfied both the ideological 
and numerical formation criteria. Therefore, if Proposition (b) holds, no alternative 
coalition arrangement would have lasted as long as the Red-Green coalition.
Although it is a counter-factual argument (and therefore impossible to prove one way 
or the other), one suspects that, despite constituting a surplus majority and a sub- 
optimal distribution of payoffs, a Grand Coalition would have made a better fist of 
confronting the new strategic environment that arose out of the collapse of the GDR. 
There is some evidence to support this proposition. First, despite having the same 
fundamental problems to deal with, the subsequent Grand Coalition that formed after 
the 1990 elections successfully survived a full electoral term and was re-elected in 
1995, albeit with a reduced vote-share [Lees, 1996]. Second, from 1950 until 1963. 
Berlin was governed by three consecutive surplus-majority coalitions (see Appendix 
Four). Indeed, the coalitions formed in 1950 (SPD, CDU and FDP) and 1958 (SPD 
and CDU) included all the parties represented in the legislature at the time. These 
coalitions also coincided with periods of relative political upheaval in the city (the 
1950 coalition was formed just a year after the lifting of the Berlin blockade) and lasted 
their full electoral terms. Taken together, the success of these surplus-majority 
coalitions indicate that, in the Berlin party polity, conditions of political stress (what 
Laver and Schofield (1990) call 'events') appear to place a premium upon such 
coalitions94 .
94There are two possible explanations for why a coalition between the two Volksparteien might have been 
more stable (and they are not mutually exclusive). These could be called a 'cohesiveness' and/or an 
'inclusiveness' argument, (i) Cohesiveness. If this is this case, there is actually very little ideological 
distance between the two Volksparteien and certain conditions of political stress make ideological 
cohesiveness more important than the optimum distribution of payoffs within a coalition, (ii) 
Inclusiveness. Alternatively, that such conditions of political stress place a premium upon the inclusion of 
as many of the democratic parties as possible, subject to secondary ideological and numerical formation 
criteria (which will obviously vary across cases). Thus, one could argue that the failure to maintain the 
Red-Green coalition through such conditions of political stress \vas a result of either a lack of ideological
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Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony, the Red-Green coalition was the only minimal- 
connected-winning coalition within the bargaining set as well as the minimal-winning 
coalition per se. Therefore, no other alternative coalition arrangement could have better 
satisfied both the ideological and numerical formation criteria. If Proposition (b) holds. 
no alternative coalition arrangement would have lasted as long as the Red-Green 
coalition and as the coalition did last a full term, this assumption is satisfied (with the 
same caveats about 'events' that apply to the Berlin case).
(c) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of partners within the
coalition.
Berlin. In the Berlin case, there were seven numerically possible coalition outcomes: (i) a 
minority SPD administration (tolerated by the CDU and/or the AL); (ii) a minority 
CDU administration (tolerated by the SPD and/or - improbably - the AL); (iii) a 
minimal-connected-winning Red-Green coalition; (iv) a minimal-winning CDU-AL 
coalition; (v) a surplus-majority Grand Coalition; (vi) a surplus majority CDU-SPD- 
AL coalition; (vii) an all-inclusive Republican-CDU-SPD-AL coalition.
Option (vii) is excluded because the Republicans were not normatively defensible (see 
Precondition 1 (a) to Coalition Bargaining), whilst options (vi), (iv), (ii) and (i) are all 
improbable due to a combination of ideological and/or numerical criteria. The two most 
probable outcomes were (iii) and (v), which would both have two partners. With 
regard to the respective merits of (iii) and (v), the arguments made with regard to 
Assumption 3 (b) about Coalition Maintenance apply (including the usual caveat about 
the use of counter-factual argument degenerating into simple speculation).
cohesiveness out-weighing its office-seeking benefits or because it was insufficiently ideologicalK inclusive, 
or a combination of both.
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Lower Saxony. As in Berlin, there were multiple possible numerical outcomes. However, 
unlike in Berlin, there were no parties excluded on the grounds of democratically 
accepted criteria. Because of the arguments posited above, the most likely outcomes 
were (i) A Red-Green coalition and (ii) a Grand Coalition. As there was a Red-Green 
coalition and it lasted a full term, the assumption is satisfied.
(d) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of alternative coalitions
available to members.
Berlin. In the Berlin case, the SPD was in the position where it had a choice between two 
potential coalition partners: the AL and the CDU. Moreover, it enjoyed a degree of 
congruence in policy terms with both parties. Indeed, it had kept its options open in 
the opening round of coalition negotiations. The SPD's position of leverage was 
reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios, where it is evident that the SPD's 
bargaining position was enhanced by the availability of an alternative coalition partner. 
Throughout the period, the SPD appeared confident enough of its decisive position to 
force concessions from the AL (for instance over its attitude towards the Allied 
presence) and at the same time pursue policies that appealed to the more socially 
conservative elements of its (and the CDU's) support (such as the eviction of 
squatters). As a result, whilst the AL (and in particular the grass-roots membership) 
felt compromised by its participation in government, the SPD did not have to make 
any significant concessions. Moreover, following the 1990 elections it remained in 
government as junior partner to the CDU.
One could argue that the availability of an alternative coalition partner meant that the 
SPD was not forced to invest all of its political capital in the Red-Green coalition and 
that this contributed to its demise. Certainly many in the AL suspected that the SPD.
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and Walter Momper in particular, was not wholeheartedly committed to the coalition 
(and, according to many of those involved, would have been happier working with the 
CDU). However, even if the coalition had not collapsed, the outcome of the 1990 all- 
Berlin elections made its continuation impossible anyway.
Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony, the SPD was also in the happy position where it 
enjoyed a degree of congruence in policy terms with all three other parties. However, 
it had not kept its options open in the opening round of coalition negotiations to the 
same extent that had been the case in Berlin. Indeed, as Jun [1994: 192-3] observed, 
the electorate and the parties went into the election with the understanding that there 
was a choice between a CDU-FDP or SPD-Green coalition. Jun argues that the rise of 
the Greens and the failure of the SPD to unseat the incumbent coalition in previous 
elections had made this inevitable. Another reason must surely be the personality of 
Gerhard Schroder, with the 'new sharpness' he had brought into the Landtag (which 
had alienated the FDP) and his stated preference for a Red-Green coalition.
However, there is no evidence that the failure to fully exploit the SPD's numerical 
advantage and ideological leverage was reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios. It 
is true that the SPD's numerical ratio of seats per portfolio is worse than in Berlin, but 
(as already noted) this might be more of a reflection of the fact that the Greens were 
being compensated for their failure to secure the Environment portfolio.
Moreover, the Greens had no alternative coalition partners. Also, as in Berlin, the 
Lower Saxony SPD appeared confident enough of its decisive position to force 
concessions from them (for instance, over the U-turn on high-temperature incinerators) 
and at the same time pursue policies that appealed to the more socially conservative 
elements of its (and the CDU's) support (such as 'Eurofighter', EXPO 2000 and
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Europipe). Again, whilst the Greens (and in particular, the grass-roots membership) 
felt compromised by its participation in government, the SPD did not have to make 
any significant concessions. Finally, following the 1994 elections, it was able to 
abandon the Greens and govern alone.
There is little evidence to suggest that the SPD did not invest all of its political capital 
in the Red-Green coalition whilst it lasted, given that it did last a full term. Unlike 
Walter Momper, Gerhard Schroder would not have been any happier working with 
another party. However, having the chance to rule alone, he and the SPD seized their 
opportunity.
(e) Codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture procedure, are more stable. 
In the Federal Republic, it is normal practice to formally codify coalition arrangements 
with a coalition agreement, which sets out in some detail the policies that are to be 
pursued by the coalition. Moreover, such coalitions have to be formally approved by 
the legislature. Therefore, testing this assumption in either case study would involve 
counter-factual argument.
(f) All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on the
basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and anticipated
payoffs.
Berlin. By the time the Red-Green coalition had collapsed, both parties had come to the 
conclusion that continued participation in the coalition was not desirable. For a 
number of reasons, including frustration with the AL's polemical political discourse. 
the SPD was already anticipating a coalition with the CDU. One result of this was
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that its stance on law and order became increasingly authoritarian prior to the all-Berlin 
election.
For the Greens, the Red-Green coalition had promised more than it had delivered and 
anger with the SPD was palpable. The Daimler-Benz debacle and in particular, the 
Research Reactor at the Hahn-Meitner Research Institute (HMI) had led to the 
resignation of Environment Minister Michaele Schreyer in August 1990 and the 
Mainzer StraBe evictions of the 15 November (ordered by SPD Interior Minister Erich 
Patzold in the run-up to election) were intolerable for many party members.
With hindsight, the two parties' assessments of the payoffs associated with the 
coalition have become more favourable. Legislation such as the Berlin Energy Law, 
with its provision for the Energy Advisory Council, has permanently opened-up the 
energy policy network to the Greens' client groups and has to some degree changed the 
culture of public administration in the city95 . Nevertheless, at the time of the 
coalition's demise, both parties had come to the conclusion that the real and anticipated 
payoffs associated with the continuance of the Red-Green coalition were not worth the 
political candle.
Lower Saxony. Unlike the Berlin case, the Red-Green coalition did not collapse and if the 
distribution of seats had made it possible (rather than allowing the SPD to govern 
alone) following the 1994 Landtag elections, the SPD and Greens would quite 
probably have continued the coalition. For a number of reasons, including frustration
95This re-assessment was evident in conversations with the author prior to 1995 elections, in which a 
number of senior Green politicians (including a former minister) expressed a w illingness to enter into 
another coalition with the SPD if the legislative arithmetic allowed (it did not). For many in the SPD. the 
experience of being a junior partner of the CDU in a Grand Coalition has led to a re-appraisal of the Greens 
as a potential coalition partner. Indeed, following the 1995 elections many of the SPD's rank-and-file 
argued that the SPD should go into opposition with the Greens rather than reconstitute the Grand Coalition.
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with the Greens' resistance to projects like EXPO 2000, the SPD was keen to govern 
alone. However, they never anticipated a coalition with the CDU or FDP.
For the Greens, the Red-Green coalition had its frustrations. The rows over the high 
temperature incinerator, EXPO 2000, 'Eurofighter1 , Europipe and the Pappenburg test- 
track all had an effect but, despite the rhetoric of their party conferences, the Greens 
never left the coalition in the manner of the Berlin AL.
Moreover, both parties have always maintained that the payoffs associated with the 
coalition were favourable. Legislation such as the new Lower Saxony Waste Disposal 
Law and (indirectly) the new Federal Technical Instructions on Residential Waste and 
the Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Re-cycling had made a qualitative 
change to this area of environmental policy. In addition, institutional innovations such 
as the NLO, the BfK and the Second Commission permanently opened-up the energy 
policy network to the Greens' client groups, at least to the extent that the continuance 
of the Red-Green coalition would have been worthwhile. The Greens' problem was 
that the SPD was able to continue the good work without them.
9.3. Resume of Chapter Nine
The chapter began by noting that, although coalition formation can be easily 
conceptualised as a single-play game (and therefore, relatively easy to model), it is much 
harder to model multiple plays of a game over time, such as those that would take place in 
a model of coalition maintenance. It pointed out that Assumption 3 (f) is of particular 
significance, in that its stress upon the idea of payoffs provides the focus for the case
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studies. The nature of these payoffs is discussed at greater length in the conclusion 
(Chapter Ten).
In this chapter, the case studies were examined in the light of the complete model of 
coalition maintenance. In doing so, it extrapolated up from the particular circumstances of 
each coalition, in order to identify the general phenomena that are taking place in the 
studies.
What is evident from the two case studies is that, although the specific circumstances 
differ between Berlin and Lower Saxony, these circumstances can be explained in the light 
of general principles rather than just as a local 'story'. Thus:
(a) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range. The Berlin coalition 
collapsed in acrimony whilst the Lower Saxony coalition went the full term. Given that 
there is no evidence that the Lower Saxony coalition had a significantly narrower 
ideological range, the section speculated as to the importance of 'events' (the collapse of 
the GDR in particular) in determining coalition stability. Moreover, the section noted the 
fact that in both cases, the SPD used 'events' to re-orient their own stance away from a 
post-materialist agenda and towards the traditional 'old' SPD stance in the run-up to the 
next elections.
(b) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative majority. In both 
cases, the Red-Green coalition option was the only minimal-connected-winning coalition 
and the only minimal-winning coalition per se in the bargaining set. In theory, there were 
no alternative coalition arrangements to the ones that actually formed, that better satisfied 
both the ideological and numerical formation criteria. Therefore, if Proposition (b) holds. 
no alternative coalition arrangements would have lasted as long as the Red-Green coalitions
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in either case. To posit an alternative would be to use counter-factual arguments 
(although, with regard to the Berlin case, the section noted that a Grand Coalition might 
have been more successful in confronting the new strategic environment that arose out of 
the collapse of the GDR).
(c) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of partners within the 
coalition. In both cases, there were a number of numerically possible coalition outcomes. 
However, Precondition 1 (a) to Coalition Bargaining and Assumption 3 (b) on Coalition 
Maintenance ruled out the majority of the numerical option, leaving (i) A Red-Green 
coalition and (ii) a Grand Coalition as the options that would most likely guarantee 
coalition stability. The observation about a Grand Coalition being more stable in the 
Berlin case again applies. However, in Lower Saxony, there was a Red-Green coalition and 
it lasted a full term, thus satisfying the assumption.
(d) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of alternative coalitions 
available to members. This does appear to be borne out by the evidence from the two 
case studies. In the Berlin case, the SPD had a choice of coalition partners (the AL and the 
CDU) and its position of leverage was reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios, 
where it did well. In the Lower Saxony case, the SPD also enjoyed a degree of congruence 
in policy terms with all three other parties but for various reasons, it had not kept its 
options open to the same extent as had been the case in Berlin. Moreover, its numerical 
share of the portfolios was worse than in the Berlin case. However, there is no evidence 
that the failure of the Lower Saxony SPD to fully exploit its numerical and ideological 
leverage was reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios. The lower numerical share 
appears to be a reflection of the Greens being compensated for their failure to secure the 
environment portfolio. As predicted, the Berlin coalition (where the SPD had alternatives) 
collapsed, whilst the Lower Saxony coalition (where it did not) went the full term.
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(e) Codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture procedure, are more stable. 
As already noted, it is normal practice in the Federal Republic to formally codify coalition 
arrangements with a coalition agreement, which sets out in some detail the policies that are 
to be pursued by the coalition.
(j) All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on the 
basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and anticipated 
payoffs. By the time the Berlin Red-Green coalition had collapsed, both parties had come 
to conclusion that continued participation in the coalition was not desirable. In Lower 
Saxony, where it went the full term, both parties professed satisfaction with the coalition's 
record. This appears to bear out Assumption (/). However, when the respective policy 
records of the two coalitions are compared, the Berlin coalition was not without its 
achievements. Indeed, with hindsight, the two parties' assessments of the payoffs 
associated with the Berlin coalition have become more favourable. This implies that it is 
the perception as much as the reality of actual and anticipated payoffs that are important. 
These issues are discussed at greater length in Chapter Ten (sections 10.3. and 10.4 on 
games and payoffs).
Thus, the chapter demonstrates that the model is predictive. However, one must be 
satisfied that the model is sound in its assumptions and therefore explanatory. In other 
words, does the model fulfil the following criteria:
• Does it correctly predict coalition behaviour in the case studies?
• Are its assumptions realistic?
• Does it yield intellectually satisfactory answers to 'why' questions?
As already noted, the first point has been satisfied. As to the 'realism' of the model's 
assumptions, one must return to Nagel's three criteria [1973: 133-135]. First, are the
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assumptions selective and not exhaustive? In one sense, all assumptions are selective to a 
certain extent, given that it is impossible to include every possible permutation of 
behaviour within its parameters. However, within the parameters of anticipated behaviour 
in the two case studies, the model does not neglect any of the variables (such as 
institutional norms, ideology, office-seeking, group-related preferences etc.) that are salient 
to the thesis. With regard to the second question of whether they rely too much on 'pure 
cases' or ideal types, the choice of using case studies within the thesis was intended to 
counter this criticism. By choosing two discrete cases and analysing all aspects of 
coalition behaviour within them, conscious selection is kept to a minimum. As to ideal 
types, by looking at what have until recently been quite irregular and contested coalition 
agreements, the thesis has 'got its hands dirty'. Obviously, the choice of case study is 
itself a selective process. The only riposte to this point is for other researchers to use the 
model on cases of their choice. Finally, as to whether the model is explanatory, the reader 
must ask if it provides intellectually satisfactory answers to the 'why' questions relating to 




In this chapter, the theoretical framework set out in Chapter One is reviewed in the light of 
the empirical evidence presented in the thesis as a whole. The chapter will first recap 
upon the theoretical debate set out in Chapter One, including the research questions, the 
choice of cases, the literature review and subsequent selection of idioms of analysis (the 
modelling of coalition behaviour and the use of the policy networks idiom), the structuring 
of the research around two substantial case studies and the methods used to carry out the 
research. Because it involves a re-statement of the theoretical framework, the discussion 
of Chapter One is longer than that for the subsequent chapters.
The chapter will then briefly review the institutional context within which the empirical 
research is grounded, including that of the party system, the two parties themselves, the 
structure and norms of German public administration per se and that of Environmental 
policy-making in particular. This in turn prepares the reader for a discussion of Chapter 
Three, which tells the historical 'story' of Red-Green coalitions in the Federal Republic, 
from the early experiments in Hamburg and Hesse to the present day, where such coalition 
arrangements have become commonplace.
The chapter will then review Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, in which the bulk of the 
original research is presented. These four chapters are divided along thematic lines 
('polities' and 'policy') and the chapter will assess the extent to which this division is both
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intellectually tenable and of practical use in structuring what was a great deal of 
unstructured and occasionally contradictory primary data into a plausible and explanatory 
account of the two coalitions. It will identify any common political and policy-oriented 
challenges faced by the two coalitions and assess the degree to which they addressed them, 
within the context of the wider phenomena of Red-Green coalitions.
The chapter will then review Chapters Eight and Nine, where the empirical data is used to 
test the models of coalition behaviour, in particular the new model of coalition formation 
and maintenance. It will assess the degree to which the model(s) can be assumed to be 
'realistic' in their assumptions, predictive in the light of the available data and explanatory 
in their accounts of such data.
As set out in Chapter One, the chapter will then set out the process of coalition formation 
and maintenance as a formal game [cf. Hargreaves Heap et al, 1992: 95-97] and, having 
established these parameters, the thesis will look at policy-oriented payoffs (determined 
as much by the process of policy-making as by its content and drawing upon the work of 
Rhodes [1981, 1986a, 1986b]).
Finally, the chapter will use the evidence from the thesis to make two points: one 
theoretical and the other speculative. First, it will discuss the nature of payoffs (office 
seeking and/or policy oriented), both in a general sense and in relation to the two case 
studies. The evidence of the thesis will be assessed in the light of selected material from 
elite interviews conducted in the Spring and Summer of 1996, with a particular focus upon 
the disparity (if any) between what can be regarded as the 'revealed preference' of agents' 
strategic behaviour at the time, and their perceptions of such behaviour in the light of at 
least two years' ex post rationalisation.
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Second, it will assess what light the thesis has thrown upon the phenomena of Red-Green 
coalitions in particular and speculate as to the possible future of such political co­ 
operation.
10.2. Discussion of the Thesis and its Findings
10.2.1. Chapter One
The thesis is predicated upon the research question 'to what extent the Greens have 
assumed a 'normal' political role within the party system'? In other words, can their 
strategic behaviour be predicted as a function of the rational pursuit of their preferences. 
be they instrumental (office-seeking) or ideological (related to policy processes and 
outcomes). The thesis assumes that policy-related payoffs will be as much a function of 
the process of policy-making as of its content, in other words the extent to which the 
Greens have been able to break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory 
framework. The thesis builds upon a number of formal hypothetico-deductive models of 
coalition behaviour and posits a new model of coalition formation, within the rational 
choice tradition (with a focus upon agency), in order to impose form and structure upon 
the research. The thesis includes a 'policy dimension', in order to establish a common set 
of criteria in order to assess a given coalition's record of policy implementation. 
Environmental policy provides the primary policy focus, because it is the policy area 
most closely identified with the Greens (indeed, it is at the core of their own self-identity 
and external perceptions of them) and of academic interest in its own right.
The analysis contains two distinct elements. First, a comparative analysis of the 
ideological and discursive profiles of the SPD and Greens, with emphasis upon the role of
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the 'new polities' and second, use of the 'policy networks' idiom as a secondary theoretical 
tool (examining the degree of Green penetration of the policy-making process) in order to 
structure the data derived form the two case studies in Berlin and Lower Saxony.
Chapter One then reviewed the established literature associated with coalition theory and 
policy networks. Within the field of coalition theory, the chapter identified two distinct 
and divergent 'traditions' within coalition theory, broadly classified as the 'game- 
theoretical' (or formal-deductive) and 'European polities' (primarily inductive) schools 
[Laver and Schofield 1990: 10-11]. It then traced the development of coalition theory. 
from the early 'office-seeking1 models such as Riker's [1962] minimal-winning 'size 
principle', Gamson's [1961] 'cheapest winning coalition' model and Leiserson's [1968] idea 
of 'payoff vectors, which have been criticised for being too 'policy blind1 [Laver and 
Schofield 1990: 90], with only a modest record in predicting real outcomes to processes of 
coalition bargaining [Browne, 1973: 17-31; see also Bogdanor, 1983; von Beyme, 1984 and 
Pridham, 1986]. The chapter then looked at a selection of models that used some form of 
'policy dimension' as a secondary formation criterion, such as Axelrod's [1970] 'minimal 
connected winning' model, de Swaan's [1973], 'median legislator' model and noted a trade­ 
off between coalition size and ideological range and certain institutional/ideological norms 
that skew the process of coalition formation and act as a variable upon coalition 
maintenance. In order to conceptualise these norms, the chapter argued that a policy- 
driven model was required, for example 'core' theory [Hanson, 1972; Hanson and Rice. 
1972; Browne, 1973; Bacharach, 1976] - which conceptualises ^-dimensional Euclidean 
space - or Shepsle's [1979] concept of'structure imposed equilibrium', which effectively 
re-imposes a one-dimensional policy environment upon the legislative game. The chapter 
noted that Shepsle's model is of enormous significance because it allows the political 
theorist to both posit a formal deductive model of coalition formation and allow for the 
institutional specifics of a given case (see also Denzau and Mackay. 1987: and Gilligan and
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Krehbiel, 1987].which act as both facilitators and constraints upon behaviour. This has 
enabled theorists to factor in the institutional context (as a decision rule), as well as 
simplifying the concept of policy space (one dimensional, although not restricted to the 
classic Downsian Left-Right continuum) to that of a dichotomy (such as between 
materialist and post-materialist values, between authoritarianism and libertarianism. or 
between nationalism and internationalism), which imposes equilibrium on the model and is 
consistent with empirical evidence. The chapter then looked at attempts to apply formal 
modelling to the European context, such as work by Laver and Schofield [1990] and Budge 
and Keman[ 1990].
The chapter then reviewed the established policy networks literature [Altenstetter, 1994: 
Greer, 1994; Fennema, 1994; Bomberg, 1994; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Katzenstein 1987; 
Schneider, 1988; Pappi, 1993; Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1981; Marsh, 1983]. 
The chapter accepted Benson's loosely defined idea of policy networks as a 'cluster or 
complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and 
distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structures of resource 
dependencies' [1982: 148], but noted that - if too loosely defined - the idiom became little 
more than a set of lists [see for example Jordan and Schubert, 1992 or van Waarden, 1992], 
which was built upon by Rhodes, who established five types of network - 'Policy 
Communities', 'Professional Networks, 'Intergovernmental Networks'. 'Producer Networks' 
and 'Issue Networks'.[1986a, Ch.. 2]. The thesis argued that Rhodes work provided the 
analytical 'tool kit' in order to operationalise the subsidiary research question (as to the 
extent to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own 
associated client groups and break down established hierarchies within the German 
regulatory framework). This generated four further questions for research outlined in 
section 10.1 (i.e. regarding the nature of: the Greens own associated client groups prior to 
the Red-Green coalition; the established networks (ditto); the penetration by Greens' client
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groups of these established networks; and their success in (i) breaking down the 
established networks per se and/or (ii) gaining access to heretofore closed networks during 
and after the coalition) These questions were briefly returned to in section 1.4 and in 
Chapters Four to Nine. Section 10.4 (on payoffs) of this chapter will return to these 
themes in the light of the empirical evidence.
The chapter then posited the New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance in 
order both to direct and structure the research. The model and associated notes are set out 
on pages 37-43 of the thesis. The model is divided into three sections. First, it sets out a 
set of global preconditions to participation in coalition bargaining. Second, it sets out a 
number of global assumptions about the process of coalition formation. Finally, it sets out 
a number of global assumptions about the processes of coalition maintenance. With regard 
to the thesis, these last assumptions - and in particular Assumption 3(/) - are of particular 
importance to whole thesis. Assumption 3 (/) begs the question: what were the parties' 
preferences and were they successfully pursued? Whilst the other preconditions and 
assumptions are either self-evident, a logical consequence or a counter factual argument or 
relatively easy to demonstrate through quantitative means, issues relating to the pursuit of 
preferences over time (and the nature of the related payoffs) mean one has to model 
multiple plays of a theoretical game over time and operationalise this game in terms of the 
empirical research.
The chapter then defended the particular theoretical framework and choice of fieldwork 
methods used in the thesis, starting first with theory. With regard to Coalition Theory, 
the thesis starts by using three established models from the literature (Riker's [1962] 
Minimum/Minimal-Winning Theory; Axelrod's [1970] Minimal Connected Winning 
Theory; de Swaan's [1973] Median Legislator Model) in order to problematise the trade­ 
off between, first, predictive and explanatory modelling and. second, between office-
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seeking and policy-driven accounts of coalition formation before using the empirical data 
to test the New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance. With regards to the 
'policy networks' idiom, the thesis uses the policy network description in its loosest and 
most heuristic manner, which -as already discussed - is based upon Rhodes' idea of 
resource dependency. The thesis assumes that the these networks are mainly confined to 
the formal structures (such as the Energiebeirat and the Energieleitstelle with regard to the 
Energy policy network in Berlin). In addition the thesis builds upon Katzenstein's [1987] 
concept of three 'nodes' of the policy network and concentrate upon the three main sets of 
agents (political parties; tiers of multi-level governance; and the NGOs).
As to whether the theoretical framework is predictive, realistic and explanatory, it was 
stated that the thesis does not intend to 're-invent the wheel' in these respects. Noting that 
models are often defended on the grounds of their predictive power alone, the chapter 
criticises this approach on the grounds that it neglects the fact that a model's assumptions 
may be unrealistic (using Nagel's [1973] criteria), which means the model is not 
explanatory [Saunders, 1995: 60]. The chapter concludes the section by stating that, as 
rule of thumb, an explanation must yield an intellectually satisfying answer to a 'why'? 
question (or its equivalent), which can only be demonstrated by testing against the 
empirical data. The chapter notes that the whole debate reflects the often ambiguous 
nature of Political Science, torn between a desire for the empiricism of the natural sciences 
and the values of empathy and context inherent in the idea of 'Geisteswissenschafteri 
[Ryan, 1973: 7].
The chapter then defended its methodology, noting that there is some debate about the 
worth of case studies as a comparative method per se or merely as a methodological tool 
within the context of a wider comparative analysis [Sartori, 1994: 23]. The chapter asserts 
that the use of case studies in this thesis does conform to accepted standards of
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comparability [see Mackie and Marsh, 1995 for instance] and that the use of the formal 
institutional structure of two German Lander as the parameters of the case studies was 
appropriate, given the ease with which functional equivalents can be identified across the 
cases.
Finally, the chapter describes and defends the fieldwork methods used to undertake the 
research. It noted that data is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. The quantitative 
data consists of opinion poll data, election data and Land-level official statistics, whilst the 
qualitative data was sourced from official documents, press archives, party press offices 
and public libraries and elite interviews. Because of the use of such data in a 
complementary role to other sources and because reasons of confidentiality, only some of 
the interview data is directly attributed to individuals.
10.2.2. Chapter Two
Chapter Two looks at the institutional context in which the research is embedded, using 
the available literature.
First, the chapter looked at the party system and the electorate in the Federal Republic 
and concluded that the party system is undergoing a process of de-concentration as 
dealignment takes hold amongst the electorate. It noted that the electorate's inverted social 
profile in the 'New Lander' has aggravated this process, with parties forced to re-think 
their strategies in order to win and keep office. The institutional histories of the SPD and 
the Greens were then examined and it was demonstrated that both parties face similar 
pressures and experience similar intra-party debates over the whole issue of Red-Green 
political co-operation.
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The chapter then looked at the historical background, institutional norms, structure and 
processes of the German state and their impact upon policy outputs and outcomes. Stress 
was placed upon the duality between the Parteienstaat and the residual administrator-led 
Beamtenstaat. It was noted that this duality acts as both a facilitator and a constraint 
upon the parties, with the structure of German public administration (in terms of 
horizontal and vertical sectorisation) providing a benign opportunity structure for new 
parties. On the other hand, sectorised policy-making also generates conflict between 
ministries, whilst the technocratic discourse of the Beamtenstaat acts as a powerful brake 
upon the Green agenda. The chapter noted that the German policy-making environment is 
characterised by the features of what Rhodes [1986a] would call a 'policy community'.
The chapter then built upon this description of the German policy-making environment in 
general and looked at environmental policy in the Federal Republic. It noted the same 
facilitating and constraining features (access to new actors if in possession of policy- 
related expertise against the pressures of party politics and the dominance of managerial 
values within the administration).
10.2.3. Chapter Three
Chapter Three provided the historical context, within which the two case studies are 
grounded, through an overview of Red-Green coalitions at the sub-national level of the 
Federal Republic. Thus, the early years were characterised by a lack of trust and good 
faith on both sides, with many in the SPD regarding co-operation with the Greens as a 
necessary evil at best and those on the SPD's New Left who were well-disposed towards 
the Greens were not to come into the ascendant within the party until the late 1980s. For 
their part, the Greens had an even longer way to travel, having to overcome substantial
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ideological and structural blocks to becoming the 'good' coalition partner that they are 
today.
The chapter speculated as to what these structural and programmatic changes were and 
why they took place and concluded that Harmel and Janda's [1994] definition of party 
change as being the function of three factors - external shock, leadership change and change 
in the dominant coalition - could be partially applied to the Greens. They were not sui 
generis.
The chapter concluded that, taken in the round, the political record of the Red-Green 
coalitions to date have been mixed. Whilst the Hesse coalitions have been regarded as the 
seminal example of the genre, the Berlin and Lower Saxony coalitions represent the two 
extremes in terms of longevity. Nevertheless, the following chapters demonstrated that 
many of the themes, strengths and weaknesses of the two coalitions were broadly the 
same.
10.2.4. Chapter Four
Chapter Four examined the political history of the Red-Green coalition in Berlin. The 
chapter structured the events sequentially into four sections. After assessing the 
relationship between the parties, the chapter concluded that the Berlin AL was a relatively 
fundi-oriented party, whilst the local SPD was in decline. The presence of a growing New 
Left tendency in the SPD, combined with its inability to win a majority of seats on its 
own, made it fairly receptive to the idea of a Red-Green coalition. Moreover, a 
comparison of party programmes demonstrated that the SPD's ideological ambivalence 
allowed it to bargain with the AL as well as the CDU if it so wished. Therefore, during the
323
post-election bargaining process, the SPD held most of the cards and this was reflected in 
its share of cabinet portfolios.
Finally, the chapter gave an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in 
office and identified a number of salient political themes impacting on coalition 
maintenance. The chapter built upon Gudrun Heinrich's [1993] idea of the Berlin Red- 
Green coalition having three distinct phases. The 'honeymoon period' from the Spring 
until late Summer of 1989; the second phase, from the late Summer of 1989 until early 
1990, with a slow break-down in trust between the two parties and, finally, a third phase, 
lasting from the beginning of 1990 until its collapse. The chapter concluded that the 
underlying economic weakness of Berlin, the upheaval of November 1989, and political 
manoeuvring by both parties weakened the coalition. Other institutional factors, such as 
the AL's referring every decision back to its Basis and the resistance of the SPD's 
authoritarian Right-wing, aggravated the process. In addition the Basis in Berlin (as also in 
Hamburg) had an even more direct and malign impact because of the geographical 
compactness of the city-state. As a result, Basis access to parliamentarians was easy and 
the latter always felt that the party's activists were 'breathing down their necks'.
The chapter identified a number of political issues that perfectly encompassed these 
tensions, including the influence of big business (the Preussen Electra and Intrac affair, the 
Daimler-Benz row), fiscal rectitude versus social provision (the KIT A strike). 'Green1 
shibboleths such as nuclear power (the row over the Research Reactor at the Hahn- 
Meitner Research Institute), the ever-present ambiguity of many Greens towards private 
property and the state monopoly on violence (SPD Interior Minister Patzold's eviction of 
the squatted houses in Mainzer StraBe being the final straw). In addition, the political 
style of Walter Momper was also identified as a contributing factor.
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10.2.5. Chapter Five
Using the same thematic structure as Chapter Four, Chapter Five examined the political 
history of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony. It first looked at the relationship 
between the parties leading up to the 1990 Landtag elections and concluded that there was 
a de facto two-bloc party system in Lower Saxony by the time of the 1990 election, which 
was understood by both the parties and the electorate. Thus, the Lower Saxony Greens 
had moderated their previously radical stance and were relatively pragmatic, whilst 
Gerhard Schroder had managed to bring the local SPD around to accept the idea of a Red- 
Green coalition. Again, a comparison of party programmes concluded that, as in Berlin, 
the SPD displayed an ideological ambiguity that allowed it to bargain with any party if it 
so wished. Moreover, the SPD was again decisive within the bargaining set (because of its 
ideological stance and its share of the seats) but the chapter concluded that this was not as 
strongly reflected in its numerical share of cabinet portfolios because of a trade-off 
between policy-oriented and office-seeking payoffs (the SPD denied the Greens the 
Environment Ministry).
Finally, the chapter examined the political life of the coalition, using an analogue of 
Heinrich's three phases (as applied to the Berlin case). It concluded that the 'honeymoon 
period' lasted longer than in Berlin, ending in 1992 when Bruns floated the idea that the 
Land would build a high temperature solid waste incinerator after all. The second phase, 
characterised by a slow break-down in trust between the two parties, lasted from early 
1992 until mid-1993, whilst the third phase, in which both parties were effectively 
estranged from one another, lasted from mid-1993 until the Landtag elections the following 
year. The chapter demonstrated that, from the summer of 1993. everything that Schroder 
did can be explained in terms of forcing the Greens into a corner whilst winning moderate 
support from the centre (by re-profiling himself as a job-creating Landesvater).
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The chapter concluded that, as in Berlin, the underlying economic weakness of Lower 
Saxony contributed to the coalition's slow decline but that the bulk of the coalition's 
problems were self-inflicted. Again, the Utopian views of the Lower Saxony Greens' Basis 
and the resistance of the SPD's authoritarian Right-wing were aggravating factors. In terms 
of political issues, in Lower Saxony the influence of big business was flagged by EXPO 
2000, the Europipe affair and another Daimler-Benz row (over the test-track at 
Papenburg), the tensions between fiscal rectitude and social provision in the row over the 
teachers' working week, whilst the 'Green' shibboleths were the issues of high temperature 
incinerators and nuclear power (Stade, in both instances). Unlike Berlin, however, there 
were no real problems regarding the ambiguity of many Greens towards private property 
and the state monopoly on violence and Gerhard Schroder's handling of the Lower Saxony 
coalition was far superior to that of Walter Momper's in Berlin.
10.2.6. Chapter Six
Chapter Six examined in greater depth the degree to which Red-Green coalitions were able 
to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in their 
respective Lander, through three examples of programmatic and institutional innovations 
carried out within the field of environmental policy in Berlin.
First, it looked at three of the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation in 
Berlin and concluded that West Berlin's unique geo-political position had a huge impact 
upon the city's political economy, with a need to reduce dependency upon the German 
Democratic Republic for the provision or transport of resources. The chapter observed 
that Berlin was economically weak, environmentally degraded and lacking a coherent 
energy strategy. Second, it looked at the degree to which Berlin's polarised party system 
constrained policy-implementation and concluded that there were some areas of agreement
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with the Greens, although the AL's solutions were more radical, driven by a decentralised 
policy-formulation process, based on the environmental expertise centred around the city's 
universities and the Federal Environment Agency.
It went on to examine the degree of resistance from the NGOs and concluded that there 
was only limited significance in the resistance of trades unions etc., whilst the process of 
staffing the Environment Ministry was eased by a lack of rigid policy networks, a young 
and innovative staff, the failure of the FDP to enter the legislature (thus denying a focus of 
partisan opposition amongst permanent officials who hankered after the old FDP regime) 
and a plentiful source of environmental expertise outside the established policy network 
described above. Finally, the section looked at the degree to which the coalition's policies 
represented continuity or change in terms of their use of economic instruments and 
concluded that the traditional reliance upon statist solutions represented continuity rather 
than change in the style (if not the content) of policy making.
The Berlin Energy Law CEnergiegesetze).
The Berlin Energy Law sought to promote a raft of measures such as low energy 
consumption and the use 'low value-added' energy forms and the chapter described the 
proposed measures for both the public and private sectors, such as the 'Energy Pass' 
system, new procurement guidelines, the Energy Officials initiative and the 'Energy 
Concept' (to be drawn up by the proposed 'Energy Advisory Council').
The Berlin Energy Advisory Council fEnergiebeirat).
The chapter concluded that the Energy Advisory Council was quite successful in opening 
up the policy network to the Greens' client groups. It identified two reasons for this. 
First, the advisory council's central institutional location meant that its deliberations were 
disseminated throughout the policy formulation and planning culture of the ministry and.
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second, it was a heterogeneous body, drawn from all 'three nodes' of Katzenstein's [1987] 
policy network ideal type, including producer and consumer groups from both sides of the 
Green debate (BEWAG and GASAG versus Eurosolar for instance). It concluded that it 
was not a consensual body. The section also speculated as to whether groups like 
Eurosolar were more a 'Producer Network' than an 'Issue Network' [after Rhodes 1986a] 
and observed that Eurosolar and the other academic research institutes (such as the Oko- 
institut, the Forschungsstelle fur Umweltpolitik and the Berlin International Solar Centre) 
represented a formidable resource of environmental expertise with which to counter the 
producer interests on the Advisory Council in drawing up the 'Energy Concept'.
The Berlin 'Energy Concept' CEnergiekonzept Berlin).
The chapter then examined the Berlin Energy Concept itself. The section concluded that, 
when the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection produced the first 
Berlin Energy Concept in 1992 (two years after the AL left government), the document's 
advocacy of much of what was in the Energiegesetz represented a long term policy- 
oriented payoff for the AL (who in turn praised the high standard of technical debate 
within the document).
Interestingly, the SPD's reaction was more critical, although it is impossible to isolate why 
this was the case without going into a much deeper analysis of this aspect of the coalition. 
Suffice to say that the SPD declared the Energy Concept a disappointment because it 
recognised that planned reductions in CO2 emissions would not be achieved. The chapter 
observed that this reaction was surprising, given that, on the evidence, the coalition's 
record of institutional and programmatic innovation was (by the criteria set out in this 
thesis) a relative success.
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10.2.7. Chapter Seven
Using the same thematic structure as in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven examined the degree to 
which the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony was able to break down the established 
hierarchies within the policy-making process in the Land administration, through a 
selection of programmatic and institutional innovations within the field of environmental 
policy.
First, the chapter looked at the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation 
in Lower Saxony as they confronted the Red-Green coalition in 1990. such as the state's 
poor economic health and the problem of staffing. The chapter concluded that (compared 
to Berlin) staffing was much more of an issue in Lower Saxony, with the SPD and Greens 
sharing misgivings about the closed nature of the Land policy-network. The chapter gave 
an account of the early days of the Lower Saxony coalition - marked by the removal of 
many high-profile civil servants - and noted that the Greens lacked expertise in depth. 
Taken in the round, the chapter concluded that the coalition's policies represented 
continuity, rather than change, in terms of their use of economic instruments.
The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (Niedersachsiches Landesamt filr 
Okologie).
The chapter first looked at the Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (NLO) and 
concluded that the policy of Integrationsgedanke was only partially successful and that, 
because of its size and terms of reference the NLO was of little use in breaking down the 
established hierarchies within the policy network. Nevertheless, it was noted that the 
NLO has escaped the severe criticism that the Beirats ~u Fragen des Kernenergieau.sstiegs 
and the Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Ver\vertung have attracted.
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Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (Beirut 
zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs).
The chapter then looked at the setting up the Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs 
(BfK) and the events that precipitated it (e.g. how the Nuclear power policy issue was 
complicated by the Basic Law, with competencies shared between Lander and Bund and 
the Land having to 'work around1 the Federal government through its powers of the 
Aufsichtspflicht (the duty to monitor) to review nuclear power-related plants and practices 
with an eye to closure on health and safety grounds), in particular, the row between 
Monika Griefahn and Federal Environment Minister Topfer. It was noted that this 
illustrated the limited nature of Lander powers in this 'second node' [after Katzenstein. 
1987] of the policy network.
Having described how the BfK was set-up as a way of getting the coalition off the hook on 
this issue, the chapter then assessed the BfK's structure and terms of reference. It was 
noted that the BfK's terms of reference were extremely wide-ranging (and with its 
constituent committees in danger of duplicating their terms of reference), that they touched 
upon the interests of the Federal Government (including those of a security-oriented 
nature) and that the estimated operating budget of DM 450,000 per annum invited the 
charge of'jobs for the boys'.
The chapter then described the coalition's poor record in the field of nuclear energy policy 
(with building work at the planned Endlager Gorleben and the licensing process for the 
Asse II facility still underway and the Federal government able to force through a license 
for the Schacht Konrad facility).
The chapter then noted that the BfK's terms of reference had become more modest since 
the Greens have left the Land government, with a reduction in the number and terms of
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reference of the sub-committees. Moreover, there has been a re-emphasis upon traditional 
technocratic solutions to policy problems. Nevertheless, the chapter concluded that, in its 
own terms, the BfK had not been an institutional failure, as it had been set up by an SPD- 
dominated coalition and worked to the (SPD-run) Environment Ministry and 
Staatskanzlei. As such, the Greens never enjoyed enough institutional leverage over it.
Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of 
Waste (Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung. Verwertung)
The chapter then looked at the operation of the Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, 
Verwertung, describing how the topic of waste disposal was flagged-up during the 
bargaining phase and in the coalition agreement. Much was made of the coalition's desire 
to avoid the incineration option at nearly all costs, only to eventually be forced into a 
political U-turn and eventually approving the building of a high temperature incinerator 
after all. The chapter speculated as to whether this decision was necessary or more an act 
of deliberate provocation of the Greens in the run-up to the 1994 Landtag election.
The chapter then noted that, despite these difficulties, the overall record of the Red-Green 
coalition (and its SPD successor) was relatively successful. The chapter gave a resume of 
the Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law (NAbfAbgG) of 1992, as well as an account of how 
the relevant Federal technical standards (the 1993 Technical Instructions on Residential 
Waste) and legislation (the 1994 Federal Act on Waste management and Product 
Recycling) have also been amended along the same lines, with a much stronger application 
of the 'polluter pays' principle. The influence of the Red-Green coalition (and the Second 
Commission) on these documents is clear.
The chapter concluded that the Second Commission failed in political terms and that the 
Greens' client groups had only limited success in breaking down the established
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hierarchies, because entry into the network was constrained by opportunity costs related 
to expertise and access to the means of production in such a specialised and capital- 
intensive field. However, even though it represented a much more corporatist model than 
the other bodies studied in Chapters Six and Seven, the chapter noted that such an under- 
representation of ecological groups was of limited importance, given the degree of 
consensus in the Federal Republic over the basic principles of solid waste management. 
The chapter concluded that the Second Commission was a success, but noted the iron) of 
the Greens' limited role in this.
10.2.8. Chapter Eight
Chapters Eight and Nine test the model(s) against the empirical evidence of the previous 
four chapters. Chapter Eight first tested established models of coalition formation, 
starting with Riker's [1962] Minimum/Minimal-Winning Theory before moving on to 
Axelrods [1970] Minimal Connected Winning Theory and finally de Swaan's [1973] 
Median Legislator Model. It concluded that the three models display some variance of 
predictive power when applied to the two case studies, with all three models limited by 
their neglect of ideological distance. De Swaan's account, which contains a policy 
dimension, is more explanatory but, in the trade-off between predictive and explanatory 
power, once the policy-dimension has been accounted for (or discounted), a numerical 
formation criteria remains important.
Next, the chapter applied the new model of coalition formation to the two case studies and 
concluded that the model is both predictive and explanatory. In both cases, the 
Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining stood up against the empirical evidence. The 
bargaining set was self-selecting and excluded all parties that were perceived not to be 
normatively-defensible, according to accepted democratic criteria. Thus, the Berlin
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Alternative Liste and the Lower Saxony Greens eventually moderated their stance to 
become more acceptable as potential coalition partners. Moreover, in both instances this 
represented a trade-off between office-seeking and policy-driven preferences in which they 
acted like any other conventional office-seeking party. The evidence also supports the 
idea of policy preferences as a function of one or more ideological dimensions, with the 
SPD's Janus-faced ideological profile allowing it to positively engage with the other parties 
along either the Downsian Left-Right and/or the materialist/post-materialist dimension.
The model's main assumptions about Coalition Formation were also well supported by the 
evidence. Both coalition outcomes were the closest for both parties in policy terms 
(ideologically 'connected' along at least one policy-dimension). Moreover, having fulfilled 
these policy-oriented criteria, it was demonstrated that the actual outcome was the only 
possible (ideologically connected) minimal-winning coalition in either case. Again, the 
SPD were decisive: with the CDU (in Berlin) and the CDU and/or FDP (in Lower Saxony) 
having the option of engaging the SPD along the Downsian-esque Left-Right policy 
dimension (such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs. Freedom and Democracy. 
Government, the Economy, Welfare, Fabric of Society, Social Groups and Discursive 
Form), whilst the Berlin AL and the Lower Saxony Greens were able to selectively 
emphasise the common post-materialist ground they shared with the SPD (within the 
Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups). In turn, the SPD was able to 
calculate policy-distance in terms of the parties' relative positions along these dimensions, 
with the actual outcome assumed to be the revealed preference of all parties (with no other 
party able or willing to offer a more attractive alternative). These revealed preferences 
fulfilled specific policy-oriented formation criteria, and served to maximise office-seeking 
payoffs by being the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least partners. 
However, the assumption (e), that if all other conditions are satisfied, the party that 
controls the median legislator within the most policy sectors is decisive, was not
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conclusively demonstrated, with the SPD (who controlled the median legislator) getting a 
different numerical share of the office-seeking payoffs in the two cases. Nevertheless, the 
chapter posited the idea that such a variance can be explained by a difference in the type of 
portfolios in each case (with the Lower Saxony Greens' being given a numerically 
disproportionate share of cabinet portfolios to offset the loss of the normcitively 
disproportionate policy-related payoffs associated with the Environment portfolio).
The chapter concluded that the established models of coalition formation successfully 
problematised the trade-off between prediction and explanation, office-seeking and policy- 
oriented payoffs and that the new model possessed considerable predictive and 
explanatory power. However, it was stressed that models of coalition formation only 
aspire to predict and explain a one-off outcome (easily conceptualised as a single-play 
game and easy to model) and that it is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over 
time (those that would take place in a deductive model of coalition maintenance).
10.2.9. Chapter Nine
The chapter began by noting that, as it is much harder to model multiple plays of a game 
over time, Assumption 3 (f) is of central significance to the thesis because its stress upon 
the idea of payoffs provides the focus for the case studies and sets up the discussion on 
the nature of payoffs in sections 10.3. and 10.4. The chapter concluded that the two case 
studies can be explained in the light of general principles set out in the new model (rather 
than just as a local 'story'), albeit through their partial falsification.
The assumption (a) that coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range 
was falsified, given that the Berlin coalition collapsed in acrimony whilst the Lower 
Saxony coalition went the full term. Notwithstanding the fact that the AL still retained a
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robust fundi element within its Basis, this suggests that - uncomfortably for some political 
scientists - 'events' (pace Harold Macmillan) are as crucial as any predictable variables in 
determining the success of coalition maintenance. Likewise, the assumption (b) that 
coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative majority was also 
questionable, given that in both cases, the Red-Green coalition option was the only 
minimal-connected-winning coalition (and indeed the only minimal-winning coalition per 
se) in the bargaining set. In theory, no alternative coalition arrangements would have lasted 
as long as the Red-Green coalitions in either case yet the chapter noted that a surplus- 
majority Grand Coalition in Berlin, for example, might have been more successful in 
confronting the new strategic environment that arose out of the collapse of the GDR. 
However, as this is a counter-factual argument, the proposition cannot be said to have 
been falsified. The proposition (c), that coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the 
number of partners within the coalition is also challenged by the collapse of the Berlin 
coalition, but satisfied by the Lower Saxony case, where the coalition lasted the full term. 
The proposition (d) that coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of 
alternative coalitions available to members is also satisfied.. Because of Schroder's hostile 
attitude towards the CDU and FDP, the SPD did not realistically have a choice of coalition 
partners in the Lower Saxony case and it lasted the full term (despite the lower numerical 
share of payoffs, as a result of the Greens being compensated for their failure to secure the 
environment portfolio). In contrast, the Berlin coalition (where the SPD had alternatives) 
collapsed. Proposition (e), that codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture 
procedure, are more stable is unproved in the German case, given that it is normal practice 
in the Federal Republic to formally codify coalition arrangements with a coalition 
agreement, which sets out in some detail the policies that are to be pursued by the 
coalition.
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Given that two of the five propositions examined so far are at least partially falsifiable. 
much hangs on the proposition (/), that all parties calculate the utility of their continued 
participation within a coalition on the basis of the degree of correlation between their 
preferences and their actual and anticipated payoffs. It is clear that by the time the Berlin 
Red-Green coalition had collapsed, both parties had concluded that continued participation 
in the coalition was not desirable, whilst in Lower Saxony, where it went the full term, 
both parties professed satisfaction with the coalition's record. This is self-explanatory and 
appears to bear out the assumption. But when the respective policy records of the two 
coalitions are compared, the Berlin coalition was not without its achievements (as both 
parties have belatedly recognised). Clearly, the perception of actual and anticipated 
payoffs is as important as the reality. These issues are discussed at greater length later in 
this chapter.
Chapter Nine concluded that the model is predictive and its assumptions realistic [Nagel 
1973]. As to whether it is explanatory depends on the extent to which it can be used to 
explain the nature of the payoffs involved in the two cases and, by implication, in the 
abstract. This will also be looked at in sections 10.3. and 10.4.
1O.3. The Rules of the Game
10.3.1. The idea of Games (and payoffs)
The reader will have noted that the idea of Games (and their payoffs) is central to the 
theoretical framework that drives this thesis forward. But what does one mean when this 
imagery is used? As was discussed in Chapter One, coalition games can be regarded as
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having six distinct elements, or 'rules of the game', through which coalition behaviour is 
modelled and there are six questions (formulated here for the simplest form of game, that 
involving two players) which define those rules [Hargreaves Heap et al, 1992: 95].
First, who are the players? In other words, who is making the decisions within the game? 
This is important, not so much because of what it tells us about the individual player 
herself, but because it identifies whose actions or 'moves' (on the other side) the player 
must take into account.
Second, having identified who matters in the game, what are the strategies available to the 
players? A strategy is a plan of action, based upon knowledge of the permissible sequence 
of rules within the game. The degree of sophistication of a strategy is defined by (i) the 
complexity of the game and (ii) the amount of knowledge the player has about it.
Third, to what extent are the players able to form coalitions? If the players are 
participating in a 'co-operative game', any subset of players is able to form a coalition. In a 
'non-co-operative game' players are not able to make the binding agreements with each 
other that constitute coalitions, but must rather act as independent agents. The process by 
which a non-co-operative strategy is superseded by one of co-operation is called 
'bargaining'.
Fourth, what are the payoffs of the players (assuming payoffs measure the degree to 
which players are successful in meeting their objectives in the game)? Given that 
preferences vary, so does the method used to order them. They may be ordered cardinally 
or, more simply as an ordinal order of preference.
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Fifth, how much information do the players have about the game? What do they know 
about the available strategies and associated payoffs available to themselves and the 
opposing player? If players have 'complete information', they know all of the rules of the 
game and the strategies and payoffs available to themselves and their opponent. This does 
not remove uncertainty, but assumes that each player knows the probability distributions 
attached to the outcomes of the available strategies. If players are not in possession of 
such knowledge, then they are considered to be playing a game with 'incomplete 
information'.
Finally, how much information can be considered 'common knowledge'? Common 
knowledge is possessed by both players and - crucially - is seen to be so. Therefore, 
player A knows that player B knows what player A knows and vice versa. This absence 
of doubt facilitates the solving of games because both players are able to put themselves in 
other's place, imagine what they would do in that position and act upon that knowledge. 
However in reality games are reasonably complicated and players are more often than not 
incapable of (i) possessing all of the relevant knowledge and (ii) making the quick and 
highly complex computations required to act upon them. In other words, these players 
actions are informed by 'bounded rationality', in which highly complex problems are 
truncated into a manageable scenario. How this actually takes place is still something of a 
mystery to psychologists [ibid: 125]. Essentially, one is in the realm of the imagination.
10.3.2. The Berlin and Lower Saxony Games
So how does the party system in Berlin in the period 1989 to 1990, or that of Lower 
Saxony in the period 1990 to 1994, fit this analogy of a game, and what were the payoffs 
involved? For the purposes of the thesis, question 4 (what are the payoffs?) will be dealt 
with last in section 10.4.
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Who are the players?
It is crucial that each player is able to know who is making the decisions within the game 
and whose moves must be taken into account. It is perhaps not surprising then that the 
two parties found themselves unable to anticipate each other's moves. In a formal sense, 
the coalition agreement in both cases was drawn up by the two parliamentary Fraktionen 
and would be implemented and monitored by them. However, in reality there were other 
players whose presence disrupted the game and hindered the development of strategies. 
For instance, the Berlin AL Fraktion and its Lower Saxony counterpart had to refer all 
important decisions back to their Basis for approval. Obviously, this undermined the 
principle of cabinet government because decisions taken in cabinet were constantly being 
second-guessed by the extra-parliamentary Green movement. This was especially the case 
in Berlin, where the uniquely vociferous nature of the intra-party discourse within the AL 
at that time meant that Fraktion members had to 'cover their backs' when it came to dealing 
with the membership. When SPD cabinet members saw their AL colleagues not only 
giving cabinet decisions a completely different 'spin' but also adopting a more strident (and 
often anti-SPD) tone to do so, trust was slowly eroded. This process also took place in 
Lower Saxony, albeit over a longer period of time. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1993, 
the Greens' Basis in Lower Saxony were explicitly denouncing the SPD and all its works, 
leaving Trittin with little choice but to harden his own stance. Whether by accident or 
design, this provided the pretext for Schroder and the SPD to move away from their 
coalition partners towards the political centre in the run-up to the 1994 elections.
On the other hand, for the Berlin AL and the Lower Saxony Greens, it was clear that 
producer interests such as the trades unions, big business and property speculators were 
exerting influence upon the SPD at the highest level. They regarded them as additional - 
and shadowy - players in the game. This assumption was especially potent, given the 
long history of political corruption within the Berlin SPD. Contentious issues such as the
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Preussen Electra and Intrac affairs, the row over the Hahn-Meitner Institute Research 
Reactor and even Interior Minister Patzold's eviction of Mainzer StraBe squatters were 
regarded by many in the AL as symptomatic of the malign influence of such producer 
interests. By contrast, the Lower Saxony SPD was not so discredited. Nevertheless. 
Schroder was close to big business and the rows over EXPO 2000, the Europipe affair and 
the Papenburg test-track only served to confirm the Greens' worst suspicions.
What are the strategies available to the playersl
As already noted, the ability to draw up a plan of action is based upon knowledge of the 
permissible sequence of rules within the game. The degree of sophistication of such a 
strategy is defined by the both the complexity of the game and the amount of knowledge 
the player has about it. Both of these elements were problematised by the outside 
influences noted above. There were two reasons for this.
First, in purely numerical terms, the presence of additional players moves the game from 
being essentially a two-person game to being an n-person game. As discussed in Chapter 
One (and demonstrated in greater detail in Appendix Two, section 2.5), as players are 
added to an w-person game, the number of possible outcomes rises exponentially. Thus, 
the game becomes increasingly more complex and the likelihood that the player has 
complete knowledge of it becomes increasingly remote. Second, parties are not 'black 
boxes' and the presence of the particular additional players mentioned above made the task 
of both internal party management and that of the coalition itself so much harder. For 
instance, the sight of AL and Green ministers having to refer back to the more 'wild and 
woolly1 elements within the Basis was anathema to the SPD's right wing, including the 
producer interests mentioned above. The right-wing was by temperament anti-AL/Green 
in its orientation and had to be kept onboard by party managers. This often meant that 
concessions had to be made to re-assure them that the SPD was not in thrall to 'Red-Green
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chaos1 , which inevitably meant a more robustly right-wing stance than would otherwise 
have been the case. This had negative consequences for the process of coalition 
management.
Conversely, the obvious influence of producer interests on the SPD confirmed to the more 
fundi-oriented members of Basis that the Greens were supping with the devil in political 
terms. This served to further polemicise their internal debate and make decisions of the 
Basis even harder to predict than usual. Given that the two local party's internal 
constitutions at the time required the consent of the Basis, it was even more likely as a 
result that Fraktion members had to 'play to the gallery' in order to bring the party with 
them. In turn, this further aggravated the SPD's right-wing. In other words, there were a 
combination of institutional factors - in effect a vicious circle - that inhibited the successful 
formation and implementation of a political strategy of co-operation.
To what extent are the players able to form coalitions?
In a 'co-operative game1 , any subset of players is able to form a coalition. However, 
institutional norms within the two party systems (for instance, the marginalisation of the 
Republikaner in Berlin) meant that prior to the election, the environment in which even the 
democratically-acceptable parties found themselves was one of a 'non-co-operative game', 
in which players act as independent agents (albeit committed to certain policy positions 
which constrained their room for manoeuvre). However, once the parties assessed their 
relative positions within the bargaining environment after the election, they began to 
undertake the bargaining process by which the original non-co-operative strategy moved to 
one of co-operation. This was easier in Lower Saxony, where the party system had 
already concentrated into a de facto two-block system. At the heart of this process in 
both cases were each party's bundle of preferences, be they of an office-seeking or policy- 
oriented nature.
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How much information do the players have about the game?
None of the parties had 'complete information1 about the rules of the game and the 
strategies and payoffs available to themselves and their opponent. On the contrary, there 
was a great deal of uncertainty; much of which was aggravated by the specific institutional 
arrangements (such as referring back to the Greens' Basis) of the parties involved. In the 
period around 1990, the learning process between local SPD and Green parties that was 
described in Chapter Three was still at a relatively unsophisticated stage. Indeed the 
mistakes that were made in the two case studies have become part of the institutional 
knowledge of'Red-Green co-operation1 , which may be called upon one day at the national 
level. Because of this early stage in the acquisition of this institutional knowledge, none of 
the parties had a great deal of information about the probability distributions attached to 
the outcomes of the available strategies available to them.
How much information available to the parties can be considered 'common knowledge "? 
This leads on from the previous question, in that were limits to the amount of knowledge 
which was possessed by both players and seen to be so. There was a broad common 
understanding of the institutional norms that underpinned the party system, outlined in 
the Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining, but even this understanding was only partial 
(with the Greens still ambivalent at the margins towards acceptance of the state's 
monopoly of violence). Beyond this broad understanding, there was a great deal of doubt 
with regard to the 'rules of the game' per se and each player's understanding of them. This 
persistence of doubt constrained the solving of the political game, precisely because the 
players were not always able to put themselves in the other's place. There was a degree of 
mutual incomprehension that made it very hard for either party to imagine what the other 
would do in a given position and to act upon that knowledge. In terms of 'bounded 
rationality', the lack of a common knowledge meant that many highly complex political 
problems were truncated into a what was essentially a 'worst case' scenario, based upon
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suspicion and incomprehension. Thus, the more complex the problem, the less able the 
coalition partners were able to deal with it. The breakdown in relations between the SPD 
and AL following the events of November 1989 in Berlin and the chill that crept in to 
relations between the SPD and Greens over the growing jobs crisis in Lower Saxony after 
1992 can be seen in this light. In both cases, the parties suspected that the other was more 
interested in using the situation for their own party political advantage that in finding a 
solution to the particular problem they faced.
What are the payoffs of the player si
The Berlin coalition collapsed in acrimony, whilst the Lower Saxony coalition was 
characterised by a slow breakdown in relations between the two parties. At first glance 
one would be forgiven for thinking that the acrimony surrounding the demise of both 
coalitions meant that both parties regarded the two coalitions as being relative failures. 
Payoffs measure the degree to which players are successful in meeting their objectives in 
the game, so by implication one might assume that the parties' payoff shares failed to live 
up to expectations. Indeed, one could compile a list of political issues and policy areas in 
both cases where the two coalitions did indeed fail to deliver either office-seeking or policy 
oriented payoffs. At the very least, the coalitions records are mixed.
10.4. On the Nature of Pavoffs
10.4.1. Office-seeking payoffs at first glance
It is hard to make a snap judgement about the importance of office-seeking payoffs per se. 
or each party's relative share of them, in determining the shape and performance of the 
coalition. In Berlin, the SPD did far better than the AL in the numerical distribution of
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portfolios. The latter's representation within the city legislature of 17 representatives 
only yielded three out of the fourteen cabinet posts, a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet 
posts of almost six-to-one. The SPD, on the other hand, had 55 representatives and took 
all the other portfolios as well as the post of Governing Mayor, a ratio of just five-to-one. 
As already noted, this disparity was a function of the disproportionate weight the AL 
attached to the environmental policy sector, especially with the areas of city-development 
and traffic policy attached. It will be recalled that an AL representative told the author 
that they 'didn't want just a ministry for environmental propaganda [but rather] wanted to 
make policy'.
By contrast, the Lower Saxony Greens received just two portfolios - the Ministry for 
Federal and European Affairs and the Women's Ministry - in contrast to the SPD's ten. 
Moreover, they did not even get 'their' Environment portfolio, but had to be content with 
the post of State Secretary within the ministry. In addition, all the 'blue-chip1 posts - such 
as the Economics Ministry - remained in the SPD's hands. Nevertheless in numerical 
terms the Greens did better than the SPD, with a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts 
of four-to-one compared with the latter's seven-to-one. As was noted this numerical 
advantage can be regarded as compensation for failing to win what many regarded as the 
'core' portfolio.
For the Lower Saxony SPD it was the quality rather than the quantity that counted in this 
case. It will be recalled that this view was echoed by the tabloid Neue Pres.se, which 
considered the outcome of the bargaining process to be 'Schroder's success', given that 'the 
soon-to-be-elected head of Government ...had displayed strength and only permitted the 
Greens to have competence for two relatively unimportant mini-ministries' [08/6/90].
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10.4.2. Policy-oriented payoffs at first glance
At first glance the distribution of policy-oriented payoffs in the two cases is equally 
mixed. In Berlin the coalition were confronted with a great deal of institutional resistance 
within the traditional ministries by tenured civil servants for whom indefinite leave 
(Ruhestand) at the public expense was normally the only sanction. This was aggravated 
by the shortage of men and women of sufficient credibility and expertise to replace them. 
Even where this implementation drag and lack of expertise was less the case, in the City 
Development, Environmental Protection and Traffic Ministry, with the exception of some 
aspects of transport policy (for instance, the reduction of fares for public transport, 
introduction of the Umweltkarte system and the imposition of traffic controls) most of the 
programme required implementation over the medium- to long-term (whilst the political 
costs were felt immediately). There was little short-term policy-oriented utility and, given 
the fact that the coalition did not even reach its second anniversary, any long term utility 
was of a diffuse nature. This was especially the case for the AL who, having ran the 
ministry during the coalition, were no longer in office. Moreover, as already noted, the 
coalition's environmental policy was the product of two distinct and often contradictory 
discourses. Whilst to limited extent, a certain amount of left-libertarian/post-materialist- 
oriented linkages between environmental policy and wider societal power structures were 
made, the traditional statist 'top-down' approach to policy making remained evident.
Similarly, in Lower Saxony a deficit in the state's finances of DM 1 A billion meant that 
staffing within the ministries had been cut to the bone and any expansion of social 
provision was to be limited and at the expense of other projects. As a result, the coalition 
emphasised issues such as civil rights/constitutional protection, atomic energy, waste 
disposal and transport policy. Given that these were potentially divisive policy domains, 
with only limited scope for the selected emphasis of areas of consensus, it was vital that 
the coalition delivered on these issues. Yet by the end of the coalition, the nuclear waste
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storage sites at Gorleben and Schacht Konrad were still in use and, despite the Greens' 
hostility to any form of incineration of industrial and household waste, a high-temperature 
facility was in the process of being built. Nevertheless, despite Gerhard Schroder's 
political manoeuvrings, he remains popular with many Greens, who consider the coalition 
to have been a success.
10.4.3. Between Office Seeking and Policy Making
Obviously, the trade-off between office seeking and policy-oriented payoffs is more 
complex than first appears. But how is one to express it in terms of the order of 
preferences? In abstract, game-theoretical terms the numerical representation of a 
preference ordering is called a 'utility function'. Such a utility function can be represented 
either in cardinal or ordinal terms [Hargreaves Heap et al, 1992: 96].
However, in neither case study can a clear argument be made for the decisiveness of 
policy-oriented payoffs (defined by the record of policy outcomes alone) over office- 
seeking payoffs. Neither can the opposite case be made, although the Lower Saxony 
Greens objectively went further in sacrificing a 'core1 portfolio - that of environment - in 
order to reach a coalition agreement (and by implication to secure office).
Taken in such crude terms (i.e. the ideological distance travelled in order to enter 
government) the thesis' findings would indicate that, if there is a qualitative difference in 
the type of payoffs each party valued, it is the Greens who are the more office seeking 
party and not the SPD! Yet this is counter-intuitive in terms of what we know about the 
Greens in particular and in contradiction to the thesis' assumptions about the behaviour of 
parties in general. These are set out in the New Model of Coalition Formation condition // 
(d) which states that:
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• it is only after conditions II (a) (ideological 'connectedness'). // (b) (mutual 
calculation of policy-distance along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post- 
materialist dimensions) and // (c) (identifying the party or parties with which each 
party X is most in agreement, across the weighted aggregate of policy sectors) are 
satisfied that parties will choose to be a member of the coalition that will maximise 
office-seeking payoffs (the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least 
partners) [page 38].
Moreover, according to the model, even this bounded form of office-seeking rationality is 
contingent on a constant re-appraisal by the parties of their record in government in the 
light of their (primarily policy-oriented) preferences. As condition /// (f) states:
• All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on 
the basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and 
anticipated payoffs [page 39].
Although there are increasingly elements of truth to the idea of the Greens as a pragmatic 
office-seeking party, it is an inadequate explanation of this discrepancy between the 
findings of the case studies and what is known about the Greens (especially during the 
period covered by the case studies). The alternative explanation is that, in those areas of 
policy where the coalition's record of policy outcomes was at best mixed, the effect of the 
Greens participation in government upon the processes - or outputs - of policy making 
were great enough to offset what one must assume was a great disappointment to the 
party's Fraktion, Basis and wider associated networks. Moreover, given that the Lower 
Saxony Greens were in favour of renewing the coalition despite the traumas of the last 
year in office, it might be assumed that this (real or perceived) impact upon policy 
processes was particularly profound (compared with Berlin). In assessing if this was the 
case, the thesis builds upon the work of Rhodes [1981. 1986a. 1986b] (see Chapter One).
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10.4.4. The nature of the configuration of groups associated with the Greens prior 
to the Red-Green coalition
Using Rhodes' terminology, the thesis asks if the configuration of groups associated with 
the Greens prior to their participation could be described as Policy Communities. 
Professional Networks, Intergovenmental Networks, Producer Networks or Issue 
Networks? As already noted, the networks associated with the Greens in both case 
studies were loose configurations, which one could not credibly even regard as an Issue 
Network (a detailed discussion of this point is beyond the scope of the thesis).
Berlin. In the West Berlin case, the AL had access to a resource of environmental expertise 
centred around the city's universities (in particular the Free University) and the 
Umweltbundesamt (Federal Agency for the Environment), founded in 1974. Thus the 
configuration of groups in the city was reasonably well-established and characterised by a 
number of participants with a significant degree of interdependence, as the inter- 
connectedness of Eurosolar and other environmental groups demonstrates (see Chapter 
Six). Thus, the Berlin AL was able to draw upon a wealth of expertise for advice and, if 
needed, the staffing of ministries.
Lower Saxony. By contrast, although there a great deal of expertise in Lower Saxony 
(mainly in the Universities), it was not on the scale of Berlin and it did not benefit from 
the presence of an equivalent to the Umweltbundesamt. The configuration in the state was 
characterised by a smaller number of participants with a more limited degree of 
interdependence and a more atomised structure than its Berlin equivalent (on the face of it. 
this would make staffing ministries harder than in Berlin).
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10.4.5. The nature of the established network(s) prior to the Red-Green coalition
Berlin. In Berlin, the established networks presented a mixed picture. Amongst the 
permanent civil service it could be assumed that a significant proportion of the Beamtcn 
were long-established party placemen (especially amongst the top tier of permanent 
officials). As a result, there was a danger of 'implementation drag' on the part of 
recalcitrant officials. At the same time, the City Development, Environmental Protection 
and Traffic ministry was only set up in 1981 and had not become part of a rigid policy 
network in the manner of some of the more established ministries. Although it had 
previously been close to the FDP (who were not represented in the legislature), it was 
staffed with younger and less well-entrenched officials.
Amongst the social partners, the local trades unions attitude to the new coalition depended 
upon their position within the producer networks. The education and science union 
(GEW} were initially sympathetic to the coalition (this changed after the KITA strike). 
whilst the traditionally right-wing unions, such as the construction workers' union (IG 
BSE), often displayed outright hostility.
Within the energy sector itself, the policy-making environment was traditionally closed, 
with a very restricted membership and was distinctly corporatist in nature [cf. Schneider 
1988]. Building upon Rhodes' model, the policy-making establishment displayed all the 
manifestations of an entrenched 'Policy Community', characterised by stable relationships 
between a highly restricted membership, high vertical interdependence and insulation from 
other networks and the wider polity.
Lower Saxony. If anything, the picture in Lower Saxony was even more unclear than that 
in Berlin. Within the civil service a significant raft of SPD members had flourished at all 
levels, despite the fact that the CDU had held power since 1976. This was indicative of
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the cosy relationship between the parties, the administration and the NGOs that had 
developed over successive SPD and CDU-led administrations. Again, it conformed very 
closely to Rhodes' ideal-type of an entrenched 'Policy Community'. Ironically, the initial 
force working against this closed network was not the Greens but the SPD itself. As 
already noted, after coming to power Schroder made 11 changes to existing senior 
positions within the civil service and created a number of new posts within the Land 
administration (including the expansion of the Staatskanzlei which was to become his 
fiefdom). Schroder has often been described as an outsider, even - some might say 
especially - within his own party. He obviously did not trust the established networks 
within the civil service regardless of party affiliation.
Within the field of environmental policy in general, the networks conformed to the same 
pattern. They were characterised by a stable and highly restricted membership, high 
vertical interdependence and insulation from other networks. This insulation took the 
form of disciplinary and media-oriented barriers, preventing policy being made 'in the 
round' [Weale, 1992a] to tackle environmental degradation at source. Because of this, the 
coalition was to create the NLO in order to introduce a new ethos of integrated thinking 
(Integrationsgedanke).
The network associated with the domain of nuclear policy was additionally complex, given 
that it involved delegated administration (Auftragsverwaltung) passed down from the 
Federal government. This had profound consequences in terms of party politics, the 
vertical sectorisation of policy-making and the nature of social partners involved (given the 
foreign policy/defence-related implications of nuclear power for the Bund).
For legal, political and technical reasons, the network within the domain of waste disposal 
was additionally complex and opaque. Again the Land shared technical competencies: this
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time with the Bund and the Kommunen (the Land relies upon the Kommunen to carry out 
waste disposal). In addition, Article 79 of the Basic Law made the policy area subject to 
concurrent legislation (konkurriende Gesetzgebung) between the Bundestag and Bundesrat 
as well as with the La'nder. Thus, competencies were both horizontally and vertically 
sectorised in law. Politically, although multi-level governance in Germany is meant to be 
carried out in a spirit of co-operative federalism, it inevitably has party-political overtones 
(the Red-Green coalition in Hannover could rely upon a sympathetic SPD majority in the 
Bundesrat, but not in the Bundestag and had to expect a number of (CDU- and/or FDP- 
controlled) Kommunen making common cause with their political allies in the Federal 
government against the Landesregierung). Finally, the domain was made additionally 
closed, because the topic area of solid waste disposal, particularly industrial waste, 
presents high opportunity costs to entry (based on technical expertise and access to the 
means of production). Thus when the new coalition set up the Second Commission to 
look at the issue, even one of the trades union representatives came from Oldenburg 
University faculty - supporting the idea of limited entry based on expertise - and there 
was only one individual on the Commission acting in a private capacity - supporting the 
idea of limited entry based upon access to the means of production. In fact, like the 
energy sector network in Berlin, this particular network comes close to Schneider's [1988] 
corporatist ideal-type (see Chapter One).
10.4.6. The extent to which the Greens' associated client groups had already 
penetrated the network(s) prior to the Red-Green coalitions
From the evidence of the two case studies (Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven), the 
Greens' associated client groups had made little or no impact upon the established groups 
prior to the Red-Green coalitions in either case. Indeed, this is why the setting up of the 
various advisory councils and their actual membership was of such importance (and why
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they are looked at in this thesis). Where some progress had been made, this was more 
evident in Berlin (where the presence of the Umweltbundesamt provided a limited method 
of entry into the established networks up to and including the Federal level) than in Lower 
Saxony, where any environmentalists within the established network were politically (and 
often geographically) isolated.
10.4.7. The extent to which the Greens' associated client groups penetrated the 
networks during or after the coalition
In other words, to what extent had they (i) succeeded in breaking down the established 
network(s) per se and making them more open and democratic, or (ii) were co-opted into 
what remained a relatively closed and privileged policy elite?
This is the central question when evaluating the nature of the payoffs accruing to the 
Greens and their associated client groups and the answer is not a simple one. For instance, 
it would be perfectly possible for the Greens to ignore the structure of the networks as an 
issue and concentrate on using the existing state machine to generate the desired policy 
outcomes (as indeed Social Democratic parties across Europe - including the SPD - had 
done before them). However, given the Greens' underlying post-materialist'/left-libertarian 
ideological stance this would in their terms be a failure which would be aggravated by the 
mixed record of actual policy outcomes in the two case studies. Alternatively, it could be 
imagined that the Greens might settle for the co-option of their associated client groups 
into the established policy network regardless of policy outcomes (again, an option that is 
not wholly unfamiliar to European Social Democratic parties!). Again, however, within 
the Greens ideological terms of reference, this form of clientilism would be hard to justify. 
Therefore, we must assume that the Greens at least set out to effect policy outcomes and 
outputs.
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But how is this assumption to be assessed? Moreover, given that the discussion is 
ultimately about payoffs, one must look at these effects as much in terms of the 
perceptions of those involved as in hard objective facts. Also, it would be mistake to look 
at the established network at the aggregate level alone. At that level, the establishment of 
advisory councils with a large budget, a wide remit and a healthy representation of Greens 
would appear to constitute a major change in the process of policy making. But 
essentially it is only of limited impact if the structure state bureaucracy is unchanged. If 
that is the case, then one must conclude that the Greens associated client groups have 
merely been co-opted into the existing policy network. To have made a real impact, the 
Greens have to have affected major changes in at least two out of the following three 
elements:
• legislation, modes of regulation and enforcement (policy outputs)
• the constitution of interest group representation (policy processes)
• the structure of the state bureaucracy (policy processes). Moreover, they have to 
have been seen to do so. The extent to which they were is assessed below.
10.4.8. The real and/or perceived impact upon legislation, modes of regulation and 
enforcement
Berlin. As discussed in Chapter Six, the coalition's legislative programme emphasised the 
need for greater transparency in the city's planning culture and made specific pledges 
within the fields of: air emissions and clean air technologies; water technology; waste 
disposal policy; the development of'green field' sites; public transport and - crucially for 
the thesis - impose a 'sparing, rational and socially sustainable' system of energy provision 
and use (including a new energy tax, modification of existing laws on energy use. 
modification of pricing system and decentralisation of energy production). With the 
exception of some aspects of transport policy, most of the programme would be
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introduced over the medium- to long-term with a primary reliance upon bureaucratic 
instruments (such as judicial review, state regulation and subsidy) over economic 
instruments (such as eco-taxes and pricing). The Berlin Energy Law was the centre-piece 
of the coalition's energy policy. It sought to promote the lowest possible consumption of 
non-renewable energy and proposed measures for both the public and private sectors. 
These included an 'Energy Pass' system, new procurement guidelines and a network of 
Energy Officials at the local Bezirke level. However, the most important innovations were 
the proposed development of an 'Energy Concept' (through the convening of the 'Energy 
Advisory Council'). Although this was an innovative raft of legislation, in general it 
represented continuity rather than change in terms of modes of enforcement and regulation.
Although it was completed in 1992, two years after the coalition's collapse, the Berlin 
Energy Concept represented the culmination of the coalition's ambitions in the energy 
sector. It aimed to raise East Berlin's technical standard of energy consumption to the 
same standard as that in West Berlin and make the new united Berlin a model for 
innovation in the environmental field The document built upon much of what had been 
advocated in the Energiegesetz, representing a long term policy-oriented payoff for the 
AL, who naturally praised the high standard of technical debate within the document. 
Interestingly, although time had changed the AL's perceptions and vindicated the 
coalition's record within the domain of energy policy, the SPD claimed that the Energy 
Concept was a disappointment. One can only speculate as to the reason for such differing 
perceptions, but one explanation is that they were not just ex post rationalisations of past 
events, but were also contingent upon events in 1992. The AL were a party no longer in 
power, but anxious to be regarded as still a relevant political force with some influence 
over events. Moreover, it had to reassure its own milieu that the political pain of the 
coalition had not been in vain. As such, its welcoming of the Energy Concept made a lot 
of sense. The SPD on the other hand was still in power. However it was now the junior
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partner to the CDU in a Grand Coalition, rather than senior partner to the AL in a Red- 
Green coalition. Moreover, the SPD was highly unpopular with both its own membership 
and the voters. It made no sense from their point of view to praise a policy document that 
originated under the auspices of a political arrangement that it had written off for little or 
no political gain. The orthodoxy was that no good had come of the Red-Green coalition. 
Any other interpretation would imply that Walter Momper et al had made a strategic 
mistake in dumping the AL.
Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony the new coalition focused upon the issues of civil 
rights/constitutional protection, atomic energy, waste disposal and transport policy. 
These were potentially divisive policy domains, with limited scope for the selected 
emphasis of areas of consensus. Within the domain of environmental policy, both parties 
favoured abandoning the plans agreed by the Albrecht administration to use the sites at 
Gorleben and Schacht Konrad as final storage facilities for nuclear waste, but the SPD was 
more cautious than the Greens, who were impatient to wind-up these facilities. Similarly, 
the Greens were hostile to any form of incineration of industrial and household waste, 
whilst Monika Greifahn would not rule-out developing at least one high-temperature 
facility. The new programme was not regarded as purely the task of one ministry but 
rather a Querschnittsaufgabe, a task that cut across all activities of government. A number 
of advisory councils were set up, including the Lower Saxony State Environmental Office 
(NLO), the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (BfK; and the 
Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of Waste. As in Berlin, 
although the coalition proposed an ambitious raft of legislation, the programme was still 
reliant upon a statist/technocratic set of policy instruments that represented continuity 
rather than change in terms of modes of enforcement and regulation.
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The coalition did enjoy some success in legislative terms. Even in the last months of the 
coalition when inter-party relations were at their worst Andrea Hoops (the Greens' 
Spitzenkandidat for the up-coming elections) was still able to point to the coalition's record 
on civil liberties and social policy and housing (45,000 new nursery places; 60,000 new 
flats etc.) [Bild. 22/11/93]. These were some of reasons why the Greens still valued the 
coalition.
With regard to environmental policy, on the debit side the coalition had failed to deliver on 
a number of issues. It had officially approved the so-called Europipe project (which was 
to run through the Nationalpark Wattenmeer) as well as the Eurofighter. the Atomic 
reactor at Stade, the Mercedes test-track at Papenburg and the dredging of the Ems in order 
to allow the super-liner Oriana to pass through. It had also failed to bring the Gorleben 
debacle to an end and had built a high temperature incinerator to deal with the mountain of 
industrial and household waste in the state. However, on the plus side. Lower Saxony has 
been at the forefront of modernising the technical standards and legal framework of solid 
waste disposal at both the Land and Federal level, as the Lower Saxony Waste Disposal 
Law (NAbfAbgG) of 1 January 1992, the 1993 Technical Instructions on Residential Waste 
(TA Siedlungsabfalle) and the 1994 Federal Act on Waste Management and Product 
Recycling (KrW- /AbfG) bear witness. Over its four years in office, the coalition had 
invested huge amount of political capital and financial resources into changing the technical 
and legal framework at Land level and, consequently, exerting influence on the Federal 
government (via the SPD majority in the Bundesrat, backed up by the technical expertise 
of the Second Commission and its successor the Third Commission). The problem for the 
Greens is that the SPD has had no incentive to continue with the coalition, given that this 
good work has evidently been continued since 1994 by the Social Democrats alone. For 
instance, the Third Commission was convened in 1996, and is tasked to concentrate upon 
integrated systems of waste management, as part of the implementation of the
356
aforementioned 1994 Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Recycling, which 
came into force at the same time. When Monika Griefahn declared that 'the SPD can also 
make very good Green policy without the Greens' [Neue Presse. 14/03/94], she meant it!
10.4.9. The constitution of interest group representation
Berlin. The main advisory body in set up by the Red-Green coalition in Berlin was the 
Energy Advisory Council (Energiebeirat). By and large, it was quite successful in opening 
up the policy network to the Greens' client groups, not least because it reported directly 
to the section for central affairs within the Ministry for City Development and 
Environmental Protection. It drew on all 'three nodes' of Katzenstein's [1987] policy 
network ideal type (including producer and consumer groups from both sides of the Green 
debate) and provided a vehicle for advocates of alternative energy, such as Eurosolar, the 
Oko-institut, the Forschungsstelle fur Umweltpolitik and the Berlin International Solar 
Centre. These close-knit groups represented a formidable resource of environmental 
expertise which served to counter the producer interests on the Advisory Council.
But how was it perceived by those involved? On the environmentalist side of the 
argument, Prof. Janicke, an academic from the Berlin Free University's Research Point for 
Environmental Policy (Forshungsstelle fur Umweltpolitik) - who sits on the Energiebeirat 
- was ambivalent about the real impact of the Beirat. On the one hand, he felt that the 
Beirat had 'loosened up' the entire policy network within the energy sector. In contrast 
to the transport sector network (which Janicke singled out as remaining remarkably 
closed) the energy network was now relatively 'pluralistic', at least up to the point 'that 
the important decisions are taken'. However, Janicke was of the opinion that the 
influence of the big energy producers such as BEWAG was still decisive and that the 
relationship between them and the city government remained too close for comfort. He
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cited what was at the time an ongoing process by which the city planned to sell their 
share of BEWAG as an example of this closeness. The process, he said, was 'top secret 
...involving a very few actors.....a small group of senators will make this decision. The 
information is not available to the Energiebeirat.' Moreover, Janicke did not believe that 
this was due to the fact that the incumbent Grand Coalition were in power. He felt that 
it would have made no difference if the Greens were still in government and that the basic 
structures of decision-making had not changed96 .
Astrid Schneider, a representative of Eurosolar on the Energiebeirat, was more sanguine 
about the impact of the body, especially in terms of changing the discourse of policy- 
making within the energy sector. For Schneider, the Beirat had provided an opportunity 
structure within which her organisation had been able to 'push much harder' for renewable 
energy use. Moreover, this opportunity structure was not weakened by the Greens 
absence from government. She cited the example of a decision made by the Grand 
Coalition in line with the Energy Concept of 1992, to reduce CO2 emissions in the city by 
25% by 2005 and - as part of a wider agreement of European cities - by 50% by 2010. 
Schneider saw the Energiebeirat as central to these changes. '// had had she said 'a very 
positive effect' on the style and content of policy making within the energy sector97 .
Schneider's viewpoint was supported by Ulrich von Dewitz, an official at the 
Energieleitstelle (to which the Energiebeirat reports), who was convinced that the Beirat 
was a valuable resource in what he called the 'struggle' to drive up environmental 
standards. In Herr von Dewitz's opinion, the argument had been won within the Berlin 
government. Like Schneider, he felt that the Energiebeirat was so well entrenched that the
96Interview conducted at the Forshungsstelle fur Umweltpolitik on 10 June 1996. 
97Interview conducted on 12 June 1996.
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change of government after the 1990 elections was 'only of limited importance' and that the 
following through of the Energy Concept 'continued... with some degree of success'98 .
In their own way, many of the representatives of producer interests interviewed confirmed 
this argument. Prof. Winje, a Berlin academic and engineer who represented BEWAG on 
the Energiebeirat, claimed that the Beirat no longer functioned as a neutral advisory 
council but had been captured by the environmentalists - particularly the research groups 
and lobbyists for renewable energy - who used it 'to pursue their own interests.....for 
financial gain'. Prof. Winje thought that this would lead to a decline in the importance of 
the Energiebeirat, especially in the light of the pressing economic problems associated 
with German unification. He saw the role of BEWAG on the Beirat to 'moderate and 
inform' a debate that he implicitly regarded as immoderate and ill-informed".
This theme was taken up even more forcefully by one Dr. Schutt, who represented the 
Berlin Industrial Energy and Power Generation Sector Association (Verband der 
industriellen Energie und Kraftwirtschaft e. V. Berlin). For Dr Schutt, the constitution of 
the Energiebeirat - with majority voting and an Environment Ministry finding common 
cause with groups like Eurosolar - meant that the whole council was run 'in the interests of 
the Greens'. For Dr Schutt, the Beirat was moving 'in the direction of absolute 
environmental protection without any thought for the economic consequences'. The 
evidence of this was that, four years after the introduction of the Energy Concept, Berlin 
had 'the most expensive [end-user] electricity in Germany'^.
^Interview conducted at the Energieleitstelle on 13 June 1996.
"interview conducted at BEWAG on 12 June 1996.
'^Interview conducted at the Verband der industriellen Energie und Kraftwirtschaft e.l'. Berlin on 10
June 1996.
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For many Greens, this could be regarded as a sign of success rather than failure. 
Notwithstanding differences of opinion between the different actors, all of those 
interviewed painted a remarkably similar picture of a high-profile advisory council that had 
quite an impact (be it positive or negative) on the style and content of energy policy 
making in Berlin. Within certain parameters, the policy network had widened and the 
Greens associated client groups had - depending on the interviewee's position - either gone 
some way to redressing the dominance of the big producer interests or skewed the whole 
debate towards a Utopian discourse that was damaging the economic interests of Berlin. 
Clearly the policy network had been changed.
However, it is less clear if this represented a genuine democratisation of the process. 
Members of the Beirat are still appointed by the Environment Minister and, as Prof. 
Janicke pointed out, the important decisions are still taken behind closed doors. 
Therefore, the whiff of co-option remains. This is confirmed by Prof. Harms, who 
represents the Berlin Institute for Energy Law (Institut fur Energierecht Berlin) on the 
Beirat. According to Prof. Harms, 'the Energiebeirat enjoys very little direct competence 
because only a small percentage of its recommendations are carried out..... its real function 
is to take ideas arising within the Environmental Ministry and give them some 
resonance'^. In other words a talking shop, albeit on the side of the angels.
Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony, the three examples of institutional innovation had 
different impacts upon the constitution of interest-representation within the networks. 
The NLO, for example, was only partially successful in its remit of co-ordinating policy 
across disciplinary and media-oriented boundaries along the lines of Integrationsgeddnke. 
It remained broken up along functional lines, with it main offices in Hildesheim and the
1 Interview conducted at the Institut fur Energierecht Berlin on 4 July 1996.
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rest scattered across Lower Saxony from Hannover to Norderney. This meant that those 
elements within the existing network were disparate and isolated and could not represent 
Green interests in any explicit sense. Moreover, this fragmentation made it hard for new 
actors to enter the network. This last barrier was aggravated because issues of huge 
political salience to the Greens were reduced to a technical or problem-solving discourse.
Nevertheless, Monika Griefahn had appointed the noted Physicist Horst Wilbrand zur 
Horst head of the NLO, indicating that the success of the NLO was a high priority. 
Indeed, it has been quite a successful institutional innovation, despite only modest 
representation of the Greens associated client groups within it. This was reflected in an 
interview with an official at the NLO's main offices in Hildesheim, one Dr. Gorsler. For 
Gorsler, although the NLO 'arose from a political vision', it had no explicitly political 
function. Rather its role was to harness expertise through the Querschnittsaufgabe 
principle and 'prepare politicians.... for innovative wor^ 102 . However, it is unclear that all 
of the NLO's officials regard the present arrangements as an improvement. Another 
official, one Dr. Kotter, had his doubts. 'They thought that it would make ihe 
administration simpler' he said, 'but that has not happened1 ^®!. The traditional structures 
of decision-making could not be simply 'wished away' by a coalition agreement document.
The Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs has enjoyed a much higher political profile 
than the NLO and attracted far more criticism from both sides of the environmental debate. 
In its original form it was somewhat unwieldy, with very wide terms of reference and quite 
expensive. It was no surprise the opposition accused the BfK of being no more than a 
'maintenance-club for the Red-Green circle' which made 'a mockery of the tax-payer in
^Interview conducted on 16 July 1997 at the Hildesheim offices of the NLO. 
I03 lnterview conducted on 18 July 1997 at the Hannover offices of the NLO.
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Lower Saxony' [HAZ. 26/09/91]. Yet as already noted, the membership of the BfK was 
the subject of behind the scenes turf wars.
Despite the fact that the Greens were quite successful in getting 'their' people onto the 
BfK, it still found itself under pressure from the anti-nuclear lobby, because it was unable 
to force through fundamental changes in the face of opposition from the Federal 
government and their allies in the energy and defence industries (the reasons for this failure 
were examined in the last section of the thesis). Moreover, the BfK served as a political 
smoke screen in many ways. Schroder was still able to sign a deal with the firm 
PreussenElektra to build a gas-fired power station at Stade and approve the Europipe 
project (which although relating to a different fuel source tied in politically and 
strategically with the nuclear energy debate). In doing so, he split the Greens between the 
Fraktion (who had to defend these decisions) and the Vorstand and drew the sting of many 
of the groups represented on the BfK (who were compromised by their position on the 
Beiraf).
At present, the Beirat is still operative, but with its terms of reference much reduced. 
Nearly all traces of the Greens' polemical approach to environmental policy have now 
gone and the institution has become far more technocratic and problem-solving. As 
already noted, this is perhaps no surprise. The BfK was not originally planned in the 
coalition agreement, but rather was set up to get the coalition out of trouble on the nuclear 
issue. Moreover, it worked to the Environment Minister (soon to become an SPD 
member) and the Staatskanzlei (Schroder's fiefdom). Thus, unlike the Energiebeirat in 
Berlin, it never worked to a Green-controlled ministry and, once out of power, the Greens 
no longer had any leverage over personnel involved in the BfK. Rather than achieving a 
permanent alteration of the style and content of policy making (as was achieved to some 
extent in Berlin) the Greens associated client groups had only limited impact on the nuclear
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debate. If one was being uncharitable, one might say that they had essentially been co- 
opted into a political face-saving exercise.
This impression was partially borne out by comments made by a senior civil servant 
within the Environment Ministry. This official W]04 was fairly dismissive of the BfK. 
As already noted in Chapter Seven, he objected to the manner in which the Greens forced 
'their1 people onto the Beirat (as well as their calibre). However, he also regretted what he 
regarded as a new shrillness to the debate within the policy network. In the past, he said. 
'one could argue with colleagues and still be able to meet up at the end of the day and drink 
a beer together'. However, the new influx of Green-associated policy actors were 
'differently socialised" and brought with them what he called 'a culture of conflict' 
(Streitkultur) that was 'completely alien' to the established policy discourse. There were 
exceptions of course - people who quietly immersed themselves in their particular area of 
specialisation - but in general the official made it clear that he found many of the new 
policy actors hard to get used to and did not regret their passing.
By contrast to the BfK, the Greens failed to make much impact upon the Zweite 
Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung'm terms of personnel. One reason for this 
was that the Regierungskommission 'Vermeidung Sonderabfalle' (the First Government 
Commission on the subject) had been set up in the Albrecht era and the Second 
Commission essentially built on this. Members of the commission were appointed from 
business and industrialist groups, trades unions, ecology groups, the sciences and the civil 
service, chaired by a board-member of Preussag AG a member of the Lower Saxony 
Institute of Commerce as CEO (deputised by senior civil servants from the Farming and 
Environment Ministries). Of the other 17 permanent members of the commission, only
104Official jy was a member of the SPD and held the post of Abteilungsleiter at the time of the interview. 
For obvious reasons the official will remain nameless. The interview was conducted on 19 July 1996 at the 
Environment Ministry offices in Hannover's ArchivstraBe.
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two came directly from the ecological movement. In addition, each working group 
(Arbeitskreise) was staffed by specialists in roughly the same proportion as the permanent 
members.
What is significant about this mix is that - because of the high opportunity costs discussed 
in the previous section - the Greens only managed to secure a limited amount of access to 
the Second Commission by their own client groups [Niedersachsiches Umweltministerium 
AbschluJ3RegKom-502, 1995]. However, unlike the energy sector (particularly nuclear 
power) the whole issue of recycling and the sustainable disposal of solid waste was 
relatively uncontested (the Federal Republic is internationally noted for the degree of 
consensus around this issue). This explains why the Green press were not overt) 
concerned by the Second Commission's closed network, with the Grime I/lustrierte hoping 
that 'the state of Lower Saxony can use and develop the existing instruments of economic 
management in order to support an ecological orientation' [1-2, 1990]. As already noted, 
the state of Lower Saxony was able to do just that in a more orderly - and successful - 
fashion than in the nuclear sector. As official A105 pointed out, since the departure of the 
Greens from government there was 'less pressure' on officials even though the broad 
objectives of policy remained the same under the SPD alone.
10.4.10. The structure of the state bureaucracy (policy processes)
As is evident from the accounts above, the role of permanent civil service is crucial to the 
success or failure of the Greens in influencing either the form or content of policy making 
in Berlin and Lower Saxony.
105Official X was a Section Leader (Referatsleiter) who worked to Official W. The intervieu took place on 
the same afternoon as the interview with Official W in the Archivstralk.
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Berlin. Broadly speaking, within certain parameters the Berlin Energiebeirat was quite 
successful in building a lobby within the civil service which was sympathetic to the 
objectives of the environmentalist groups. The Berlin Environment Ministry was staffed 
with younger officials and was allotted within the coalition as an AL portfolio. As already 
noted, there was less 'implementation drag' than in other ministries.
The Energiebeirat reported directly to the section for central affairs within the Ministry 
and, as all those interviewed attested, had survived the change in government and still 
exercised considerable influence over the style and content of policy making. At the same 
time, no doubt because of the short life-span of the coalition in Berlin, the AL had not 
managed to have any impact upon the actual structure of the civil service. Therefore, they 
cannot be said to have truly democratised the policy network. As a result, when it came 
to really important issues - such as the sale of the city's stake in BEWAG - even the 
Energiebeirat was kept in the dark. To sum up, the AL's associated client groups had 
been co-opted into the existing system, albeit with some beneficial effects on policy 
outcomes.
Lower Saxony. The Lower Saxony coalition's record is more complicated. Not only is the 
Greens' impact upon policy outcomes at best mixed and their penetration of the policy 
network patchy but, given that they were in government for four years, they appear to 
have had less impact upon the structure of the civil service as well. As the interviews 
attest, the civil service was generally quite pleased to see the back of the Greens as a 
governing party following the 1994 elections. Obviously, the Greens now have people 
permanently in the system within the ministry but they are not an explicit political force. 
To the extent that they are able to make an impact, this is dependent upon their personal 
skills as bureaucratic in-fighters.
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And the evidence is that even on those terms, the more experienced (and senior) SPD 
affiliated civil servants now have their measure. In the interview, Official \V was open 
about this. 'Quite often1 he said 7 know what they are going to say before they speak 
.........if I offer them three alternatives they will choose the last one'. Official IT made it clear
that he set the agenda accordingly.
Clearly, the main reason for the lack of Green impact upon the culture of the Environment 
Ministry was the fact that it was not their portfolio. Schroder made Monika Griefahn 
Environment Minister and the Greens had to settle for the post of State Secretary within 
the Ministry. Moreover although this was officially the second most powerful job within 
any ministry, it has less power than many Greens had assumed. The reasons for this lav 
partly with the experience of the SPD officials at the level of Abteilungsleiter as well as the 
character of the minister herself (Griefahn is quite a formidable politician). However, even 
if this was not the case, Schroder had deliberately beefed up the Staatskanzlei when 
coming into office. It was his fief and he used it 'co-ordinate' policy across the 
government. In this context, the State Secretary was caught in the middle of a powerful 
hierarchy running all the way up to the Minister President.
However the more thoughtful among the Greens had already come to the conclusion that it 
was this very hierarchy itself that was as much the problem as the fact that the Greens had 
not received the Environment portfolio in the first place. This was most obviously clear 
to those civil servants who were sympathetic to the Greens, one of whom - Official F106 - 
handed the author a briefing document prepared by the Greens on the subject. The 
document called for the 'de-hierarchicalisation (enthierarchisieren) of the decision-making 
process and enable value for money and high quality forms of decision management'.
106Official Y and the author met after the scheduled interviews at ArchivstraB. I can only suggest that he 
sought me out after hearing the subject of my interviews. We spoke for roughly 20 minutes, during which 
it became clear to me that he was not happy with the present situation.
366
through a reduction in the number of Departments (and Sections within each department) 
and the disbanding of certain established regulatory institutions such as the state Offices of 
Mining (Bergamter), which would be replaced by a new over-arching Office of the 
Environment or Umweltamt [Bundnis 90 / Die Griinen. 28/06/96: 1-2]. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to speculate if these reforms would actually do this, but it is clear that 
they would have most effect in those positions (the Departments and Sections, mostly 
controlled by SPD affiliated officials) and policy areas (such as mining) where they and 
their associated client groups are weakest! It remains to be seen whether the Greens will 
ever have the chance to carry out these changes. What is clear is that they almost 
definitely have to insist on the Environment portfolio if they are to make them work.
10.4.11. Patterns of policy making in Berlin and Lower Saxony as payoffs
It is not necessary once more to go into the specific details of environmental policy making 
in Berlin. The overall patterns of environmental policy making in the two cases are laid 
out in Table 10.4.11. below.
Looking at Table 10.4.11. one can discern clear differences in the payoffs accruing to the 
AL and/or Greens in the two cases. In Berlin, the AL not only 'score1 well, but do it 
consistently
across the three criteria. Given that the Berlin case only looks at the energy sector it 
would be methodologically unsound to extrapolate to the whole ministry, but in this case 
at least the AL would appear to benefit from the fact that they 'own' the Environment 
portfolio. At the very least, it seems to have given them a degree of consistency that is 
not evident in the Lower Saxony case. Taken in the round, it is clear that the AL did enjoy 
substantial policy-oriented payoffs as a result of their participation in the Red-Green
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Table 10.4.11. Environmental Policy making in Berlin and Lower 
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coalition of 1989-1990. However, these payoffs were not altogether evident at the time. 
Partly this was because many of them were medium-term in nature (often with short-term 
political costs) and were not realisable within the lifetime of the coalition. However, it 
was also undoubtedly because those payoffs that were realisable were not great enough to 
offset the huge political reaction to the two parties' disastrous record of day-to-day 
coalition management. As already noted, some of the blame for this lay with the AL's 
unwieldy structure of Basisdemokratie whilst a great deal of the problem lay with the 
personal political style of governing mayor Walter Momper. Both of these problems have 
since been resolved.
In Lower Saxony not only are the overall 'scores' lower, but the picture is less consistent 
across the three criteria. If one follows the logic of the Berlin case set out above, then this 
is almost definitely due to the fact that they did not 'own' the Environment portfolio. As a 
result, different policy areas were dealt with on an ad hoc basis with different results. In 
terms of institutional reform what one might call the 'NLO model' (i.e. low profile technical 
reforms to bring about a more holistic approach to policy making) was the most 
successful, at least in as far as it was never a bone of contention within the coalition. Yet 
it was far too prosaic to be a 'flagship' innovation. Far more high profile was the BfK. 
which did succeed in bringing many of the Greens' associated client groups into the policy 
network, at least temporarily. However, rather than breaking down the established 
hierarchy these groups were co-opted into it for short term political reasons and had no 
real impact upon policy outcomes. Moreover, the political crisis that this lack of impact 
had upon the Greens themselves - with the Fraktion at loggerheads with the ( 'orstand and 
the wider movement - indicates that results were important. It was not enough just to get 
'their' people into the policy network, there had to be some policy-outcome related 
payoffs to it all. Such payoffs were most obviously evident within the field of waste 
disposal, where the coalition (and its successor) have been at the forefront of legal and
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technical innovation at the Land and Federal level. Apart from the row over the high 
temperature reactor the Greens regard this policy area as one of their successes, despite 
the fact that - for reasons already discussed - their associated client groups have had 
minimal input into the policy network. This is more evidence that policy outcomes matter 
more than patronage.
To sum up, the evidence from the two case studies suggests that the Greens can display a 
great deal of pragmatism when it comes to assessing policy-oriented payoffs. Indeed, in 
agreeing not to receive the Environment portfolio in 1990, the Lower Saxony Greens were 
perhaps too pragmatic, given that most of their subsequent problems arose from this 
failure. For what is clear in both cases is that the structure of the permanent civil service is 
crucial to the success of the Green 'project1 . If the civil service is to be harnessed to the 
Green agenda, the structure of the ministry needs to be opened up and democratised. At 
the very least, the fact that the author has judged it prudent not to name those Lower 
Saxony officials interviewed would seem to demonstrate this lack of openness (in contrast 
to the energy sector in Berlin). But to democratise the norms and structures of a ministry 
requires that one must 'own' the portfolio. Moreover, even if one does own the portfolio, 
the experience of Hesse - where such reforms are now taking place - is that it is a task for a 
second or third term in office. In the meantime, both cases demonstrate that the day-to­ 
day process of coalition management has to be carried out and crucial to this process is the 
need to keep the Basis satisfied. What is clear is that they will not always be satisfied 
with delayed gratification as they wait for medium-term policy-oriented payoffs to be 
realised. Nor can they be placated with a series of advisory councils of varying potency. 
The Greens have moderated a great deal, but they are still an idealistic party and they want 
results.
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10.5. The Research Question and the Implications of the Thesis for Future 
Red-Green Co-operation
10.5.1. The Research Question
In Chapter One of the thesis, the Research Question asked to what extent the Greens have 
assumed a 'normal1 political role within the party system, given that such a 'normal' role 
would mean that their strategic behaviour could be predicted as a function of the rational 
pursuit of a bundle of group-related preferences of either an instrumental (office-seeking) 
or ideological (related to the policy dimension) nature. With regard to the policy 
dimension, the thesis assumes that policy-related payoffs are as much a function of the 
process of policy-making as of its content. This led on to the subsidiary question of the 
extent to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own 
client groups and break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory 
framework.
Without repeating the findings of the thesis, it would appear that - as far as the 
predictability of their strategic behaviour is concerned - the Greens are assuming an 
increasingly 'normal' role within the party system. Looking at the Greens parliamentary 
Fraktion, this strategic behaviour seems to be characterised by a degree of pragmatism in 
the Praxis of politics that belies the more bellicose uttering of their Basis. Indeed as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, if a crude measure of office seeking pragmatism is the 
ideological distance travelled in order to secure a coalition agreement, then the Greens are 
more office seeking than their Social Democratic competitors.
However, this measure is ultimately too crude because just as importantly - and 
predictably - the policy dimension remains the single most important factor in the 
maintenance of Red-Green coalitions over time. When the real or perceived gap between
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expectations and achievement becomes too big the Greens' Fraktion comes under intense 
pressure from the Basis to dig in their heels, with negative effects for coalition 
management. In both cases the Greens' Fraktion made concessions in order to placate the 
SPD but ultimately found that their coalition's mixed policy record (in terms of outcomes) 
and the only partial penetration of the policy network by their associated client groups 
only served to reinforce the pressure on them and the coalition as a whole. Thus it is clear 
that there are limits to political pragmatism, beyond which one is storing trouble up for 
oneself rather than averting it. This is a familiar story within the democratic left in 
Europe.
10.5.2. Postscript: Is There a Red-Green Route?
The thesis demonstrates that the SPD has tended to be the decisive party within the 
coalition game rather than the Greens, falsifying purely mathematical models of coalition 
formation (which stress the importance of the small but decisive party within a given 
party system). One reason for this is that the SPD is a much bigger and popular party 
than the Greens and therefore wields more political clout in both normative terms (the 
norm in the Federal Republic that the biggest party should be in or close to government) 
and practically (in terms of access to expertise and the ability to bestow patronage). 
However within the environment of an ideologically-grounded European party system, the 
thesis demonstrates that the SPD is also decisive because it is closer to the political centre 
(the 'median legislator' argument). But can one call upon the findings of the thesis to 
predict how the SPD and (to a lesser extent) the Greens are going to react in the future?
As already discussed in Chapter Two, since the early 1980's, the SPD has had to respond 
to four threats to its position. First, the decline in the overall Volkspartei vote, which has 
effected both the SPD and CDU and has prompted some observers to forecast growing
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instability within the Federal Republic's party system; second, the extraordinary personal 
appeal and political acumen of Helmut Kohl, who has managed to keep the SPD on the 
back foot in the fight for the political centre-ground; third, the growth of the Greens, which 
has served to put pressure on the SPD along the post-materialist or 'New Polities' 
dimension; and fourth, the persistence of the PDS in the new Lcinc/er, which has 
contributed to the SPD's weakness in the east and (with the additional weakness of the 
Greens and FDP) has severely restricted their coalition options 107 .
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1998 - a Bundestag election year - opinion polls reveal 
deep dissatisfaction with the incumbent CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. Indeed, the SPD is 
even ahead in the 'New' Lander of the former East Germany [de - 
news@LISTSERV.GMD.DE> 06/01/98]. As a result, many commentators regard the 1998 
elections as the best opportunity for over a decade for the SPD to win power and end the 
'Kohl era.
However if the SPD does win the 1998 Federal election, it must be assumed that they will 
have addressed two questions beforehand. First, who do they want to be their candidate 
for Chancellor 108 and, second, who do they want as a coalition partner after the election?
107These processes are looked at in more detail in C. Lees, The Ambivalent Left' in Contemporarv 
Political Studies 1996, Vol. 3. pp.1438-1451
108The debacle of the Berlin elections of 22 October 1995 was fatal for the party leader at the time Rudolf 
Scharping. At the SPD annual conference in November 1995, Scharping was replaced as leader by Oskar 
Lafontaine, who had failed to unseat Kohl in the 1990 Bundestag elections. The choice of the mercurial 
Left-winger Lafontaine over the staid centrist Scharping is indicative of the party's ideological ambivalence. 
Rudolf Scharping's strategy was based around projecting the SPD's governmental competence at all costs. 
As a result, he always refused to rule out the possibility of re-entering national government as a junior 
partner to the CDU. Oskar Lafontaine, securer in his position as Minister President of the state of Saarland, 
promised a more confrontational and explicitly left-wing stance in opposition. In the two years since then 
Lafontaine has turned the party around, at least in terms of self-confidence. The 'loosely coupled anarchy' of 
the late 1980's and early 1990's seems to have been replaced by a steelier approach to the business of 
opposition. This new self-confidence was evident at the SPD's conference in the north German city of 
Hannover at the beginning of December 1997. For the first time in years, delegates were clearly sanguine 
about their chances of returning to government and gave much of the credit to Lafontaine. Lafontaine's 
position as darling of the conference was never in doubt and his key note speech was greeted with 
something close to euphoria by the delegates. Moreover, the speech itself was a red-blooded re-affirmation 
of the Social Democratic project; advocating state intervention to secure social justice, more regulation.
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At the time of writing, all of the opinion poll data suggests that the most likely outcome of 
the 1998 Bundestag elections will be a repeat of the Grand Coalition between CDU/CSl 
and SPD that ruled in Bonn between 1966 and 1969 109 . However, there is a fair chance 
that this will not be the case and that the SPD considers the Greens as serious enough 
potential coalition partners at the national level to consider going into coalition with them. 
If this is the case, it must be assumed that the two parties will have reached a viable modus 
operandi to offset the higher political stakes associated with Federal government.
The evidence of the thesis suggests that in order to do this, the two parties must meet and 
maintain certain criteria associated with their ideological stance and election programmes, 
the composition and division of portfolios and the staffing and structure of the civil service
'green' taxes and greater European integration as a bulwark against the forces of globalisation. However 
there was one other significant speech at the party conference, made by the only politician who could 
conceivably stop Lafontaine being made the SPD's candidate for Chancellor and take the job, none other 
than Gerhard Schroder. Despite being on home territory, Schrb'der was in many ways the outsider at the 
conference, albeit one whose message cannot be ignored. For where Lafontaine preaches state intervention 
and regulation, taxes and European integration, Schroder advocates flexibility and de-regulation, trimming 
social costs and a more sceptical approach to Europe. Aware that for much of his audience this is anathema, 
Schroder is careful to keep his distance from the Anglo-Saxon model and is increasingly coy about being 
called a 'moderniser' (in the mould of Tony Blair). Nevertheless it Schroder is popular with the electorate, 
which is why he is listened to. For despite Lafontaine's obvious political strengths, all of the opinion poll 
data at the turn of the year indicates that he would fail once more to unseat Kohl or his putative successor 
Wolfgang Schauble. Schroder on the other hand evidently could. For instance, an EMNID poll of 1382 
respondents on behalf of the magazine Der Spiegel - carried out between 9 and 12 December 1997 - 
reinforced the message that has been clear for at least the whole year. Respondents preferred both Kohl and 
Schauble to Lafontaine (by 49% to 42% and 53% to 38% respectively). Schroder on the other hand would 
on the evidence of the poll beat either, beating Kohl by 57% to 33% and Schauble less comfortably by 49% 
to 44% [Der Speigel. 20/12/97]. Schroder's popularity in the country is based upon his centrist stance as 
moderniser, yet in order to beat Lafontaine to the nomination he cannot afford to create too much 
ideological distance between himself and the party membership. He has to 'triangulate' between the t\vo 
positions. At the same time, the lack of an internal competitor on the left means that Lafontaine can afford 
to edge towards the centre ground. Schroder would then have two strategic options; first to tack further to 
the centre himself, with the danger that he alienates the party rank-and-file or, second, to resist that 
temptation but risk losing the quality that makes him popular with the voters (his ideological distance from 
the SPD apparatchiks). Either option would have its risks. At the time of writing, the party does not have 
to make a final decision until after the state elections in Lower Saxony on 1 March 1998. Any significant 
drop in support would leave Schroder's campaign in huge difficulties. On the other hand, a good showing 
could give him enough momentum to take the nomination.
109The Spiegel poll found a Grand Coalition option to be the most likely outcome in the opinion of the 
voters (33%) with a Red-Green option as second most likely outcome (30%).
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The thesis demonstrates that the SPD's Janus-like ideological ambivalence allows it to 
selectively emphasise either its post-materialist and/or libertarian or its materialist and/or 
authoritarian 'faces' as political circumstances dictate. For instance in Berlin, the SPD was 
able to move from the broadly social libertarian stance (based around the policy of 'de- 
escalating' relations between the police and the community in inner-city areas such as 
Kreuzberg) which marked the coalition agreement of 1989 to a much more authoritarian 
'law and order' stance (demonstrated by the eviction of the Mainzer StraBe squatters) by 
the end of 1990. Moreover, this shift was achieved with only a certain (manageable) 
degree of internal heart-searching within the party.
Similarly the thesis describes how, as the newly elected Minister President of Lower 
Saxony, Gerhard Schroder undertook the clearing out of the highest echelons of the state's 
police and security apparatus in order to reform these structures along less authoritarian 
lines. Nevertheless in his campaign to become the SPD's chancellor candidate for the 1998 
elections, Schroder felt able to play the 'law and order' card in a quite shameless fashion 
(arguing for increased stop and search powers for the police and the compulsory expulsion 
of foreigners who commit criminal acts in the Federal Republic). This ability to shift 
ideological 'faces' can be regarded as a tactical resource for the SPD and its leading 
politicians.
For the Greens the only ideological direction that they are able to - and normally have to - 
shift is towards the political centre. This puts them at a tactical disadvantage during 
coalition negotiations because there is no chance (as yet) of playing one potential coalition 
off against another in order to secure concessions. In short they are forced to move away 
from 'their1 ideological ground towards the SPD's because there is nowhere else for them to
go.
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The main area where the Greens have had to shift and/or clarify their position is with 
regard to the nature of 'the state' itself, in particular its monopoly on legitimate force and 
its dealings with other states, particularly in terms of defence arrangements. As the thesis 
demonstrates, the Greens have come a long way in accepting the state monopoly on 
violence and, notwithstanding the occasional 'knee-jerk' reaction to police actions such as 
the clearing of the Mainzer StraBe squatters, the party's 'wrecking ball' tendency seems to 
be a thing of the past. However coming to terms with the realities of political life within 
the domain of foreign policy - particularly defence and security - remains a problem that 
has to be resolved if the Greens are to ever hold power at the Federal level 110 .
As for the composition and division of portfolios and the staffing and structure of the civil 
service, it is hard to make predictions at this stage, with over half a year before the 1998 
Bundestag elections. However, if the Greens' experiences in Berlin and Lower Saxony are 
any evidence, the party will insist at the very least that they receive the Environment 
portfolio for themselves (with no division between the minister's and state secretary's 
posts along the lines of Lower Saxony in 1990). Moreover, the experiences of the
reason why the Greens have been so slow the resolve these issues is because, as they have only held 
power at the sub-national level, they have never really had to. Apart from when domestic issues were 
tangentially connected (such as the Eurofighter row in Lower Saxony), the only time the foreign policy 
domain has been explicitly salient was in Berlin in 1989, when SPD leader Walter Momper demanded - and 
received - the AL's grudging acceptance of the city's 'five power' status (and by implication a de facto 
acceptance of the legitimacy of Germany's involvement in NATO). The Greens' stance on foreign policy is 
not just a symbolic artefact of a more militant past (along the lines of the Labour Party's long attachment to 
Clause Four of its constitution) and, as the election approaches, the Greens have been forced to confront it. 
Moreover, the extent to which the party has not done so in the past has been reflected by the fact that the 
debate has cut across the party, with the Fraktion as divided as the Basis over the issue. Thus in October 
1997 Jiirgen Trittin, who is now the Greens' national spokesperson, announced the party's draft programme - 
to be voted on by delegates to the Greens' national conference in March 1998 - for the upcoming Bundestag 
elections. Amongst other things, it proposed a national withdrawal from the use of nuclear energy and the 
disbanding of NATO. As such it drew immediate criticism from both within the Greens itself and from the 
SPD. Joshka Fischer took the realo position that 'unrealistic demands' would hamper any post-election 
coalition negotiations [de-news q /LISTSERl'.GMD.DE> 14/10/97]. whilst the SPD flatly rejected the draft 
programme as a basis for negotiations [ibid. 22/10/97]. After much debate the draft programme was re­ 
drafted and the NATO commitment was down-graded to a long-term goal for Germany and her allies rather 
than a unilateral act to be taken at once. This left the road clear for the SPD to praise the new draft 
programme, with Federal Secretary General Meuntefering telling a radio talk-show that the ditching of the 
anti-NATO stance 'spelled good news for the Social Democrats' [ibid. 16/12 97]. The Greens appear to be 
positioning themselves for a possible junior coalition role after the Bundestag elections.
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incumbent Hesse coalition will make them wary of 'super-ministries' - like the Hesse 
Ministry for Environment, Energy, Health, Youth and the Family - which expose 
ministers to conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable political pressures.
If possible, they might also look to acquire one 'blue-chip' ministry in order to confirm 
their position as a serious party rather than a one-issue political grouping. However given 
the fact that a Red-Green coalition at the Federal level will at least initially be regarded 
with alarm by industry and the money markets, the Economics and Industry ministries can 
be regarded as being off limits for the foreseeable future! Nevertheless, they may feel that 
they have an outside chance of getting the Justice portfolio (as taken by Rupert \ on 
Plottnitz in Hesse), although this remains to be seen.
It is not clear how this would impact upon the staffing and structure of the civil service. 
The evidence of the thesis supports the premise that 'owning' the portfolio is the sine qua 
non of making any impact and - as the Berlin coalition's record suggests - even if a party 
does own the portfolio there is no guarantee that it can permanently open-up the policy 
making process to associated client groups. Nevertheless if there is ever going to be a Red- 
Green coalition at the Federal level in the future it is this issue which will prove crucial in 
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APPENDIX TWO: A RESUME OF FORMAL MODELS 
OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND COALITION 
BEHAVIOUR [cf. Laver and Schofield, 1990]
2.1. Downs' (1957) 'Median Voter' Model
In the Downsian universe, the policy dimension is laid out one-dimensional ly along a 
single left-right spectrum. Voter's preferences are distributed along this spectrum and are 
assumed to be single-peaked under normal conditions. This means that an individual voter 
will have one ideal position along the continuum and, the further away any given policy 
positions are from this point, they display less and less affinity for them. Thus, a left- 
wing voter will prefer a left-wing position over a centrist position and a centrist position 
over a right-wing position (and vice versa). Where single-peaked preferences are the norm 
and are fairly evenly distributed along the left-right continuum, there is a tendency for the 
aggregate (or social choice) of these preferences to reach an equilibrium (and thus 
effectively a consensus) somewhere around the median of the distribution. It is around 
this point, occupied by the 'median voter' 1, that the office-seeking parties will manoeuvre 
in order to maximise votes. By contrast, where voters' preferences are not single peaked. 
there is the possibility of extremism as there is less of a definable political centre around 
which parties will compete.
'The median voter theorem was formulated by Duncan Black [1958]. The gist of the argument is that the 
median voter, who has an equal number of voters on each side, is in a priveledged position because he/she 
can vote down alternatives to both the right and the left. The ideal point of the median voter is the 
equilibrium outcome under majority rule.
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2.2. Riker's (1962^ 'Size Principle'
The size principle is stated below:
In \\-person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where 
players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only 
minimum winning coalitions occur.....
In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side- 
payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will 
ensure winning and no larger. [1962: 32-33].

















The size principle is demonstrated in Table 2.2.. Although party A'has the largest share 
of the seats, it is not in the winning coalition because any coalition that forms with it (X.Z 
orX,WorX,W,YorX,W,Z) will be a surplus majority coalition and will therefore invoke a 
sub-optimal division of payoffs to its members. Party }' is not in the coalition because 
any combination involving it is either not winning (II'. For A' For Z, Y) or invokes a surplus 
majority (W,X,Y or X,Y,Z or W,Y,Z). This leaves the minimal winning coalition (ll'.Z)
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reaching the required 76 seats (50 % plus one seat). Moreover, as it is the smallest party 
whose leaving the coalition would facilitate either a new winning coalition or a blocking 
minority in the legislature, party Z is decisive within the set.
The outcome of the bargaining set in Table 2.2. conforms to Hiker's size principle. Each 
player is expected to join the potential coalition that will maximise their share of the 
payoff. A coalition is predicted to form successfully if each member of that coalition is 
able to maximise their payoff share. This is known as an 'undominated' coalition. 
Problems arise if their are more than one potential undominated coalition within the 
bargaining set or, conversely, if there are none. Under such circumstances, at least some 
of the players will be indifferent to any given rational choice of coalition formation.
2.3. Gamson's (196H 'Cheapest Winning' Model
Although he conceptualises the players strategic choice slightly differently from Riker, in 
practical terms the cheapest winning coalition will be that combination of parties that can 
harness 50% plus one of legislative seats. In other words, Gamson predicts the minimal 
winning coalition.
Table 2.3. demonstrates that all the parties are potential members of a cheapest winning 
coalition according to Gamson's formation criteria. Given that the winning post is again 76 
seats, the combinations (S, T, V, W,X)\ (S, U, V, IV.X); (T, U. V, IV,X); (S, T, Y,Z): (S. U. Y.Z): 
(T,U,Y,Z)and(V,Z,Y) are all winning sets.
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2.4. Leiserson's (1968) 'Bargaining Proposition' Model






























Leiserson's model significantly limits the number of predictions generated within a 
bargaining set. Using the same distribution of party weights as used to demonstrate 
Gamson's cheapest winning model, Table 2.4. demonstrates that, over the course of time 
in a multi-party environment, (S,T, V, W,X)\ (S, U, V, W,X)\ (T, U, V, W,X) and then (S, T, Y,Z)\ 
(S,U,Y,Z); (T,U,Y,Z) will no longer be members of potential coalition formations on the 
grounds that these formations contain too many players. The winning set is (T,Z, >'). 
Other parties will only be potential members of any winning coalition during inter-decision 
periods, where surplus majorities may be considered strategically rational. To sum up. 
Leiserson's model predicts minimum winning coalitions to be the rational outcome but 
allows institutional norms to skew this process. Those minimal winning coalitions that do 
form will tend to have as few members as possible.
2.5. Schubik's (\967} General Formulation for Simple re-Person Games with 
Players Added
Table 2.5. Simple «-Person Game With Players Added






20 more than 106 
[Schubik, 1967: 249 cited Hinckley, 1981: 24]
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Martin Schubik's model vividly demonstrates the problem of predicting coalition outcomes 
in multi-party systems, even when the rules are very simple. The most simple coalition 
game is one in which each player must only make a 'yes/no' decision about whether to join 
with each other player in the bargaining set. Shubik calculated a general formulation for 
such games as giving 2n -1 possible outcomes (see Table 2.5.)- Thus, even the most 
simple «-person game quickly becomes unwieldy. Obviously the complicated strategic 
environment of a real coalition game would make it far more unwieldy.
2.7. Axelrod's (1970) 'Minimal Connected Winning' Model
Table 2.6. One-Dimensional Bargaining Set For Minimal Connected Winning 
Coalition (151 seats In Legislature)































Axelrod's 'minimal connected winning1 model of coalition formation is one of the earliest 
and well-known attempts to factor-in a secondary policy dimension to the coalition 
bargaining process. Table 2.6. demonstrates that the imposition of a policy dimension as 
a formation criteria has profound consequences for the predictive power of the model. 
Using the same distribution of party weights, Gamson's cheapest winning criteria made six 
predictions (S, T, Y,Z)\ (S, U, Y,Z)\ (T, U, Y,Z); (S, T, V, W,X)\ (S, U, V, W,X) and (T, U, V. \V.X)} 
which Leiserson's solution set with bargaining proposition reduced to three (S,T. Y.Z): 
(S,U,Y,Z} and (T, U,Y,Z). However. Axelrod's assumption that coalitions will be 
ideologically adjacent as well as conforming to the Rikerian size principle means that 
(T, U, V, W,X) is the predicted winning set. Axelrod's model leaves parties S, Y and Z 
outside the potential coalition on the ideological extremes of the legislature.
2.7. De Swaan's O973) 'Median Legislator' Model
De Swaan's theory is often referred to as the 'median legislator' (or 'median party') model 
because it is predicated upon the assumption that the party that controls the median 
legislator in any potential coalition is decisive because it blocks the axis along which any 
connected winning coalition must form. If a party is the Mparty (median within the 
legislature) and Mparty(k) (controlling the median legislator within a potential coalition) in 
all cases, then it is dictator within the bargaining set. Theoretically, any such part) must 
be included in the winning set. Table 2.7. demonstrates the implications of de Sxvaan's 
model for the distribution of party weights. No minimal connected winning coalition is 
able to form without party X. Therefore X is decisive. Given that the size principle still 
applies, party 7 will not be a member of the winning set as any coalition that included A' 
and Y would entail a surplus majority. If the ideological range is assumed to be evenly
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distributed across the legislature, then the Mparty median legislator (for the legislature as a 
whole) can be assumed to be on the right of party X. whilst the Mparty(k) median 
legislator would be on the centre-left of party X.
Table 2.7. One-Dimensional Bargaining Set For Median Party/Median Legislator 
Solution (151 seats In Legislature)






























2.8. Voting Games in Multi-Dimensional Space
Figure 2.8. demonstrates the implications of a second dimension in a spatial voting game. 
Assume that party y was Mparty (with the median legislator) along a Downsian left-right 
dimension. Under such conditions, party T was decisive within the set. However, when a 
second dimension is added party 7's position is no better that the other two parties. In 
this voting game, any two parties can propose a policy package that is better than any 
rival proposal at that point. Thus, parties X and Z can propose package (i) which beats
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any alternative that party Y may propose. Alternatively, parties X and Y can propose 
package (ii) which beats anything party Z may propose. However, this majority (x plus 
Y) can be split by Z's introduction of package (III) that beats any package party A' can 
propose.
Figure 2.8. Voting Game In A Two-Dimensional Policy Space
Party x Party y Party z R
2.9. 'Core' Theory
More often than not, this has involved some variation upon the game-theoretical concept 
of the 'core' or 'barycenter' [Hanson, 1972; Hanson and Rice, 1972]. In his Coalition 
Theories: A Logical And Empirical Critique, Eric Browne [1973] Browne considers the 
process of calculating the mean of points in multi-dimensional space to be analogous to De 
Swaan's measurement of the distance of potential coalition partners from the median
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Figure 2.9. In /i-Dimensional Euclidean Space, The Core [a) Is (i) An Area




of that potential coalition. A weight is assigned to each party according to their position 
within a given policy space (as well as the number of seats they hold in the legislature) and 
the 'barycenter' (as Browne calls it) calculated as the mean of these positions. The 
predicted coalition will be that which is winning and minimises the policy distance of 
members from the core. Core theory assumes that a point exists in ^-dimensional
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Euclidean space that minimises the preference disagreement of a specific set of players and 
thus dominates the utility allocation of all other possible outcomes. Each potential 
coalition's utility allocation is based upon its members calculation of the potential damage 
all players outside the coalition could do to it. Such an allocation is called the coalition's 
security level. As the core consists of that set of preferences that are not dominated by 
any other, it is assumed to also be Pareto optimal. A core allocation may even imply a 
grand coalition of all the players involved, although the payoff allocated to individual 
members will depend on their ability to form a smaller alternative coalition which could 
block (but not dominate) the Pareto set. The location of the core is plotted by calculating 
the mean of a collection of points (representing the policy positions of the parties that 
comprise the bargaining set) within political space (see Figure 2.9.). The core is bound to 
exist in one-dimensional space, and finds an analogue in the 'median voter' of Black and 
Downs or De Swaan's 'median legislator'.
2.10. Laver and Schofield's (1990) Model of Coalition Formation
Laver and Schofield's model builds upon the 'Protocoalition' model of Bernard Grofman 
[1982] and Laver's earlier empirical work. Figure 2.10. demonstrates the difference the 
two options make to the process of coalition formation in a hypothetical five-party 
system. In the hierarchical option, parties d and e are the closest ideologically and 
therefore the first to form an indissoluble protocoalition, followed by a and b. ab and c (a 
majority coalition), and finally abc and de (forming grand coalition abcde). The non- 
hierarchical option is more fluid, with protocoalition de forming and then breaking up . to 
be replaced by the majority coalition cd. which in turn could be replaced by the even larger 
abc and finally grand coalition abode. An hierarchical bargaining process would imply
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Figure 2.10. The 'Bargaining Approach', (i) Hierarchical and (ii) Non-Hierarchical 
Coalition Building In A Five-Party System (after Laver and Schofield 1990: 139)


































that parties voluntarily limit their strategic options within the process of coalition 
formation, thus ruling out winning coalition cd. This is to some extent at odds with the 
assumptions implicit in some of the more formal coalition models. Yet. the evidence 
suggests that, where the two options yield different predictions, the hierarchical model 
works better with the empirical evidence [1990:142]. This would imply that parties 
conform to certain norms of association and trust which skew the bargaining process.
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APPENDIX THREE: A BRIEF GLOSSARY OF 
RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL TERMS.
(Courtesy of The National Alternative Fuels Laboratory (NAFL)2)
3.1. Advanced Power Systems
Advanced power systems aim to provide clean and efficient energy from coal and other 
energy sources. Advanced power systems research embraces a wide spectrum of energy 
conversion and use technologies. At one end of the spectrum are thousands of existing 
facilities that will require retrofitting and upgrading to extend their useful life. At the other 
end of the spectrum are the more efficient and environmentally compatible energy 
technologies that will see commercial application in the short and long term. Advanced
2The NAFL is funded by the United States Department of Agriculture. Current NAFL work includes an 
investigation of how the performance and capacity of fuel evaporation canisters are affected by vapors from 
fuels containing ethanol. The motivation for this work was provided by comparison of NAFL data on 
evaporative emission compositions with data from other researchers using "SHED" (sealed housing for 
evaporative determination) test methodology. While the NAFL data showed that the ethanol concentration 
in an evaporative emission from a 10 volume percent ethanol/90 volume percent base gasoline (E10) blend 
should be about 13 weight percent (wt%), published SHED test results for ethanol concentration in E10 
evaporative emissions were significantly lower. One possible explanation for this difference may involve 
canister performance with E10 fuels. Other current work includes an investigation of how ethanol (in E10 
blends) effects the evaporation of gasoline. The investigation showed that in 2-hour evaporation tests 
performed under identical environmental conditions, E10 fuels consistently lost more total weight to 
evaporation than their base fuels, but less gasoline. The increased weight was due to ethanol, which was 
present in the E10 evaporative emissions at concentrations of about 13 weight percent (wt%). This data 
indicates that because ethanol displaces a significant portion of gasoline in E10 evaporative emissions, the 
accuracy of assessing the environmental impact of these emissions could be improved by more 
understanding of the atmospheric activity and ozone-forming potential of ethanol in relation to the gasoline 
components it displaces. Other NAFL work includes investigating the effects of different additives and 
ethanol denaturants including glycerine and ethylene glycol on Reid vapor pressure (RVP). One study 
found that RVP of E10 blends could be decreased by as much as 0.3 psi by the addition of a small amount 
of ethylene glycol. The results of a study in which component analysis and RVP measurement were 
performed on E10 and base gasolines before and after the fuels were transported from a pipeline terminal to a 
gasoline station, showed that even after a 60-mile transport, the splash blended ethanol was not complete 1\ 
mixed in the E10 fuel. The study also demonstrated the importance of proper sampling to ensure 
compliance with EPA-recommended RVP limits, by showing how RVP varied by as much as 1.0 psi for 
several samples obtained from a tanker truck using different sampling techniques.
Power Systems research includes: Fuel Utilisation; Pressurised Combustion; Hot-Gas 
Cleaning; Advanced Gasification; Particulate Control; Waste Management: Utilisation and 
Disposal; Fluidized-Bed Technologies; Waste Conversion; Waste to Energy: Plastics 
Recycling
3.2. Atmospheric Emission Control
Atmospheric emission controls for energy and other systems include retrofit acid gas and 
particulate removal technologies for existing facilities as well as the design of the next 
generation of equipment needed to control particulate as well as gaseous organic and 
inorganic emissions from utilities, incinerators, refineries, and other industrial sources. 
Substances removed with atmospheric emission control technology must be properly 
utilised or disposed of: for example in mine land settings. Atmospheric Emission Control 
research includes Air Toxins; Flue Gas Conditioning for Enhanced Particulate Control; 
Fine Particulate Control; Hot-Gas Cleaning; Acid Gas Emissions Control; Fuel and 
Sorbent Characterisation; Re-powering; Advanced Power Systems; Waste Management: 
Utilisation and Disposal; Fuel Conditioning;
3.3. Carbon-Based Energy: Biomass
Tremendous amounts of energy are stored within biomass resources. Biomass-Related 
research includes: Vegetable Oil Diesel Fuel; Liquefaction of Carbon Compounds: Waste 
Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Refuse-Derived Fuels: Combustion and
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Environmental Issues; Effects of Biomass on Combustion System Performance: Advanced 
Combustion Systems
3.4. Carbon-Based Energy: Coal
Coal will continue to play a major role in meeting energy needs. Increasingly, coal can be 
utilised as cleanly and efficiently as possible in existing facilities as well as with emerging 
technologies. Coal-Related research includes: Coal Resource Evaluation and 
Characterisation; Fuel Upgrading; Direct Coal Liquefaction; Indirect Coal Liquefaction: 
Conventional Gasification; Underground Coal Gasification; Advanced Gasification; Re- 
powering; Fuel Quality Impacts on Power System Performance; Advanced Power 
Systems; Atmospheric Emission Controls; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; 
Reclamation of Disturbed Lands; Analytical Methods Development; Ground water: 
Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation; Applied Geology.
3.5. Carbon-Based Energy: Gas
The environmental issues currently facing the gas industry include the production and 
conditioning of synthetic or substitute natural gas by conventional coal gasification, mild 
gasification, and underground coal gasification. Gas-Related research includes: Produced- 
Water Management; Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM); Mercury in 
Ground water and Atmospheric Emissions; Waste Management (Utilisation and 
Disposal); Advanced Power Systems; Hot-Gas Cleaning; Advanced High-Temperature
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Materials; Atmospheric Emission Controls; Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation: 
Underground Coal Gasification; Conventional Gasification; Advanced Gasification: Mild 
Gasification; Applied Geology.
3.6. Carbon-Based Energy: Oil
Oil research programmes embrace a variety of issues relevant to the oil industry. Issues 
include the use of organic liquids and alternative oils such as methyl ether diesel fuel. Oil- 
Related research includes: Ground water Research; Produced-Water Management; Applied 
Geology; Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM): Mercury in Ground water 
and Atmospheric Emissions; Direct Coal Liquefaction; Indirect Coal Liquefaction; Plastics 
Recycling and Depolymerization; Combustion Testing; Atmospheric Emission Controls; 
Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Petroleum Coke Testing: Contaminant 
Cleanup and Site Remediation; National Alternative Fuels Laboratory; Vegetable Oil 
Diesel Fuel.
3.7. Contaminant Clean-up and Site Remediation
Contaminant cleanup and site remediation technologies are essential to restore countless 
sites world-wide that are contaminated with varying combinations of organic, inorganic, 
and radioactive materials that pose threats to human health and environmental quality. 
Activities, including mining, waste disposal, military operations, energy extraction, 
agriculture, and real estate development, may result in soil and/or ground water
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contamination. Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation research includes: Remediation 
Technology Development; Analytical Methods Development for Environmental 
Contaminants; Ground water Research for the North American Oil and Gas Industry; 
Impacts of Agricultural Chemicals on Ground water Quality; Environmental 
Microbiology; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Coal, Uranium, and Metal 
Mine Reclamation; Applied Geology.
3.8. Fluidised Bed Combustion (FBC)
Fluidised bed combustion (FBC) refers to a method of burning coal in a bed of a granular 
material, usually consisting of an alkaline lime type substance. This 'Fluidised bed' is kept 
Fluidised by pumping a gas, usually air, through the bed particles from the bottom. FBC 
provides an environment where coal is burned in a manner that has the ability to remove 
acid gases such as sulphur dioxide by reacting with the alkaline bed material. Many of 
these "advanced" combustion systems rely on the presence of an alkaline material, 
somewhere in the system, for the uptake of acid gases often referred to as SOx and NOx. 
These sulphur and nitrogen oxide acid gases are one of the more prominent environmental 
problems associated with coal combustion. Although the sulphur, which is associated with 
the coal, can be partially removed from some coals by 'coal cleaning', the nitrogen present in 
the air presents an entirely different problem. NOx production and/or emissions can be 
reduced by other means usually involving some sort of absorbent or catalytic system to 
either remove or change the chemistry of the NOx formation. The gas cleaning technologies 
work not by preventing the SOx and NOx from forming but by 'cleaning' the flue gas.
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3.9. Ground Water
Ground water is the largest available reservoir of fresh water for human use. Issues include 
the geologic setting, the water flowing through that setting, and ground water quality as the 
basis for evaluating contaminant occurrence, transport, and fate. Ground water-related 
activities include: Ground water Research Program for the North American Gas and Oil; the 
assessment of the impact of Agricultural Chemicals on Ground water Quality: 
Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal: 
Wetlands management; Coal, Uranium, and Metal Mine Reclamation; Underground Coal 
Gasification; Applied Geology.
3.10. Hot Gas Cleaning (HOC)
Hot-gas cleaning refers to the location in the combustion system where the process is 
carried out. Stack gas is often cleaned after heat removal in the power plant, through steam 
production and passage through much of the combustion system. The gas can be treated in 
one of the hot zones however: thus 'hot-gas' cleaning.
3.11. Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal
Cost-effective, environmentally sound management of our wastes continues to be a volatile 
issue, the solution for which must integrate science, technology, individual responsibility, 
and policy. Waste management must address utilisation, the preferred option, and
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disposal, the option of last resort. Waste management begins with understanding the 
complete and detailed physical, chemical, mineralogical, leaching, and biological character 
of the waste in question. This understanding is critical to successful utilisation or 
environmentally friendly disposal and enables us to predict what is in a material, how 
much is there, how it may leach out, and how it will ultimately behave. The understanding 
developed in waste management research is also valuable in the cleanup of contaminated 
sites. Waste Management-Related research includes: Materials Characterisation Focused 
on Process Residuals; Coal Ash Resources Research Consortium (CARRC); Advanced and 
Conventional Power Systems Research; Waste Utilisation Options; Ground water 
Research Program for the North American Gas and Oil; Impacts of Agricultural Chemicals 
on Ground water Quality; Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation; Advanced Leaching 
Procedures; Atmospheric Emission Control; Analytical Methods Development; Coal, 
Uranium, and Metal Mine Reclamation; Applied Geology.
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APPENDIX FOUR: ELECTION RESULTS FOR WEST 
BERLIN, 1950-1994
Original data courtesy of Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim in co-operation with the 
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The John Hopkins University 
'Elections News' Website (http://www.klipsan.com/elecnews.htm)3
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4.1. Federal Elections In Berlin since 1990




















































•^During the compilation of these figures, the author noted that some of the numerical percentage totals do 
not add up to 100, due to the effect of'rounding up/down' totals to the nearest tenth of one percent.
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4.3. Distribution of Seats


















































































4.4. Government Composition in Berlin. 1950-1995
1950. After the election of 3 December 1950, a coalition was formed between the SPD. 
CDU and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Ernst Reuter (SPD). From December 1953. 
the governing coalition consisted of the CDU and FDP. The Governing Mayor was 
Walter Schreiber (CDU).
1954. After the election of 5 December 1954, a coalition was formed between the SPD 
and CDU. The Governing Mayor was Otto Siihr (SPD) and, from October 1957, Willy 
Brandt (SPD).
1958. After the election of 7 December 1958, a coalition was formed between the SPD 
and CDU. The Governing Mayor was Willy Brandt (SPD).
1963. After the election of 17 February 1963, a coalition was formed between the SPD 
and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Willy Brandt (SPD) and, from December 1966, 
Heinrich Albertz (SPD).
1967. After the election of 12 March 1967, a coalition was formed between the SPD and 
FDP. The Governing Mayor was Heinrich Albertz (SPD) and, from October 1967. Klaus 
Schiitz (SPD).
1971. After the election of 14 March 1971, the SPD formed a government without 
coalition partners. The Governing Mayor was Klaus Schiitz (SPD).
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1975. After the election of 2 March 1975, a coalition was formed between the SPD and 
FDP. The Governing Mayor was Klaus Schiitz (SPD) and, from May 1977, Dietrich 
Stobbe (SPD).
1979. After the election of 18 March 1979, a coalition was formed between the SPD and 
FDP. The Governing Mayor was Dietrich Stobbe (SPD).
1981. After the election of 10 May 1981, a minority government was formed by the 
CDU. The Governing Mayor was Richard von Weizsacker. From March 1983. a 
coalition was formed between the CDU and FDP. From February 1984, the Governing 
Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).
1985. After the election of 10 March 1985, a coalition was formed between the CDU and 
FDP. The Governing Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).
1989. After the election of 29 January 1989. a coalition was formed between the SPD and 
the Berlin Alternative Liste (Greens). The Governing Mayor was Walter Momper (SPD).
1990. After the election of 2 December 1990, a coalition was formed between the CDU 
and SPD. The Governing Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).
1995. After the election of 10 March 1985, a coalition was formed between the CDU and 
SPD. The Governing Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).
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APPENDIX FIVE: SYNOPSIS OF THE PROGRAMME 
PROPOSED BY THE MINISTRY FOR CITY 
DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AND TRAFFIC.
Precis into English,
5.1. The Imposition of a New 'Planning Culture'
Greater transparency on the part of officials during the planning stage of policy; the repeal 
of measures designed to speed up planning permission and, subject to costing, the 
prioritisation of ecological and health criteria within public provision.
5.2. Air Pollution
New controls over emissions; encouragement of the development of new clean air 
technologies; strengthening of smog regulations (traffic restrictions to be imposed at lower 
levels of pollutant build-up); ban on the use of PVC and asbestos in the public sector and 
the removal where already in use; earliest possible total ban on CFC's in West Berlin; 




Priority given within the 'Work and the Environment' programme to the removal of lead 
piping in the city's water provision; imposition of state of the art technology within the 
water industry; improvement of quality of drinking water; improved river management 
including more water protection areas and the 're-greening' of river banks etc.; use of 
ecological criteria in the management of the city's extensive system of lakes and 
waterways.
5.4. Waste Management
Cancellation of planned second municipal incinerator, reduction of levels of waste sent to 
the German Democratic Republic for disposal; imposition of an integrated and coherent 
waste disposal policy in co-operation with other Lander (to include extension of 
compostisation methods); discouragement of waste production through a system of tariffs 
imposed on their disposal; promotion of recyclable products; reworking of the legal 
framework covering waste production and disposal.
5.5. Land Use and Protection
A freeze on the new development of'green field' sites: including the review and alteration 
of existing developments to include new minimum standards for provision of public space 
for small parks, allotments etc.; more forceful measures to prevent this trend: including the
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imposition of specific qualitative criteria and specific subsidies to encourage better use of 
existing sites (including the renovation of old houses); greater control of land use for 
dumping and land fill (including greater regulation of those on private and corporate 
property); encouraging the development of a nation-wide approach to the problem: 
increased consultation with local communities; cancellation of certain existing road-building 
projects; cancellation of the planned building of the 'German Historical Museum' and 
imposition of a new programme called 'Work and the Environment'.
5.6. Energy Policy
Development and imposition of a 'sparing, rational and socially sustainable' system of 
energy provision and use, including a new energy tax; modification of existing laws on 
energy use; modification of pricing system to make it more flexible and progressive; 
making West Berlin's monopoly electricity supplier (BEWAG) adopt a more ecologically- 
friendly approach: including the encouragement of reduced electricity consumption and the 
greater use of decentralised electricity generation (Blockheizkraft\\'erke}\ creation of an 
energy advisory body (with experts from the worlds of science, business, trades unions, 
consumers' organisations and environmental groups) to make recommendations on future 
policy; creation of a specialist working group within the ministry to concentrate on energy 
policy as well as an independent agency to promote better use of existing methods and the 
development of new technology; encouragement of better energy use in public buildings: 
the creation of advice centres for tenants, home owners and small businesses; development 




Cancellation of plans for a third reactor in Berlin (BER III): review of safety of research 
reactor BER II and cancellation of other projects in progress.
5.8. Traffic
Long-term plan to completely re-open the city's railway system (S-Bahn): budget for the 
expansion of public transport raised from DM.170 million to DM. 380 million per annum; 
make public transport more attractive through extension of bus-lanes, reduced waiting 
times, reduced prices including introduction of cheap all-inclusive travel card 
('Umweltkarte'); reduction of emissions from buses; introduction of'night-taxi' system for 
women; more ecologically-friendly road planning; banning of traffic from certain forested 
areas within the city and introduction of 100 km/h speed limit on part of the motorway 
network; extension of cycle-lanes; more regulation of air-traffic in and out of the city: 
upgrading of rail-links to the Federal Republic and re-opening of old stations within the 
city (especially with regard to freight purposes). 
[SPD Landesverband Berlin 1989: 79-84]
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Paragraph One. Purpose of the Law.
To promote the most sparing, rational, socially and environmentally sustainable, resource- 
friendly, low risk and - in terms of the wider economy - low cost means as possible for the 
production and utilisation of energy and, at the same time, secure the long-term provision 
of energy for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Berlin.
Paragraph Two. Basic Principles.
Through the conservationally-minded approach to the use of energy and the engagement of
renewable energy, the following principles should be realised.
1. The allocation of energy should made specifically in order to facilitate the smallest 
possible consumption of non-renewable energy.
2. In securing energy requirements, priority shall be given to those processes:
• (i)That as far as possible take into account those users of non-renewable energy.
• (ii)That cause the least damage to the natural environment.
• (iii)That make the most efficient use of the space available.
• (iv)That involve the smallest risk for people and the environment.
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3. Priority will be given to those measures that limit demand and consumption (of 
energy), such as the utilisation of 'waste heat' and 'heat retrieval', over those that increase 
the use of primary energy.
4. The most efficient use will be made of the inherent energy within 'primary energy' 
resources. Waste heat will be utilised where possible.
5. With regard to the provision of energy, priority will be given to 'low value-added' 
energy forms: such as the use of waste heat and 'environmental energy'.
Paragraph Three. Explanation of Terms.
1. 'Primary Energy' refers to energy sources that undergo a process of conversion before 
the point of provision. 'End-Energy' is the energy at the point of provision to the 
consumer. 'User-energy' is the end-energy after conversion to heat, power and light.
2. 'Renewable Energy' refers to solar power, water power, wind power, Geo.-thermal 
energy and 'environmental energy' (for instance energy from bio-masses).
3. 'Combined Heat and Power' (CHP) refers to the dual production of power and user- 
heat under the conditions of a wide-ranging prevention of waste heat.
4. 'Installation7'Establishment'/"Construction'/'Building' is used in the sense as that laid out 
Article Three, Paragraph Five of the Federal Emissions Law.
Paragraph Four. The Sparing Utilisation of Energy as a Duty.
Sparing, rational, social, environmentally sustainable and resource-friendly utilisation of
energy is the dutiful task of the state (Staatsaufgabe) and every citizen.
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6.2. Measures Proposed By the State of Berlin to Conserve Energy
Paragraph Five. The Binding Aims and Principles of the Law.
The aims and principles of the law shall be observed by the state of Berlin in all planning 
and measures taken, in particular with respect those involving intended investment and 
construction. This also applies to those companies owned by the state of Berlin. The 
principles of economic and sparing budgeting are not affected (and remain in force).
Paragraph Six. Energy Conservation in Buildings and Installations owned by the State of 
Berlin.
1. In all cases of construction, extension, modernisation or renovation, or especially 
changes in energy use in buildings and installations belonging to the state of Berlin, 
measures must be taken that further the aims and principles of this law. With regard to 
Paragraph One, these would mean specifically:
• (i)Measures regarding building technology that limit energy requirements.
• (ii)Measures regarding the modernisation of heating and building technology, especially 
regulating and controlling technology.
• (iii)The bringing on-line of heating installations (both on-site or municipal) through 
CHP or through special use of waste heat.
• (iv)The use of re-newable energy for room-heating, provision of warm water and 
electrical energy.
• (v)The building of heat retrieval installations.
• (vi)The conversion from electrical to non-electrical means of room- and water-heating.
• (vii)The installation of electricity-saving instruments and devices.
2. Priority will be given to the conversion of state-owned buildings and installations to 
municipal heating using CHP or the utilisation of waste heat. If this form of heat 
provision is not possible, priority will be given to the installation of solar-installations
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or block-heating. Swimming pools should use solar-installations as a matter of course. 
If energy provision under these conditions is not possible, a connection to the gas-main 
should be made. It will no longer be permissible to install electric heating in new or 
extended buildings and installations belonging to the state of Berlin.
3. Remedial measures shall be carried out in all extended buildings and installations in the 
spirit of Articles 1. and 2.
4. Measures relevant to Articles 1. and 3. shall be introduced in the form of an Energy 
Concept, through which the existing conditions of the building, the energy needs for 
room-heating, household technology and warm water provision are taken into account, 
so that the achievable conservation of primary energy and the environmental ly 
beneficial and economical effects of these measures can be carried out.
5. Guidelines will be established with regards to details of Articles 1. to 3. These 
guidelines will be set out by the Berlin senate.
6. The senate will set up a programme in due time, in order to follow through the 
measures set out in Articles 1. to 3.
Paragraph Seven. The 'Energy Pass'System.
1. An Energy Pass is required in order to carry out any extensions, modernisation, 
conversion or any particular changes to buildings belonging to the city of Berlin. This also 
applies to any third party (buyer, tenant or user) in a relationship with the state of Berlin. 
Any subsequent changes will require a new application for an energy pass.
2. An energy pass requires an audit of the energy requirements of a given flat or premises. 
The audit will be carried out with regards to the guidelines set out by the senate.
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Paragraph Eight. Requirements for the Procurement of Supplies and Services, Invitations 
for Tenders.
1. The aims and principles of this law will be observed in the procurement of supplies 
and services.
2. The state of Berlin will also attempt to procure such energy-saving devices and 
installations that are still in their developmental stages and not yet commercially available.
3. The procurement of such devices and installations will be made with regard to the aims 
and principles of this law, in so far as this does not lead to significantly higher 
procurement costs.
4. The same requirements apply to the invitation to tender for the procurement of 
supplies and services.
5. Paragraph Six, Article 7 applies.
6.3. Measures Furthering the Aims and Principles of the Law
Paragraph Nine. Energy Conservation in Publicly-Resourced Buildings and Installations.
1. The granting of public resources by the state of Berlin for planned construction, 
extension, modernisation and changes in energy use in buildings and installations will be 
made with a view to the aims and principles of the law. Any future plans regarding 
buildings, technical developments or companies will be subject to the guidelines laid down 
by the senate.
2. The granting of resources as set out in Article 1 is contingent upon the recipient taking 
the measures necessary in order to gain an energy pass. The recipient is also charged with 
ensuring that, in the event of changes in use, a new energy pass is acquired by the buyer, 
tenant or user before the contract is closed.
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Paragraph Ten. The Promotion of Energy Saving in Residential Buildings.
1. The state of Berlin will introduce measures to limit, and make pricing structures reflect, 
the consumption of primary energy in residential buildings, subject to the existing legal 
framework.
2. Such measures will be especially salient to Paragraph Six, Article 1., line 2.
3. A pre-condition of the aforementioned promotional measures is the development of an 
Energy Concept, as set out in Paragraph Six, Article 4. The guidelines will anticipate that 
such an energy concept is proposed.
4. In rented accommodation, the consent of the tenant will be required. Measures will 
only be taken when the anticipated rise in rent is no greater or not significantly greater than 
the savings made through reduced energy and operating costs.
5. Promotional resources, as laid out Article 1. and Article 3. line 2.. can be applied for by 
the owner of tenant.
Paragraph Eleven. Promotion of De-centralised Energy-Use Installations.
1. The state of Berlin will promote the construction of installations that realise the aims 
and principles of the law, in that such installations are localised in both production and 
use, or use re-newable energy. Paragraph Ten, Article 1., line 2. applies.
2. Priority will be given to the promotion of installations using re-newable energy, such as 
CHP. In particular:
• (i)Installations for the use of waste heat, such as gas-fired heat pumps, if they are 
part of a local heating system.
• (ii)Other forms of local heating systems, such as heat networks, transfer stations. 
controlling technology etc.
• (iii)Other forms of re-newable energy systems, for example regulatory technology.
• (iv)Decentralised installations for gas-recovery and related technology.
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3. Installations as set out in Articles 1. and 2. must fulfil specific environmental benefits 
and should not exceed certain maximum levels of energy. These benefits and levels are set 
out in the guidelines in Paragraph 14.
Paragraph 12. Promotion of Research and Development, such as Pilot and 
Demonstration Installations.
1. The state of Berlin will promote research and development of such pilot and 
demonstration installations in the area of technology, in so far as they promote the aims 
and principles of energy conservation as set out in the law.
2. Such promotion of research and development will take place within the framework of a 
Research Programme, set up by the senate. The results of such research will be made 
public.
3. Promotion will be made of plans for the development and introduction of methods and 
products that are anticipated to lead to the conservation of primary energy, the greater use 
of re-newable energy and the preservation of the environment. Within this promotional 
framework, priority will be given to those plans that involve technology that is able to be 
put into operation in a decentralised manner.
4. Priority will be given to planned research and development from applicants located 
within the state of Berlin. Pilot and demonstration installations are only eligible for 
promotion if they are to be erected and operated within the state of Berlin.
Paragraph 13. Promotion of Energy Advice.
The state of Berlin will set up an advice centre to advise consumers with regard to the aims
and principles of the law.
Paragraph 14. Promotional Guidelines and Programmes.
1. The details laid out in Paragraphs Ten to Thirteen will be set out as guidelines.
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2. There is no legal right to such promotional measures.
3. The promotional measures laid out in Paragraphs Ten to Thirteen will be presented by 
the state of Berlin in an annual promotional programme. The terms of reference of such a 
programme will be able to encompass more than one calendar year.
6.4. Measures for the Re-Orientation of the Energy Sector in the State of 
Berlin
Paragraph Fifteen.. A State Energy Programme.
1. Every four years, the state of Berlin will set up an Energy Programme, which will 
include the aims of the conservation of energy, restrictions on the growth of energy use 
and environmental damage and measures furthering these aims.
2. The public domain will be involved in the formulation of the State Energy Programme.
Paragraph Sixteen. An Energy Report.
On the basis of the State Energy Programme, the Berlin senate will present the state 
parliament with an annual Energy Report, dealing with those measures introduced in order 
to realise the aims and principles of this law and the implementation of the State Energy 
Programme as set out in Paragraph Fifteen and the results of such measures.
Paragraph Seventeen. Involving the Public Domain.
Those measures proposed under Paragraph Four of the Energy Sector Law. with regard to 
the planned erection and extension of:
• (i)Power stations and electricity generating plants involving the use of solid, liquid 
or gaseous fuel, in so far as they exceed the electrical rated power of 5 MW.
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• (ii)High energy cables from 110 kV, including transformer stations.
• (iii)Gas storage facilities and those gas works, gas tanks, tanks for petrol, methanol 
or oil as well as those installations that are connected with the storage of liquid 
gas, which require permits under the Federal Emissions Law. 
(iv)High pressure pipelines for natural gas.
will be made public. This will include the opportunity to put forward opinions and for 
the public discussion of proposed plans, in particular with regard to their effects upon the 
security and pricing of energy provision and upon the realisation of the aims of this law. in 
so far as this does not effect the rights of third parties. The Berlin senate will use 
statutory instruments with regard to the details of public involvement.
Paragraph Eighteen. The Energy Service Industry
The Berlin senate will ensure that those firms registered in the state of Berlin who supply
others with energy:
1. Will have business aims that are compatible with the aims and principles of this law, in 
particular that the promotion of energy conservation and the rational use of energy takes 
precedence over the expansion of the availability of energy.
2. That such services offered are geared towards the aims and principles of this law.
3. At the planning stage of proposals to expand the availability of energy, possible 
alternatives should be costed, in particular measures designed to conserve energy that 
would make the expansion of the availability of energy unnecessary.
4. Set tariffs and prices with the goal of economically influencing and reducing the use of 
energy.
5. That as far as possible they make public their investment and business plans, in 
particular their price calculations.
6. That they make public any plans of special importance to the energy sector.
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Paragraph Nineteen. Licensing Contracts.
1. Contracts agreed by the state of Berlin shall ensure that the partner to the contract is 
under the obligation to support the state of Berlin in the realisation of the aims and 
principles of this law. Licensing contracts should implement the aims of Paragraph 
Eighteen, in so far as this does not affect existing statutory rights.
2. Licensing contracts will ensure that the Berlin senate can suggest an adaptation of 
existing laws, when this is in the public interest and in furtherance of the aims and 
principles of this law with regard to energy use.
3. The closing of licensing contracts requires the prior approval of the parliament.
Paragraph Twenty. Energy Officials.
1. In order to promote the aims and principles of the law. Energy Officials will be 
appointed in the districts (Bezirken).
2. The Energy Officials will have the following tasks:
• (i)To investigate the existing condition of buildings and installations within the 
district, with regard to their energy requirements for room-heating, household t 
echnology and the supply of warm water.
• (ii)To assess the possibility for measures to conserve energy in buildings and 
installations within the district, within the parameters set out in Paragraph Six.
• (iii)To present proposals in accordance with Paragraph Six.
• (iv)To monitor energy-consuming installations and to suggest measures in order to 
improve their effectiveness.
• (v)To monitor the effectiveness of measures in accordance with Paragraph Six and 
present an annual report to the District Office (Bezirksamt) and District Council 
(Bezirksverordneten versammlung).
3. The Energy Official is to be involved in the planning and implementation of measures in 
accordance with paragraph Six and with any other measures that are of importance to the
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energy use of buildings and installations within the district. The official is responsible for 
the issue of Energy Passes in accordance with Paragraph Seven. They have the authority 
to refer cases immediately to the District Office and District Council.
Paragraph Twenty-One. The Energy Advisory Council.
The Berlin senate will convene an Energy Advisory Council. The Energy Advisory 
Council will advise the Berlin Senate of their judgements upon basic questions of energy- 
economics and energy policy. It will discuss those matters that are salient to the provision 
of energy for the state of Berlin, from the viewpoint of technical expertise as well as the 
economic and social aspects, and, in doing this, will highlight problems, provide the basis 
for judgements and suggest solutions. In particular, the Energy Advisory Council will 
advise and co-operate in the setting- up and application of the state Energy Programme as 
set out in Paragraph Fifteen. The members of the Energy Advisory Council will be chosen 
from the different areas of the energy sector, users groups and those civil interest groups 
that are affected by the topic of energy provision and science, The number of members on 
the council will not exceed 25.
6.5. Other Measures for Energy Conservation
Paragraph Twenty-Two. A ban on the new installation of Electrical Heating Appliances.
1. The new installation of electric heaters and night storage heaters for domestic use with a 
capacity of more than 2 kW is not permissible.
2. Exceptions to Article 1. can be made by the ruling of the Berlin senate, if other forms of 
heating are not appropriate or economical for use.
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Paragraph Twenty-Three. Regulations regarding Installation and Use.
1. The Berlin senate will be empowered to stipulate the use in particular instances of 
certain methods and techniques in fulfilling energy needs, in particular with regard to 
municipal or localised heating networks, where this promotes the aims and principles of 
the law.
2. The rulings will anticipate certain exceptions to such regulations regarding installation 
and use, in particular those buildings with an especially low energy requirement. They 
will anticipate reduced regulations on installation and use for particular groups of people, 
businesses or premises, especially those premises that are to be newly developed. In the 
enforcement of regulations regarding installation and use upon premises with other heating 
systems in place, the rulings will anticipate transitional regulations in order to minimise 
social hardship.
Paragraph Twenty-Four. The Ordering of Heating and Air-conditioning installations, 
such as Warm Water installations.
1. Where installations for heating or air-conditioning or the supply of warm water are or 
will be installed, it will be required to use certain technologies (such as CHP or the use of 
waste heat) in accordance with Paragraph 2. and in order to ensure that these installations 
do not use more non-renewable primary energy than is necessary.
2. Regulations will establish maximum levels for the energy needs of buildings, where any 
excess energy requirements will have to be fulfilled through the erection installations using 
CHP or the use of waste heat. The regulations will make exceptions where these 
requirements are not attainable on technical or economic grounds.
3. The regulations will ensure that the installation of ventilation and air-conditioning 
systems in buildings is only permitted when deemed essential.
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Paragraph Twenty-Five. Regulations concerning the erection and operation of other types 
of installation.
1. The Berlin senate is empowered to legislate in order to ensure, as long as this does not 
contravene Federal legislation, that the erection and operation of other installations with 
significant energy requirements are in accordance with the furtherance of the aims and 
principles of the law, to the extent that the type and location of such installations make 
this possible.
2. Measures in accordance with Article 1. are in particular:
• (i)The reduction of the unnecessary use of User-energy.
• (ii)The reduction of User-energy requirements.
• (iii)The improvement of the degree of energy for end-use.
Paragraph Twenty-Six. Requirements on Declaration.
Businesses are required to declare the level of energy used by them and to what use this 
energy was put. The results are only to be used for the state Energy Programme, for 
statistical use and for measures to further this law. The regulations regarding Data 
Protection apply.
Paragraph Twenty-Seven. Application to Gas for Street Lighting.
The regulations regarding this law do not apply to gas-powered street lighting.
6.6. Regulations Regarding Fines
Paragraph Twenty-Eight. Infringement of Regulations.
1. It is an infringement of regulations for anyone to intentionally or accidentally
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(i) (In infringement of Paragraph Nine, Article 2) do not present an Energy Pass at
the closing of a contract.
(ii) (In infringement of paragraph Twenty-Two) newly install electrical heating.
• (iii) (In infringement of Article 26) fail to submit a declaration, submit a false
declaration, submit an incomplete declaration or a declaration at the wrong time.
• (iv) Defy a ruling in accordance with Paragraphs Twenty-Four and Twenty-Five. 
2. Infringements of regulations can incur fines of up to one hundred thousand Deutsche 
Marks.
6.7. Closing Regulations
Paragraph Twenty-Nine. Amendments to the Berlin Building Regulations.
Paragraph 56, Article 1 of the Berlin Building Regulations of 28 February 1985 (GVBI.
S.522), amended by law on 25 September 1990 (GVBI. S.2075). will be amended as
follows.
1. The new Number 37 will read:
"37. Solar panels and photosensitive installations in and on roofs and outer wall areas".
2. The former number 37. will become Number 38.
Paragraph Thirty. Coming into Force. This law comes into force one day after its
notification in the Berlin legal bulletins.
The above law is hereby announced.
The Governing Mayor: Ingrid Stahmer (Mayor).
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APPENDIX SEVEN: ELECTION RESULTS FOR 
LOWER SAXONY, 1947-1994.
Original data courtesy of Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim in co-operation with the 
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The John Hopkins University 
'Elections News' Website (http://www.klipsan.com/elecnews.htm)4
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7.1. Federal Elections In Lower Saxonv



























































































4During the compilation of these figures, the author noted that some of the numerical percentage totals do 
not add up to 100, due to the effect of'rounding up/down' totals to the nearest tenth of one percent. 
5 1949: of which DP 17.8; DRP 8.1; Zentrum 3.4; KPD 3.1; 1953: of which DP 11.9; GB BHE 10.8: 
DRP3.5; 1957: of which DP 11.4; GB/BHE 7.6; 1961: of which GDP(DP-BHE) 6.1; 1965: of which 
NPD2.5; 1969: of which NPD 4.6; 1990: of which REP 1.0; 1994: dof which REP 1.2: PDS 1.0. 
^Only one vote per voter in the 1949 election.
7.2. State Elections



























































































7.3. Distribution of Seats















































































7a) 1951: Niederdeutsche Union (DP/CDU); b) 1978: GLU; c) 1947: of which DP 17.9: KPD 5.6:
Zentrum 4.1; 1951: of which GB/BHE 14.9; SRP 11.0; Zentrum 3.3; 1955: of which DP 12.4: GB/BHE
11.0; DRP 3.8; 1959: of which DP 12.4; GB/BHE 8.3; DRP 3.6
8With the DP.
9 1947: davon DP 27; KPD 8; Zentrum 6; 1951: davon DRP 3; DSP 1: GB/BHE 21; KPD 2; SRP 16:
Zentrum 4; 1955: davon DP 19; GB/BHE 17; DRP 6; Zentrum 1; KPD 2; 1959: davon DP 20: GB BHE
13; 1967: NPD
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7.4. Government Composition in Lower Saxony. 1950-1995
1947. Following the elections of 20 April 1947, a coalition was formed consisting of the 
SPD, CDU, DP, FDP, Zentrum and KPD. The Minister President was Heinrich Wilhelm 
Kopf (SPD). From February 1948, a coalition consisting of the SPD, CDU, DP, FDP and 
Zentrum. From June 1948, a coalition of SPD, CDU and Zentrum. From August 1950, a 
coalition of SPD and Zentrum.
7957. Following the elections of 6 May 1951, a coalition was formed consisting of the 
SPD, BB/BHE and Zentrum. The Minister President was Heinrich Wilhelm Kopf (SPD). 
From December 1953, a coalition consisting of the SPD and GB/BHE.
7955. Following the elections of 24 April 1955, a coalition was formed consisting of the 
CDU, DP, FDP and GB/BHE. The Minister President was Heinrich Hellwege (DP). 
From November 1957, a coalition consisting of the SPD, CDU and DP.
7959. Following the elections of 19 April 1959, a coalition was formed consisting of the 
SPD, GB/BHE and FDP. The Minister President was Heinrich Wilhelm Kopf (SPD). 
From December 1961, the Minister President was Georg Diedrichs (SPD).
1963. Following the elections of 19 May 1963, a coalition was formed consisting of the 
SPD, and FDP. Minister President was Georg Diedrichs (SPD). From May 1965. 
coalition of the SPD and CDU.
1967. From 4 June 1967, coalition of the SPD and CDU. Minister President was Georg 
Diedrichs (SPD).
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1970. Following the elections of 14 June 1970, the SPD governed alone. Minister 
President was Alfred Kubel (SPD).
^. Following the elections of 9 June 1974, a coalition of the SPD and FDP. Minister 
President was Alfred Kubel (SPD). From January 1976, the Minister President was Ernst 
Albrecht (CDU). From Janauary 1977, the CDU governed alone. Minister President was 
Ernst Albrecht (CDU).
1978. Following the elections of 4 April 1978, the CDU governed alone. Minister 
President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU).
1982. Following the elections of 21 March 1982, the CDU governed alone. Minister 
President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU).
1986. Following the elections of 15 June 1986, a coalition of the CDU and FD. Minister 
President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU).
1990. Following the elections of 13 May 1990, a coalition of SPD and Griinen. Minister 
President was Gerhard Schroder (SPD).
1994. Following the elections of 13 March 1994, the SPD governed alone. Minister 
President was Gerhard Schroder (SPD).
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